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History is told by the winners. Also, the first casualty of war is the truth.
Originally posted by Oatmeal
It is honorable to save hundreds of thousands of lives by dropping just two bombs. President Truman made the right choice.
America's leaders understood Japan's desperate position: the Japanese were willing to end the war on any terms, as long as the Emperor was not molested. If the US leadership had not insisted on unconditional surrender -- that is, if they had made clear a willingness to permit the Emperor to remain in place -- the Japanese very likely would have surrendered immediately, thus saving many thousands of lives.
It's weird, I didn't see this displayed in any of the MSM
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." -- George Santyana
Originally posted by silo13
Thanks for your post - I appreciate and respect your view, and your respectful way of delivering it.
peace
Originally posted by carnival_of_souls2047
TruthParadox, it should go without saying that I don't consider children or other innocents to be the enemy and my heart as a human being goes out to those who perished in this massive conflict wether it be man, woman or child.
Originally posted by carnival_of_souls2047
By the same token, you should feel some level of sympathy for the men, women, and children who were killed, tortured, or maimed due to an unprovoked attack by an enemy that considered us a subhuman race.
Originally posted by carnival_of_souls2047
When I mentioned the Japanese concentration camps from my earlier post I was speaking from personal knowledge. My brother-in-law, Peter, (who is dutch) was a small boy when he was imprisoned in Indonesia along with his mother and 2 sisters (one of whom was only 6 months old) by the japanese.
Young Peter, his two sisters, and their mother lanquished in that camp for 2 years where they had witnessed horrors you couldn't possibly imagine by their hosts. One horrible day his mother witnessed the hanging of 6 year old boy to serve as a lesson to his mother for some imaginary transgression (she probably tried to steal food for her babies).
They would have died there if Japan was not forced into surrendering in the final days. They spent an entire year in a hospital after those events but they survived.
1b.) Profanity: You will not use profanity in our forums, and will neither post with language or content that is obscene
In the meantime, the Japanese government was attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to mediate a peace for Japan that would not be unconditional.
This was in response to the Emperor's request at a Big Six meeting on June 22, 1945 to seek peace thru the Soviets, who were the only major member of the Allies that had a neutrality pact with Japan at the time (Butow, pg. 118-120).
Unfortunately for all concerned, Japan's leaders were divided over precisely what terms should be sought to end the war, with the Japanese military leaders still wishing to avoid anything that the Allies would have considered a clear "surrender".
Having broken the code Japan used for transmitting messages, the U.S. was able to follow Japan's efforts to end the war as it intercepted the messages between Foreign Minister Togo and Japan's Ambassador to Moscow Sato. The messages were sent as the result of the June 22, 1945 Japanese Cabinet meeting. The conditions under which Japan was willing to surrender were not clearly spelled out in the messages, aside from a willingness to give up territory occupied during the war and a repeated rejection of "unconditional surrender".
July 1945 - Japan's peace messages
Still, the messages from Togo to Sato, read by the U.S. at the time, clearly indicated that Japan was seeking to end the war:
· July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war".
· July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war".
· July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see: U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
· July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
· July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
· July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
· July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
President Truman knew of the messages' content, noting, for instance, in his diary on July 18, "Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of telegram from Jap [sic] Emperor asking for peace" (Robert Ferrell, ed., Off the Record - the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, pg. 53).
Originally posted by Exuberant1
reply to post by chiron613
It is a good thing that the Nazis did not share your sentiments with regards to the use of weapons of Mass Destruction.
The Germans could have used all of the excuses that you just gave to justify the use of Chemical weapons against England to "end the war fast, to save lives".
Imagine is V-1 and V-2 bombs had been equipped with Nerve agents or radiation bombs (dirty bombs)..... Your arguments could be used to justify that. Thankfully the Germans did not use these War-Decisive weapons.
The Germans could have made hundreds of radiation bombs with the amount of Uranium-234 that they had - enough to wipe out England and end the War with the British Empire.
They even sent some to the Japanese:
"The Uranium carried by U-234 was enough to make two atomic bombs, to blow up two American cities -- 1,235 pounds of 77 percent pure uranium oxide -- unusable by the destroyed Nazi hopes, it was destined for the Japanese atomic bomb program. The U-234 executive officer supervised the opening of the containers in Washington, DC, and reports he was told that one of the Americans was Oppenheimer. It is generally believed the the uranium was taken over by the Manhattan project, but its ultimate use, if any, is lost in secrecy. It was most certainly sent to Oak Ridge, but there was probably not enough time for it to have been processed and used in the two WW2 weapons."
