How the Royal Navy prepared for global war in the interwar years

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

This is from yout link. Are you telling me it is wrong ?

The importance of this doctrinal development has largely been ignored, primarily because *battleships formed its centerpiece.

* centerpiece

The destruction of the Navy’s battle line at Pearl Harbor and the ensuing dominance of the aircraft carrier in the decisive battles of the Pacific War

Why doesn’t that say continue dominance if aircraft carriers were already dominating United States Naval strategy ?

have led investigators to focus on aircraft carriers when examining the prewar development of the Navy’s doctrine.

Self-explanatory and related to this next quote .

This article seeks to address that oversight.

This is page 33 from your document and is the conclusion.

On December 7th, the battle line, centerpiece of the fleet, was destroyed, but the doctrinal principles developed for that fleet could be readily applied to the Navy’s remaining forces in the absence of the battle line. The ensuing battles, both those dominated by the aircraft carrier and the confused night action ruled by the torpedo, could be won through the application of the principles of the Navy’s tactical doctrine. The emphasis on decisive offensive action, reliance on individual initiative, and development of

Prior to World War II the USN Followed the big gun doctrine of battleships and firing lines. It’s abundantly clear in the paper you linked and the paper I linked .

They even mentioned it in no uncertain terms of both the beginning and end of your paper .

The power of aircraft carriers was underestimated at the onset of the war in the Pacific as per your data .

a reply to: RadioRobert
The historical context is that the twenty-year Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 was about to expire in 1921, and was not renewed. This was long before the rape of Nanking. I believe I got the American factor in the non-renewal decision from Churchill's biography (he was War Secretary at the time), but it would take a while to track down the reference. However, Wikipedia also says "The American government feared that the renewal of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance would create a Japanese-dominated market in the Pacific, and close China off from American trade."

a reply to: Fallingdown

You are wholly ignoring the specific Fleet Problems I cited and linked.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

So now you’re saying your source is lying ?

a reply to: Fallingdown

Second link I provided with the specific Fleet Problem strategies, findings and results.

Just one of many excerpts:

Although short, Fleet Program XX demonstrated a high degree of sophistication in the development of the American naval force. The navy’s use of air power had clearly matured. Both commanders, Kalbfus and Andrews, had managed their air forces rather well, each concentrating his efforts at destroying his enemy’s air power before going after his battle fleet. Each had made carriers the center piece of independent task forces.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

So you are saying that your source is lying except for the parts you like ?

My argument is that at the onset of World War II battleships were the central doctrine for the United States Navy .

Do you want to play word games I saw a post of yours I can do it on.

But I knew what you meant so I wouldn’t take such a ridiculous stance .

originally posted by: Fallingdown
So you are saying that your source is lying except for the parts you like ?

None of the quotes you used are from the second link.

My argument is that at the onset of World War II battleships were the central doctrine for the United States Navy .

You're argument is incorrect, Fleet Problems XIV and onwards showed the carrier taking a role of parity and in some cases superseding the battleship.

Each had made carriers the center piece of independent task forces.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

The quotes are from the first link.

Are you saying that link doesn’t count anymore because there’s something you don’t agree with ?

During Fleet Problem XX, attacks on battleships during the fleet action were very effective. The New York was destroyed by a combination of battleship gunfire and aerial attacks. Dive bombers and torpedo bombers inflicted a total of 33% damage, the majority of it early in the action. Battleship gunfire finished her off; she suffered 50% damage from gunfire overall.90
Much of the incentive for these coordinated attacks resulted from the perceived vulnerability of attacking aircraft.
I doubt the advisability of a carrier plane attack against a battleship division in close formation unless the conditions are most favorable or unless executed in support of some other operation. I believe that such an attack would result in very heavy damage to the attacking planes and doubt if the resulting battleship damage would justify the operation.91
The Umpire Rules reflected this assumption. They specified that torpedo bombing, dive bombing and level bombing attacks would score twice as many hits if unopposed by antiaircraft fire and if the target ship was unable to maneuver. The effectiveness of attacks would be increased to a lesser extent if only one of these conditions prevailed.92


By delivering such attacks during a fleet engagement, the enemy would be forced to choose between maneuvering and reducing the effectiveness of his gunfire against the US ships, or maintaining a steady course and offering an easier target for aerial attacks.
The aerial attacks were also expected to assist the battleships by decreasing the effectiveness of enemy gunfire.

Of course they had promised and were used. But that’s not my point my point is that prior to World War II they were used in a

Secondary role .

Germany had developed successful tactics for their commerce raiders. Are you trying to claim they were a significant part of German fleet maneuvers ?

Fleet Problems XIV and onwards showed the carrier taking a role of parity and in some cases superseding the battleship.

Not according to your first link.

Let’s make this easy with your vast knowledge of naval warfare. You should be able to find something that says aircraft carriers were the central tactical doctrine for the USN.

Try not to you use another source that I’m locked out of .

If you don’t mind .

Wait

Does that have anything to do with the way I used your source against you ?

originally posted by: Fallingdown
Are you saying that link doesn’t count anymore because there’s something you don’t agree with ?

I included it to show that carriers were part of the combined strategy. The second link shows how they rose to parity and beyond in the Fleet Problems.

