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It is the policy of the Department of Defense to use the security classification categories and the applicable sections of E.O. 12958 and its implementing ISOO Directives to limit access to classified information on a "need-to-know" basis only to those personnel who have been determined to meet requisite personnel security requirements. Further, it is DoD policy to rigorously apply the need-to-know principle in the normal course of controlling collateral classified information so that Special Access Program (SAP) controls will be used only when exceptional security measures are required based on threat and/or vulnerability (e.g. sensitivity or value of the information) associated with the SAP. Need-to-know principles shall also be applied within SAPs. In this context, SAPs may be created or continued only on a specific finding that:
a. The vulnerability of, or threat to, the specific information to be protected is exceptional;
b. Normal criteria for determining access to the assigned level of classification are not sufficient to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure;
c. Careful consideration is given to: assessing the vulnerability, the sensitivity of the information to be protected, and the adequacy of needed safeguarding requirements; and/or
d. The establishment of the SAP is required by statute.
...
8-102 Control and Administration
a. SAPs shall be controlled and managed in accordance with DoD Directive O-5205.7.
e. All personnel accessed to DoD SAPs shall notify the Director, DoD SAPCO, in a timely fashion, when briefing or providing DoD SAP material to any members of Congress or congressional staff. No DoD contractor entity, contractor employee, contractor representative, or consultant shall provide SAP material to any members of Congress or congressional staff without Director, DoD SAPCO, approval.
No copies shall be stored outside DoD repositories or control without the approval of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Lesson 3.
2: Responsibility – Completing an NdA
The NdA is a contract between you and the U.S. Government that creates a lifetime contractual obligation to protect classified information
. The importance of this contract, and your resulting responsibilities to national security, cannot be overstated.
The NdA specifically indicates that the failure to properly protect classified information may result in several criminal or administrative sanctions as outlined by various governing documents.
Call Out Box:
“I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, ...of classified information by me could cause damage...to the United States. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations...”
Call Out Box:
“In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations of...”
• 18 United States Code (USC) 793 / 794 / 798 of the Espionage Act
• 18 USC 641(Theft of Government Property)
• 50 USC 421of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act Individuals who have been granted access to classified information must understand their obligations to safeguard classified information. You must also be aware of additional responsibilities, including:
• Properly classifying and handling information
• Reporting unauthorized disclosures
• Obtaining proper authorization prior to communicating with the media
• Submitting all material related to your position for pre-publication review prior to public release
The type of sanction which can be levied depends on the nature and severity of the disclosure.
Administrative
Administrative sanctions include:
• Suspension without pay
• Revocation of clearance
• Termination of employment
Federal statute specifically allows the heads of agencies to terminate an employee if they believe the termination is necessary in the interest of national security.
Criminal
Criminal sanctions include:
•Incarceration
•Fines
•Death penalty (under very specific circumstances)
Unauthorized retention or disclosure of national defense information
Section 793 of the Espionage Act discusses the unauthorized retention or disclosure of national defense information to any person not entitled to receive it. If you improperly disclose or retain national defense information you can be fined, incarcerated for up to ten years, or both.
Unauthorized disclosure to a foreign government
The Espionage Act of 1917 is best recognized for Section 794 which prohibits the disclosure of classified information to a foreign government. If you disclose classified information to a foreign government, you can be punished by death or incarcerated for any term of years up to life.
Additional Sanctions
In accordance with the Hiss Act which was passed in 1954 and amended in 1961, an individual convicted of certain offenses, including the provisions of the Espionage Act, may not be paid a federal annuity or pension.
(1) Security Violation. Any incident that involves the loss, compromise or suspected compromise of classified information. Additionally, (1) Any knowing, willful, or negligent action that could reasonably be expected to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information; (2) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to classify or continue the classification of information contrary to the requirements of E.O. 13526 or its implementing directives; or (3) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to create to continue a SAP contrary to the requirements of E.O. 13526.
originally posted by: Annee
originally posted by: shooterbrody
a reply to: Annee
When dealing with classified info intent and mistakes do not exist. She signed all those rights away long ago.
And who decides what is applicable and what is not?
You?
originally posted by: Annee
originally posted by: IAMTAT
originally posted by: Annee
originally posted by: IAMTAT
originally posted by: Annee
originally posted by: introvert
originally posted by: Annee
originally posted by: introvert
originally posted by: Annee
originally posted by: introvert
originally posted by: xuenchen
a reply to: introvert
Blumenthal's emails to Hillary were classified the second they hit her server address.
But nobody marked them like they were supposed to.
Not true. The emails by definition do not meet the standards for classification under part 2 of Section 1.1 of the EO.
Has there been any actual confirmed statement or announcement from the investigation?
Other then, someone said.
No. We're just going off of very little information. That has been my point through all of this. We need a lot more information before we say she is guilty of anything.
Yes, I agree.
And there's the question of mishap, or intent.
I expect new regulations may come out of this, but not much else.
New regulations have already been put in place after Hillary's email scandal began.
It is my opinion that unless her emails contained some absolutely earth shattering info, no charges will come out of this. This audit report highlights the issues within the entire system and it is not limited to just Hillary.
From everything I've read, it seems Hillary was very dedicated in doing her job.
The objection seems to be in how she did it.
"Dedicated to her job"? LOL!
UNITY MOMENT:
Can we ALL, at least, agree she's been lying through her teeth?
We Now Know Hillary Lied Multiple Times About Her Email Server
We do not really know anything. You're believing what you want to believe
I read a lot of comments by people who worked with her. They all thought she was a very intelligent, hard, and dedicated worker. Even those who did not like her or agree with her.
You're offering ambiguous anecdotes to support your point.
