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The Indian AF beats the USAF: Not ! The Real Story Behind The Cope India Exersize
page: 5share:
Originally posted by Russian
What you are posting is an excuse. Also Mig-21s even if upgraded alot are stil old and cant and will not fight the newer aircrafts.
Just what do you mean by that? "will not fight the newer aircrafts"
I HOPE you mean that it was GOOD that they WERE able to take on the F-15s and not anything else.
Also I dont think you lot should should doubt Russian Prowess in air combat tactics. After Cope India whatever anybody says, uneven or not, its evident that Indians are good in the air with whatever they fly, Jaguars, MiGs and Su's. And we Indians im sure are more than willing to exchange knowledge on that with our ruskie comrades! After all aint that what friends are for ?!
[edit on 19-10-2004 by Daedalus3]
Lots of speculation here, the Mig 21's didn't fight the Eagles, they flew escort for the Mig-27's which were designated as the strike AC.
Anyway,here is the unclassified summary on Cope India. Draw your own conclusions:
USAF:
4 x F-15 (APG-63(v)1 [not AESA])
semi-active radar missiles with much less range than AIM-7M/P Sparrows (apparently a sort of simulated AA-10a or AIM-7F)
IAF:
Certainly at least 4, probably 6 or 8 Su-30MK1 and M2000
AA-12 and MICA active radar missiles
GCI (pretending to be an AWACS)
October 6, 2004: More details have come out about the "losing" performance of U.S. F-15Cs (from the Alaska-based 3rd Wing) against India's air force in the Cope India air-to-air combat exercise earlier this year. The Air Force and some members of Congress have used the "failure" to justify the need for new F/A-22 and F-35 fighters. Some are calling the results a demonstrated weakening of American air combat capabilities
Two factors have been cited as major reasons why the 3rd Wing took a drubbing. None of the participating American aircraft had the latest long-range AESA radars, although some of the F-15Cs of the Wing had this equipment. A decision had been made beforehand not to send the AESA equipped planes to India due to the additional maintenance package required to support them. A total of six F-15Cs were sent to India, each equipped with a fighter data link, short-range AIM-9X heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, and the U.S.'s helmet-mounted cueing system.
Secondly, at India's request, the U.S. agreed to mock combat at 3-to-1 odds and without the full range of capabilities of simulated long-range radar-guided AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. U.S. fighters could not use the active on-board radar capability of the AMRAAM, and the missile was limited to around 32 kilometers range and required the use of the F-15C's onboard radar to target Indian aircraft. In standard use, AMRAAM has a range of over 100 kilometers and is a fire-and-forget missile that doesn't require additional guidance from the F-15. Practiced tactics by the F-15 crews mix two AESA-equipped F-15Cs with two stock aircraft. The AESA aircraft take long-range missile shots to thin out and disrupt the formation of a numerically superior force before the two sides close up for closer fighting.
The F-15s flew in groups of 4 against packages of 12 Indian Air Force aircraft consisting of a mix of Mirage 2000, Su-30, Mig-21, and Mig-27 aircraft. The Mirage and Su-30 aircraft were used in the air-to-air role, while the Mig-27 was used as the strike aircraft with the Mig-21 providing escort to the Mig-27s. The Indians also had a simulated AWACS platform and the use of simulated active radar missiles such as the AA-12 and the French Mica, unlike the F-15Cs. This gave the Indian Air Force a fire-and-forget air-to-air missile capability that the U.S. fighters didn't have, a heavily unrealistic assumption in actual hostilities.
However, the U.S. pilots admitted that they did have problems with the simulated active missile threat and don't normally train against launch-and-leave threats. They also admit they underestimated the training and tactics of the Indian pilots. Indian air force planners never repeated failed tactics and were able to change tactics as opportunities became available, mixing things up and never providing the same tactical "look." Some of the Indian aircraft radars had different characteristics than U.S. pilots had seen on stock versions of the aircraft, including some of the Mirage 2000s.
I will see what I can dig up on Cope Thunder for the poster who asked about that earlier.
Cheers.
USAF:
4 x F-15 (APG-63(v)1 [not AESA])
semi-active radar missiles with much less range than AIM-7M/P Sparrows (apparently a sort of simulated AA-10a or AIM-7F)
IAF:
Certainly at least 4, probably 6 or 8 Su-30MK1 and M2000
AA-12 and MICA active radar missiles
GCI (pretending to be an AWACS)
October 6, 2004: More details have come out about the "losing" performance of U.S. F-15Cs (from the Alaska-based 3rd Wing) against India's air force in the Cope India air-to-air combat exercise earlier this year. The Air Force and some members of Congress have used the "failure" to justify the need for new F/A-22 and F-35 fighters. Some are calling the results a demonstrated weakening of American air combat capabilities
Two factors have been cited as major reasons why the 3rd Wing took a drubbing. None of the participating American aircraft had the latest long-range AESA radars, although some of the F-15Cs of the Wing had this equipment. A decision had been made beforehand not to send the AESA equipped planes to India due to the additional maintenance package required to support them. A total of six F-15Cs were sent to India, each equipped with a fighter data link, short-range AIM-9X heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, and the U.S.'s helmet-mounted cueing system.
Secondly, at India's request, the U.S. agreed to mock combat at 3-to-1 odds and without the full range of capabilities of simulated long-range radar-guided AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. U.S. fighters could not use the active on-board radar capability of the AMRAAM, and the missile was limited to around 32 kilometers range and required the use of the F-15C's onboard radar to target Indian aircraft. In standard use, AMRAAM has a range of over 100 kilometers and is a fire-and-forget missile that doesn't require additional guidance from the F-15. Practiced tactics by the F-15 crews mix two AESA-equipped F-15Cs with two stock aircraft. The AESA aircraft take long-range missile shots to thin out and disrupt the formation of a numerically superior force before the two sides close up for closer fighting.
The F-15s flew in groups of 4 against packages of 12 Indian Air Force aircraft consisting of a mix of Mirage 2000, Su-30, Mig-21, and Mig-27 aircraft. The Mirage and Su-30 aircraft were used in the air-to-air role, while the Mig-27 was used as the strike aircraft with the Mig-21 providing escort to the Mig-27s. The Indians also had a simulated AWACS platform and the use of simulated active radar missiles such as the AA-12 and the French Mica, unlike the F-15Cs. This gave the Indian Air Force a fire-and-forget air-to-air missile capability that the U.S. fighters didn't have, a heavily unrealistic assumption in actual hostilities.
However, the U.S. pilots admitted that they did have problems with the simulated active missile threat and don't normally train against launch-and-leave threats. They also admit they underestimated the training and tactics of the Indian pilots. Indian air force planners never repeated failed tactics and were able to change tactics as opportunities became available, mixing things up and never providing the same tactical "look." Some of the Indian aircraft radars had different characteristics than U.S. pilots had seen on stock versions of the aircraft, including some of the Mirage 2000s.
I will see what I can dig up on Cope Thunder for the poster who asked about that earlier.
Cheers.
I'll answer like this: You can read about it in Aviation Week & Space Technology 10/04/2004.
You can see parts of the article here:
www.freerepublic.com...
[edit on 20-10-2004 by engineer]
[edit on 20-10-2004 by engineer]
You can see parts of the article here:
www.freerepublic.com...
[edit on 20-10-2004 by engineer]
[edit on 20-10-2004 by engineer]
Check ou this article from "Inside the Air Force" mag with the usaf admitting their loss to the IAF and that the need for the f-22 is urgently
felt, they also comended indian pilots
USAF: Indian Exercises Showed Need For F/A-22, Changes In Training
There are alos cool pics of F-15 dogfighting a Su-30K, F-15 going against mirages and Mig-21's
USAF: Indian Exercises Showed Need For F/A-22, Changes In Training
There are alos cool pics of F-15 dogfighting a Su-30K, F-15 going against mirages and Mig-21's
Everyone can find something to support themselfs! The media can write anything!
In terms of target designation angles, maneuverability, etc., the R-73E close-range air-to-air missile in service with the Su-30MKI significantly outperforms similar foreign missiles and is rightly considered the world�s best in its class. The high energy and ballistic parameters of the Su-30MKI�s long-range air-to-air missiles, combined with the capability of its radar, allow it to deliver preventive strikes against aerial targets, including its potential rivals.
Fitted with 12 weapon stores, carrying a full complement of air-to-air missiles and featuring a multichannel target engagement capability, the Su-30MKI fighter can be effectively used to repulse a massive air raid.
