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Tyler Drumheller, the former highest ranking CIA officer in Europe, spoke out on 60 Minutes about the Bush Administration's desire to ignore intelligence that conflicted their their preconceived desire to go to war
The CIA said Saddam had an "active" program for "R&D, production and weaponization" for biological agents such as anthrax.
Iraqi diplomat gave U.S. prewar WMD details: Saddam’s foreign minister told CIA the truth, so why didn’t agency listen?
With a series of flip charts, McLaughlin showed that Saddam--with near certainty--had lethal chemical and biological weapons, mobile biological weapons production facilities and missiles with ranges far in excess of U.N. ceilings. He was, moreover, thought to be aggressively pursuing such WMD programs. Bush was not overwhelmed. "Nice try," he said, but it's not good enough to convince "Joe Public." Turning to Tenet, Bush posed a critical question: "I've been told all this intelligence about having WMD, and this is the best we've got?" Tenet then weighed in with perhaps the most momentous pronouncement of his career: "It's a slam dunk case!" he enthusiastically informed the President. Wary, Bush pressed the DCI again: "George, how confident are you?" Tenet repeated: "Don't worry, it's a slam dunk." Tenet had sold the President, but Bush was not entirely happy. He informed Andy Card and Condoleezza Rice, each of whom had attended the briefing, "Needs a lot more work" and he warned Tenet several times: "Make sure no one stretches to make our case."
CBS Spinning Again
News as infomercial.
In a breach of ethics, CBS News did not reveal on it's extended 60 Minutes coverage that viewers were watching "news" coverage of a publication property owned by Free Press, which is a label under Simon & Schuster who is owned by Viacom, parent of CBS.
On March 7, 2003, the head of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency announced that the Niger uranium documents were forgeries. The Bush administration went to war in Iraq 12 days later, without acknowledging that one of its main arguments for going to war was false.
Originally posted by Seekerof
Seen these mentions? When "dear CIA insider" gets around to debunking these,
CIA analysts' assessments "differed on several important aspects of [Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons] programs and those debates were spelled out in the estimate. They never said there was an imminent threat.
"Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our policy-makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests," he continued.
Originally posted by dgtempe
In the words of "Lionel" a progressive radio talk host, :shk:
"They dont get it. They just dont get it"
:shk:
In February 1999, Zahawie left his Vatican office for a few days and paid an official visit to Niger, a country known for absolutely nothing except its vast deposits of uranium ore. It was from Niger that Iraq had originally acquired uranium in 1981, as confirmed in the Duelfer Report. In order to take the Joseph Wilson view of this Baathist ambassadorial initiative, you have to be able to believe that Saddam Hussein's long-term main man on nuclear issues was in Niger to talk about something other than the obvious. Italian intelligence (which first noticed the Zahawie trip from Rome) found it difficult to take this view and alerted French intelligence (which has better contacts in West Africa and a stronger interest in nuclear questions). In due time, the French tipped off the British, who in their cousinly way conveyed the suggestive information to Washington. As everyone now knows, the disclosure appeared in watered-down and secondhand form in the president's State of the Union address in January 2003.
If the above was all that was known, it would surely be universally agreed that no responsible American administration could have overlooked such an amazingly sinister pattern. Given the past Iraqi record of surreptitious dealing, cheating of inspectors, concealment of sites and caches, and declared ambition to equip the technicians referred to openly in the Baathist press as "nuclear mujahideen," one could scarcely operate on the presumption of innocence.
However, the waters have since become muddied, to say the least. For a start, someone produced a fake document, dated July 6, 2000, which purports to show Zahawie's signature and diplomatic seal on an actual agreement for an Iraqi uranium transaction with Niger. Almost everything was wrong with this crude forgery—it had important dates scrambled, and it misstated the offices of Niger politicians. In consequence, IAEA Chairman Mohammed ElBaradei later reported to the U.N. Security Council that the papers alleging an Iraq-Niger uranium connection had been demonstrated to be fraudulent.
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger - are in fact not authentic.
.......
Conclusion
In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated:
There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.
There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question.
Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.
The Bush administration deviated from the professional standard not only in using policy to drive intelligence, but also in aggressively using intelligence to win public support for its decision to go to war. This meant selectively adducing data -- "cherry-picking" -- rather than using the intelligence community's own analytic judgments. In fact, key portions of the administration's case explicitly rejected those judgments....
In the upside-down relationship between intelligence and policy that prevailed in the case of Iraq, the administration selected pieces of raw intelligence to use in its public case for war, leaving the intelligence community to register varying degrees of private protest when such use started to go beyond what analysts deemed credible or reasonable.
