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Originally posted by st3ve_o
Well that's really debatle especially since it uses an inferior mechanical radar rather than the much more advanced phased arrays, used on American ships.
It is still inferior to a Virginia class sub and probably a Seawolf Class.
niceone
is this your 'opinion' though or 'fact' - links please
Some people say it isn't Considering the Leopard 2 of CHallenger have never really seen combat, it's pretty silly to use inuendo.
iraq/afghanistan
Erm yes, tehy are, seems every second SAS trooper writes a book. However the best units ar ethose which keep a low profile. US Delta and SEALS are easily just as capable as the Brit SAS, although inferior to the Australian SASR.
oh yeah i forgot about 'the delta force', its not that low profile though because i'm sure i seen a film with chuck norris in
what you mean like all the rape storys you heard about american soilders did during the 'vitenam war?'
but yes we forgot how the old british empire burned people in churches and things like that, we've all seen hollywoods 'patriot'
LOL, you're lucky teh Argies dropped so many incorectly fused bombs on their A-4's otherwise half the British fleet would have been sunk. I think they had more strikes with dummy bombs than properly fused ones.
lady luck is always on our side my friend 'the sun never sets on britain' (still we did it in 6 weeks though)!!
what happened in vietnam though oh thats right, politics even though you dropped more explosives than the WHOLE of WW2 put together, americans like to put down the loss to vietnamese to politics
Originally posted by Daedalus3
1) The only thing partially common between kargil and 62' is the proximity of the terrain, even though the terrain is very different.
There were major considerations about crossing the border here and so bombing runs were not as optimal as they could have been.
The weaponry required to assure 100% dislodging/destruction of such fortifications would probably be only available with countries like the US
5)The role of the IAF in Kargil was pivotal in dislodging the militants from their perch.
So you're concluding that the amount of firepower deployable against PLA on a per soldier basis would have been much lesser in 62' than the korean war?
100000-500000 is a wild range. In 1950 Tibet was not even a part of China. It was annexed only in 1959.
By 1954, 222,000 members of the PLA were stationed in Tibet. In April 1956, the Chinese inaugurated the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART) in Lhasa, headed by the Dalai Lama and ostensibly convened to modernize the country and bring about democratic reforms.
Despite this and other successes, the US aid now served no serious purpose any more. By 1962, the Chinese have built a number of roads and airstrips, establishing strong lines of communications, which enabled them to deploy a large number of Army and PLAAF units in Tibet.
Initially, the US support had minimal effects on the war that raged through Tibet, and in which the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was meanwhile deploying at least two regiments of fighter-bombers to hit towns under guerrilla control. Exactly what types were deployed by the PLAAF in Tibet remains unknown, but various Tibetan sources indicate the use of Ilushin Il-10 fighter-bombers, Ilushin Il-28 and Tupolev Tu-4 bombers, as well as MiG-fighters (MiG-15s and MiG-17s). From few available reports, it is known that in October 1958, the Khampa guerrillas have shot down at least one Chinese aircraft on a bombing mission, and that this has had a crew of five, as well as a “turret with powerful machine guns” and internal bomb-carrying capability. This would indicate the use of some other type but the already mentioned. Certainly, the Il-28 was the preferred solution, then it had the range as well as good load capacity; but, it has never had a crew of five.
A long drawn out battle would've seen the PLA at major logistical debacle.
My pick is that it was a combination of the two.
Its hard for everybody to accept, except you.
All this would be inferior in capability to the same on the Indian side. That again is the basis for my reasoning behind why the PLA stopped its advance when it did.
Originally posted by Daedalus3
We're talking about 1962 and not 1992. You have no info on 1962.
According to the official Indian history of the war published by the MoD in 1992
No only the MiG -15s were in service at the time in question.
The MiG 17s or J-5s were available in few numbers and production only picked up in the late 60s.
No, I'm saying there wasn't any infrastructure to support the same, east of Xian esp in Tibet in 1962.
I can give you maps which show roads and rail routes upto all the fwd bases I've mentioned before. All this in 1962.
ALL of China? Even tibet? A region China had just waltzed into only a couple of years back?
Yeah.. they'd barely be able to make to the theatre before having to scurry back because of fuel shortages. Get real cw.
You'd need at leas 3 BIG or 5-6 small airfields to support that quantity you estimate.
I admit that the MiG 15 was comparable to the Gnat ,but its lacked a vital feature for mountainous warfare which as you mentioned was rate of climb.
Why attack? Why not let the people decide?
Ill pretty sure you know that the whole area gets covered by a layer of snow during winter?. You telling me how high the kargil war was fought yet you dont take into account that askin chin is the area which starts the decent down. It took chinese troops less than a week to go down the karakoram pass.