The Su-30MKI has a twofold advantage over the F-16 aircraft in the number of simultaneously carried air-to-ground guided weapons, which are also more efficient. High-power guided weapons carried by the Su-30MKI enable it to defeat deeply buried, hardened and superhardened priority targets. The Su-30MKI�s medium-range guided missile can be launched at stand-off ranges. The F-18E/F fighter is expected to be armed with similar missiles after 2005. It will be also equipped with air-to-surface missiles guided by a satellite navigation system, although export deliveries of these aircraft are unlikely in the near future.
Antiradar and antiship missiles in service with the Su-30MKI fighter excel their foreign couterparts in their mean speed.The Su-30MKI�s gun features higher accuracy and better armor piercing capability against lightly armored vehicles. Owing to its unique features which favorably distinguish it from foreign counterparts, the Su-30MKI is rightly considered one of the best multirole fighters at the beginning of the 21st century.
Aircraft combat capabilities are usually assessed using complex efficiency indicators defining aircraft overall performance. According to preliminary estimates, in long-range air combat, the Su-30MKI outperforms the F-16C Block 60, F-16C Block 50 and F-18E/F aircraft by 15, 20 and 12-15 percent, respectively, owing to its radar�s greater detection range, higher jamming immunity and multichannel capability, as well as better maneuverability.
he Su-30MKI�s supermaneuverability and better air-to-air missiles give this aircraft superiority in close air combat in which it excels the F-16C Block 50 by 10-15 percent, F-16C Block 60 by 20-30 percent (as the high wing loading significantly limits its maneuverability in close-range combat), and F-18E/F by 15-20 percent.
(edit to add link to source)
vayu-sena.tripod.com...
(please try to remember to link to the source of your quoted text )
[edit on 22-10-2004 by pantha]
In terms of target designation angles, maneuverability, etc., the R-73E close-range air-to-air missile in service with the Su-30MKI significantly outperforms similar foreign missiles and is rightly considered the world�s best in its class. The high energy and ballistic parameters of the Su-30MKI�s long-range air-to-air missiles, combined with the capability of its radar, allow it to deliver preventive strikes against aerial targets, including its potential rivals.
Fitted with 12 weapon stores, carrying a full complement of air-to-air missiles and featuring a multichannel target engagement capability, the Su-30MKI fighter can be effectively used to repulse a massive air raid.
The Su-30MKI has a twofold advantage over the F-16 aircraft in the number of simultaneously carried air-to-ground guided weapons, which are also more efficient. High-power guided weapons carried by the Su-30MKI enable it to defeat deeply buried, hardened and superhardened priority targets. The Su-30MKI�s medium-range guided missile can be launched at stand-off ranges. The F-18E/F fighter is expected to be armed with similar missiles after 2005. It will be also equipped with air-to-surface missiles guided by a satellite navigation system, although export deliveries of these aircraft are unlikely in the near future.
Antiradar and antiship missiles in service with the Su-30MKI fighter excel their foreign couterparts in their mean speed.The Su-30MKI�s gun features higher accuracy and better armor piercing capability against lightly armored vehicles. Owing to its unique features which favorably distinguish it from foreign counterparts, the Su-30MKI is rightly considered one of the best multirole fighters at the beginning of the 21st century.
Aircraft combat capabilities are usually assessed using complex efficiency indicators defining aircraft overall performance. According to preliminary estimates, in long-range air combat, the Su-30MKI outperforms the F-16C Block 60, F-16C Block 50 and F-18E/F aircraft by 15, 20 and 12-15 percent, respectively, owing to its radar�s greater detection range, higher jamming immunity and multichannel capability, as well as better maneuverability.
he Su-30MKI�s supermaneuverability and better air-to-air missiles give this aircraft superiority in close air combat in which it excels the F-16C Block 50 by 10-15 percent, F-16C Block 60 by 20-30 percent (as the high wing loading significantly limits its maneuverability in close-range combat), and F-18E/F by 15-20 percent.
(edit to add link to source)
vayu-sena.tripod.com...
(please try to remember to link to the source of your quoted text )
[edit on 22-10-2004 by pantha]
here's another article :
Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time'
This one's from Aviation Week and Space Technology,
By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie
[May 24, 2002]
Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time'
This one's from Aviation Week and Space Technology,
By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie
[May 24, 2002]
NEW DELHI, APRIL 19: US Air Force F-16s and AWACS are set to take on the IAF during joint combat aircraft exercises to be held in Gwalior early next
year. It is understood that the USAF acceded to the IAF�s request during the Initial Planning Conference (IPC) held last week at the Shillong-based
Eastern Air Command.
A high-level US Air Force delegation arrived in New Delhi on April 13 to hold discussions on conducting joint exercises. The US delegation was led by Lt Gen Victor E. Renaurt Jr, Vice-Commander of the Hawaii-based Pacific Air Command, while the Indian team was led by Air Marshal M. McMahon, Vice-Chief of Air Staff.
The decision to introduce the AWACS in the proposed exercises comes at a time when the IAF is all set to acquire the Israeli Phalcon early warning radar systems to enhance its strategic capabilities. It is learnt that the IAF had asked for an AWACS to participate in the last joint exercises held in Gwalior from February 16 to 26, but the USAF had turned down the request citing operational commitments.
The IAF is also keen on the participation of the F-16, the main combat aircraft in the Pakistan Air Force�s fleet, during the exercises. India, with its MiG-29 air defence aircraft and multi-role Mirage-2000 and the SU-30 MKI, has been keen to take on the F-16 and learn from operational capabilities under simulated conditions. Similarly, AWACS, with its ability to provide early warning as well as serve as command post in the air, has been high on the IAF�s agenda.
Besides, the USAF were reportedly unhappy that the last joint exercises had been conducted without the AWACS, putting their pilots at a disadvantage. As per sources in Air Headquarters, the Indian pilots had proved to be more successful during the exercises with the US pilots finding it difficult to operate without the AWACS. ��They expected us to use Soviet tactics and were surprised when they engaged us at Gwalior,�� said an official.
A high-level US Air Force delegation arrived in New Delhi on April 13 to hold discussions on conducting joint exercises. The US delegation was led by Lt Gen Victor E. Renaurt Jr, Vice-Commander of the Hawaii-based Pacific Air Command, while the Indian team was led by Air Marshal M. McMahon, Vice-Chief of Air Staff.
The decision to introduce the AWACS in the proposed exercises comes at a time when the IAF is all set to acquire the Israeli Phalcon early warning radar systems to enhance its strategic capabilities. It is learnt that the IAF had asked for an AWACS to participate in the last joint exercises held in Gwalior from February 16 to 26, but the USAF had turned down the request citing operational commitments.
The IAF is also keen on the participation of the F-16, the main combat aircraft in the Pakistan Air Force�s fleet, during the exercises. India, with its MiG-29 air defence aircraft and multi-role Mirage-2000 and the SU-30 MKI, has been keen to take on the F-16 and learn from operational capabilities under simulated conditions. Similarly, AWACS, with its ability to provide early warning as well as serve as command post in the air, has been high on the IAF�s agenda.
Besides, the USAF were reportedly unhappy that the last joint exercises had been conducted without the AWACS, putting their pilots at a disadvantage. As per sources in Air Headquarters, the Indian pilots had proved to be more successful during the exercises with the US pilots finding it difficult to operate without the AWACS. ��They expected us to use Soviet tactics and were surprised when they engaged us at Gwalior,�� said an official.
Hi fellows,
Sorry for dragging what looked to be a rather acrimonious discussion from a couple months ago, but holy crud, there's a lot of misinformation about this exercise some of you have, and I feel compelled to reply!
America accepted the rules of the excercise themselves; and they admitted they did so with the presumption that the Indian Air Force is incompetant or stuck in rigid, predictable tactics, be they Western or Soviet. However, as they themselves admitted after the exercises, they completely underestimated the IAF's skill and tactics.
Before I go any further, here's probably the most authoritative article on the COPE India Ex, based on interviews and quotes from the USAF pilots themselves. There are some incorrect statements that the reporter threw in (ex: IAF Mirages are not armed with the Mica), but the quotes from the aviators are most relevant.
The IAF exhibited incredible flexability and skill in the mission planning and flying. The tactics they used, to the great surprise of the Americans were uniquely Indian, as, to quote a USAF pilot, Indian tactics "were developed in a vaccum"; i.e. Indian tactics were neither Soviet or Western style. Beacuse they expected the IAF to be strictly conformal to Soviet doctrine and not at all innovative, the excercise came as a very rude shock to the Americans.