-www.ww2pacific.com...
*A u-boat called U-234 which was carrying U-234....
[edit on 7-8-2009 by Exuberant1]
From what I've read, Japan was willing to discuss surrender terms months before the bombings.
The surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought World War II to a close. By August 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy effectively ceased to exist, and an Allied invasion of Japan was imminent. While publicly stating their intent to fight on to the bitter end, Japan's leaders at the Supreme War Council (the "Big Six") were privately making entreaties to the Soviet Union to mediate peace on terms favorable to the Japanese. The Soviets, meanwhile, were preparing to attack the Japanese, in fulfillment of their promise to the Americans and the British made at the Yalta Conference.
The reason we hit Nagasaki was to convince them we had more than one bomb because their scientists knew creating the bomb would be difficult and limiting. Even after Nagasaki, another six days went by before the surrender. Why? We have learned since that their military leaders tried to convince the Emperor and Japan's civilian leaders to fight to the bitter end. The battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa demonstrated this attitude. When we invaded Okinawa, the island contained 117,000 defending troops. Before its final capture, 114,000 of them had died (according to U.S. Army reports, as many as 140,000 civilians also died during the three-month battle). To surrender was a disgrace to them; and the closer we got to Japan itself, the harder they fought.
The atomic bomb was dropped on August 6. It was not until President Truman addressed his nation the next day that the leaders in Tokyo understood what had happened. They were assured there was not enough uranium in the world to allow a repeat an atomic attack and that wearing white clothing would defeat the bomb. On 9 August, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow was told of the repudiation of the existing treaty as a means to bring peace nearer and at the request of its allies, a state of war existed. Two hours later, Soviet troops attacked the hollow shell of the remaining Japanese troops in Manchuria. The cabinet meeting over the night of 9-10 August was deadlocked with six in favor of surrender under certain conditions, three to fight on until after the final battle had shown Japan's will, and with five neutral members. Issues discussed that night were: that the Emperor must remain; that Japan must disarm her own troops and not surrender arms to a foreign power; and that Japan must try her own war criminals. Word came during the meeting that a second city had been destroyed by atomic attack. The meeting was moved to an audience with the Emperor who listened to the arguments on both sides and concluded that the time had come to "bear the unbearable". The Emperor had no direct authority other than the loyalty of those who would listen to him. A diplomatic message was drafted to the Allies describing Japan's conditions of accepting the Potsdam proclamation. The army felt that the troops must be keep fighting until the terms were formally agreed and broadcast this announcement : "We shall fight on to the bitter end, ever firm in our faith that we shall find life in death . . . and surge forward to destroy the arrogant enemy." The peace side decided to counteract the martial effect of that news release with an announcement of their own. This was for several reasons. The government sponsored news agency was in Morse code only and not covered by military censorship; it would speed the receipt of the Japanese offer going through diplomatic channels and could possibly postpone destruction of another city; and it was hoped that rejoicing created among the allies by an end to the war would make them unable to reject Japan's counter offer. On the morning of the 11th, the army was furious, but did not resort to violence. That evening the Emperor agreed to broadcast to the nation on acceptance of the offer.
The Japanese military leaders were not considering surrender. They were preparing a last-ditch defense of the home islands using old women and children with rocks and clubs if necessary. Only when they realized that the US had the capability of totally annihilating their culture with the atomic bomb (they didn't know we only had two) did they consider surrendering, and even then some of the leaders tried to prevent the Emperor�s surrender message from getting to the US.
The government of Japan was under the military rule of Hideki Tojo, nicknamed the "Razor." He was a high-ranking general in the Imperial Japanese Army, but acted as Prime Minster for most of the war. Above Tojo was the Emperor of Japan, Hirohito. The Emperor was not interested in continuing the war and asked Tojo to end it. Many high-ranking Japanese government officials did not wish to "lose face" to the Americans. The Code of Bushido did not allow for surrender, and they preferred the nation die in battle without shame. Tojo also tried to negotiate a separate deal from the Soviet Union, but it did not respond to the Japanese requests. The Japanese were unaware that the Americans had broken their military codes. The United States was able to read all of their military and diplomatic messages. This meant that the United States knew exactly what was going on, including the military decisions being made by the Japanese government. It became clear to the United States that Japan was not going to surrender, and would have to be invaded with ground forces.
May 31
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reports on receiving a Japanese peace feeler through a Japanese diplomat stationed in Portugal. The Japanese diplomat says that the actual terms are unimportant so long as the term "unconditional surrender" is not used.
