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Warning bells about anomalies in the fiscal sector were sounded in the summer of 2001, but not heeded. Among those who has since raised questions was Bill Bergman. As a financial market analyst for the Federal Reserve, he was assigned in 2003 to review the record of July and August of 2001. He noticed an unusual surge in the currency component of the M1 money supply (cash circulating outside of banks) during that period. The surge totaled over $5 billion above the norm for a two-month increase. The increase in August alone was the third largest single monthly increase since 1947, even after a significantly above-average month in July.
Another 9/11 Commission Misrepresentation
Footnote 28 of the Staff Monograph on Terrorist Financing from the official 9/11 Commission Report states that the National Money-laundering Strategy Report for 2001 “didn’t mention terrorist financing in any of its 50 pages.”
True? No. The NMLS Report mentions it 17 times. One gets the impression that the commission staff (under Philip Zelikow) was trying to paint the picture that there wasn’t a lot of co-operation between those involved in counterterrorism and the banking regulators in 2001. Why do they paint this picture, inasmuch as the contrary is the case? In fact, anti-terrorism was an important element of the National Money Strategy, and it was included and emphasized in its Report annually. It may have been part of the reason why the August 2, 2001 letter urging scrutiny of suspicious activity reports was issued in the first place.
The Fed: Prior Knowledge Of 9/11?
March 22, 2007 – William Bergman worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago from July 1990 until early 2004. He served as an economist for eight years, and then moved to a senior analyst position in a new department researching financial market and payment system risk policy issues. In late 2003, he was asked to consider an assignment in the money laundering area. Bergman accepted the assignment, underwent a background check, received credentials affording access to confidential banking information, and began working in the area. He was told that he was “part of the fight against terrorism” and that he “had been asking good questions.”
One aspect of the assignment to the money laundering area was for Bergman to develop a paper that, if accepted, could serve as a reference source for the Federal Reserve System.
Bergman decided to begin his new assignment by developing a 40 question Q&A in order to introduce himself and anyone else new to the money laundering area to the topic. He thought that the Q&A could serve as a primer that dealt with the fundamentals, including some history on money laundering, recent legal developments in the area, and the role of banking regulators.
After submitting his draft to a supervisor, Bergman received approval of his work and was told that it could be considered as a reference. However, in his Q&A, Bergman left one question without an answer. That is to say that Bergman submitted his 40 question Q&A with 40 questions, but only 39 answers. The supervisor that reviewed the draft told Bergman that he should continue his work by answering the only remaining unanswered question in the draft.
What prompted the unanswered question that Bergman incorporated into his draft? Bergman had noted that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve had issued supervisory letters to the 12 Reserve Banks in the weeks after September 11, 2001 urging scrutiny of suspicious activity reports in tracking terrorism activity and financing. However, Bergman also noticed that the Board of Governors had issued a similar letter, albeit one that did not refer explicitly to terrorism, on August 2, 2001. According to Bergman, terrorism and terrorist financing were known to be part of ‘suspicious activity’ however, and the August 2, 2001 supervisory letter clearly called for scrutiny of suspicious activity, which implies and includes the tracking of terrorism activity and financing. The unanswered question on Bergman’s 40 question Q&A asked why the Board had issued the August 2, 2001 letter – a very fair, logical, and important question that has yet to be answered to this day.
Given the fact that the supervisor gave him the green light and directed him to find the answer regarding the August 2, 2001 supervisory letter, Bergman decided that the best method to discover the answer was to contact the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve directly. In December 2003 he called the Board and inquired about the meaning and motivation behind the August 2, 2001 letter. Within two weeks his assignment was abruptly terminated and his credentials canceled. More here.
SEC SECRET PROBE OF STOCK DEALINGS BEFORE 9/11
Between August 26 and September 11, 2001, a group of speculators, identified by the American Securities and Exchange Commission as Israeli citizens, sold "short" a list of 38 stocks that could reasonably be expected to fall in value as a result of the pending attacks. These speculators operated out of the Toronto, Canada and Frankfurt, Germany, stock exchanges and their profits were specifically stated to be "in the millions of dollars."
Short selling of stocks involves the opportunity to gain large profits by passing shares to a friendly third party, then buying them back when the price falls. Historically, if this precedes a traumatic event, it is an indication of foreknowledge. It is widely known that the CIA uses the Promis software to routinely monitor stock trades as a possible warning sign of a terrorist attack or suspicious economic behavior. A week after the Sept.11 attacks, the London Times reported that the CIA had asked regulators for the Financial Services Authority in London to investigate the suspicious sales of millions of shares of stock just prior to the terrorist acts. It was hoped the business paper trail might lead to the terrorists.
Investigators from numerous government agencies are part of a clandestine but official effort to resolve the market manipulations There has been a great deal of talk about insider trading of American stocks by certain Israeli groups both in Canada and Germany between August 26 and the Sept.11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Lynne Howard, a spokeswoman for the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), stated that information about who made the trades was available immediately. "We would have been aware of any unusual activity right away. It would have been triggered by any unusual volume. There is an automated system called 'blue sheeting,' or the CBOE Market Surveillance System, that everyone in the business knows about. It provides information on the trades - the name and even the Social Security number on an account - and these surveillance systems are set up specifically to look into insider trading. The system would look at the volume, and then a real person would take over and review it, going back in time and looking at other unusual activity."
Why it was not investigated, is the same reason the SEC and IRS investigations on WorldCom and Enron were drastically hindered by Silverstein, while nothing was done about that either, when he ordered WTC 7 to be pulled.
For those who do not know, the Federal Reserve is privately held stock by a few powerful financial people, i.e. David Rockefeller. Attempting to locate all the shareholders is almost impossible. Privately held stock is not public information. It will not go public unless a corporation goes public with stocks and or bonds. Federal Reserve basically privately finances the US bureaucracy and controls the US economy, including interest rates, at the private owners' discretion
Originally posted by Swampfox46_1999
reply to post by OrionStars
Slap on the wrist? Did you pay attention to the sentences?????? Their professional lives are over.
The answer is, a lot of something was sold (or paid for), all of a sudden. A lot of something that is paid for in cash. Moreover, this money must have flowed from foreign money supplies into the US money supply. That means American interests sold a lot of something to foreigners for cash.
At the time I was also looking into and asking questions about currency flows. I thought these questions were worth pursuing, and was planning to raise them when I made the above-noted phone call to the Board of Governors. The currency component of M1 (Federal Reserve Notes circulating outside of banks) rose especially rapidly in July and August 2001. In fact, up to and including August 2001, that month (August 2001) was one of the three fastest growing months for the currency component of M1 since 1947, on a seasonally adjusted basis, even on the heels of significantly above-average growth in July 2001. Much of the July-August surge (over $5 billion above-average) seems to have been in the $100 denomination. Among other explanations, persons aware of any imminent terrorist attacks and concerned about possible asset seizures such as those that arose after the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and the 1998 embassy bombings could have been trying to liquidate their bank accounts in July and August 2001. The money trail could provide important clues about people aware of, if not responsible for, the attacks. I looked at some internal data bearing on this issue that was available to anyone within the Federal Reserve’s internal computer network; after going back to look at this important data again a week or two later, it was no longer freely available, but password protected.
Money supply is measured in a variety of ways, but the most widely cited measurements are M1, M2 and M3 -- the "monetary aggregates." M1 is chiefly currency in circulation and bank checking accounts. M2 is M1 plus savings accounts, CDs under $100,000, retail money-market fund shares and overnight repurchase agreements. M3 is M2 plus CDs over $100,000, institutional money-market funds and term repurchase agreements.