You should be able to find something that says aircraft carriers were the central tactical doctrine for the USN.

Try reading the second link, there's no lock out, it requires making a copy.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

And which ship was the spearpoint of that combine strategy prior to World War II ?


I included a link to show the rise of aircraft carriers in my first post.

To which you replied “did you read my whole article” ? Supplying a second link in lieu of the first one. Then you stated pretty much everything that I linked to you .

I didn’t for one second contest the fact that aircraft carriers were included in USN planning.

But that didn’t stop you from trying to convince me that they were .

In my next post I think I mentioned Billy Mitchell. But that didn’t stop you from lecturing me on the same stuff. Lol

I was beginning to feel like I was in this commercial . (Jk)



So I’m pretty much worn out you win .

originally posted by: crayzeed
The Royal Navy has been too arrogant. We were very lucky in WW2...

On the contrary. The RN defeated the Italian and German navies, successfully prosecuted the Battle of the Atlantic with Canadian and later US support, and maintained sea lanes open throughout the Empire and to the Soviet Union, including with a significant presence in the Far East and the Pacific. The RN was successful in WW2.

originally posted by: Fallingdown
I didn’t for one second contest the fact that aircraft carriers were included in USN planning.

Did you read it?

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

No because it as I said I’m familiar with your position .

But since we’re going to do this it’s this my turn.

originally posted by: xpert11
In their analysis of the IJN, their interpretation relied on the idea the Japanese didn't operate at night.

originally posted by: [post=25127052AugustusMasonicus[/post]
The USN made the same mistake and got its ass handed to it at Guadalcanal several times because of that.

There were around 3 or 4 naval battles in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal Nov 1942 . “Several” would mean the US didn’t catch on to the fact the Japanese could conduct night time operations until the fourth battle .

There were a cornucopia of mistakes made by the US Navy . Poor or no battle plans, indecisive leader ship, improper deployment of Radar equipped vessels. Command/control and inproper deployment of assets in their fighting lines. Some of the contest at iron bottom sound were at point-blank range. I remember in one clash a destroyer got within 50 feet of a Japanese battleship. That was so close that the battleship couldn’t depress it’s guns low enough to shoot . (same thing happened in the Leyte gulf taffy 3)

The Japanese advantage of drilling for night fighting was not the reason the US got their asses handed to them.

originally posted by: Fallingdown
The Japanese advantage of drilling for night fighting was not the reason the US got their asses handed to them.

It was the prime contributing factor, so much so that Willis Lee begin night fire training exercises prior to engaging the IJN fleet. Despite having radar the USN commanders, Callaghan being the main example, distrusted the sets and instead relied on poor night fighting tactics and was reduced to engaging IJN capital ships at point blank with his cruisers. The IJN practiced night fighting regularly and could deploy torpedos and maneuver in the first three battles better than the USN.


Read: Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

It was the prime contributing factor,

Yes

I knew you didn’t mean the only reason the Japanese Navy defeated us. Was because we didn’t think they could night fight. I also knew you didn’t mean that we couldn’t figure that out for several battles .

Your reply was open ended and not accurate . But it required no great leap of intellect to deduce what you meant. Especially because I know you’re not stupid .

That’s why I didn’t even address it with the exception of one post to prove a point .

I could carry-on a conversation over this just like the one we are having on aircraft carriers. Sticking to the flaw in your statement and drawing meaning where there is none.

I understood what you were getting at .

So I figure why bother?

Sure would be nice to be offered the same courtesy.

originally posted by: andy06shake

The Bismarck was sunk by a strike force of fifteen Swordfish flying from the carrier Ark Royal.

Bismarck was disabled by a torpedo from a Swordfish. The lucky torpedo hit crippled the Bismarck's rudder and send the vessels in circles. I recommend the book Pursuit The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck by Ludovic Kennedy (1919 - 2009). Kennedy's work is a must for anybody interested in naval history.

originally posted by: xpert11
Bismarck was disabled by a torpedo from a Swordfish. The lucky torpedo hit crippled the Bismarck's rudder and send the vessels in circles.

In truth, the torpedo hit was not "lucky", as it was aimed. Of the range of damage possible, jamming the rudder was good fortune.

On night operations and capabilities of the Royal Navy. I am sure there are numerous examples, including by the USN and others, however, here’s a couple of examples off the top of my head.

> The Battle of Cape Matapan is a lesson in night naval operations. In this action the Italians lost three heavy cruisers and two destroyers. The Royal Navy had some paintwork scratched.

> The Battle of the Malacca Strait, where the IJN heavy cruiser Haguro was sunk and a destroyer damaged in a night action against five RN destroyers. Interestingly in this engagement the IJN destroyer Kamikaze escaped because the RN thought that an explosion at sea was her blowing up. In fact, the explosion was a truly lucky torpedo strike on another torpedo.

originally posted by: Fallingdown
I knew you didn’t mean the only reason the Japanese Navy defeated us.

That's good, because I never said that.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

And I never said the United States didn’t have strategies involving aircraft carriers .

Now that that is settled .

originally posted by: Fallingdown
And I never said the United States didn’t have strategies involving aircraft carriers .

OK, I never said that either.