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British research and development company, which claims to have invented a method to detect stealth aircraft, has clammed up on details about its technology.
The system uses a traditional mobile phone network to detect stealth
aircraft as they pass silently through the ether. Although the aircraft have
advanced coatings which absorb conventional radar signals, they apparently still reflect back enough radiation emitted from mobile phone masts to be detected by special ground receivers.
The receivers are linked to a central computer which - in sync with a GPS
satellite - is able to position the aircraft to within 10 metres.
The central computer could conceivably be a simple notebook operated by
ground troops. Once exposed, the stealth aircraft would be easy prey for
convential ground-to-air missiles.
Disabling the system would require the complete destuction of a target
country's mobile phone mast network - in reality, an impossible task.
Considering the potential of this system to completely undermine the US's
stealth aircraft programme, it might be reasonable to assume that the
military there is taking a close interest. Not so, according to Roke Manor
Research, despite claims by the Daily Telegraph.
According to the Telegraph Peter Lloyd, head of projects at the laboratory's
sensor department, said: "I cannot comment in detail because it is a
classified matter, but let's say the US military is very interested."
The Telegraph article claims that, according to 'military sources', the Serbs may have used a crude version of the same technology to shoot down an
F-117 during the Kosovo crisis.
"Low-frequency radars, destined to become the base element of any detection system against LO aircraft and guided missiles, enjoy increasing confidence of military hardware developers, as computing capabilities of modern radars and sophistication of computing algorithms are rapidly growing and allow to identify even the smallest characteristics of aircraft designs using "Stealth" technology.
A recently published article from Aviation Week & Space Technology, based on the interview with a US Navy pilot, who participated in the planning of strikes against Iraqi air defense during the early stages of the operation Desert Storm, indicates that there is "nothing invisible in the radar frequency range below 2GHz"and with a well-designed low-frequency radar it is possible to "see even a dragonfly at a great distance".
Soviet-built low-frequency "Bar Lock" and "Spoonrest" radars were used for detecting targets at great distances. These radars operated in the UHF and L-band frequency ranges when it was possible to make use the half-wave resonance effect. This effect can be observed when the length of an aircraft or a cruise missile roughly corresponds to the half of the wavelength, thus creating phase-coherent reflections from the terminal points of the target. Dipole reflector, developed during the Second World War, used this effect to jam radars of that era. Metallic film, cut into strips of the length corresponding to half of the wavelength, resonate with the incoming radar signal, creating an illusion of a large target. Using the resonance effect it is relatively easy to detect even the most advanced LO aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
The one country that surely doesn't need to find out where Stealth bombers might be is buying a radar system that is claimed to be able to detect them.
The USA is reported to be negotiating to buy a set of Vera radars from the Czechs, the quid pro quo being that a deal to sell them to China does not go ahead.
Vera is the successor to the Tamara radar system, which has been alleged to have been responsible for the loss of an F-117 in Kosovo.
The rationale behind the current proposed US purchase is that the US wants to test the radar's effectiveness.
Stealth engineers at Roke Manor Research design both stealth and covert antennas, as well as developing applications that analyse the radar signature of stealth antennas and platforms that host stealth antennas.
We use our world renowned Epsilon™ for radar signature analysis and design hybrid solutions using Epsilon™ in conjunction with other rigorous solvers.
Epsilon™ is a comprehensive radar signature assessment and diagnostics tool, used to address land, sea and air platforms.
Since 1986 we have provided our customers in this field with the solutions that they need to be world leaders. We take design concepts, on paper or CAD format, to analyse the radar signatures. Epsilon™ has an international reputation and is probably the most widely used radar cross-section prediction code.
Much of the work is computational electro-magnetic based and has applications in both civil and defence sectors for electro-magnetic compatibility and radiation hazard assessment.
We have also developed Victory™, in conjunction with DERA, software to exploit computational physics skills and computational electro-magnetics in physical level simulations.
Roke Manor Research's stealth engineering group's experience means that it has become increasingly involved in counter-stealth projects. We are currently involved in the development of next generation radar systems to counter sophisticated stealth technology.
We are working on systems that are increasing our expertise in ultra wideband systems. Areas of application for this technology are in impulse radar and future generation communications systems. In particular, the group has developed signal sources and antennas covering the 1-40 GHz band
Originally posted by Harlequin
those articles are all dated at least 2001 and some are even older
Scientists of the Bangalore-based Indian Institute of Science (IISc) are developing the next generation radars.