The IAF's first ever tangle with the Armee de l'Air a couple years ago pitted IAF M2Ks versus French, which were BVR armed. The exercises showed the Indians that, though they beat the French in WVR dogfighting, the French could pick IAF a/c off at BVR. The IAF then went all out in developing BVR-heavy a/c (Su-30MKI, LCA), upgrading its current fighter fleet to BVR capabilities (including down to the BVR MiG-21 Bison upgrade of its MiG-21 fleet, which proved itself more than worthy in COPE India), porcuring and developing BVR weapons, and developing tactics in BVR combat from the French and internal DACT exercises.]
That plus the fact that the Indians flew as many, and in the case of the Jags, M2Ks and Sukhois, more hours than their American counterparts. The capabilities of the plain vanilla Su-30 (IAF didn't field their Su-30MKI 'supercars'; the IAF Su-30s will in the next couple years will be upgraded to MKI standard) also came as a shock to the Americans.
The biggest lesson that America took away from these exercises was that a well-trained airforce can best an American force of equal footing without American force-multipliers the dissipation of the groupthink belief that inherantly assumes American combat superiority in the post-cold war world. Hence, this was a major reason the USAF gave in pushing for the F-22, which in terms of capabilities, is far ahead of any current aircraft. The USAF also learned about the capabilities firsthand of the vanilla IAF Su-30 which are comparable to PLAAF Su-27s and Su-30s.
The IAF's lesson was one of the need for force multipliers (like the AWACS, which prompted India to restart its indegenous AWACS program, which is designed to complement the Phalcon, and increased the order of Su-30MKI a/c; and the exercises refined IAF's combat tactics versus Western fighters.
The latter they did as well in the recent exercises with South African Mirages and, even more significantly, with RSAF F-16 blk 50s, which are a generation and a half superior to the Pakistani F-16s. Unlike COPE India, these exercises were very hush-hush and, according to IAF pilots in news reports, the exerciseses gave them significant information on how to develop F-16-specific combat tactics. Singapore was so impressed with India that the majority of their training will now be done in and with India, so this will obviously give the IAF much more familiarity with the capabilities of the F-16, and similarly the RSAF will get familiarity with the Sukhois, which Malaysia and potentially Indonesia operates.
===============
OK, now to address some of the misconceptions that some members here raised:
Firstly, many here suggest that the Americans were 'outnumbered' in the entire exercise. In a way, you are correct, as there were more IAF planes that participated in COPE India.
But your implication that the USAF were solely outnumbered by the Indians throughout the missions, is incorrect. The exercise consisted of offensive and defensive counter-air exercises, with 12 attacking aircraft (8 ground attack and 4 escorts) conducting a simulated raid on Gwalior AFB, versus 4 defending aircraft scrambling to intercept.
Both the Indian and the American fighters took turns being attacking and defending a/c, mixing the formations between MiG-21 Bis, Su-30K, M2K, and F-15. The numbers of a/c used in the missions was applied the same to aircraft both sides! In other words, if you were to say the American (defenders) were mugged by the Indians, then you should say the Indian (defenders) were equally mugged by the Indians!
It wasn't a case where 12 Indian fighters mugged the Americans due to numbers! The the exercise was to judge the performance of the pilots in theses scenarios. And even then, it wasn't always 12v.4, as 10v.4 and 6v.4 missions were documented.
Even so, the declassified version of the report that was sent to Congress noted that the USAF defenders lost 90% of the time, which was apparently was a worse record than the IAF when they played the defenders.
Secondly, the same weapons range handicaps applied to both sides! It was not as if the Americans were the only ones that these ROEs applied to, as you are implying, but the Indians, too, limited the same range on their BVR missiles. The exercise was made to test tactics and pilot skill, not how far the USAF or IAF can slug it out
Thirdly, the IAF did not use AWACS against AWACS-less F-15s, as some of you suggest. Heck, the Phalcons are still a couple years in coming. The simulated AWACS was simply an An-32 that one mission required for the fighters to protect. Both the USAF and IAF used their datalinking capabilities, however, the IAF and especially the MiG-21s having it apparently being a shock to the Americans (though I don't know why it would be, as it is publicly-available information...)
Forthly, so what if America didn't field their best aircraft (AESA-equipped F-15s)?. Neither did India (Su-30MKI with BARS ). However, the even the aircraft America fielded (i.e. AESA-less F-15s (without the hardware, software updates, etc.)) with their slotted-array radars still outclassed the N-001 radars of the Su-30Ks by a generation! Only the MiG-21 Bis with their Kopyo-M radar was the technological equivilant of the F-15s, but even this doesn't have the same range. However, it should be noted that in some of the missions involved the IAF using their datalinking capabilities, with appaerent tremendous success, but it wasn't used in every mission, though.
Fifthly, though America fielded an average squadron, so did India! The article specifically states that the Indian pilots were a mix from novice to expert, as is the norm in IAF squardrons, where there are no 'elite' squadrons. It is not as if the IAF aces all flew against rookie USAF pilot.
Sixthly, what is all this ruminition about poor IAF pilot training?(!) The IAF is one of the few AFs in the world that is always at a state of operational readiness, i.e. has the immediate ability to conduct full scale operations as soon as the order is given. They train long, and they train hard. One reason the attrition rate is high for the old MiG-21s is because the IAF logs so very many flying hours on the machines (though even then the attrition rate is not exceptional, given the flying hours.)
Heck, even the USAF guys who came said their Indian pilot friends logged just as many, and in many cases more flying hours than them!
Lets see... am I forgetting anything else?
Oh yes, seventhly, the IAF MiG-21 Bisons are probably the most advanced -21s in the world. Packed to the brim with Indian, Israeli and French avionics, Indian software, composities and computers, and the most modern Russian technologies and radar. Not your father's -21s by any means but still not equal to the F-15s America brought in.
===============
The exercise (like all exercises are) was a very specific one, aimed to test the skills and abilities of the pilots applied to very exacting scenarios. The Americans did not have their technical advantages, and neither did the Indians; as the exercises were designed to test mission planning, aerial tactics and pilots. The ROEs did not handicap one country versus the other; there wouldn't be any value to an exercise if that were the case. The reason that this exercise generated so much interest, was that the IAF apparently very much impressed the Americans with their abilities, and showed that pilot-to-pilot, as an American pilot said, the IAF is "just as good as us."
I simply don't understand the bruising of egos and the need for excuses founded on misconceptions that this exercise generated. Remember, this wasn't a competition, but a cooperation in exercise, seeing and learning and experimenting ('how would 4 F-15s fare versus 4 -27s and 2 Su30s and these mission factors?''hmm interesting, now what about using this tactic against this situation', etc)... The only thing to take away from this exercise is that both sides learned a great deal from each other, and laid a great foundation for friendship and future cooperation.
Hear's to the great, up and coming US-India relationship!
Cheers,
Raj
Sorry for dragging what looked to be a rather acrimonious discussion from a couple months ago, but holy crud, there's a lot of misinformation about this exercise some of you have, and I feel compelled to reply!
America accepted the rules of the excercise themselves; and they admitted they did so with the presumption that the Indian Air Force is incompetant or stuck in rigid, predictable tactics, be they Western or Soviet. However, as they themselves admitted after the exercises, they completely underestimated the IAF's skill and tactics.
Before I go any further, here's probably the most authoritative article on the COPE India Ex, based on interviews and quotes from the USAF pilots themselves. There are some incorrect statements that the reporter threw in (ex: IAF Mirages are not armed with the Mica), but the quotes from the aviators are most relevant.
3rd Wing Explains 'Cope India' Exercise
Aviation Week & Space Technology 10/04/2004, page 50
David A. Fulghum Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
3rd Wing explains what happened when U.S. pilots faced innovative Indian air force tactics
Indian 'Scare'
The losing performance of F-15Cs in simulated air-to-air combat against the Indian air force this year is being perceived by some, both in the U.S. and overseas, as a weakening of American capabilities, and it is generating taunts from within the competitive U.S. fighter community.
The Cope India exercise also seemingly shocked some in Congress and the Pentagon who used the event to renew the call for modernizing the U.S. fighter force with stealthy F/A-22s and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.
The reasons for the drubbing have gone largely unexplained and been misunderstood, according to those based here with the 3rd Wing who participated. Two major factors stand out: None of the six 3rd Wing F-15Cs was equipped with the newest long-range, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars. These Raytheon APG-63(V)2 radars were designed to find small and stealthy targets. At India's request, the U.S. agreed to mock combat at 3-to-1 odds and without the use of simulated long-range, radar-guided AIM-120 Amraams that even the odds with beyond-visual-range kills.
These same U.S. participants say the Indian pilots showed innovation and flexibility in their tactics. They also admit that they came into the exercise underrating the training and tactics of the pilots they faced. Instead of typical Cold War-style, ground-controlled interceptions, the Indians varied aircraft mixes, altitudes and formations. Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled. Moreover, the IAF's airborne commanders changed tactics as opportunities arose. Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.