The Bush administration's use of intelligence on Iraq... turned the entire model upside down. The administration used intelligence not to inform decision-making, but to justify a decision already made. It went to war without requesting -- and evidently without being influenced by -- any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq. (The military made extensive use of intelligence in its war planning, although much of it was of a more tactical nature.) Congress, not the administration, asked for the now-infamous October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, although few members of Congress actually read it. (According to several congressional aides responsible for safeguarding the classified material, no more than six senators and only a handful of House members got beyond the five-page executive summary.) As the national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was in charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community's assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until a year into the war.
Originally posted by SkepticOverlord
If you read the material presented by Tyler Drumheller, it's clear that part of the problem was a derth of conflicting information inspired by the administration's desire to select the material that supported their goals, and reject material that didn't.
Originally posted by Seekerof
To simply have some "ex-insiders" come out now and play the 'Hindsight is 20/20' game is ludicrous, that the adminstration recieved 'bad' and conflicting information/intelligence and/or the administration recieved 'good' conflicting information/intelligence--which this 'good' information/intelligence is the stuff the adminstration chose to ignore, based upon Tyler's assertions, serves nothing and represents political agenda determinism.
Originally posted by Seekerof
In Tyler admitting that the CIA was delivering conflicting information
Accordingly, what are or were the consequences if Saddam had no WMD and the U.S. and company remove him anyway?
What are the consequences if Saddam had WMD and the U.S. and company failed to act?
When decisions are made, everyone is not going to agree with them, therefore because Tyler feels that the administration did not heed his word, the adminstration is now considered to be liars and fabricators who deliberately sought "to select the material that supported their goals, and reject material that didn't." Yeah, thats it....
To simply have some "ex-insiders" come out now and play the 'Hindsight is 20/20' game is ludicrous,
Btw, did those CIA intelligence folders, when passed to the adminstration for deliberation, were they marked/labeled selectively good information/intelligence and bad information/intelligence?
And since I do not watch CBS, NBC, or ABC anymore, per chance, was CBS pushing Tyler Drumheller's book, as well? No doubt in my mind that the this particular 60 Minutes segment was based from or upon it.
60 Minutes has become nothing but a political agenda driven "News as Infomercial" media outlet.
Vice-President Cheney responded to ElBaradei’s report mainly by attacking the messenger. On March 16th, Cheney, appearing on “Meet the Press,” stated emphatically that the United States had reason to believe that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear-weapons program. He went on, “I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency on this kind of issue, especially where Iraq’s concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don’t have any reason to believe they’re any more valid this time than they’ve been in the past.” Three days later, the war in Iraq got under way, and the tale of the African-uranium-connection forgery sank from view.
Joseph Wilson, the diplomat who had travelle to Africa to investigate the allegation more than a year earlier, revived the Niger story. He was angered by what he saw as the White House’ dishonesty about Niger, and in early May he casually mentioned his mission to Niger, and his findings, during a brief talk about Iraq at political conference in suburban Washingto sponsored by the Senate Democratic Polic Committee (Wilson is a Democrat). Another speaker at the conference was the Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, who got Wilson’s permission to mention the Niger trip in a column. A few months later, on July 6th, Wilson wrote about the trip himself on the Times Op-Ed page. “I gave them months to correct the record,” he told me, speaking of the White House, “but they kept on lying.”
The White House responded by blaming the intelligence community for the Niger reference in the State of the Union address. Condoleezza Rice, the national-security adviser, told a television interviewer on July 13th, “Had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence . . . it would have been gone.” Five days later, a senior White House official went a step further, telling reporters at a background briefing that they had the wrong impression about Joseph Wilson’s trip to Niger and the information it had yielded. “You can’t draw a conclusion that we were warned by Ambassador Wilson that this was all dubious,” the unnamed official said, according to a White House transcript. “It’s just not accurate.”
But Wilson’s account of his trip forced a rattled White House to acknowledge, for the first time, that “this information should not have risen to the level of a Presidential speech.” It also triggered retaliatory leaks to the press by White House officials that exposed Wilson’s wife as a C.I.A. operative—and led to an F.B.I. investigation.
Originally posted by antipigopolist
And here is another item, still hot in the news, that gives some insight to how this is "played" if your not fully in the "game". Sorry for the long quote...but I think it is very relevant.
Source
The White House responded by blaming the intelligence community for the Niger reference in the State of the Union address. Condoleezza Rice, the national-security adviser, told a television interviewer on July 13th, “Had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence . . . it would have been gone.” Five days later, a senior White House official went a step further, telling reporters at a background briefing that they had the wrong impression about Joseph Wilson’s trip to Niger and the information it had yielded. “You can’t draw a conclusion that we were warned by Ambassador Wilson that this was all dubious,” the unnamed official said, according to a White House transcript. “It’s just not accurate.”
The best-known example was the assertion by President George W. Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq was purchasing uranium ore in Africa. U.S. intelligence analysts had questioned the credibility of the report making this claim, had kept it out of their own unclassified products, and had advised the White House not to use it publicly. But the administration put the claim into the speech anyway, referring to it as information from British sources in order to make the point without explicitly vouching for the intelligence.