You offering me a signed official statement of facts from the Federal Government?
The 37 pages include messages recently described by a key intelligence official as concerning so-called "special access programs" - a highly restricted subset of classified material that could point to confidential sources or clandestine programs like drone strikes or government eavesdropping.
The government officials said that discussions in an email thread about a New York Times article — the officials did not say which article — contained sensitive information about the intelligence surrounding the C.I.A.’s drone activities, particularly in Pakistan.
At the center of that argument, the officials said, is a “top secret” program of the Central Intelligence Agency that is anything but secret. It is the agency’s long effort to track and kill suspected terrorists overseas with armed drones, which has been the subject of international debates, numerous newspaper articles, television programs and entire books.
The officials say the emails included relatively "innocuous" conversations by State Department officials about the CIA drone program, which technically is considered a "Special Access Program" because officials are briefed on it only if they have a "need to know."
As a legal matter, the U.S. government does not acknowledge that the CIA kills militants with drones. The fact that the CIA conducts drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, however, has long been known. Senior officials, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein and former CIA Director Leon Panetta, have publicly discussed CIA drones.
In 2009, Feinstein disclosed during a public hearing that the U.S. was flying Predator drones out of a base in Pakistan. Also that year, Panetta called drone strikes in Pakistan "the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership." Various public web sites continue to keep track of each CIA drone strike.
Everyone has times in their lives that they exercise poor judgement. That does not mean some are not qualified for certain jobs.
originally posted by: interupt42
a reply to: introvert
Everyone has times in their lives that they exercise poor judgement. That does not mean some are not qualified for certain jobs.
When it comes to Nations Security and such bad judgement you bet your skippy it does.
If I had done such a thing with Top Secret information I would be immediately walked of site and black listed with gov't contracts not promoted to be in the running to be the CEO of the company.
She should be reprimanded
not promoted.
originally posted by: introvert
originally posted by: interupt42
a reply to: introvert
Everyone has times in their lives that they exercise poor judgement. That does not mean some are not qualified for certain jobs.
When it comes to Nations Security and such bad judgement you bet your skippy it does.
If I had done such a thing with Top Secret information I would be immediately walked of site and black listed with gov't contracts not promoted to be in the running to be the CEO of the company.
We don't have any context to go with these emails. As I have just posted above, there is much doubt as to what information has been classified and why.
.
Don't get too far ahead of yourself here
ORIGIN OF KEY CLINTON EMAILS FROM REPORT ARE A MYSTERY
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton was supposed to have turned over all work-related emails to the State Department to be released to the public. But an agency audit found at least three emails never seen before - including Clinton's own explanation of why she wanted her emails kept private.
After 14 months of public scrutiny and skepticism over Clinton's motives in keeping her emails secret, new questions emerged Thursday.
They centered on her apparent failure to turn over a November 2010 message in which she worried that her personal messages could become accessible to outsiders, along with two other messages a year later that divulged possible security weaknesses in the home email system she used while secretary of state.
The Clinton campaign has previously denied that her home server was breached, but newly revealed emails show an aide worried it could have been compromised.
The existence of these previously unreleased messages - which appear to have been found among electronic files of four former top Clinton State Department aides - renews concerns that Clinton was not completely forthcoming when she turned over a trove of 55,000 pages of work-related emails.
Don't bury your head in the sand with her proven track record for scandals, lying, conflict of interest , and coincidences that end up in investigations but her always on the winning side.
Just because she was under sniper fire and her Husband doesn't know the meaning of "is" don't feel sorry for them.
originally posted by: MOMof3
a reply to: burntheships
Which laws?
What has she been convicted of? Don't use conspiracy in a debate where logic and facts should be presented.
Also this "what has she been convicted of" argument is just BS and deflection. What does conviction have to do with innocence at her level?
Nobody is saying she has been convicted, what people are saying is that she and her husband have a proven track record of being liars and riddled with questionable circumstances, and conflict of interest. Enough so, that any reasonable person can see she shouldn't be running to be POTUS.
That is your opinion based on what you have been led to believe.
1. She lied about being under sniper fire
2. He lied under oath and was disbarred from practising law
3. You already agreed that she used extreme bad judgement with the email server.
Question 13: What is the threshold of liability for violating the nondisclosure provisions of the SF 312?
Answer:
A party to the SF 312, SF 189 or SF 189-A may be liable for disclosing “classified information” only if he or she knows or reasonably should know that: (a) the marked or unmarked information is classified, or meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination; and (b) his or her action will result, or reasonably could result in the unauthorized disclosure of that information. In no instance may a party to the SF 312, SF 189 or SF 189-A be liable for violating its nondisclosure provisions by disclosing information when, at the time of the disclosure, there is no basis to suggest, other than pure speculation, that the information is classified or in the process of a classification determination.
...
Question 19: If information that a signer of the SF 312 knows to have been classified appears in a public source, for example, in a newspaper article, may the signer assume that the information has been declassified and disseminate it elsewhere?
Answer:
No. Information remains classified until it has been officially declassified. Its disclosure in a public source does not declassify the information. Of course, merely quoting the public source in the abstract is not a second unauthorized disclosure. However, before disseminating the information elsewhere or confirming the accuracy of what appears in the public source, the signer of the SF 312 must confirm through an authorized official that the information has, in fact, been declassified. If it has not, further dissemination of the information or confirmation of its accuracy is also an unauthorized disclosure.
Trying a different tack because you realize your other (which was an attempted deflection of anyway) wasn't working. Not gonna slip past me.
Question 23: Are Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data, classified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, included in the definition for “ classified information, ” as used in the SF 312?
Answer: Yes.