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Originally posted by Xarian6
reply to post by rockymcgilicutty
this is why i call NK the proxy/pivot point.. and why we should watch this as a signal of what's to come.
However, North Korea has a track record for raising tensions and then backing down. In particular, Madden said this is not the first time North Korea has canceled the armistice and that today is the sixth time that it has publicized severing a military communication hotline with South Korea. “A lot of what we’re reading or hearing from Pyongyang has appeared in previous iterations, going back to the 1990s”, Madden explained. “Does this rule out a provocative activity? No. We may see some artillery shells being fired in the West Sea, a possible naval skirmish or an incursion by the KPA Navy across the NLL, a possible short-range missile launch.”
Originally posted by w3thepatient
Should be noted here for balance, North K track record for backing down is 6 from 6.
However, North Korea has a track record for raising tensions and then backing down. In particular, Madden said this is not the first time North Korea has canceled the armistice and that today is the sixth time that it has publicized severing a military communication hotline with South Korea. “A lot of what we’re reading or hearing from Pyongyang has appeared in previous iterations, going back to the 1990s”, Madden explained. “Does this rule out a provocative activity? No. We may see some artillery shells being fired in the West Sea, a possible naval skirmish or an incursion by the KPA Navy across the NLL, a possible short-range missile launch.”
source
Originally posted by CosmicCitizen
We have nukes in South Korea....and if the North starts it then the South (allied with the US) may finish it. I am sure that this scenario has already been discussed with China at high levels to avoid potential problems after the fact.
Originally posted by CaptainBeno
reply to post by DarKPenguiN
Fight better?
How, they have to actually cross the border first (and they won't) then we have them trapped.
Hell will rain down from the skies, they will go to the mountains, winter will come, they will get cut off, we will park off the coast and bombard with munitions until they say sorry.
Finish / the end
There isn't really a track record of bluffing with Kim Jong Un.
Originally posted by CaptainBeno
reply to post by DarKPenguiN
Sorry, I forgot to mention that I had my tongue in my cheek whilst typing
Originally posted by CaptainBeno
ok, again............................does he have nukes?
How can you have a nuclear war with no nukes? We ain't nuking no one.
As of February 2005 Defense Intelligence Agency analysts were reported to believe that North Korea may already have produced as many as 12 to 15 nuclear weapons. This would imply that by the end of 2004 North Korea had produced somewhere between four and eight uranium bombs [on top of the seven or eight plutonium bombs already on hand]. The DIA's estimate was at the high end of an intelligence community-wide assessment of North Korea's nuclear arsenal completed in early 2005. The CIA lowballed the estimate at two to three bombs, which would suggest an assessment that the DPRK either had not reprocessed a significant amount of plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed from storage in early 2003, or had not fabricated a significant number of weapons from whatever amount of plutonium had been reprocessed. The Department of Energy's analysis put North Korea's stockpile somewhere in between, which would be consistent with the roughly 7 or 8 plutonium bombs that could be produced from all existing plutonium stocks, with no uranium bombs. If one assumes that the DPRK produced sufficient plutonium for eight bombs, and expended one of these bombs in a test in Pakistan in 1998, then as of 2005 their plutonium bomb inventory would be seven weapons. Taking the mid-point of the DIA's estimate of between four and eight uranium bombs, the plausible uranium bomb stockpile as of early 2005 would be six weapons, increasing at a rate of one bomb every two months. Thus the early 2005 stockpile would be 13 weapons, growing to about 20 weapons by the end of the year.