posted on Mar, 30 2007 @ 03:07 AM
1. The Iranians have been bagmen for Terrorism ever since Lebanon in the 1980s. The Embassy and the Marine Barracks were both their work with the
Syrians supplying muscle and maybe bomb makers through their own Lebanese militias. That they have now brought the focus directly to themselves
indicates a sea change whose nature is what should be troubling us.
2. All of Islam should have roundly decried and denounced 9/11. They should have opened their borders to an Interpol type taskforce and made it
clear than anyone aiding or abetting UBL was themselves in danger of being held accountable as a criminal. This has not occured. Nor will it ever
because these are religious wars in their public perspective as a quest for pan-muslim identity.
3. The more we yipe and yell and bark and growl, the less effective we seem to be because we question our own motives even as OUR public demands the
extremes of action even as our governments say pretty words. One side should meet the other and unified face be presented, one way or the other.
4. If the SAS take anyone, it will be high ranking Iranian leadership targets. This is one way to make it clear whom we hold responsible while
attacking ruling body-politick that cannot afford to be 'unheard or seen' in this trying time for them. The problem being that the Iranian
governmental system is one of bought loyalties within very tight knit groups approaching that of a mafia driven system so that we would face a triple
threat problem of:
a. Being unable to be certain that we had the right folks to end the threat.
b. Being certain that absent their covert control rod presence, the thugs of the IRG/AQ and other organizations would be able to exert self control
or defend 'their' hostages against thievery by other militias.
c. Being able to convince the world that tit for tat was justified when our own defense is based on the LEGALITY of presence in Iraqi waters. For we
truly have no right to be in Iran.
5. I doubt seriously if we have enough SDB to accomplish even a single mission. If this is to be the first of a small-IAM airwar, it will be GBU-38s
not 39s which are used. In any case, the B-2 as presently configured cannot carry more than 64 of them because they are loaded onto BRU-61 SMERs
using MPRL launcher stations (X4 X8 X2). You can drop more GBU-38 (80) from the CBM than you can small diameter bombs. Ordinarily, there would be a
significant risk of overflight hazarding to the Spirit but the Iranian IADS, as advertised, is actually very primitive.
6. An LHA/LHS driven MAGTF is about a batallion's worth of landable expeditionary force. Driven hard with no stops for casualties or logistics (one
of the principle advantages of wheeled over tracked onslaughts) we could easily put that many ashore and _drive_ to the nuclear facilities faster than
the Iranians could defend them. We /might/ be able to put an airlanded force on-site long enough to keep them from evacuating key materiel, equipment
and personnel until they go there. But to do so would mean an entire Air Wing assigned to each objective thrust. The key will be absolute and
unrelenting preemptive BAI which obliterates all structures and approaches to the lines of march so that Iranian die hard forces can never gain
prepositional contact with the Marines. The Navy can only sustain such a 'surge' conditioned operational scenario for a few days before they will
need to restock and rest their ground crews and then only if the USAF supplies tanking. 'Bringing Fuel To The Fight' is THE KEY means of
delineating how serious we are about projecting airpower. If tankers start to move up, it's game on.
7. In a part of the world where it is still okay to be so without being called 'racist', hypernationalism in Iran is a given. They will stage no
revolution in place so long as they believe they face a communal threat. Anymore than we would. Add to this the phantom existence of a 'culturati'
sensible-elite as anything more than window dressing in a political and cultural existence still driven by largely grass roots religious and political
influence inherent to regional loyalties and the few 'decent' folk there are going to remain tight lipped lest they take more than a verbal
lambasting for any belief which contravenes the official notion of their role as 'Young Kennedy' facade of Iranian sophistication.
8. The notion of defeating Iran, militarily is the same as that of defeating Iraq. The aftermath is as important as the conflict itself. If we
humiliate but do not deviscerate the Iranians, we will have made enemies for life. They have a bug up their ass about Persia the Great Empire,
despite the fact that it only persisted for a few hundred years almost 3,000 years ago. Losing that persistent self-image will be hard for them and
the chipped-shoulder effect will lead them to make ever more dangerous alliances. OTOH, if we stay in Iran (and I frankly don't see how we can, at
this point) we will equally lose face in the eyes of the UN which will either have to divorce itself from the U.S. and UK or be seen as impotent.
Specifically, we would have to secure Irans borders against any possible exportation of oil through FSU republics and that would be hard.
ARGUMENT:
War is about amalgamation of resources for most efficient exploitation by the whole. If you are not willing to fight for that, then entering the
quagmire of threat-dictated vendettas of morality becomes a game of diminishing returns in which you imbed yourself in their own headgames of mental
masturbatory 'justification for past ills'. If you ARE willing to fight for that, then 15 lives means nothing compared to the BILLIONS of dollars
needed and gained in resecuring Iran as an icon of Western oil dominance as currency control.
In either case, having soldiers operate under 'restrained' ROE puts you in a position whereby acting in the interests of lowered tension merely
makes them look weak enough to be taken. This is why soldiers make for lousy diplomacy.
Given this, the 15 Brits screwed themselves when they failed to fight back then allowed themselves to be exploited rather than face torture by
refusing all attempts to exploit their capture or extort confessions. Because the perception of 'weak as a smoking woman' is already a given in the
Arab and Muslim worlds.
So unless you are equally willing to secure a loss of Iranian face which precludes any perception of a 'technology wins where the righteous suffer'
backlash (i.e. kill people, mano a mano, in numbers sufficient to prove that we ARE the stronger empire as much as technology base) that drives them
onwards towards possession of nukes and other high tech toys, you are in a bad position by which to stage a smash and grab type forced entry
operation.
Which is all that we can hope to do at this point. Do I think it's time to make the Iranians feel a physical twinge? Yep. And it should begin via
another Praying Mantis type sinking of their Navy and destruction of their offshore assets. Along with deliberate hijacking of their telecomms so as
to deny the population the comfort of propoganda from their leadership as a soothing reassurance of national integrity as much as war chant.
These things could be readily done with existing forces in place (and an EC-130 or three).
Past which we must create a scenario which drives them to madness wondering into which black hole of absent awareness of their own political landscape
we will drive the first direct assault.
That this must happen /in spite/ of what may be done to the 15 is a given. Because, in the end, we must show these 'Persians' not how much we care
for our own. But how readily we will sacrifice them to underline our position. Us big dawgs. You very little pups.
At the same time, we must prepare, globally, for assymetric counter attacks and in particular harden ourselves for ethnic/religious minority revolts
in our own countries as 'terrorist' scenarios which make the Japanese internment in WWII actually seem like a good idea.
CONCLUSION:
It will get ugly. And it will get brutal. And much of whatever polished image we hold of ourselves and our moral motives in the world will have to
be shed. But because it will be a stepped escalation process, it will seem like we are applying moderated force 'to prevent future specific
equivalent events by rogue paramilitary forces' even as it shows in no small way that we /could/ do more to the national government which defacto
backs them.