9/11 Intercepted

Originally posted by Boone 870
reply to post by ThePostExaminer

 

TPE, earlier you linked to to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction regarding military procedures. Now you're pointing out that ATC and American Airlines were slow to react, how are the two related?

This reply is for hooper as well.

I'm just warming up Boone. I wanted to show how, from every level through each "chain of command" from civil to military, there were links in the chain who purposely stalled and dithered to enable the operations carried out that day.

I mean, hooper keeps harping on about the "900 second" gap between the first definitive signs that an aircraft was allegedly in distress and pilots being "suited up". What they actually did after they "suited up" is another story.

Six minutes to realize that there was proof positive that an alleged hijack was under way and nine minutes before fighter pilots were told to even make a move. Why?? What happened in those vital first minutes?

I personally can't wait to get to "Flight 93" to see the jive party starting in here.

reply to post by ThePostExaminer


Are you ever going to explain why Boobie tampered with the radar video cartoon images to make it look like there was a plane swap ?

Exactly how close did these planes get ?

Originally posted by waypastvne
Exactly how close did these planes get ?

They won't answer so I will. The closest they got to one another was 15 nmi with a 20,000 foot separation in altitude.

reply to post by ThePostExaminer
How exactly was the military response stalled by not following the the protocols in CJCSI3610.01A?

Originally posted by 911files


They won't answer so I will. The closest they got to one another was 15 nmi with a 20,000 foot separation in altitude.

Then Boobie should re edit his video and remove the plane swap innuendo.

reply to post by ThePostExaminer

Six minutes to realize that there was proof positive that an alleged hijack was under way and nine minutes before fighter pilots were told to even make a move. Why?? What happened in those vital first minutes?

Just for giggles - what do you think should have happened? Should the person at the reservation center immeadiately called the President? 9 minutes to respond.

Originally posted by hooper

Six minutes to realize that there was proof positive that an alleged hijack was under way and nine minutes before fighter pilots were told to even make a move. Why?? What happened in those vital first minutes?

Just for giggles - what do you think should have happened? Should the person at the reservation center immeadiately called the President? 9 minutes to respond.

Aren't the air traffic controllers supposed to run outside, draw their pistols, and shoot at the planes, the second they know they're hijacked ? Isn't that what we pay them for ?

Originally posted by hooper
reply to post by ThePostExaminer

 

Six minutes to realize that there was proof positive that an alleged hijack was under way and nine minutes before fighter pilots were told to even make a move. Why?? What happened in those vital first minutes?

Just for giggles - what do you think should have happened? Should the person at the reservation center immeadiately called the President? 9 minutes to respond.

Yes, let's giggle hooper.

The "problem" you guys seem to be having is that you don't differentiate between the joint failure of the FAA and NORAD in losing so much time when it took only six minutes according to official sources to identify an allegedly hijacked aircraft. Why did it take a further "9 minutes" to notify NEADS?


@08:34am

Also at 8:34 A.M., in an attempt to get fighter aircraft airborne to track Flight 11, Boston Center's managers decided not to wait for the request for military assistance to be passed up the FAA chain of command, and took the initiative by calling a manager at the FAA Cape Cod facility. They asked the Cape Cod manager to contact Otis Air Force Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts to get fighters airborne to "tail” the hijacked aircraft

911 Commission Report

@08:33am a call by Boston to scramble fighters is made to OTIS Air Force Base

Cape Approach: Cape Approach.

Bueno: Hey Cape, ah, Dan Bueno callin’ from Boston Center. Hey we’ve got a situation with American 11, a possible hijack.

Cape Approach: American 11?

Bueno: Yes sir, departed Boston going to LAX, right now he’s out to Albany, like to scramble some fighters to go tail him.

Cape Approach: Well, Ok. Well, we’ll talk to Otis here.

Bueno: Ok, and (indistinct) if you want just depart and, ah, we’ll put a flight plan in for him and, ah, we’ll aim him toward, ah, Hampton direct.

Cape Approach: American 11 (indistinct).

Bueno: Ok.

Cape Approach: And right now he’s (indistinct) Albany.