Maj. Mark A. Snowden, the 3rd Wing's chief of air-to-air tactics and a participant in Cope India, spoke for the 13 U.S. pilots who attended the exercise. They flew six F-15Cs, each equipped with a fighter data link for rapid exchange of target information, AIM-9Xs and a Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, he says. The aircraft had been to Singapore for another exercise and for the long, six-week jaunt it was decided not to bring along the additional maintenance package needed to support AESA-equipped F-15Cs.
Cope India was held Feb. 15-28 at Gwalior, about 150 mi. south of Delhi, where the Indian air force has its Tactics Air Combat Development Establishment, which operates late-model MiG-21 Fishbeds as fighter escorts and MiG-27 Floggers as strike aircraft. Aerospace officials who have heard the classified brief on the exercise say the MiG-21s were equipped with a "gray-market" Bison radar and avionics upgrade.
Mica-armed Dassault Mirages 2000s are also stationed there. Brought in for the exercise were Sukhoi Su-30s (but not the newest Su-30 MKIs) carrying simulated AA-11s and AA-12 Adders. There also were five MiG-29 Flankers involved in a peripheral role and an Antonov An-32 Cline as a simulated AWACS.
"The outcome of the exercise boils down to [the fact that] they ran tactics that were more advanced than we expected," Snowden says. "India had developed its own air tactics somewhat in a vacuum. They had done some training with the French that we knew about, but we did not expect them to be a very well-trained air force. That was silly.
"They could come up with a game plan, but if it wasn't working they would call an audible and change [tactics in flight]," he says. "They made good decisions about when to bring their strikers in. The MiG-21s would be embedded with a Flogger for integral protection. There was a data link between the Flankers that was used to pass information. [Using all their assets,] they built a very good [radar] picture of what we were doing and were able to make good decisions about when to roll [their aircraft] in and out."
Aerospace industry officials say there's some indication that the MiG-21s also may have been getting a data feed from other airborne radars that gave them improved situational awareness of the airborne picture.
Generally the combat scenario was to have four F-15s flying at any time against about 12 Indian aircraft. While the U.S. pilots normally train to four versus 12, that takes into account at least two of the U.S. aircraft having AESA radar and being able to make the first, beyond-visual-range shots. For the exercise, both sides restricted long-range shots.
"That's what the Indians wanted to do," Snowden says. "That [handicap] really benefits a numerically superior force because you can't whittle away some of their force at long range. They were simulating active missiles [including] AA-12s." This means the missile has its own radar transmitter and doesn't depend on the launch aircraft's radar after launch. With the older AA-10 Alamo, the launching fighter has to keep its target illuminated with radar so the U.S. pilots would know when they were being targeted. But with the AA-12, they didn't know if they had been targeted. The Mirage 2000s carried the active Mica missile. Aerospace industry officials said that some of the radars the U.S. pilots encountered, including that of the Mirage 2000s, exhibited different characteristics than those on standard versions of the aircraft.
Indian planners combined the use of top-line fighters like this Su-30 with older types and impressive, innovative tactics.
Credit: USAF TSGT. KEITH BROWN
The U.S. pilots used no active missiles, and the AIM-120 Amraam capability was limited to a 20-naut.-mi. range while keeping the target illuminated when attacking and 18 naut. mi. when defending, as were all the missiles in the exercise.
"When we saw that they were a more professional air force, we realized that within the constraints of the exercise we were going to have a very difficult time," Snowden says. "In general, it looked like they ran a broad spectrum of tactics and they were adaptive. They would analyze what we were doing and then try something else. They weren't afraid to bring the strikers in high or low. They would move them around so that we could never anticipate from day to day what we were going to see."
By comparison, the U.S. pilots don't think they offered the Indians any surprises. The initial tactic is to run a wall with all four F-15s up front. That plays well when the long-range missiles and AESA radar are in play.
"You know we're there and we're not hiding," Snowden says. "But we didn't have the beyond-visual-range shot or the numerical advantage. Eventually we were just worn down by the numbers. They were very smart about it. Their goal was to get to a target area, engage the target and then withdraw without prolonging the fight. If there were a couple of Eagles still alive away from the target area, they would keep them pinned in, get done with the target and then egress with all their forces.
"All their aircraft seemed to be capable of breaking out [targets] and shooting at the ranges the exercise allowed," he says. "We generally don't train to an active missile threat [like the Mirage's Mica or the AA-12 for the Russian-built aircraft], and that was one of the things that caused us some problems."
USAF planners here see Cope India as the first step in an annual series of exchange exercises.
The IAF exhibited incredible flexability and skill in the mission planning and flying. The tactics they used, to the great surprise of the Americans were uniquely Indian, as, to quote a USAF pilot, Indian tactics "were developed in a vaccum"; i.e. Indian tactics were neither Soviet or Western style. Beacuse they expected the IAF to be strictly conformal to Soviet doctrine and not at all innovative, the excercise came as a very rude shock to the Americans.
The IAF's first ever tangle with the Armee de l'Air a couple years ago pitted IAF M2Ks versus French, which were BVR armed. The exercises showed the Indians that, though they beat the French in WVR dogfighting, the French could pick IAF a/c off at BVR. The IAF then went all out in developing BVR-heavy a/c (Su-30MKI, LCA), upgrading its current fighter fleet to BVR capabilities (including down to the BVR MiG-21 Bison upgrade of its MiG-21 fleet, which proved itself more than worthy in COPE India), porcuring and developing BVR weapons, and developing tactics in BVR combat from the French and internal DACT exercises.]
That plus the fact that the Indians flew as many, and in the case of the Jags, M2Ks and Sukhois, more hours than their American counterparts. The capabilities of the plain vanilla Su-30 (IAF didn't field their Su-30MKI 'supercars'; the IAF Su-30s will in the next couple years will be upgraded to MKI standard) also came as a shock to the Americans.
The biggest lesson that America took away from these exercises was that a well-trained airforce can best an American force of equal footing without American force-multipliers the dissipation of the groupthink belief that inherantly assumes American combat superiority in the post-cold war world. Hence, this was a major reason the USAF gave in pushing for the F-22, which in terms of capabilities, is far ahead of any current aircraft. The USAF also learned about the capabilities firsthand of the vanilla IAF Su-30 which are comparable to PLAAF Su-27s and Su-30s.
The IAF's lesson was one of the need for force multipliers (like the AWACS, which prompted India to restart its indegenous AWACS program, which is designed to complement the Phalcon, and increased the order of Su-30MKI a/c; and the exercises refined IAF's combat tactics versus Western fighters.
The latter they did as well in the recent exercises with South African Mirages and, even more significantly, with RSAF F-16 blk 50s, which are a generation and a half superior to the Pakistani F-16s. Unlike COPE India, these exercises were very hush-hush and, according to IAF pilots in news reports, the exerciseses gave them significant information on how to develop F-16-specific combat tactics. Singapore was so impressed with India that the majority of their training will now be done in and with India, so this will obviously give the IAF much more familiarity with the capabilities of the F-16, and similarly the RSAF will get familiarity with the Sukhois, which Malaysia and potentially Indonesia operates.
===============
OK, now to address some of the misconceptions that some members here raised:
Firstly, many here suggest that the Americans were 'outnumbered' in the entire exercise. In a way, you are correct, as there were more IAF planes that participated in COPE India.
But your implication that the USAF were solely outnumbered by the Indians throughout the missions, is incorrect. The exercise consisted of offensive and defensive counter-air exercises, with 12 attacking aircraft (8 ground attack and 4 escorts) conducting a simulated raid on Gwalior AFB, versus 4 defending aircraft scrambling to intercept.
Both the Indian and the American fighters took turns being attacking and defending a/c, mixing the formations between MiG-21 Bis, Su-30K, M2K, and F-15. The numbers of a/c used in the missions was applied the same to aircraft both sides! In other words, if you were to say the American (defenders) were mugged by the Indians, then you should say the Indian (defenders) were equally mugged by the Indians!
It wasn't a case where 12 Indian fighters mugged the Americans due to numbers! The the exercise was to judge the performance of the pilots in theses scenarios. And even then, it wasn't always 12v.4, as 10v.4 and 6v.4 missions were documented.
Even so, the declassified version of the report that was sent to Congress noted that the USAF defenders lost 90% of the time, which was apparently was a worse record than the IAF when they played the defenders.