These high-precision radars would also be able to detect rain drops, hails or ice flakes at a large distance with high accuracy for meteorological studies, he said, adding "A single drop of rain having a diameter of one millimeter at a distance of 100 km can be traced by these radars."
The only bottleneck is that the radars require very high computing facility for practical use. "With our supercomputer, which is faster than US Cray supercomputer, it takes about nine hours to analyze the data," Balakrishnan disclosed.
A new mode of computing is therefore necessary to accelerate the practical use, he said. Probably quantum computing, which is still in the laboratory stage and is believed to be the future of computing, would be the right technique for such radars.
The team is also working on an advanced version of the radar which can make the so-called "invisible aircraft" visible. Normal radars fail to see the type of aircraft, regularly used by advanced countries for surveillance, as they are coated with a paint which makes them invisible to the radar.
But in their movement they produce waves which, at least theoretically, can be detected just as the movement of a ship can be traced by observing the waves it creates. "We are trying to develop computational algorithm for this purpose," Balakrishnan said.
Sensors to locate targets pose a particular problem for stealth aircraft. The large radars used by conventional aircraft would obviously compromise the position of a stealth aircraft. Air-to-air combat would rely on passive detection of transmissions by hostile aircraft, as well as infrared tracking.
Aircraft for attacking targets on the ground face a similar problem. FLIR can be used for precise aiming at targets whose general location is known, but they are poorly suited for searching for targets over a wide area. A radar on the aircraft to scan for potential targets would compromise its position. In order to locate targets, stealth aircraft may rely on an airborne laser radar, although such a sensor may prove of limited utility in poor weather.
There are limits to the utility of stealth techniques. Since the radar cross-section of an aircraft depends on the angle from which it is viewed, an aircraft will typically have a much smaller RCS when viewed from the front or rear than when viewed from the side or from above. In general stealth aircraft are designed to minimize their frontal RCS. But it is not possible to contour the surface of an aircraft to reduce the RCS equally in all directions, and reductions in the frontal RCS may lead to a larger RCS from above. Thus while a stealth aircraft may be difficult to track when it is flying toward a ground-based radar or another aircraft at the same altitude, a high-altitude airborne radar or a space-based radar may have an easier time tracking it.
Another limitation of stealth aircraft is their vulnerability to detection by bi-static radars. The contouring of a stealth aircraft is designed to avoid reflecting a radar signal directly back in the direction of the radar transmitter. But the transmitter and receiver of a bi-static radar are in separate locations indeed, a single transmitter may be used by radar receivers scattered over a wide area. This greatly increases the odds that at least one of these receivers will pickup a reflected signal. The prospects for detection of stealth aircraft by bi-static radar are further improved if the radar transmitter is space-based, and thus viewing the aircraft from above, the direction of its largest radar cross section.
Several analysts claim stealth aircraft will be vulnerable to detection by infrared search and track systems (IRST). The natural heating of an aircraft's surface makes it visible to this type of system. The faster and aircraft flies, the warmer it gets, and thus, the easier to detect through infrared means. One expert asserts "if an aircraft deviates from its surroundings by only one degree centigrade, you will be able to detect it at militarily useful ranges." In fact, both the Russian MiG-29 and Su-27 carry IRST devices, which indicates that the Russians have long targeted this as a potential stealth weakness.
Stealth aircraft are even more vulnerable to multiple sensors used in tandem. By using an IRST to track the target and a Ladar (laser radar), or a narrow beam, high-power radar to paint the target superior data is provided.
The most basic potential limitation of stealth, is its vulnerability to visual detection. Since the F-22 is 25-30 percent larger than the F-15 and 40 percent larger than the F-18, for example, it will be much easier to detect visually from ranges on the order of 10 miles. When one considers that stealth characteristics will drastically reduce the effectiveness of several types of guided air-to-air missiles, fighter engagements will probably move back to the visual range arena. In this context, the cumbersome F-22 would be at a distinct disadvantage.
Originally posted by backtoreality
Stealth Spy, interesting links you have provided. Glad to see you are still denying "ignorence".
Originally posted by Stealth Spy
The one country that surely doesn't need to find out where Stealth bombers might be is buying a radar system that is claimed to be able to detect them.
The USA is reported to be negotiating to buy a set of Vera radars from the Czechs, the quid pro quo being that a deal to sell them to China does not go ahead.
Vera is the successor to the Tamara radar system, which has been alleged to have been responsible for the loss of an F-117 in Kosovo.
The rationale behind the current proposed US purchase is that the US wants to test the radar's effectiveness.