 

08:35am

Kingston Sector: Yeah, heads up for you here. I’ve got an American 11. He’s right over Kingston right now. He’s at, we think he’s at flight level two nine zero. There appears to be some possible problem with him. He’s departed Boston, going to ah Los Angeles. But, ah, somewhere along the way here he took a left turn and he’s not talking to anyone. Hasn’t talked to anybody in about 75, maybe a hundred miles. So, he’s southeast bound right now, so he’s going to pass just, like, over Carmel, and again, we don’t have a verified altitude. We think he’s at flight level two nine zero, we’re tryin’ to verify that now.

Kennedy Sector: You have a code on him?

Kingston Sector: Ah, no, he’s flying x-ray, there, there’s no code on the guy. He’s flying x-ray, and we approved that, so he’s a primary now, right over Kingston, flight level two nine zero, supposedly.
 

First notification received by the military

Note: According to the 911 Commission Report, the first that the incident was reported to the military was 18 minutes after the alleged loss of communication with the cockpit. Not 15 minutes as hooper claims.


08:37am

Boston Center called the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and notified NEADS about the suspected hijacking of Flight 11. 

The United States' military defense of its homeland on 9/11 began with this call. Indeed, this was the first notification received by the military — at any level — that Flight 11 had been hijacked.

The report of the hijack was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr at NEADS, who was stationed in the Battle Cab in preparation for a scheduled NORAD exercise. Col. Marr confirmed that the hijacking was "real-world" then ordered fighter pilots at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts to battle-stations.

Col. Marr then phoned Maj. General Larry Arnold, commanding General of the First Air Force and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) commander. Col. Man advised him of the situation, and sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters in response to the reported hijacking. General Arnold instructed Col. Marr "to go ahead and scramble the airplanes and we'd get permission later. And the reason for that is that the procedure... if you follow the book, is they [law enforcement officials] go to the duty officer of the national military center, who in turn makes an inquiry to NORAD for the availability of fighters, who then gets permission from someone representing the Secretary of Defense. Once that is approved then we scramble an aircraft. We didn't wait for that." General Arnold then picked up the phone and talked to the operations deputy at NORAD, who told him 'Yeah, we'll work with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) Go ahead and scramble the aircraft.'"

911 Commission Report

08:37am

Powell: Huntress weapons, Sergeant Powell

Cooper: Hi, Boston Center, TMU, we have ah a problem here, we have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New, New York and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there to help us out.

Powell: Is, is this real world or exercise?

Cooper: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.

Powell: Ok. Hey, ah, hold on one second, ok?

Cooper: Yes.

Powell: Hey, hey, hey, hey, hey, hey, hey, seriously, (indistinct) big time (indistinct).
 

www.vanityfair.com...

"When they told me there was a hijack, my first reaction was 'Somebody started the exercise early,'" Nasypany later told me. The day's exercise was designed to run a range of scenarios, including a "traditional" simulated hijack in which politically motivated perpetrators commandeer an aircraft, land on a Cuba-like island, and seek asylum. "I actually said out loud, 'The hijack's not supposed to be for another hour,'" Nasypany recalled.

[...]

08:46am

More than 150 miles from Manhattan, within the same minute as American 11 hits the tower, the stoplight in the Alert Barn at Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod turns from red to green, Colonel Marr and General Arnold having approved Nasypany's order to scramble the fighters. The pilots taxi out and fire the afterburners as the planes swing onto the runway. neads has no indication yet that American 11 has crashed.

08:38am

Cooper: Hijacked aircraft headed towards the New York metro area. Wonderin’ if you could uh send some one up there, some F-16s or somethin’ to help us out, maybe out of—

Deskins: New York metro.

Cooper: Maybe out of Otis.

[...]

Cooper: It’s just a primary target only, we lost, ah, we lost the, ah, mode, the mode C on it, so you’d have to get up in the air and we’d have to vector you towards the aircraft.

Deskins: Ok, so you’d want’a control the intercept, because—

Cooper: We’d have to, yeah.

Deskins: You’d have to, right.