Secondly, the same weapons range handicaps applied to both sides! It was not as if the Americans were the only ones that these ROEs applied to, as you are implying, but the Indians, too, limited the same range on their BVR missiles. The exercise was made to test tactics and pilot skill, not how far the USAF or IAF can slug it out
Thirdly, the IAF did not use AWACS against AWACS-less F-15s, as some of you suggest. Heck, the Phalcons are still a couple years in coming. The simulated AWACS was simply an An-32 that one mission required for the fighters to protect. Both the USAF and IAF used their datalinking capabilities, however, the IAF and especially the MiG-21s having it apparently being a shock to the Americans (though I don't know why it would be, as it is publicly-available information...)
Forthly, so what if America didn't field their best aircraft (AESA-equipped F-15s)?. Neither did India (Su-30MKI with BARS ). However, the even the aircraft America fielded (i.e. AESA-less F-15s (without the hardware, software updates, etc.)) with their slotted-array radars still outclassed the N-001 radars of the Su-30Ks by a generation! Only the MiG-21 Bis with their Kopyo-M radar was the technological equivilant of the F-15s, but even this doesn't have the same range. However, it should be noted that in some of the missions involved the IAF using their datalinking capabilities, with appaerent tremendous success, but it wasn't used in every mission, though.
Fifthly, though America fielded an average squadron, so did India! The article specifically states that the Indian pilots were a mix from novice to expert, as is the norm in IAF squardrons, where there are no 'elite' squadrons. It is not as if the IAF aces all flew against rookie USAF pilot.
Sixthly, what is all this ruminition about poor IAF pilot training?(!) The IAF is one of the few AFs in the world that is always at a state of operational readiness, i.e. has the immediate ability to conduct full scale operations as soon as the order is given. They train long, and they train hard. One reason the attrition rate is high for the old MiG-21s is because the IAF logs so very many flying hours on the machines (though even then the attrition rate is not exceptional, given the flying hours.)
Heck, even the USAF guys who came said their Indian pilot friends logged just as many, and in many cases more flying hours than them!
Lets see... am I forgetting anything else?
Oh yes, seventhly, the IAF MiG-21 Bisons are probably the most advanced -21s in the world. Packed to the brim with Indian, Israeli and French avionics, Indian software, composities and computers, and the most modern Russian technologies and radar. Not your father's -21s by any means but still not equal to the F-15s America brought in.
===============
The exercise (like all exercises are) was a very specific one, aimed to test the skills and abilities of the pilots applied to very exacting scenarios. The Americans did not have their technical advantages, and neither did the Indians; as the exercises were designed to test mission planning, aerial tactics and pilots. The ROEs did not handicap one country versus the other; there wouldn't be any value to an exercise if that were the case. The reason that this exercise generated so much interest, was that the IAF apparently very much impressed the Americans with their abilities, and showed that pilot-to-pilot, as an American pilot said, the IAF is "just as good as us."
I simply don't understand the bruising of egos and the need for excuses founded on misconceptions that this exercise generated. Remember, this wasn't a competition, but a cooperation in exercise, seeing and learning and experimenting ('how would 4 F-15s fare versus 4 -27s and 2 Su30s and these mission factors?''hmm interesting, now what about using this tactic against this situation', etc)... The only thing to take away from this exercise is that both sides learned a great deal from each other, and laid a great foundation for friendship and future cooperation.
Hear's to the great, up and coming US-India relationship!
Cheers,
Raj
Ok,sounds good to me,but how will they work if they used the latest equpment - (F-15s with AESAs or Su-30MKIs with BARS)?IMHO,the USAF were trained
for BVR tactics,not flying with 1/3 of their missle ranges and having to illuminate their targets.
Originally posted by W4rl0rD
Ok,sounds good to me,but how will they work if they used the latest equpment - (F-15s with AESAs or Su-30MKIs with BARS)?IMHO,the USAF were trained for BVR tactics,not flying with 1/3 of their missle ranges and having to illuminate their targets.
An offense defense scenario is always in the odds of 2/ or 3/1. It takes 2 to 3 offensive equivalent unit to upset a single defensive unit. All offence defense exercises are carried out in such numbers. And the USAF shouldn't be only trained for BVR tactics because if the opposition has equal BVR then it will come down to dogfighting in the end anyways.
And your question about how the exercise would turn out if both AFs used their top stuff..well nobody is supossed to know including the two AFs themselves. Its never done like that so that neither AF can see the "full" capability of the other.There is always an element of surprise. In the prev India-US naval exercises the US navy wanted the indians to field their super quiet kilo-class subs but the indians didnt do that.
Some here have mentioned the fact that BVR capabilities did not come into play.... This article is kind of dated but in my knowledge it is still very
much accurate.
Aerospace America
January, 1990
Radar combat and the illusion of invincibility
by Jeffrey L. Ethell, Contributing Editor
Evidence mounts that the stunning capabilities of radar guidance may prove to be its greatest liability
Ever since World War II proved the stunning capabilities of radar, military planners have come to depend on it more and more in modern combat. At present, the U.S. builds weapons and trains personnel in preparation for the radar war of the future, relying almost exclusively on the combat advantages of radar-guided missiles, radar-avoiding stealth technology, air- and land-based early warning radar, low-level terrain-following radar, and target acquisition radar.
At the heart of radar's performance is an uncanny ability to find and hit targets at distances beyond enemy killing range, primarily beyond visual range (BVR). At the same time, radar can be used to provide early warning of an enemy's intentions while radar-jamming and stealth techniques can help to avoid detection by enemy radar. It is almost as if radar has become a kind of Rosetta Stone for the practice of modern warfare.
Unfortunately, radar has not only turned out to be less than invincible, it has recently become a liability. Fueling what is now a raging debate are the last few shooting engagements in the Middle East: The USS Stark could not defend itself against two Exocet sea-skimming missiles; USS Vincennes Aegis cruiser fired BVR at what its crew thought was an attacking fighter and downed an Iranian airliner; and two F-14s fired twice at intruding Libyan fighters, missing them BVR with radar-guided Sparrows and shooting them down within visual range with a Sparrow and a heat-seeking Sidewinder.
The DOD has been trying since 1977 to ive birth to the advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) as a replacement for the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinder. Almost 13 years later, the technical challenges of creating the AMRAAM are still to be met. One of those responsible for developing the missile in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Myers, says "the drive to create it was a reflection of the frustrations in the radar weapons community."
The dogfight was consigned to the scrapheap of history when radar-guided missiles appeared in the '50s. Guns disappeared from from fighter planes, and missiles were hung in their place to defend U.S. borders and naval vessels from air attack. Sorting friend from foe was never considered worrisome, even at the higher closing speeds of jet aircraft and greater firing range of the airborne missile. Then came Vietnam and what one-time combat pilot Myers calls "military-political gymnastics" instead of a real air war.
Suddenly, a minor enemy arose who put up a limited air challenge with inferior MiGs. The U.S. fielded its front-line fighters, in particular the F-4 Phantom II, which had been designed for fleet defense rather than violent close-combat aerial maneuvering. Back came the dogfight, but since pilots had little dogfight training and worried about killing their buddies, the Americans did not do well, especially with radar-guided Sparrows and especially beyond visual range.
Even though Vietnam drove home the lesson that pilots and aircraft must learn to dogfight within visual range, the air services asked for improved radar missiles. The AMRAAM emerged, supported by advocates inside and outside the DOD. To score a kill during a swirling dogfight, a pilot would have to launch missiles one after the other at multiple targets, a dubious tactic quickly called "launch-and-leave." "What no one wanted to say," says Myers, "is that they already had a missile that did this -- the cheap, accurate heat-seeking Sidewinder."
At $ 500,000 a missile, the AMRAAM solution has a cost 10 times higher than a Sidewinder. It is so expensive that the services have been forced to stop buying the Sidewinder because they can no longer afford both radar-guided and heat-seeking missiles.
In the AMRAAM project office, Air Force Col. James Burton had been handed the job of collecting hard information on the effectiveness of missiles in air-to-air combat. Burton studied all 407 known missile kills made in the air since 1958 (except for the 1967 Middle East war and Pakistan's 1971 clash with India), focusing hard on the 2,014 missile firings made during the Vietnam War and the 1973 and 1982 Middle East skirmishes.
Burton fast became one of the most unpopular men in the Pentagon. He titled the briefing he gave on his findings "Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile." His findings? Of more than 260 Arab aircraft knocked down by Israel in 1973, only five fell to Sparrows in 12 firings. Of the 632 Sparrows fired in all the wars Burton studied, only 73 destroyed the airplane they were fired at, for a kill rating of 11%. The ancient Sidewinder did almost three times better: of some 1,000 Sidewinder firings, 308 kills resulted in a kill rating of 30%.