You do realise where the actual fighting took place dont you?. Chinese forces where already in askin chin and where moving out of the actual area. We even built a big highway right though askin chin without india even knowing about it. In three days the chinese infantry already reached Pangong Lake and Ladakh
You're thinking that chinese forces would need to go across askin chin and all that open space. But if you read some history you would have known that the chinese forces attacked from the Askin chin border
Why would there be need to cross the border during kargil?. I do not see the need to since you could just as easily have went parallel to the border instead of straight into it.
The indian airforce were unable to hit a fixed target already painted by infantry and which positions were already known, how are they going to be effective againest moving infantry on mountain passes. And yes they were mountain passes, karakoram pass was the first then saser pass. I hope you dont think the war was fought in a desolate landscape
The weaponry required to assure 100% dislodging/destruction of such fortifications would probably be only available with countries like the US
Even with LGBs the indian airforce only managed one hit on a large supply base, and that supply base had a large open top. They didn't need to dislodge the troops inside by themselves but shut off the bunker openings which they failed to do
yet my article tells otherwise, The article actually quotes a indian offier which took part in the conflict and was his professional opinion on the indian airforce. Whats the amount of time have to do with whether the indian airforce could hit a target or not?. Even if they were deployed that month eariler, they still would being missing the same targets they started off with.
The IAF had the main use of supplying the enemy and not much more. The indian infantry was the one which actually did all that work while the artillery was the one doing some accurate hits.
So you're concluding that the amount of firepower deployable against PLA on a per soldier basis would have been much lesser in 62' than the korean war?
Are we including artillery as well?. Because the amount of firepower the UN had dropped on PLA positions were alot more than what the indian forces could have managed (per soldier). Also come up with your korean war figures and i will come up with mine.
The FACT of the matter is.
* Chinese forces did not get halted by indian forces at any significant point
* When they called their advance off no indian forces could have opposed their advance if they choose to go on
* They controlled three times more area than they claimed
* And the fact that the PLA already built up a extensive supply line in tibet aready and had a active supply line working in tibet supplying roughly 100,000~500,000 troops already in tibet
Initially, the US support had minimal effects on the war that raged through Tibet, and in which the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was meanwhile deploying at least two regiments of fighter-bombers to hit towns under guerrilla control. Exactly what types were deployed by the PLAAF in Tibet remains unknown, but various Tibetan sources indicate the use of Ilushin Il-10 fighter-bombers, Ilushin Il-28 and Tupolev Tu-4 bombers, as well as MiG-fighters (MiG-15s and MiG-17s). From few available reports, it is known that in October 1958, the Khampa guerrillas have shot down at least one Chinese aircraft on a bombing mission, and that this has had a crew of five
Am i right in saying that during 1965 india only had a month left of supplies before the war actually finished and the only way india did win the war was because pakistan had a even smaller supply than india themselves. I think your asumtion should be the other way around. Chinese indsutry and logistics supply was indias senior by a long shot. Chinese forces were experienced in mountainous warfare and partipated in one of the largest wars ever againest the US which was at its prime
What wars had india been in?. Lost 1962, stalemate againest pakistani in 1965. How, according to you is india meant to wage a war if it has no experience espeically againest a enemy which has had experience and showed them where it counted in the actual war we are talking about
Originally posted by Daedalus3
Which whole area? The Indians didn't know about the highway because they didn't administer Aksai Chin.
In 1938, the Survey of India published a map of Tibet, which showed the Tawang tract as part of that country. Even the first edition of Jawaharlal Nehru's Discovery Of India showed the Indo-Tibetan boundary as running at the foot of the hills. The Tibetans did not accept this 'annexation' of the Tawang tract and challenged the British attempts to expand their government into this area.
I was talking about what routes any reinforcements would have to take.
* One armoured division or brigade
* Two to three infantry divisions or brigades
* An artillery division or brigade
* An air defence (SAM/AAA) brigade
* A communications regiment
* An engineer regiment
* A reconnaissance battalion (group)
* A pontoon bridge regiment (only in some GAs)
* A chemical defence regiment (only in some GAs)
* Other combat service support units such as medical and transportation
Fly parallel?Oh I guess they didn't think of that then!!
I prefer to stick to equipment and logistical analyses, which do NOT involve 'what ifs'.
Are you trying to say that all other LGBs employed went astray? What are you trying to say? More bombs missed than hit?