Cooper: Until you guys can pick him up on primary radar.

Deskins: Ok. Do you have a general location as to where he is?

Cooper: We’re still trackin’ him right now.

Deskins: You’re trackin’ him.

Cooper: Yeah.

Deskins: Can you, can you give me a lat long, where he is for our SA?

Cooper: Yeah, hold on a second.

08:38am

ID Tech: And where are they going now, do you know?

Scoggins: No idea. He’s headin’ towards Kennedy, looks like his speed is decreasing, I’m not exactly sure where, nobody really knows

ID Tech: Are you the controlling agency? Or is New York?

Scoggins: Boston Center.

ID Tech: Boston Center.

Scoggins: Right now we are, he’s headed right for New York Center.

IT Tech: And is there any military assistance requested?

Scoggins: Ah, yes. We’re actually trying to get ah F-15s to ah—

ID Tech: (Indistinct) to get F-15s out.

Scoggins: Yeah, F15s out of Otis.

ID Tech: But you don’t have, uh, you don’t have any modes or codes on him?

Scoggins: Uh, no, right now, right now, it’s just, ah, no we don’t have any mode C.

ID Tech: Is he inbound to JFK?

Scoggins: We, we don’t know. Heh—

ID Tech: You don’t know where he is at all?

Scoggins: He’s been hijacked. The pilots having a hard time talkin’ to the, I mean, we don’t know, we don’t know where he’s going, he’s headin’ towards Kennedy, he’s, ah, like I said he’s like thirty five miles north of Kennedy now at three hundred sixty seven knots.

ID Tech: Ok.

Scoggins: No idea where he’s goin’ (indistinct).

08:39am

Boston Center: Ok, TRACON, hi, Boston Center, ah good morning, American 11, ah seven fifty seven, possible hijack

NY TRACON: K. American 11, seven, seven five and uh (indistinct). Where’s he landing?

Boston Center: Ah, right now, we don’t have any idea. But ah, he was to the Northwest of Albany and now he’s ah down by Sparta, losing speed very rapidly, we believe he is a primary only, and uh, we believe he’s in a descent, and that’s why he’s, ah, he’s, he’s slowing down.

 

08:39am

Weapons Position: Real world hijack. You got it.

Weapons Position: (Indistinct) yep. Once we, ah, once he comes into our radar, we will, we’ll be takin’ it, give me those slides quick.

Deskins: Four one one five north, zero seven eight four six west

Weapons Position: (Indistinct) make sure you know what’s goin’ on. Real world hijack, forty mi—forty miles north of Kennedy.

Deskins: (Indistinct)

Weapons Position: Otis on battle stations.

Weapons Position: Putting Otis on battle stations.
 

08:40am

Powell: This is Huntress placing Panta four five, four six on battle stations, I repeat battle stations, time one two four one, authenticate hotel romeo, all parties acknowledge with initials. Command Post.

08:40am

Boston calls command center to speak to New York TRACON direct to confirm hijack

TRACON: "Where's he landing?"

BMTU: "Right now we have no idea. He was to the northwest of Albany and now he's out by Sparta.... We believe he's in descent..uh..that's why he's slowing down.

TRACON: "He's in Sparta now? I don't see anything"

BMTU: " He's in primary right now"

TRACON: "I'm looking for any type of primary target...we should be able to see it but uhh...

BMTU: "We do have him on the TSV(?)

TRACON: "I'm looking at the..radar and I just don't see anything out there"

BMTU: His speed has diminished quite a bit"

(Washington was also being advised)

08:41am

” Brokaw: So what’d you think at that point? What was going through your mind? 
Bottiglia: I really thought they were probably going to Cuba. 
Brokaw: So you kept track of the target? 
Bottiglia: Kept track of the target. And now we of course we know he was descending at a rapid pace, but we had no altitude or anything on him.

911 Commission Report

08:42am (alleged to be 08:46am by 911 Commission Report)

MCC/T: SD, scramble Otis.

Fox: Copy, say mission

Fox: I don’t know where I’m scramblin’ these guys to, I need a direction, ah, destination.

