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Mainstream media misrepresents latest International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) report. What that report actually says is there is no evidence
Iran has diverted any material for a nuclear weapons program. And even
more important: Much of Iran's uranium stockpile has been converted into
a form that would be very difficult to use in a nuclear weapon.
"The agency had found that Iran had "converted much of the new material
to metal form for use in a nuclear research reactor." The Washington
Post even quoted an unnamed Obama administration official acknowledging
that the converted 19.75 percent enriched uranium could not be "further
enriched to weapons-grade material." But this admission appears deep
within the article." ☛ IAEA Iran Report: Little New except Reduced
Bomb-Making Capacity - Tehran Bureau
FRONTLINE
PBS
www.pbs.org...
"The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report made public
Thursday reveals that Iran has actually reduced the amount of 20-percent
enriched uranium available for any possible "breakout" to weapons grade
enrichment over the last three months rather than increasing it." ☛ IPS
-- IAEA Report Shows Iran Reduced Its Breakout Capacity
Inter Press
Service
IAEA Report Shows Iran Reduced Its Breakout Capacity
"Not only is any Uranium Iran has below weapons grade but, according to
the new IAEA report, Iran has today less enriched Uranium that could
quickly be converted into a nuclear weapon than it had in May 2012, the
time of the IAEA's last report (GOV/2012/23) on the issue." ☛ IAEA:
Iranian "Nuclear Danger" Decreased
www.moonofalabama.org...
Iran has now 10% less "dangerous stuff" in the form of further easily enrichable 20% UF6 than it had in May 2012. Further enriched this stockpile would not be enough by half to create even one nuclear device. The "imminent danger" of a "nuclear Iran" has thereby decreased.
The answer is that the IAEA expects Iran to allow its inspectors to visit an Iranian military site at Parchin, which falls outside the Safeguards Agreement between both sides. The agency’s request is simply based on reports given to the IAEA by obscure sources. Iran’s answer, on the other hand, has been totally unequivocal.
Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, efforts to resolve all outstanding substantive issues have achieved no concrete results: Iran, in an initial declaration,10 simply dismissed the Agency’s concerns in connection with the issues identified in Section C of the Annex to GOV/2011/65; Iran has not responded to the Agency’s initial questions on Parchin and the foreign expert; Iran has not provided the Agency with access to the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access; and Iran has been conducting activities at that location that will significantly hamper the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification. Notwithstanding Mr Jalili’s statement referred to above, agreement on the structured approach has yet to materialize.
Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. All of these activities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.
The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided. Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology. As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.
Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has
not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is under Agency safeguards.
Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency has not been provided with further access to the plant. As a result, the Agency is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the plant appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not permitted the Agency to take samples from the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).
Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of those obligations, although the facilities are under Agency safeguards. Iran has stated that it is conducting these activities in order to make fuel for research reactors.
The Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency’s own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that, prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing. Since November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information which further corroborates the analysis contained in the aforementioned Annex.
Satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the containment vessel. However, since the Agency’s first request for access to this location, satellite imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at this location. A number of satellite images of the location since February 2012 show: large amounts of liquid ‘run off’ emanating from the building in which the vessel is housed; equipment in open storage immediately outside the building; the removal of external fixtures from the building itself; and the presence of light and heavy vehicles. Satellite imagery shows that, as of May 2012, five other buildings or structures at the location had been demolished, and power lines, fences and all paved roads had been removed. Significant ground scraping and landscaping have been undertaken over an extensive area at and around the location, with new dirt roads established.
Satellite images from August 2012 show the containment vessel building shrouded. In light of these extensive activities, the Agency’s ability to verify the information on which its concerns are based has been adversely affected and, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability to conduct effective verification will have been significantly hampered.
Contrary to its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, which provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier.
The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards
agreement that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities.
As previously reported, Iran’s response to Agency requests that Iran confirm or provide further information regarding its stated intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in “due time” rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.
Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.
There you've got me. I don't know about any violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If you've got time, help me out.
I find it funny (not literally) that there are how many nations with nuclear weapons that are not abiding to the NPT.
I always thought that disarmament agreements were reached between two or more countries. I don't think Israel is covered by any.
It is not only about non-proliferation, but about disarmament as well.
Actually, they're doing nothing about them. For two reasons, no matter what ATSers think, the world as a whole hasn't been afraid that Israel would be a problem, at least not before Iran's behavior. Second, Israel has no obligation to anyone to show it's weapons. They've never agreed to and they don't have to.
Is this more of "do as I say and not what I do"? What are they doing about Israel's nuclear weapons?
My understanding is that a signatory has to give three months notice. (I'm not absolutely sure on that.) It would be interesting to see how the world would react during that time.
Is that all it takes? Either don't sign it in the first place or drop out of it?
Originally posted by superman2012
reply to post by charles1952
I find it funny (not literally) that there are how many nations with nuclear weapons that are not abiding to the NPT. It is not only about non-proliferation, but about disarmament as well. Is this more of "do as I say and not what I do"? What are they doing about Israel's nuclear weapons? North Korea's? Is that all it takes? Either don't sign it in the first place or drop out of it?
Originally posted by OccamsRazor04
Originally posted by superman2012
reply to post by charles1952
I find it funny (not literally) that there are how many nations with nuclear weapons that are not abiding to the NPT. It is not only about non-proliferation, but about disarmament as well. Is this more of "do as I say and not what I do"? What are they doing about Israel's nuclear weapons? North Korea's? Is that all it takes? Either don't sign it in the first place or drop out of it?
Neither Israel or NK are signatories, therefore they can not be held to it. Iran is. It would be like me agreeing to allow my landlord to inspect the property once a week and then you trying to hold me to the same agreement. Doesn't work that way, I didn't sign on the dotted line. You did.
Israel did not sign on the dotted line. Iran did.