'The sincerity of the Indian Air Force to participate in Kashmir's campaign was in inverse proportion to their hit rates' said an Indian Army Officer in Dras. He said for nearly three weeks after the airstrikes began on May 26, its effectiveness was 'near negligible'. In addition to losing two MIG series of fighters and one MI-17 helicopter gunship on two successive days in an environment which the Indian Air Force monopolised, the Air Force simply failed in destroying Pakistani 'sangars' (rock bunkers) or dislodging the intruders in any significant way. 'They (Air Force) were more show than go', said one Indian Army Officer in Dras.
I could shove 10 articles down this thread which explain the problems caused by employing the IAF so late in Kargil.
What I'm trying to say is that the IAF helped a great deal in softening the targets which were so difficult to hit in the first place.
Why should I come up with ANY figures??!! You're the one making the claim. YOU back it up!!
Originally posted by Daedalus3
1) No. They held back at quite few locations but the PLA finally overran those positions after repeated attacks and a numerical superiority of 5:1.
But American and Soviet help was on the way or had already arrived... oh wait.. the PLA would've wasted them too right?
And so the logistical problem. The chinese had taken more than they could defend.
There were only 50000 involved in the war.period. Where was this 'acti linve' supplye?
So you're saying that the Aircraft used in battling dimunitve tibetian rebels would've sufficed against the IAF?
In the mountains? Sure they would've!! I forgot the IAF sucks and the PLAAF can appear anywhere miraculously and also fly in adverse conditions w/o any setbacks
Stalemate 65?!!!! According to whom?!!! Pakistan attacked first and we pushed em' back and even went as far as upto 10km from a major city!
"A situation in which further action is blocked; a deadlock."
Originally posted by Daedalus3
IT definitely wasn't as well supplied as the one in Korea and/or the one that skirmished with the soviets.
I am unaware of such figures. My sources put chinese troops involved in the war of 62 to more or less 50000.
I doesn't mean that India's on a war footing.Anyways the deployment employed in the build-up to 62 was a move to assert the Indian version of the border between the countries, not an act of war.
.
I thought the Allies and the British were the same thing.
The region wasn't administered. That doesn't mean you go and build a highway through it.
Wikipedia as a source for politically sensitive information?!! You should know better than that!
The boundaries of the MacMohan Line clearly demarcated all of the Tawang tract as a part of British India.
The tibetians had NO problem whatsoever with the Mac-Mohan Line or the fact that the Tawang tract was a part of British India. What's more they even rejected the tibetian ability to take a stance on such decisions without prior chinese consultation!
The Tibetans however, did not accept this “annexation” of the Tawang Tract and challenged the British attempts to expand their government into this area. They, however, tacitly accepted the rest of the McMahon demarcation
Suzerainty is a situation in which a region or people is a tributary to a more powerful entity which allows the tributary some limited domestic autonomy but controls its foreign affairs. The more powerful entity in the suzerainty relationship, or the head of state of that more powerful entity, is called a suzerain
Furthermore considering the fact that almost ALL of the Tibetian resistances,govts in exile and refugees now reside and operate from India itself
Just because I don't see eye to eye with chinese interpretations of the events that unfolded in 1962, doesn't mean I have a 'lack of knowledge'.
Originally posted by Daedalus3They see it as an objective attained(Aksai Chin) and a quick cessation of hostilities before the Americans and Soviets could get their hands into the situation.Now whether the cease fire offer by the chinese was presented before this pledge of force assistance by the US and/or USSR, is not clear.
The Sino-Soviet Split (Return to Index)
Many factors influenced Sino-Soviet involvement in the Vietnam War but no factor was as influential in their levels of involvement as dictated by their relationship towards one another. This above all things would serve to guide their actions in Indo-China.
Tensions between the two countries could be felt as early as 1956. Soviet intervention in Hungary was met with criticism by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. Perhaps the most estranging move between the two countries came at a poolside conference between Mao and Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev. The subject was the Communist attitude toward the west. As recorded in Krushchev's diary, Mao was recorded as saying,
Mao replied by trying to assure me that the atomic bomb itself was a paper tiger! "Listen Comrade Khrushchev, he said. "All you have to do is provoke the Americans into military action, and I'll give you as many divisions as you need to crush them-a hundred, two hundred, one thousand divisions." I tried to explain to him that one or two missiles (nuclear) could turn all the divisions in China to dust. But he wouldn't even listen to my arguments and obviously regarded me as a coward.
This incident itself left a permanent impression on Khrushchev. His relationship towards Chairman Mao had previously been one of high regard and admiration, but from this point on a distancing between the two can be felt. At the root of this separation was the issue of the U.S.