Nasypany: OK, I’m going to give you the Z point. It’s just north of, ah, New York City.

Fox: I got this lat long forty one fifteen seventy four thirty six, or seventy three forty six

Nasypany: Head ‘em in that direction.

Fox: Copy that

08:45am

Powell: This is Huntress with an active air defense scramble for Panta four five, four six. Time, one two four six. Authenticate delta x-ray. Scramble immediately, Panta four five, four six, heading two eight zero, flight level two niner zero. Contact Huntress on frequency two two eight decimal niner. Backup three six four decimal two. All parties acknowledge with initials. Command Post.

08:45am

Cape calls Boston to say that they need authorization from NEADS to launch fighters. Cape tells Boston that the flight ID of the fighters is Panta 45 and 46...they'll be airborne soon.

i1067.photobucket.com...


08:45am

Also at 8:45 A.M., the American Airlines director of security learned of the hijacking. He contacted the special agent in charge of the FBI's Dallas Field Office to tell him that a hijacking was taking place

reply to post by ThePostExaminer

Note: According to the 911 Commission Report, the first that the incident was reported to the military was 18 minutes after the alleged loss of communication with the cockpit. Not 15 minutes as hooper claims.

Yeah, because we all know that as soon as there are technical problems with the communication systems we should be scrambling fighter jets and shoot down the plane. The flight attendents call to the American Airlines RESERVATION CENTER came at 8:19. The plane hit the towers at 8:44. Even if, for some strange reason, we had fighter jets in the air at the time the call was made, unless those jets happen to be circling over north Jersey, there really wasn't much they could have done. For some reason you fail to grasp this.

Originally posted by hooper
reply to post by ThePostExaminer

 

Note: According to the 911 Commission Report, the first that the incident was reported to the military was 18 minutes after the alleged loss of communication with the cockpit. Not 15 minutes as hooper claims.

Yeah, because we all know that as soon as there are technical problems with the communication systems we should be scrambling fighter jets and shoot down the plane. The flight attendents call to the American Airlines RESERVATION CENTER came at 8:19. The plane hit the towers at 8:44. Even if, for some strange reason, we had fighter jets in the air at the time the call was made, unless those jets happen to be circling over north Jersey, there really wasn't much they could have done. For some reason you fail to grasp this.

Fair point on the "15 minutes" gap. I take that back.

I still stand by the fact that the FAA and NORAD joint failure to not only follow protocol but that links within the chain of communication went out of their way to do everything within their power to put stumbling blocks in the way of doing something.

I see no rational explanation for the way the entire morning panned out. From every angle.

"[If the Air Traffic Control Center sector] has no datablock or other information on it, the military will usually scramble an intercept flight. Essentially always they turn out to be private pilots… not talking to anybody, who stray too far outside the boundary, then get picked up on their way back in. But, procedures are procedures, and they will likely find two F-18s on their tail within 10 or so minutes." -- Air Traffic Control Center, ‘ATCC Controller’s Read Binder’, Xavier Software, August 1998.

You know that this gets much more difficult to defend as we go on, don't you?

reply to post by ThePostExaminer
Examiner, are you going to explain how the air defense response was slowed by not following the instruction you posted earlier in this thread?

"[If the Air Traffic Control Center sector] has no datablock or other information on it, the military will usually scramble an intercept flight. Essentially always they turn out to be private pilots… not talking to anybody, who stray too far outside the boundary, then get picked up on their way back in. But, procedures are procedures, and they will likely find two F-18s on their tail within 10 or so minutes." -- Air Traffic Control Center, ‘ATCC Controller’s Read Binder’, Xavier Software, August 1998

bolded for emphasis.

Do you have an online source for the above quote? I think I've read this before and the author is referring to aircraft coming back in through the Air Defense Identification Zone off the coast of the continental United States.

NORAD actively monitors every flight that crosses through the ADIZ. None of the hijacked flights on 9/11 were anywhere near the ADIZ. NORAD did not monitor aircraft over the continental United States in 2001. You're comparing apples to oranges.