In Southeast Asia, Sparrow had such a poor reputation that pilots routinely ripple-fired their Sparrows, firing off two or more in a row rather than taking a chance on a single shot. Even though few fighters came to Vietnam equipped with guns, they had a better kill rating than Sparrow-equipped fighters. Burton found that guns actually made about one-third of all the kills counted in Vietnam.
To the horror of those he briefed, Burton told them he found only four BVR kills in all the wars he covered. What is more, each of the four (two by Israel, two by F04s in Vietnam) was carefully staged outside the confusion of combat to prove BVR's combat worthiness. One Southeast Asia kill was listed as a MiG-21 when it was really an F-4 mistakenly identified and shot down using Combat Tree, the BVR identification equipment of the era that was supposed to sort friend from foe. According to Burton, the only reason Israel went after its two BVR kills was strong pressure from the U.S. to establish BVR doctrine.
In summarizing how the 407 missile kills were made, Burton came up with some unsettling conclusions:
* Most targets were unaware and were fired on from the rear.
* An insignificant number of targets were aware and maneuvered hard to avoid the attack.
* Many rear shots were fired from above the target, making them more difficult shots to hit.
* There were almost no head-on BVR shots because of the high closing speeds of the aircraft involved.
Even though BVR shots were almost nonexistent in the wars Burton studied, he reached one unsettling conclusion: "The most dominant aspect of missile air combat to date has been the requirement to positively identify the target." And the only sure way to do that has been by eye.
When validation tests were under way in the late '70s, on the air combat missiles and doctrines of the next generation, the cry went up that the results would be useless since most of the flying was done under clear air visual conditions and BVR shooting was so limited. Myers suggested giving AMRAAM's proposed operational BVR parameters and air-to-air anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) to Red Force. This would give everybody some rules and results worth measuring, but the idea was struck down by the AMRAAM office. Clearly, the new rules might have pointed up radar's inherent weakness: A simple, inexpensive missile like ARM can home in on radar and kill in an instant.
In 1984, Burton managed to have the idea tested in McDonnell Douglas' differential maneuvering simulators. The results were devastating. Over and over, ARM-equipped fighters shot down AMRAAM aircraft and missiles. The results were turned over to the AMRAAM office, which invalidated them and threw out the exercise. In airborne tests in Nevada, Red Force aircraft using simple radar homing and warning devices could see Blue Force AMRAAM radars coming on 10 mi. away. The warnings allowed Red Force to turn away and beat the missile. When the AMRAAM radar was reset to come on 5 mi. from the target aircraft, the change negated the longed-for BVR scenario.
In addition, the missile's fabled multiple-target tracking and killing capability turned out to be no more effective than single-target shooting, either in simulations or live aerial firings. "The simple launch-and-leave ARM casts a pall over the whole issue since it homes in perfectly on an illuminating radar," says Defense Dept. analyst Thomas Amlie. "This means you can't use AMRAAM, AIM-7, Phoenix, or any other radar-guided missile in combat."
Meanwhile, the USSR has a well-developed series of ARMs, including the AA-10 Alamo for air-to-air combat. They have also converted the AS-4 Kitchen and AS-6 Kingfish, both with 2,200-lb warheads, into ARMs. Notes Amlie: "They never throw anything away. Flying at Mach 3+, these are a tremendous threat to the U.S. fleet, which is virtually bathed in radar. Now our prime weapons systems, such as Aegis, STARS, E-3A, Patriot, and Hawk, are in serious jeopardy."
Targeting the enemy has never proved difficult for the Soviets, especially with American fighters. "All fighter radars in the U.S. transmit on the same frequency, right around 10,000 MHz, to get all-weather capability," Amlie says. "That is very convenient, a missile designer's dream. The Soviets have no need for IFF transponder identification since their radar frequencies are higher or lower, so ARM use is almost risk free, even in a mixed air-to-air fight." As soon as U.S. pilots turn on their radars, the opposition gets some valuable information as well -- how many fighters are out there, their nationality, their direction, whether they are locked on to fire, and type of fighter -- based on their radar pulse signature.
The pilot firing the ARM still has problems, such as obtaining distance from the target, the need for his own radar to paint the target and give its range, the possibility of the ARM homing in on multiple enemy and friendly radars in the air, ground, and sea, and the very strong possibility of homing in on decoys. Regardless, the mere presence of ARMs in the air can lead to everyone turning off their radars, which puts the real combat arena squarely back into the visual, maneuvering, close-up fight that, AMRAAM supporters say, is not likely to happen because of the "reality" of BVR combat.
In 1969, the DOD tried to test an air-to-air ARM developed from the Sparrow airframe under the project name Brazo. At modest cost, three test firings destroyed three target drones. Amlie says the program "was cancelled when it could be interpreted as eliminating large radar fighters such as the F-14 and F-15, since the tests proved you could not use a radar fighter in combat when up against ARMs. The only countermeasure was to turn the radars off, so everything was swept under a rug." Now, department rumblings suggest that development of an air-to-air ARM is again under consideration.
The host of U.S. radar-based weapons are all vulnerable to ARMs. The E-3A AWACS has a superb radar antenna that can detect hundreds of targets simultaneously -- and can itself be seen at extremely long distances. An AS-4 or -6 could be launched 300-400 mi. away and home in on it with ease. The same is true for the 40 Aegis cruisers and destroyers destined for fleet service with the Navy. With hundreds of Soviet ARMs ready for firing from submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and land, a U.S. carrier battle group, heavily dependent on radar, might be in serious trouble, especially if the missiles were sea-skimmers.
At best, Navy countermeasures are limited against so simple a weapon. Sea-skimmers pop up over the radar horizon a bare 14 mi. away, and when radar does detect the missile, the radar reflections bounce off the waves, making it difficult to determine altitude, thus throwing off tracking. A third Soviet line of attack comes from their radar jammers, among the world's most powerful.
Pilots of B-1 and B-2 bombers penetrating Soviet airspace most likely will use terrain-following radar to stay low and avoid detection. Using inexpensive radar finders, like the fuzzbusters motorists use to avoid police speed traps, on hiss surrounded by flat terrain, the Soviets should have no trouble seeing the bombers coming. And Soviet radar homing and warning equipment can pick up VHF transmissions or over-the-horizon radar from distant approaching aircraft. In fact, the whole issue of stealth technology could become moot, if one considers that a radar antenna runs along the entire length of a B-2 wing's leading edge. Once in visual range, stealth is irrelevant. It is more than probable that an F-117 or a B-2 can be found, identified, and shot down using basic common sense. The F-117 has to make such wide turns that its survival in a visual air-to-air fight is precarious.
Myers, who proposed the first stealth aircraft ideas under Project Harvey (after the famous invisible rabbit), is extremely disappointed over where things have ended up. He recommended a small, inexpensive aircraft that would be hard to find with radar and eye. Yes, payload would have been small, but the idea was to confuse the opposition. "Suppose I weigh only 75 lb, with the payload of a hatpin, but I'm visible," he says. "How much trouble and chaos could I cause in the enemy camp?" A small aircraft carrying a small ARM and a gun, Myers' original stealth plane was to effectively blind the enemy by taking out radar vans and emplacements. The F-117 seems to have a similar mission, but had to be bigger to carry weapons like the Maverick missile as required by current Air Force doctrine.
Still, a growing number of soldiers and analysts are asking tough questions about the future of radar warfare. "We cannot go around radiating signals," says Amlie. "The French sell a missile to the entire Third World that will hit an Aegis every time. We are building a peacetime military that will never be effective in combat."
Radar combat and the illusion of invincibility
Stellar
Aerospace America
January, 1990
Radar combat and the illusion of invincibility
by Jeffrey L. Ethell, Contributing Editor
Evidence mounts that the stunning capabilities of radar guidance may prove to be its greatest liability
Ever since World War II proved the stunning capabilities of radar, military planners have come to depend on it more and more in modern combat. At present, the U.S. builds weapons and trains personnel in preparation for the radar war of the future, relying almost exclusively on the combat advantages of radar-guided missiles, radar-avoiding stealth technology, air- and land-based early warning radar, low-level terrain-following radar, and target acquisition radar.
At the heart of radar's performance is an uncanny ability to find and hit targets at distances beyond enemy killing range, primarily beyond visual range (BVR). At the same time, radar can be used to provide early warning of an enemy's intentions while radar-jamming and stealth techniques can help to avoid detection by enemy radar. It is almost as if radar has become a kind of Rosetta Stone for the practice of modern warfare.
