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originally posted by: nickyw
a reply to: KindraLabelle2
the previous pm truss ruled out the plan which is why she has been removed and blackock execs installed as oversight, sadly the acting pm has a fondness of all things CCP including a love of the camps for dissenters..
originally posted by: Tarantula777
a reply to: DaRAGE
My source is GOD!!!
Your source is the toiletpaper. Here is your toilet paper it seems?:
www.dailymail.co.uk...
Britons are told to prepare for three-hour blackouts 'from 4pm to 7pm' this winter: National Grid boss warns households to prepare for rolling power-cuts in January and February if UK fails to secure enough gas from Europe under 'worst case' scenario
In this scenario we assume the same assumptions as Scenario 1, but with an additional 10GW CCGTs unavailable for a two-week period in January1. These assumptions have been chosen to illustrate the potential impact on the electricity system if there was insufficient gas supply in Great Britain.
As this scenario only considers a specific, limited time period within the winter, we can only consider it using the modelling for our operational view. We are unable to provide a de-rated margin or LOLE value for this scenario.
Credible range for surplus Figure 7 shows the variation in operational surplus for Scenario 2. Coal contingency contracts (around 2GW) and the Demand Flexibility Service (around 2GW) are both assumed to be deployed.
The impact of this is evident from the large negative surplus on the chart. The magnitude of this surplus is such that we would not expect there to be a sufficient response from the rest of the market to prevent interruptions to consumer supplies.
Should this scenario happen, it may be necessary to initiate the planned, controlled and temporary rota load shedding scheme under the Electricity Supply Emergency Code (ESEC). In the unlikely event we were in this situation, it would mean that some customers could be without power for pre-defined periods during a day –generally this is assumed to be for 3 hour blocks. This would be necessary to ensure the overall security and integrity of the electricity system across Great Britain. All possible mitigating strategies would be deployed to minimise the disruption.