Originally posted by Boone 870
reply to post by ThePostExaminer

 

Examiner, are you going to explain how the air defense response was slowed by not following the instruction you posted earlier in this thread?

"[If the Air Traffic Control Center sector] has no datablock or other information on it, the military will usually scramble an intercept flight. Essentially always they turn out to be private pilots… not talking to anybody, who stray too far outside the boundary, then get picked up on their way back in. But, procedures are procedures, and they will likely find two F-18s on their tail within 10 or so minutes." -- Air Traffic Control Center, ‘ATCC Controller’s Read Binder’, Xavier Software, August 1998

bolded for emphasis.

Do you have an online source for the above quote? I think I've read this before and the author is referring to aircraft coming back in through the Air Defense Identification Zone off the coast of the continental United States.

NORAD actively monitors every flight that crosses through the ADIZ. None of the hijacked flights on 9/11 were anywhere near the ADIZ. NORAD did not monitor aircraft over the continental United States in 2001. You're comparing apples to oranges.

Okay Boone. You tell me what the standard procedure was for domestic threats.

Here's what I've gleaned so far.

According to the OCT between 08:19am and 08:21am, just two to three minutes, no communication with cockpit, an alleged phonecall from the aircraft itself mentioning the word "hijacked", unauthorized deviation, transponder turned off, and ATC clearing traffic at all altitudes along its proposed path....alleged "difficult to locate" and "undecipherable" recordings from the cockpit from alleged "terrorists" who had no problem locating and switching off the transponder but were supposedly confused about transmissions....trailed the alleged aircraft for a further seven minutes and didn't contact military....allegedly talked with another passenger for the duration....eventually make an alleged call to Cape Cod 8 minutes later requesting that they call for fighters....three minutes later and sixteen minutes since ATC are on record as realizing that there is an alleged hijack, NEADS are contacted for the first time...three minutes later fighters are allegedly called to "battle stations"...six minutes later fighters are allegedly scrambled at 08:46am.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
INSTRUCTION

J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A
DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, J, S 1 June 2001
AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND DESTRUCTION OF DERELICT
AIRBORNE OBJECTS
References: See Enclosure D.

4. Policy.

a. Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) of Civil and Military Aircraft. Pursuant
to references a and b, the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), has exclusive responsibility to direct law enforcement activity
related to actual or attempted aircraft piracy (hijacking) in the “special
aircraft jurisdiction” of the United States. When requested by the
Administrator, Department of Defense will provide assistance to these
law enforcement efforts. Pursuant to reference c, the NMCC is the focal
point within Department of Defense for providing assistance. In the
event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious
means by the FAA. The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate
responses as authorized by reference d, forward requests for DOD
assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval. DOD assistance to
the FAA will be provided in accordance with reference d. Additional
guidance is provided in Enclosure A.

d. DOD Directive 3025.15, 18 February 1997, “Military Assistance to
Civil Authorities”

www.dtic.mil...

Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 3025.15
February 18, 1997

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

4.7.1. Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any
form of immediate action taken by a DoD Component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The DoD Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exigent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as authorized in DoD Directive 3025.1 (reference (g)). Civil authorities shall be informed that verbal requests for support in an emergency must be followed by a written request.
As soon as practical, the DoD Component or Command rendering assistance shall report the fact of the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of command to the DoD Executive Secretary, who shall notify the Secretary of Defense..

No problem?

reply to post by ThePostExaminer

Okay Boone. You tell me what the standard procedure was for domestic threats.

Sorry Examiner, I'm not going to play your game. You have claimed, several times, that the protocols and procedures were not followed on 9/11 by both the military and civilians. Backup your own claim by showing us the procedures that were broken and explain how you believe they were broken.

No problem?

Yes, problem. You are waving the instruction around like it had any relevancy during the attacks on 9/11. Those instructions were figuratively thrown out of the window when NEADS called CONR and General Arnold gave Col. Marr permission to launch fighters without permission from the higher ups. You should know this, you posted the reference earlier in the thread.



ETA: I may have been wrong in my previous post. I claimed that NORAD actively monitors the ADIZ, I don't know that for certain, but their JSS radars are set up to monitor it.