Unfortunately, radar has not only turned out to be less than invincible, it has recently become a liability. Fueling what is now a raging debate are the last few shooting engagements in the Middle East: The USS Stark could not defend itself against two Exocet sea-skimming missiles; USS Vincennes Aegis cruiser fired BVR at what its crew thought was an attacking fighter and downed an Iranian airliner; and two F-14s fired twice at intruding Libyan fighters, missing them BVR with radar-guided Sparrows and shooting them down within visual range with a Sparrow and a heat-seeking Sidewinder.
The DOD has been trying since 1977 to ive birth to the advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) as a replacement for the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinder. Almost 13 years later, the technical challenges of creating the AMRAAM are still to be met. One of those responsible for developing the missile in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Myers, says "the drive to create it was a reflection of the frustrations in the radar weapons community."
The dogfight was consigned to the scrapheap of history when radar-guided missiles appeared in the '50s. Guns disappeared from from fighter planes, and missiles were hung in their place to defend U.S. borders and naval vessels from air attack. Sorting friend from foe was never considered worrisome, even at the higher closing speeds of jet aircraft and greater firing range of the airborne missile. Then came Vietnam and what one-time combat pilot Myers calls "military-political gymnastics" instead of a real air war.
Suddenly, a minor enemy arose who put up a limited air challenge with inferior MiGs. The U.S. fielded its front-line fighters, in particular the F-4 Phantom II, which had been designed for fleet defense rather than violent close-combat aerial maneuvering. Back came the dogfight, but since pilots had little dogfight training and worried about killing their buddies, the Americans did not do well, especially with radar-guided Sparrows and especially beyond visual range.
Even though Vietnam drove home the lesson that pilots and aircraft must learn to dogfight within visual range, the air services asked for improved radar missiles. The AMRAAM emerged, supported by advocates inside and outside the DOD. To score a kill during a swirling dogfight, a pilot would have to launch missiles one after the other at multiple targets, a dubious tactic quickly called "launch-and-leave." "What no one wanted to say," says Myers, "is that they already had a missile that did this -- the cheap, accurate heat-seeking Sidewinder."
At $ 500,000 a missile, the AMRAAM solution has a cost 10 times higher than a Sidewinder. It is so expensive that the services have been forced to stop buying the Sidewinder because they can no longer afford both radar-guided and heat-seeking missiles.
In the AMRAAM project office, Air Force Col. James Burton had been handed the job of collecting hard information on the effectiveness of missiles in air-to-air combat. Burton studied all 407 known missile kills made in the air since 1958 (except for the 1967 Middle East war and Pakistan's 1971 clash with India), focusing hard on the 2,014 missile firings made during the Vietnam War and the 1973 and 1982 Middle East skirmishes.
Burton fast became one of the most unpopular men in the Pentagon. He titled the briefing he gave on his findings "Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile." His findings? Of more than 260 Arab aircraft knocked down by Israel in 1973, only five fell to Sparrows in 12 firings. Of the 632 Sparrows fired in all the wars Burton studied, only 73 destroyed the airplane they were fired at, for a kill rating of 11%. The ancient Sidewinder did almost three times better: of some 1,000 Sidewinder firings, 308 kills resulted in a kill rating of 30%.
In Southeast Asia, Sparrow had such a poor reputation that pilots routinely ripple-fired their Sparrows, firing off two or more in a row rather than taking a chance on a single shot. Even though few fighters came to Vietnam equipped with guns, they had a better kill rating than Sparrow-equipped fighters. Burton found that guns actually made about one-third of all the kills counted in Vietnam.
To the horror of those he briefed, Burton told them he found only four BVR kills in all the wars he covered. What is more, each of the four (two by Israel, two by F04s in Vietnam) was carefully staged outside the confusion of combat to prove BVR's combat worthiness. One Southeast Asia kill was listed as a MiG-21 when it was really an F-4 mistakenly identified and shot down using Combat Tree, the BVR identification equipment of the era that was supposed to sort friend from foe. According to Burton, the only reason Israel went after its two BVR kills was strong pressure from the U.S. to establish BVR doctrine.
In summarizing how the 407 missile kills were made, Burton came up with some unsettling conclusions:
* Most targets were unaware and were fired on from the rear.
* An insignificant number of targets were aware and maneuvered hard to avoid the attack.
* Many rear shots were fired from above the target, making them more difficult shots to hit.
* There were almost no head-on BVR shots because of the high closing speeds of the aircraft involved.
Even though BVR shots were almost nonexistent in the wars Burton studied, he reached one unsettling conclusion: "The most dominant aspect of missile air combat to date has been the requirement to positively identify the target." And the only sure way to do that has been by eye.
When validation tests were under way in the late '70s, on the air combat missiles and doctrines of the next generation, the cry went up that the results would be useless since most of the flying was done under clear air visual conditions and BVR shooting was so limited. Myers suggested giving AMRAAM's proposed operational BVR parameters and air-to-air anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) to Red Force. This would give everybody some rules and results worth measuring, but the idea was struck down by the AMRAAM office. Clearly, the new rules might have pointed up radar's inherent weakness: A simple, inexpensive missile like ARM can home in on radar and kill in an instant.
In 1984, Burton managed to have the idea tested in McDonnell Douglas' differential maneuvering simulators. The results were devastating. Over and over, ARM-equipped fighters shot down AMRAAM aircraft and missiles. The results were turned over to the AMRAAM office, which invalidated them and threw out the exercise. In airborne tests in Nevada, Red Force aircraft using simple radar homing and warning devices could see Blue Force AMRAAM radars coming on 10 mi. away. The warnings allowed Red Force to turn away and beat the missile. When the AMRAAM radar was reset to come on 5 mi. from the target aircraft, the change negated the longed-for BVR scenario.
In addition, the missile's fabled multiple-target tracking and killing capability turned out to be no more effective than single-target shooting, either in simulations or live aerial firings. "The simple launch-and-leave ARM casts a pall over the whole issue since it homes in perfectly on an illuminating radar," says Defense Dept. analyst Thomas Amlie. "This means you can't use AMRAAM, AIM-7, Phoenix, or any other radar-guided missile in combat."
Meanwhile, the USSR has a well-developed series of ARMs, including the AA-10 Alamo for air-to-air combat. They have also converted the AS-4 Kitchen and AS-6 Kingfish, both with 2,200-lb warheads, into ARMs. Notes Amlie: "They never throw anything away. Flying at Mach 3+, these are a tremendous threat to the U.S. fleet, which is virtually bathed in radar. Now our prime weapons systems, such as Aegis, STARS, E-3A, Patriot, and Hawk, are in serious jeopardy."
Targeting the enemy has never proved difficult for the Soviets, especially with American fighters. "All fighter radars in the U.S. transmit on the same frequency, right around 10,000 MHz, to get all-weather capability," Amlie says. "That is very convenient, a missile designer's dream. The Soviets have no need for IFF transponder identification since their radar frequencies are higher or lower, so ARM use is almost risk free, even in a mixed air-to-air fight." As soon as U.S. pilots turn on their radars, the opposition gets some valuable information as well -- how many fighters are out there, their nationality, their direction, whether they are locked on to fire, and type of fighter -- based on their radar pulse signature.
The pilot firing the ARM still has problems, such as obtaining distance from the target, the need for his own radar to paint the target and give its range, the possibility of the ARM homing in on multiple enemy and friendly radars in the air, ground, and sea, and the very strong possibility of homing in on decoys. Regardless, the mere presence of ARMs in the air can lead to everyone turning off their radars, which puts the real combat arena squarely back into the visual, maneuvering, close-up fight that, AMRAAM supporters say, is not likely to happen because of the "reality" of BVR combat.
In 1969, the DOD tried to test an air-to-air ARM developed from the Sparrow airframe under the project name Brazo. At modest cost, three test firings destroyed three target drones. Amlie says the program "was cancelled when it could be interpreted as eliminating large radar fighters such as the F-14 and F-15, since the tests proved you could not use a radar fighter in combat when up against ARMs. The only countermeasure was to turn the radars off, so everything was swept under a rug." Now, department rumblings suggest that development of an air-to-air ARM is again under consideration.
The host of U.S. radar-based weapons are all vulnerable to ARMs. The E-3A AWACS has a superb radar antenna that can detect hundreds of targets simultaneously -- and can itself be seen at extremely long distances. An AS-4 or -6 could be launched 300-400 mi. away and home in on it with ease. The same is true for the 40 Aegis cruisers and destroyers destined for fleet service with the Navy. With hundreds of Soviet ARMs ready for firing from submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and land, a U.S. carrier battle group, heavily dependent on radar, might be in serious trouble, especially if the missiles were sea-skimmers.
At best, Navy countermeasures are limited against so simple a weapon. Sea-skimmers pop up over the radar horizon a bare 14 mi. away, and when radar does detect the missile, the radar reflections bounce off the waves, making it difficult to determine altitude, thus throwing off tracking. A third Soviet line of attack comes from their radar jammers, among the world's most powerful.
