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Originally posted by Tifozi
If it was ONE radar that made the detection, I would agree with you. But not three.
Three radars would mean that all three operators, and all three control centers were unable to detect a false reading. In my opinion, they knew it wasn't false.
In my opinion, that alone rulles out false signals.
Originally posted by Arbitrageur
I can't find any radar tracking data between 2:27 am and the time the shooting started after 3am, which leaves a void of 33 minutes where we can't really connect the 2 events. We can speculate that they might be connected, but is there any evidence for this? none that I have found.
Originally posted by WitnessFromAfar
I'd love to hear your comments on this observation from the LA Times Photo..
Thanks again for your detailed and well thought out post!
-WFA
Originally posted by Frank Warren
the very first place I released the image was at Jeff Rense's site (years ago); additionally, I sent a jpg to Bruce (Maccabee); henceforth, those two sites would have copies that aren't 100th generation clones . . . which by the way I have noticed some "degradation" in copies, even here in this thread.
Originally posted by yeti101
reply to post by WitnessFromAfar
still dont undrstand radar i see. You keep calling a false alarm a "false return" on the radar. Why?
p.s the recommendations of the british radar guy were not implemented until well after april 1942. Sorry but the americans were still amateurs at the time of BOLA
[edit on 21-9-2009 by yeti101]
It does mean there was something there. Enough of a something there to order AA Batteries to open fire over a populated city for over half an hour, causing civilian deaths, and property damage.
Originally posted by Phage
reply to post by WitnessFromAfar
It does mean there was something there. Enough of a something there to order AA Batteries to open fire over a populated city for over half an hour, causing civilian deaths, and property damage.
There were no deaths attributed to anti aircraft fire.
Originally posted by Phage
Ordered by whom?
Originally posted by Phage
Jumpy, lightly trained, unblooded soldiers? Were there giant, invulnerable, spacecraft all over the Los Angeles basin? Anti aircraft artillery has a limited horizontal range. What were those other guys shooting at?
Originally posted by Phage
Two months after Pearl Harbor. Numerous false air raid alerts up and down the west coast. Elwood had been shelled the night before. Yeah, I think they were shooting at nothing. It wouldn't be the first or last time a lot of firepower had been directed at nothing.
Originally posted by WitnessFromAfar
Originally posted by Arbitrageur
I can't find any radar tracking data between 2:27 am and the time the shooting started after 3am, which leaves a void of 33 minutes where we can't really connect the 2 events. We can speculate that they might be connected, but is there any evidence for this? none that I have found.
It seems from my searching that this is because the SCR 268's (The majority of the radar units along the coast were 268's, 270's were still fairly new...) were specifically designated for use in guiding the searchlights.
Originally posted by Phage
Two months after Pearl Harbor. Numerous false air raid alerts up and down the west coast. Elwood had been shelled the night before. Yeah, I think they were shooting at nothing. It wouldn't be the first or last time a lot of firepower had been directed at nothing.
WORLD WAR II UFO SCARE
By Paul T. Collins
Fate Magazine July, 1987
After the Ellwood incident had alerted all the West Coast defense posts to possible repeat attacks, these units were sensitive to anticipated invasion attempts. By Wednesday morning in the Los Angeles area they were ready to open fire on a boy's kite if it in any way resembled a plane or a balloon. Secretary of War Henry Stimson praised the 37th Cost Artillery for this attitude. It is better to be a little too alert than not alert enough, he said. At the same time he delicately suggested that it might have been a good idea to send some of our planes up to identify the invading aircraft before shooting at them.
Originally posted by Arbitrageur
www.historynet.com...
At 3 a.m. on the morning of the raid, the 203rd launched two balloons, one from its headquarters on the Sawtelle Veterans Hospital grounds in Westwood and the other from Battery D, located on the Douglas Aircraft plant site in Santa Monica. So that the balloons could be tracked at night, a candle placed inside a simple highball glass was suspended under each balloon, whose silver color would reflect the light enough to be tracked to heights usually well above 25,000 feet. Lieutenant Melvin Timm, officer in charge of Battery D’s meteorological operations, ordered his balloon launched and had notified the filter room–also known as the Flower Street Control Center, where all planes, identified or otherwise, were tracked on a giant, flat table map–of its departure, when ‘all hell broke loose.’
www.militarymuseum.org...
At 0306 a balloon carrying a red flare was seen over Santa Monica and four batteries of anti-aircraft artillery opened fire, whereupon “the air over Los Angeles erupted like a volcano.” From this point on reports were hopelessly at variance.
Is that just a coincidence that all hell broke loose shortly after those balloons were released? I don't think so.
Originally posted by WitnessFromAfar
For one of these, two 270's and the HQ station to have all picked up a false solid moving object... not really that likely.
-WFA
www.ibiblio.org...
Equally serious was the problem of equipment. In a report filled with illuminating detail, the British expert found our seaward reconnaissance grossly inefficient because of the total lack of ASV equipment and because of the limited number of patrol aircraft of suitable range. The radar screen along the West Coast was based on too few stations, and the equipment itself had inherent defects which made it "gravely unsuitable." All radar experts were agreed that each set represented a compromise between a variety of demands, but the principal American radar was "unique in combining slow search with poor cover in elevation, with lack of all facilities for eight finding, and with a grave danger of plotting false tracks." Moreover, dependable employment of this radar had been made even more unlikely because of a mistake in the selection of sites for its installation. Personnel to operate the radars had not been carefully selected and were inadequate both in numbers and in training. The United States was found to have repeated an early error of Britain in failing to provide for the training of large numbers of skilled radar technicians.