Originally posted by Boone 870
reply to post by ThePostExaminer

 

Okay Boone. You tell me what the standard procedure was for domestic threats.

Sorry Examiner, I'm not going to play your game. You have claimed, several times, that the protocols and procedures were not followed on 9/11 by both the military and civilians. Backup your own claim by showing us the procedures that were broken and explain how you believe they were broken.

No problem?

Yes, problem. You are waving the instruction around like it had any relevancy during the attacks on 9/11. Those instructions were figuratively thrown out of the window when NEADS called CONR and General Arnold gave Col. Marr permission to launch fighters without permission from the higher ups. You should know this, you posted the reference earlier in the thread.



ETA: I may have been wrong in my previous post. I claimed that NORAD actively monitors the ADIZ, I don't know that for certain, but their JSS radars are set up to monitor it.

edit on 26-7-2012 by Boone 870 because: (no reason given)

edit on 26-7-2012 by Boone 870 because: Spelling error

I haven't really touched on the military reaction yet. But..

Recap..

According to the OCT between 08:19am and 08:21am, just two to three minutes, no communication with cockpit, an alleged phonecall from the aircraft itself mentioning the word "hijacked", unauthorized deviation, transponder turned off, and ATC clearing traffic at all altitudes along its proposed path....alleged "difficult to locate" and "undecipherable" recordings from the cockpit from alleged "terrorists" who had no problem locating and switching off the transponder but were supposedly confused about transmissions....trailed the alleged aircraft for a further seven minutes and didn't contact military....allegedly talked with another passenger for the duration....eventually make an alleged call to Cape Cod 8 minutes later requesting that they call for fighters....three minutes later and sixteen minutes since ATC are on record as realizing that there is an alleged hijack, NEADS are contacted for the first time...three minutes later fighters are allegedly called to "battle stations"...six minutes later fighters are allegedly scrambled at 08:46am.

Read this carefully.

4.7.1. Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any
form of immediate action taken by a DoD Component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The DoD Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exigent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as authorized in DoD Directive 3025.1 (reference (g)).

What went on?

Please don't point to other procedures not followed through as an excuse for the FAA to have done what they did (or didn't do) within the first 15 minutes of confirming a "hijack". It makes no sense whatsoever. A military response could have been requested given the parameters set out above. They failed to do so. Why?

Let's get this straight. You are complaining because the FAA bypassed the bureaucratic nonsense and called OTIS and NEADS directly? Here we are 11 years later arguing about what the right procedure might have been, but they needed fighters ASAP. Afraid I'm missing the point of all the mumbo-jumbo.

reply to post by ThePostExaminer
You keep linking to a DOD directive that explains when the NMCC can authorize a military response without permission from the Sec. Def. As I said before, that is completely irrelevant to the actual response that happened that day. Boston Center completely bypassed the chain of command when they contacted NEADS, CONR completely bypassed the chain of command when they gave NEADS permission to launch without going through NORAD Headquarters, National Military Command Center and the Secretary of Defense first.

Also, Boston Center tried contacting the military 9 minutes after they were certain it was a hijack. Is that your hangup? You believe it should've happened sooner? Why do you believe it should've happened sooner?

You know there are hundreds, if not thousands, of people who work or have worked in the multiple sectors in the United States and none of them are blowing the whistle because they thought the response was too slow. I'm going to trust the people that actually know what they're talking about over a conspiracy theorist any day.

reply to post by ThePostExaminer

A military response could have been requested given the parameters set out above. They failed to do so. Why?

And a military response was requested. I really don't get where you are trying to go with this. The first indication of a hijack came after 8:19 am from a phone call between a flight attendent and the airlines reservation center. Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center tower at 8:44AM a total time of 25 minutes. Even if the attendent had called President Bush directly at 8:19AM and he personally ordered fighters in the air from the nearest base they still would not have been able to do anything. And if by some miracle they had managed to get withing firing range of Flight 11 and shot the plane down, the political effect would be the same. Terrorists would have caused the deaths of hundreds of Americans.