It seems we could have negotiated. Their primary concern was the removal of their emperor, which never happened in the end anyway. If there had been more talk, there's a very good chance it could have been avoided.
The Potsdam Proclamation had called for "Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers" (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1475). On the 13th, the Supreme Council For the Direction of the War (known as the "Big 6") met to address the Potsdam Proclamation's call for surrender. Three members of the Big 6 favored immediate surrender; but the other three - (War Minister Anami, Army Chief of Staff Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda - adamantly refused. The meeting adjourned in a deadlock, with no decision to surrender (Butow, pg. 200-202). Later that day the Japanese Cabinet met. It was only this body - not the Big 6, not even the Emperor - that could rule as to whether Japan would surrender. And a unanimous decision was required (Butow, pg. 176-177, 208(43n)). But again War Minister Anami led the opponents of surrender, resulting in a vote of 12 in favor of surrender, 3 against, and 1 undecided. The key concern for the Japanese military was loss of honor, not Japan's destruction. Having failed to reach a decision to surrender, the Cabinet adjourned (Sigal, pg. 265-267).
President Truman wanted to issue a letter of warning giving an opportunity to surrender before using the atomic bomb. The letter warned the Japanese government that if they did not surrender completely, Japan would suffer "complete and utter destruction." The Japanese did not reply to the official letter, but the Americans knew the answer by reading the coded messages. Japan intended to fight to the death.
There it is! The smoking gun! But it is nothing of the sort. The message Truman cited did not refer to anything even remotely resembling surrender. It referred instead to the Japanese foreign office's attempt (under the suspicious eyes of the military) to persuade the Soviet Union to broker a negotiated peace that would have permitted the Japanese to retain their prewar empire and their imperial system (not just the emperor) intact. No American president could have accepted such a settlement, as it would have meant abandoning the United States' most basic war aims.
From the replies these diplomats received from Tokyo, the United States learned that anything Japan might agree to would not be a surrender so much as a "negotiated peace" involving numerous conditions. These conditions probably would require, at a minimum, that the Japanese home islands remain unoccupied by foreign forces and even allow Japan to retain some of its wartime conquests in East Asia. Many within the Japanese government were extremely reluctant to discuss any concessions, which would mean that a "negotiated peace" to them would only amount to little more than a truce where the Allies agreed to stop attacking Japan. After twelve years of Japanese military aggression against China and over three and one-half years of war with the United States (begun with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor), American leaders were reluctant to accept anything less than a complete Japanese surrender.
Originally posted by Oatmeal
Japan was given opportunities to surrender, but refused...
May 28
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy argues to Secretary of War Stimson that the term "unconditional surrender" should be dropped: "Unconditional surrender is a phrase which means loss of face and I wonder whether we cannot accomplish everything we want to accomplish in regard to Japan without the use of that term."
May 28
In a State Department Memorandum of Conversation, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew describes a meeting with President Truman that day. Grew writes: "The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne. If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they themselves, when once thoroughly defeated and rendered impotent to wage war in the future will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely."
From what I've read, Japan was willing to discuss surrender terms months before the bombings.
Had the terms been slightly altered by means of negotiation, they would have been far more likely to accept.
From the replies these diplomats received from Tokyo, the United States learned that anything Japan might agree to would not be a surrender so much as a "negotiated peace" involving numerous conditions. These conditions probably would require, at a minimum, that the Japanese home islands remain unoccupied by foreign forces and even allow Japan to retain some of its wartime conquests in East Asia. Many within the Japanese government were extremely reluctant to discuss any concessions, which would mean that a "negotiated peace" to them would only amount to little more than a truce where the Allies agreed to stop attacking Japan. After twelve years of Japanese military aggression against China and over three and one-half years of war with the United States (begun with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor), American leaders were reluctant to accept anything less than a complete Japanese surrender.
One might think that compelling substantiation would be necessary to support such a monstrous charge, but the revisionists have been unable to provide a single example from Japanese sources. What they have done instead amounts to a variation on the old shell game. They state in their own prose that the Japanese were trying to surrender without citing any evidence and, to show that Truman was aware of their efforts, cite his diary entry of July 18 [1945] referring to a "telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace." There it is! The smoking gun! But it is nothing of the sort. The message Truman cited did not refer to anything even remotely resembling surrender. It referred instead to the Japanese foreign office's attempt (under the suspicious eyes of the military) to persuade the Soviet Union to broker a negotiated peace that would have permitted the Japanese to retain their prewar empire and their imperial system (not just the emperor) intact. No American president could have accepted such a settlement, as it would have meant abandoning the United States' most basic war aims.