The Soviet attitude towards the United States was always one on a professional level. As is evident in Mao's comment above the, the People's Republic of China (PRC) held a more militant position than their neighboring communists. Khrushchev's attempts in the late '50s (1959) to coordinate efforts with the U.S. was met with more criticism from the Chinese Communists. His trip to Camp David was proof of this as Mao called Khrushchev's notion of peaceful co-existence a "bourgeois pacifist notion'. At about this time the split between the two countries was confirmed. It would mark the last time that leaders from either country would visit one another.
On another note, the Soviet Union never wished to engage the U.S. in armed conflict. It can even be surmised that relations with the U.S. were more revered than those with the Chinese. Whether or not this peculiarity was apparent in the early '50's it was certainly clear to the Chinese by the time that the Vietnam War came around. In support of this, "The Russians, while actually giving important military aid, have sought to avoid unduly provocative threats that might seriously damage their relations with Washington". The position that the Soviets took in 1958 with the Taiwan incident defends this statement. The Chinese had for some time been wanting to invade the island of Taiwan and crush the remaining Kuomintang, anti-Communist, pro-U.S., Chinese nationalists (KMT). When the Soviets were asked to back this incursion they declined. The Chinese were left to do it themselves and at the risk of provoking nuclear war with the U.S. they finally backed down. The refusal on the part of the Soviet Communists to support their comrade’s left the Chinese feeling alienated.
The Taiwan incident alone would serve to be one of the primary reasons for poor relations with the U.S. in the late 1950's, and the course of the 1960's. The Chinese understood the actions on the part of the Americans, via their military and political presence, to be a direct and intended threat to China. On this note, Premier of China, Chou En-lai stated,
It is the imperialist policy of the U.S Government, and not merely the fact that U.S. troops have invaded and occupied China's Taiwan, that has put the U.S. Government in the position of being the enemy of these peoples. The invasion and occupation of Taiwan can only make the U.S. the enemy of the Chinese people.
This excerpt from an interview in 1960 between Edgar Snow and Premier En-lai marks the Chinese attitude towards the United States. It's significance becomes critical when taking into account Soviet-American relations, and the repercussions those alliances would have on the PRC.
Feelings between the two further deteriorated with Chinese actions against India in 1962. For some time the frontier disputes between China and India had gone unabated. The situation reached critical when the Chinese invaded India causing a rebuttal from the U.S. Again the Soviets refused to support or defend the actions of the Chinese. From the Soviet point of view this was again an attempt to devaluate the importance of Khrushchev's attempts at peaceful co-existence. Whether or not the Soviet government secretly advocated the Chinese invasion was insignificant. The conditions of the time prevented them from acting. As summarized by one historian, "Soviet power is not unlimited, and the USSR cannot challenge the U.S. to a nuclear duel for the sake of other socialist countries."
The Chinese Communists marked the exact opposite of the Soviets dealing with the 'Imperialists' of the west. For example, "In contrast, loud threats and temperate actions came to symbolize the Chinese posture in the Vietnam conflict." For Mao and the Chinese Communists the war against the Americans was an ideological one,
It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying, "Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind." I believe it is the characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.
The specifics of each other's foreign policies would be decisive in determining how much aid or pledged support would be given to the communists in North Vietnam. In turn their ideologies would serve to respectively draw them into the conflict in Indo-China. For these reasons and more to come the Chinese and the Soviets would resort to differing levels of involvement in accordance to their relations with the Vietnamese, Americans, and one another.
Originally posted by Daedalus3
Not worth replying to anymore. Also I don't have the time like you seem to.
Firstly, you're pin-pointing the Kargil TOWN not the areas of conflict.
Will you ever here a squeal of a similar kind EVER come from countries like China or even Pakistan??
And as for your claims of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 60s:p
Note the article states 'China invaded India'. Hence my point: the majority feel that China invaded India, irrespective of your chinese twists to historical documents.
Anyways, enough about The historical bickerings of 62.
Any criticism of the chinese military by the chinese media would be a big surprise
Is it because the chinese military is devoid of any mlapractices? Yeah.. you wish
BEIJING (AFP) - The deputy commander of China's navy has been sacked for abuse of power, corruption and "economic crimes" after his mistress reported his activities to authorities.
Wang Shouye, 62, has been stripped of his post as deputy commander of the People's Liberation Army navy as well as being forced to resign as a member of China's parliament, Xinhua news agency said.
Xinhua said the action was taken after an young unmarried woman reported to authorities on Wang's "problems" and admitted she had been in an "improper relationship" with him for a long time.
The People's Liberation Army ordered that disciplinary measures be taken against Wang in January this year, according to documents submitted to the National People's Congress, China's parliament, cited by Xinhua.