How the Royal Navy prepared for global war in the interwar years

Interestingly, the RN worst strategic fear was war breaking out with Japan, followed by Italy and Japan. They pinned their off planning on training on fighting the IJN in night actions. The RN's strategic aim was to offset the IJN's numerical advantage in vessels. In their analysis of the IJN, their interpretation relied on the idea the Japanese didn't operate at night. In terms of weaponry, torpedoes presented the chance for Swordfish (aircraft) and cruisers/destroyers to sink enemy battleships.

In terms of prosecuting a war against Japan, commerce warfare doctrines are embraced. Although surface vessels (cruises) and not submarines represented their weapons platforms for targeting Japan's merchant fleet. The RN's carrier air arm is designed to operate in the Mediterranean Sea against the Italians. So the RN's carrier's armoured decks and the number of aircraft are geared for continuous combat. In comparison, the IJN and USN's carrier arms design and doctrinal focus are on packing a punch via large waves of airstrikes.


About Germany, their surface fleet was growing in the 1930s but was considered too small to threaten the RN. However, the threat posed by U-boats was long recognised, nor did peacetime budgets permit the construction of sufficient future convoy escorts.

a reply to: xpert11

The video link didn’t work.

But the British planning was in adequate along with everybody else except Japan .

Nobody took airplanes seriously and we’re still thinking battleships .

a reply to: xpert11
The irony is that Britain had been an ally of Japan, before and during the first World War, an alliance which served its purpose very well. It was the Americans who made us give it up, because of their rivalry in China.

a reply to: xpert11
You've forgot the main reason/problem with the RN. since the days of the Empire (Britannia rules the waves) The Royal Navy has been too arrogant. We were very lucky in WW2 and it was only through lucky breaks that the RN wasn't annihilated. The Bismark incident should have been the Germans routing of the RN but the decision to flee gave GB the time to marshal weapons to see her off. Just because the RN had more ships does not guarantee success.
It's exactly the same today, arrogance. Spending multiple billions on new submarines to prove we're a global force. WHY. The UK is a pimple on the ars~ of Europe. Why do we need to spend billions on Submarines and missiles.
I've said this before, WHO wants to attack us or the US for that matter. Don't say the Russians or China. They can only just run their countries. The UK has virtually no resources, so why would they expend men and materials to get it.
UK is the same as the US. If Russia or China wanted them they would just buy them.
And the same answer would go if you wanted to bring up NATO. Donnot come with the fear of Russia like the Americans, just answer truthfully, why would Russia want Europe and that includes the UK. They do not fear us so invasion for security want wash. WHY.

a reply to: Fallingdown

Here is a link to Dr Alexander Clarke's presentation for those who wish to have a watch. Thank you for alerting me to the issue with the YouTube video.

The RN was contingency planning for carrier-based airstrikes on Taranto in the 1920s. Why engage the Italian fleet at sea, when it is vulnerable to air attacks in port?

a reply to: crayzeed

The Bismarck and Prinz Eugen chances of a successful break out into the Atlantic was slim at best. The RN benefited from superior [military] intelligence and an overwhelming number of ships. Before the war, the Germans neglected Replenishment at sea. Admiral Günther Lütjens's decision not to refuel his flagship (Bismarck) was down to a lack of operational/logistical knowledge.

Two points remain concerning the Bismarck. Firstly, the Kriegsmarine expended their destroyer force in actions during the invasion of Norway. So there was no or a limited number of destroyers for future operations. Lastly, the intelligence and logistical failings are not confined to the Kriegsmarine. These flaws are institutional in the German armed forces from before WW1 to the end of WW2.

On the subject of the RN, the nature of their global presence required a sufficient number of vessels. They made a series of calculations based upon their assessments of the threats posed by German, Italy and Japan.

a reply to: Fallingdown

Our planning was indeed rather lax, and you are spot on with the aircraft carrier aspect, i mean just look at what happened at Pearl Harbour for instance.

Even some speculation our Signals Intelligence predicted and informed the US about that sneak attack.

Hindsight is a powerful tool all the same and yet at times, we are all guilty of complacency.

Take this COVID 19 palaver, the Spanish flu almost 100 years ago should have given us a clear warning as to what could happen, and yet look at how prepared we were for that war?

a reply to: xpert11

I completely agree about not engaging the Italian fleet at sea .

The swordfish torpedo planes were even lower and slower than the American devastator’s .

originally posted by: xpert11
In their analysis of the IJN, their interpretation relied on the idea the Japanese didn't operate at night.

The USN made the same mistake and got its ass handed to it at Guadalcanal several times because of that.

originally posted by: Fallingdown
Nobody took airplanes seriously and we’re still thinking battleships .

The USN shifted its doctrine from Battleships to Carriers in the interwar period.

a reply to: Fallingdown

Aye, they were indeed flown even lower and slower than the Devastators.

But i think the torpedos and anti-submarine bombs they dropped were a little more reliable that their American counterparts, at least to begin with.

