It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
"For those readers who have not been exposed to foo fighters before, following is an American flight account found in Intercept UFO by Renato Vesco:"
'At 0600 (on December 22) near Hagenau, at 10,000 feet altitude, two very bright lights climbed toward us from the ground. They leveled off and stayed on the tail of our plane. They were bright orange lights. They stayed there for two minutes. On my tail all the time. They were under perfect control (by operators on the ground). They turned away from us, and the fire seemed to go out.'
originally posted by: peaceinoutz
Your right. There have been brook and mortar types reported as well.
I would be interested to know whether foo fighters were seen on Radar and whether those orange and red balls showing up at the nuclear sites were also seen on radar.
originally posted by: mirageman
![]()
Foo Fighter Theories
But what became of that Japanese ‘beam’ technology that David Griggs claimed could stop engines?
Now, pile on with the Dave Grohl puns!
The next chapter looks at radar and "death ray" research. As to the former, Grunden reminds readers that the Japanese scientific community was very much in the forefront of basic research and development of many aspects of radar in the pre-war years. Although not quite up to the level of the British Chain Home radar line, Japan took a fairly similar approach to utilizing the technology for military purposes. "A [radar] system for aircraft detection and warning later became operational in 1941. Some 120 sets of this type were erected along the coast on the Sea of Japan for defense against a potential air assault from the Soviet Union." However, Chapter Three goes on to point out that, comparatively, Japan's level of achievement in radar research, development, and production scarcely advanced during the war, and Grunden provides solid reasons for the Japanese failure in that arena. One of the reasons for failure was the diversion caused by the misguided attempt to develop a death ray. Going back as far as 1930, prompted by a newspaper article claiming Germany had invented such a device during World War I, the Japanese Army officially initiated research on a microwave weapon that could "...stop an internal combustion engine by means of the resonance effect or that could injure humans from a distance." Overtones of science fiction notwithstanding, the IJA was simply ahead of its time, if reports concerning deployment of Active Denial System microwave weapons in Iraq during 2004-2005 can be believed. By 1940 Japanese researchers were experimenting on live animals with prototype beams. In October 1941 the death ray research was discontinued and personnel shifted to other fields, including radar work. However, in 1943 the Army project reopened and in early 1945—in spite of the fact that the experimental system was capable only of killing rabbits after exposure of thirty to sixty seconds and only within a range of three meters—the Army ordered production of a more powerful version of the equipment as a functioning weapon. The Navy, of course, conducted its own death ray program but with no more success than its rival.
Postwar U.S. military intelligence assessments of Japanese research and development of the death ray were mixed. Some investigators who examined the army's research data at the end of the war appeared not to have been very impressed with the project, stating, "While the results of the tests are interesting, there is nothing in them to indicate that Death Rays are likely to become an effective military weapon." Yet others stated, "With the development of higher-power and shorter-wave length oscillators, which has become possible through the Allied research on radar, it is possible that a death ray might be developed that could kill unshielded human beings at a distance of five to ten miles if these Japanese experiments are reliable indications of the potentialities of the death ray." One stated reason for the failure of the Japanese army program to develop a high-frequency electric wave weapon was that the Army Ministry and the army research staff did not give a "wholehearted effort" to this project. One impediment cited in U.S. postwar intelligence reports was the "improper dissemination of information by the army staff." Although competent civilian scientists had been brought into the project as consultants, they worked in "scattered localities" and were not kept informed of the development of the research. Moreover, Japanese informants stated that "a definite goal was not given to each scientist, and in some instances, the scientists did not know that the research was to develop a 'death ray' weapon." Such observations appear not to have considered the fact that none of the other belligerents had succeeded in developing such a weapon either, or even whether any of the major powers could have done so during the war. While the Japanese were apparently the only belligerent to seriously pursue death rays, the same could not be said for development of rockets, guided missiles, and jet aircraft—the topics that comprise Chapter Four. In these fields, Japan began the war behind the other major powers and fell farther behind as the conflict progressed.