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I'm well aware of Barry Jennings. His story has been dissected countless times over this last decade. The facts in his story only line up when one considers where he was in the building at each point in his story. The part where the building "explodes" and he gets trapped temporarily is a part where he is on the stairway in the corner of the building, right next to where there is documented damage from the collapse of Tower 1. Tower 2's collapse threw out the power, which is why he had to use the stairs in the first place, remember? Now, that's about as compressed as I can make the analysis. Just do a Google search on it if you want more detail.
Originally posted by vipertech0596
reply to post by de_Genova
Hehehehe......reading anyGOVERNMENT
documents about the event is participating in one's own ignorance. So, umm, one should read an engineering document written by an Astrology tester or a water lab technician????
posted on 17-9-2012 @ 08:28 AM this post
Reading the 9/11 Commission report or anything from NIST and/or FEMA means that the readers are actually participating in their own ignorance regarding matters 9/11 - the effect of which is to involve themselves in their own destruction as a culture - or as a healthy and functioning society.
Originally posted by thedman
reply to post by totallackey
Read the NIST Report, Chapter 2.2.2. There was no 20 STORY HOLE IN THE BUILDING!!!
The FDNY men who were there say different
sites.google.com...
9-11 Attack in New York
At about 9:00 a.m., Chief of Department Ganci took over as Incident Commander (IC), but for the FDNY alone. Incident Command doctrine calls for the IC to have authority over all responding organizations, with deputies handling the specific operations of specialized agencies and units. Ganci moved the Incident Command Post from the lobby of WTC 1 to a spot across West Street, an eight-lane highway, because of falling debris and other safety concerns. Various witnesses say that the leadership considered partial collapses, but total building failure was not discussed
Distortion of Fact, by Andrew Burfield
A number of things are immediately apparent from this statement. Firstly, he doesn’t say they were told either building was going to suffer a total collapse. Some firefighters reported that they felt a partial collapse of the upper floors was likely in a few hours.
FDNY Fire Operations response on September 11
At approximately 9:00 a.m., the Incident Commander moved the Incident Command Post from the lobby of WTC 1 to the far side of West Street (an eight lane highway) opposite WTC 1, because of the increasing risk from falling debris within and around the lobby and other safety concerns. Chief officers considered a limited, localized collapse of the towers possible, but did not think that they would collapse entirely.
9.1 PREPAREDNESS AS OF SEPTEMBER 11
The specifics of the mission were harder to determine, as they had almost no information about the situation 80 or more stories above them.They also received advice from senior FDNY chiefs that while the building might eventually suffer a partial collapse on upper floors, such structural failure was not imminent. No one anticipated the possibility of a total collapse.59
When the South Tower collapsed,firefighters on upper floors of the North Tower heard a violent roar, and many were knocked off their feet; they saw debris coming up the stairs and observed that the power was lost and emergency lights activated. Nevertheless, those firefighters not standing near windows facing south had no way of knowing that the South Tower had collapsed; many surmised that a bomb had exploded, or that the North Tower had suffered a partial collapse on its upper floors.160
Staff Statement No. 14
Crisis Management
The best estimate of one senior chief, provided to the Chief of the Department sometime between 9:25 and 9:45 a.m., was that there might be a danger of collapse in a few hours, and therefore units probably should not ascend above floors in the sixties. We did not see any evidence that this assessment had any impact on operations before the collapse of the South Tower effectively disabled every FDNY command post. Even after the South Tower collapsed, another senior chief reportedly thought that the North Tower would not collapse because its corner frame had not been struck.
NYPD aviation did not foresee the collapse of the South Tower, though at 9:55 a.m., four minutes before the collapse, a helicopter pilot radioed that a large piece of the South Tower looked like it was about to fall. Immediately after the collapse of the South Tower, a helicopter pilot radioed that news. This transmission was followed by others, beginning at 10:08 a.m., warning that the North Tower might collapse, beginning at 10:08, 18 minutes before the building fell. These calls reinforced the urgency of the NYPD’s evacuation of the area.