Also the rugged and reliable Swordfish was an ideal aircraft for carriers, especially the small escort carriers, being able to operate in atrocious weather conditions that would ground more modern aircraft like the Devastators.

The Bismarck was sunk by a strike force of fifteen Swordfish flying from the carrier Ark Royal.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

It’s a common misunderstanding.

This is from your general introduction on the paper you linked.

The importance of this doctrinal development has largely been ignored, primarily because battleships formed its centerpiece. The destruction of the Navy’s battle line at Pearl Harbor and the ensuing dominance of the aircraft carrier in the decisive battles of the Pacific War have led investigators to focus on aircraft carriers when examining the prewar development of the Navy’s doctrine. This article seeks to address that oversight.

This paper from the Naval War College titled

Replacing Battleships with Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War II

Analysis starts in 1937 with “strategic deployment of the fleet “.

It goes into admiral King’s 1939 paper “ operations with carriers “ . The Navy considered carriers for aircraft carrier on aircraft carrier engagements. Other than that they were relegated to fighter protection then standoff plaforms for airstrikes on land. Even after the near success at coral sea and the success at Midway . They were kind of like Rodney Dangerfield nobody took them seriously .

It wasn’t until 1943 that they were integrated and task forces were formed around them .

Source

Oops

a reply to: Fallingdown

Did you read the entire article? Fleet Problem X, which was in the early 1930's, and the subsequent Fleet Problems (particularly XIV which simulated a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor), were already demonstrating that airpower was to play a strategic role over surface ships in determining Naval Doctrine.

Additionally, the tactical renderings show that carriers were considered a necessary element of a surface attack.

Was it in July 10 43 that they were integrated and task forces were formed around them instead of battleships.

Carrier task forces were already being strategized over in the 1930's when at sea refueling logistics were performed to enable them to operate as their own task force.

Fleet Problem XVI

Held in 1935 it was the largest mock battle ever staged, conducted over an area of the sea covering five million square miles of the North Central Pacific between Midway, Hawaii, and the Aleutian Islands and involving 321 vessels and 70,000 men. Although four aircraft carriers participated, the major contribution to aviation was the experimentation with underway refueling of carriers that enabled carrier task forces to operate independently.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

Billy Mitchell proved aircraft carriers were dangerous .

Additionally, the tactical renderings show that carriers were considered a necessary element of a surface attack.

A Secondary Element . The US was still thinking big gun navy.


There might of been some confusion because of my poor editing .

So here’s my post again .

But the British planning was inadequate along with everybody else except Japan .

Nobody took airplanes seriously and were still thinking battleships .

Meaning carriers didn’t have the dominance they deserved .

a reply to: andy06shake

You’re probably talking about the mark 14 torpedo. The proverbial turd in the punch bowl . They fixed it at one point in the war but I don’t think it was ever aerial dropped.

a reply to: Fallingdown

My understanding was at the beginning of the war the Devastators were dropping the torps into shallow water or from too great an altitude/velocity for the tolerances of the weapon to contend with.

Fascinating time period really with a lot of little idiocracies regarding battle tactics, weapons, and technology surrounding the military hardware of the time.

originally posted by: Fallingdown
A Secondary Element . The US was still thinking big gun navy.

Fleet Problems XIV, XV and XVI showed this was not the case. Those were the schism between the battleship admirals and those advocating for carriers prior to WWII.

a reply to: AugustusMasonicus

This is from yout link. Are you telling me it is wrong ?

The importance of this doctrinal development has largely been ignored, primarily because *battleships formed its centerpiece.

* centerpiece

The destruction of the Navy’s battle line at Pearl Harbor and the ensuing dominance of the aircraft carrier in the decisive battles of the Pacific War

Why doesn’t that say continue dominance if aircraft carriers were already dominating United States Naval strategy ?

have led investigators to focus on aircraft carriers when examining the prewar development of the Navy’s doctrine.

Self-explanatory and related to this next quote .

This article seeks to address that oversight.

This is page 33 from your document and is the conclusion.

On December 7th, the battle line, centerpiece of the fleet, was destroyed, but the doctrinal principles developed for that fleet could be readily applied to the Navy’s remaining forces in the absence of the battle line. The ensuing battles, both those dominated by the aircraft carrier and the confused night action ruled by the torpedo, could be won through the application of the principles of the Navy’s tactical doctrine. The emphasis on decisive offensive action, reliance on individual initiative, and development of

Prior to World War II the USN Followed the big gun doctrine of battleships and firing lines. It’s abundantly clear in the paper you linked and the paper I linked .

They even mentioned it in no uncertain terms of both the beginning and end of your paper .

The power of aircraft carriers was underestimated at the onset of the war in the Pacific as per your data .

originally posted by: DISRAELI
a reply to: xpert11
The irony is that Britain had been an ally of Japan, before and during the first World War, an alliance which served its purpose very well. It was the Americans who made us give it up, because of their rivalry in China.

Uh, the little Japanese-Chinese "rivalry" like the Rape of Nanking? Discussion probably needs some additional context if we're going to make such a statement.