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Originally posted by antipigopolist
Muaddib...the point of this thread is that the current administration ignored certain intelligence. I think the most pertinent of which came directly from the IAEA report
.................
Originally posted by antipigopolist
Maybe you could address how the IAEA's report delivered 2 weeks prior to invasion fits in with your "Hindsight is 20/20" logic? How soon they forget.
Originally posted by Muaddib
Did you even read the story I gave? That information which we got was acquired from the Italians, who passed it to the French, who then passed it to the British, who finally gave it to U.S. officials. The question remains as to whom would have made such easy to debunk documents...
Originally posted by Astronomer70
The Senate report on this matter concluded the CIA was simply inept and was responsible for approving the statements made by the President in his speech. If the CIA or DIA objected to the remarks included in the President's speech they had ample opportunity to say so, yet they did not.
Originally posted by Seekerof
as you get around to addressing these?
Originally posted by df1
As for ya'll "faux patriots", you continually use the same tactics of obcuring the issue at hand. This time by providing a bunch of garbage links. If you think your freaking links are so damn important, I suggest that you write something to go along with each link that gives me a compelling reason to read any of your article links, rather than "carpet linking" threads with manure.
(U) Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.
(U) Conclusion 2. The Intelligence Community did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.
(U) Conclusion 3. The Intelligence Community (1C) suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This "group think" dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs. This presumption was so strong that formalized IC mechanisms established to challenge assumptions and group think were not utilized.
(U) Conclusion 4. In a few significant instances, the analysis in the National Intelligence Estimate suffers from a "layering" effect whereby assessments were built based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties of the underlying judgments.
(U) Conclusion 5. In each instance where the Committee found an analytic or collection failure, it resulted in part from a failure of Intelligence Community managers throughout their leadership chains to adequately supervise the work of their analysts and collectors. They did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity.
(U) Conclusion 7. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in several significant instances, abused its unique position in the Intelligence Community, particularly in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the Intelligence Community's prewar analysis concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.
(U) Conclusion 8. Intelligence Community analysts lack a consistent post-September 11 approach to analyzing and reporting on terrorist threats.
(U) Conclusion 9. Source protection policies within the Intelligence Community direct or encourage reports officers to exclude relevant detail about the nature of their sources. As a result, analysts community-wide are unable to make fully informed judgments about the information they receive, relying instead on nonspecific source lines to reach their assessments. Moreover, relevant operational data is nearly always withheld from analysts, putting them at a further analytical disadvantage.
Conclusion 10. The Intelligence Community relies too heavily on foreign government services and third party reporting, thereby increasing the potential for manipulation of U.S. policy by foreign interests.
Conclusion 11. Several of the allegations of pressure on Intelligence Community (IC) analysts involved repeated questioning. The Committee believes that IC analysts should expect difficult and repeated questions regarding threat information. Just as the post 9/11 environment lowered the Intelligence Community's reporting threshold, it has also affected the intensity with which policymakers will review and question threat information.
More conclusions:
Full text: Conclusions of Senate's Iraq report
Originally posted by Seekerof
as soon as you get around to addressing these?
CIA Director Tenet defends Iraq WMD intelligence
Thursday, February 5, 2004
"They never said there was an imminent threat. Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our policy-makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests. No one told us what to say or how to say it."
This is a 2004 story on the possible transfer of Iraq weapons to Syria... I'm not sure how that applies here.
Intelligence war: Pentagon faults CIA finding on Iraqi WMD
Woodward: Tenet told Bush WMD case a 'slam dunk': Says Bush didn't solicit Rumsfeld, Powell on going to war
Monday, April 19, 2004About two weeks before deciding to invade Iraq, President Bush was told by CIA Director George Tenet there was a "slam dunk case" that dictator Saddam Hussein had unconventional weapons, according to a new book by Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward.
Iraqi diplomat gave U.S. prewar WMD details: Saddam’s foreign minister told CIA the truth, so why didn’t agency listen?
March 20, 2006
In the period before the Iraq war, the CIA and the Bush administration erroneously believed that Saddam Hussein was hiding major programs for weapons of mass destruction. Now NBC News has learned that for a short time the CIA had contact with a secret source at the highest levels within Saddam Hussein’s government, who gave them information far more accurate than what they believed. It is a spy story that has never been told before, and raises new questions about prewar intelligence.
Originally posted by Seekerof
Sure thing, antipigopolist, as soon as you get around to addressing these?
Originally posted by Seekerof
Intelligence community--CIA, etc--failures to the hilt. The same intelligence community that gave their conflicting intelligence to the President and his administration to be used in ultimately determing whether to go to war with Iraq. The failure and blame is self-evident, regardless of political affiliation or agenda.
seekerof
[edit on 24-4-2006 by Seekerof]
Originally posted by antipigopolist
But seriously, would you have completely disregarded the IAEA's report?
The articles you reference pretty much compartmentalize the blame squarely on the CIA. That sort of flys in the face of the reports coming out that the administration was planning to go into Iraq for some time and were just looking for intel to justify it.
Anyway...about that 20/20. I still think you are wrong about your assertion. s.o.r.r.y.