Deputy Chief Nick Visconti
I was getting some resistance. The common thing was, hey, we’ve still got people here, we don’t want to leave. I explained to them that we were worried about 7, that it was going to come down and we didn’t want to get anybody trapped in the collapse. One comment was, oh, that building is never coming down, that didn’t get hit by a plane, why isn’t somebody in there putting the fire out? A lot of comments, a bit of resistance, understandable resistance.
So when I get to the command post, they just had a flood of guys standing there. They were just waiting for 7 to come down. ... I made it down Vesey Street to just in front of the overpass of 7 World Trade. People were saying don't stand under there, it's going to come down. ... So at that point we were a little leery about how the bridge was tied in, so no one was really going onto it, and then they were also saying 7 was going to come down. They chased everyone off the block.
...
That was the only Mayday that I remember, and to tell you the truth, the only guy that really stands out in my mind that I remember being on the radio was Chief Visconti. ... I remember him screaming about 7, No. 7, that they wanted everybody away from 7 because 7 was definitely going to collapse, they don't know when, but it's definitely going to come down, just get the hell out of the way, everybody get away from it, make sure you're away from it, that's an order, you know, stuff like that.
...
We no sooner got going on something there when a chief came along and said, 'Everybody's got to leave the area. We're afraid that Seven World Trade is going to fall down.' The whole south side of Seven World Trade had been hit by the collapse of the second Tower, and there was fire on every floor.
But they also thought that it would collapse. That's why they set up the collapse perimeter 2 hours before it came down. Have you read the link in my signature?
Sure, they never used the words, "complete collapse," but do they really need to?
Firstly, he doesn’t say they were told either building was going to suffer a total collapse. Some firefighters reported that they felt a partial collapse of the upper floors was likely in a few hours.
Why do you keep repeating the same thing over and over again....?
Collapse perimeters were set up around many buildings because pieces were falling off. Somebody From OEM passed down the information that number 7 was coming down but none of the firemen thought it was going to happen and that's why Chief Visconti was getting a lot of resistance when he was told to get everybody out of there. Did you read what I posted for the tenth time already?
FDNY Assistant Chief Joseph Callan: "Approximately 40 minutes after I arrived in the lobby, I made a decision that the building was no longer safe. And that was based on the conditions in the lobby, large pieces of plaster falling, all the 20 foot high glass panels on the exterior of the lobby were breaking. There was obvious movement of the building, and that was the reason on the handy talky I gave the order for all Fire Department units to leave the north tower." Source
Callan: "For me to make the decision to take our firefighters out of the building with civilians still in it, that was very tough for me, but I did that because I did not think the building was safe any longer, and that was just prior to 9:30."–Source
EMS Division Chief John Peruggia: "I was in a discussion with Mr. Rotanz and I believe it was a representative from the Department of Buildings, but I'm not sure. Some engineer type person, and several of us were huddled talking in the lobby and it was brought to my attention, it was believed that the structural damage that was suffered to the towers was quite significant and they were very confident that the building's stability was compromised and they felt that the north tower was in danger of a near imminent collapse.
I grabbed EMT Zarrillo, I advised him of that information. I told him he was to proceed immediately to the command post where Chief Ganci was located. Told him where it was across the street from number 1 World Trade Center. I told him "You see Chief Ganci and Chief Ganci only. Provide him with the information that the building integrity is severely compromised and they believe the building is in danger of imminent collapse." So, he left off in that direction."
.
You say that a complete collapse of 7 never crossed their minds. Then you post quotes from Nick Visconti saying he was worried that 7 was going to collapse. Interesting.
Just before 10:00 am FDNY EMS Chief John Peruggia received information from engineer that building was becoming unstable
Some engineer type person, and several of us were huddled talking in the lobby and it was brought to my attention, it was believed that the structural damage that was suffered to the towers was quite significant and they were very confident that the building's stability was compromised and they felt that the north tower was in danger of a near imminent collapse.