Pilots of B-1 and B-2 bombers penetrating Soviet airspace most likely will use terrain-following radar to stay low and avoid detection. Using inexpensive radar finders, like the fuzzbusters motorists use to avoid police speed traps, on hiss surrounded by flat terrain, the Soviets should have no trouble seeing the bombers coming. And Soviet radar homing and warning equipment can pick up VHF transmissions or over-the-horizon radar from distant approaching aircraft. In fact, the whole issue of stealth technology could become moot, if one considers that a radar antenna runs along the entire length of a B-2 wing's leading edge. Once in visual range, stealth is irrelevant. It is more than probable that an F-117 or a B-2 can be found, identified, and shot down using basic common sense. The F-117 has to make such wide turns that its survival in a visual air-to-air fight is precarious.
Myers, who proposed the first stealth aircraft ideas under Project Harvey (after the famous invisible rabbit), is extremely disappointed over where things have ended up. He recommended a small, inexpensive aircraft that would be hard to find with radar and eye. Yes, payload would have been small, but the idea was to confuse the opposition. "Suppose I weigh only 75 lb, with the payload of a hatpin, but I'm visible," he says. "How much trouble and chaos could I cause in the enemy camp?" A small aircraft carrying a small ARM and a gun, Myers' original stealth plane was to effectively blind the enemy by taking out radar vans and emplacements. The F-117 seems to have a similar mission, but had to be bigger to carry weapons like the Maverick missile as required by current Air Force doctrine.
Still, a growing number of soldiers and analysts are asking tough questions about the future of radar warfare. "We cannot go around radiating signals," says Amlie. "The French sell a missile to the entire Third World that will hit an Aegis every time. We are building a peacetime military that will never be effective in combat."
Radar combat and the illusion of invincibility
Stellar
Geez, If they would have lost... (in fairplay) BUt I'd like to see them battle with the Raptor...
up we go as BVR is NOT the way of the future , history will just repeat itself which is sad.
Originally posted by Daedalus3
What about the Gulf War A-2-A stats?And Kosovo..
Well that was written in 1991 and it would obviously be interesting to see how much has changed and if you want to post source material, relating to latest incidents, here it would be obviously be appreciated.
Thanks
Stellar
[edit on 11-4-2006 by StellarX]
OK, here are the Gulf War I stats I got from: www.saunalahti.fi...
24 x AIM-7 Kills (33 launches for 73%)
02 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills (50%)
12 x AIM-9 KIlls (86%)
02 x 30mm Gun Kills
02 x Maneuvering Suicides
This apparently breaks down as:
BVR = 17 WVR = 25
I've not included 3 A2A kills by A2G ordnance, nor a pilot bailout from a trainer.
[edit on 11-4-2006 by kilcoo316]
24 x AIM-7 Kills (33 launches for 73%)
02 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills (50%)
12 x AIM-9 KIlls (86%)
02 x 30mm Gun Kills
02 x Maneuvering Suicides
This apparently breaks down as:
BVR = 17 WVR = 25
I've not included 3 A2A kills by A2G ordnance, nor a pilot bailout from a trainer.
[edit on 11-4-2006 by kilcoo316]
up we go as BVR is NOT the way of the future , history will just repeat itself which is sad.
Actually BVR is very much the future, what happened in the past is not representative of the future. For example Vietnam saw the first mass use of essentially first generation A2A missiles, as such mass problems were inevitable. Now these missile were not as advanced as today's missile as far as guidance and seekers go, their range was limited, and they were very prone to malfunction. One more thing, in Vietnam we did not adequately train pilots for WVR combat maneuvers and we prematurely removed the gun from our front line fighters. In 1991 there was some issue with the Navy’s F-14 and AF’s (IFF) compatibility which lead commanders to change BVR ROE’s. Not only were all US Fighters issued one standard (IFF) system after 91 but the F-14 is just about out of service. Also, in any war the US will have use of AWACS which will make BVR engagement easier for fighters.
So all in all it is important to train pilots in close combat maneuvers, it is important to design a fighter with good maneuverability specifications, and it is important to have a gun combined with excellent short range missiles. However pilots should always engage the enemy in BVR and only engage in WVR combat as a last resort. Countries who build big uber maneuvering fighters that stand out like a sore thumb in BVR are living in the past.
Consider this, you have two soldiers, one is excellent in hand to hand combat and is armed with a gun, a knife and is wearing a bright orange jumpsuit. The other is an excellent marksman and is armed with a rifle, a gun and camouflage. Now, set them loose in the battlefield against each other and tell me who is going to win 9 out of 10 times?
Originally posted by WestPoint23
Actually BVR is very much the future, what happened in the past is not representative of the future.
Also, in any war the US will have use of AWACS which will make BVR engagement easier for fighters.
-Uhh, no, I would tend to disagree. In the medium term expect others to attain 'stealth' capabilies, which of course means a return to... well, korea/vietnam I suppose [WVR missile engagements].
Longer term, DEWs (incidently, seen a piece on AESA radars as weapons in Feburarys Aerospace America today) will be able to jam missiles, which will result in a return to... well WWII tactics...
Longer term again, DEWs will become powerful enough to down aircraft, and radar processing power (well, computer CPU power really) will become powerful enough to discern the trailing vortices left by aircraft from the rest of clutter, rendering stealth history. So it will be something akin to Space Command - shoot down the little baddies with your lasers
- There were AWACs present in Gulf I, and the linky I posted said something like they were responsible for all (or virtually all) engagements.
Uhh, no, I would tend to disagree. In the medium term expect others to attain 'stealth' capabilies, which of course means a return to... well, korea/vietnam I suppose [WVR missile engagements].
Really? Medium term? Which means that there should be a mass of stealth fighters in development now. So, can you mention some?
Longer term, DEWs (incidently, seen a piece on AESA radars as weapons in Feburarys Aerospace America today) will be able to jam missiles, which will result in a return to... well WWII tactics...
As far as I’m aware some AESA radars on US fighters have limited jamming capability against other fighters radars. However I’m interested to hear about other radars in development with this capability. Also, there are ways in which you can improve current seekers and radar systems to cope with new emerging jamming systems. Incidentally you also can't jam a radar you cannot detect.
The Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) capability of the radar defeats conventional RWR/ESM systems. The AN/APG-77 radar is capable of performing an active radar search on RWR/ESM equipped fighter aircraft without the target knowing he is being illuminated. Unlike conventional radars which emit high energy pulses in a narrow frequency band, the AN/APG-77 emits low energy pulses over a wide frequency band using a technique called spread spectrum transmission. When multiple echoes are returned, the radar's signal processor combines the signals. The amount of energy reflected back to the target is about the same as a conventional radar, but because each LPI pulse has considerably less amount of energy and may not fit normal modulation patterns, the target will have a difficult time detecting the F-22.
AN/APG-77
The AN/APG-77 is built around an "Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)", which consists of an array of about 2,000 transmitters-receiver (T/R) modules that are linked together by high-speed processors. The AESA can obtain electronics intelligence; jam enemy electronic systems; provide surveillance; and perform secure voice and datalink communications, in principle all at the same time. The AESA can simultaneously emit several tight beams to perform different functions. One program official commented: "Anything that can be done with X-band RF can be done with that antenna."
The AN/APG-77 is not intended to give the F/A-22 a "standoff jamming" capability, such as that provided by electronic warfare aircraft like the Grumman EA-6B Prowler, blinding enemy radars over wide areas on a continuous basis. The AN/APG-77's mission is mainly to allow the F/A-22 to fight effectively while remaining difficult to detect. A standoff jamming platform, in contrast, can't help but advertise its presence. Between dealing with active threats, the AESA collects information on the "electronic order of battle (EOB)" in the operational area, locating electronic systems, classifying them, and alerting the pilot to possible threats or high-priority targets.
Link
AESA Electronics Attack
Longer term again, DEWs will become powerful enough to down aircraft, and radar processing power (well, computer CPU power really) will become powerful enough to discern the trailing vortices left by aircraft from the rest of clutter, rendering stealth history. So it will be something akin to Space Command - shoot down the little baddies with your lasers.
Perhaps, but you’re overlooking one simple detail, current offensive fighter technology will not stay stagnant. As the systems designed to detect and destroy fighters become more advance so will the capability of the fighters to evade those systems, its a delicate balance. In the 70’s or early 80’s one could have said that radar would become so powerful in the future that aircraft would be easy to track and destroy, well not so with the introduction of stealth technology.
[edit on 11-4-2006 by WestPoint23]
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