Another 737 MAX-8 down

From memory check lists are discouraged actually
Also Aviate, Navigate, Communicate in that order
a reply to: Zaphod58

a reply to: Hyperboles

Multiple pilots that I've been discussing this with all mentioned that runway stabilizer is a memory item, and the NG checklist still shows it as one.

originally posted by: charlyv
a reply to: Zaphod58

Wow, that was fairly quick. They must know more than they are telling, I would assume.
Do you think Boing knew that they had a potential design flaw after the Lion crash? The fire does not seem to follow that scenario, but who knows.

Yes and no. Yes, because they know the customers would have grounded them in very quick time by flying on other airlines anyway and no, because they cannot afford to have another plan go down.

What would that say about the governments and the airlines concern about the lives of their citizens and passengers ? -

Sacrificing peoples lives for profit comes to mind.

a reply to: thebozeian

Couple of years ago now perhaps I watched a doco on the building of the Dreamliner. If focused heavily on the over-riding of quality controls each time the schedule fell behind.

They put a recording device on an employee and it caught other employees saying there was no way they were going to fly on it.

Few days ago Jimstone said the problem with the Max was that it was built way under educated and under skilled staff. - Just sayin.

a reply to: Azureblue

He's an idiot. You don't have to all be college graduate super geniuses to build an aircraft.

a reply to: Zaphod58

The Justice Department has to do something to divert attention away from the Russia investigation.

I think there is a underpinning and more fundamental message here, and that is...

"Technology (and automation), in the end, is not always our friend."

I've been thinking about this a lot lately, and there are so many examples. When we as a society become so dependent on computers and automated processes that we neglect / forget fundamental skills bad things happen. I am convinced if you walked into a high school or college math class and took away their computers and/or calculators, better than 70% of those students would instantly revert to a 3rd grade level of capability. Call it complacency or whatever you want, but when we become so reliant on technology for our daily lives, we no longer own technology...technology owns us.

Fundamentally, technology should work for us, not us for it. When that happens there's a serious problem.

I love when "experts" talk. It's always good for a laugh. A so called expert was talking about two safety features that are options when buying the aircraft. One is the AoA indicator, the other is the AoA differential warning light. He goes on to say about how they "are vital to the safe operation of the aircraft".

Funny, thousands of flights a day safely operate without these vital safety features.

a reply to: Flyingclaydisk

That's been an ongoing conversation among pilots for many years. The problem is that no one else is listening.

a reply to: Zaphod58

It's been going on since the debut of the A-320, and even before. Just got louder since then.

a reply to: Flyingclaydisk

It may have gotten louder, but so has the echo chamber its taking place in.

mobile-reuters-com.cdn.ampproject.org...=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google .com&_tf=From%20%251%24s&share=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Farticle%2Fus-ethiopia-airplane-simulator-exclusive-idUSKCN1R20WD

Title:

Ethiopia crash captain did not train on airline's MAX simulator: source

ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) - The captain of a doomed Ethiopian Airlines flight did not get a chance to practice on his airline's new simulator for the Boeing 737 MAX 8 before he died in a crash with 157 others, a pilot colleague said.

So who's more at fault now? The title is confusing.... did he have prior training and due in March for a Refresher. Or was he never trained on the MAX?

Yared's brother said he traveled to Miami twice in the last two years to train on a simulator there, but he did not know which one. Miami has had a 737 MAX simulator since 2017.

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: 1947boomer

In the case of Lion Air, the had a write up for a bad left side AoA sensor. That's the only input that MCAS currently reads from. And right side AoA showed +20, while the right side showed normal.

Did you mean that the LEFT side showed +20O while the right side showed normal?

One thing I've been wondering about is why US pilots in US based airplanes were able to quickly identify the AOA problem and react correctly to it, while other pilots in other aircraft weren't.

I read this morning that cockpit displays that show what the AOA readings are and gives a warning light when the two different sides disagree are considered an extra cost option on the 737 MAX. American Airlines ordered those cockpit displays on their aircraft and Lion Air did not. United aircraft don't have the displays, but they train their pilots to not rely on the AOA system.

I also read that one reason that Boeing went to the MCAS system in the first place (after they put the bigger engines on the aircraft and had to deal with the reduced stability margin) was to make the handling properties of the MAX similar enough to the regular 737s so that pilots don't have to maintain currency on two different types. It's a money saving thing for the airlines, so it makes the 737 MAX purchase more attractive.

So it's looking like Boeing decided to extend the 737 product line instead of launching a new type, as an economic decision. Once they put the new engines on the old airframe and had to deal with the reduced stability margin, they added a dedicated AOA sensor, but made it a single point failure again, presumably to save cost.

Lion Air elected to not pay for the cockpit displays AND to not train their pilots to deal with MCAS failures, presumably to save costs.

Historically it's almost always the case that when an accident occurs with a complex human/hardware/software system several different factors all have to appear at the same time to contribute to the accident, and the occurrence of those factors are often driven by economic motivations. So, it's looking like the same formula that has been causing air accidents since the beginning.

a reply to: Zaphod58

Thank you SO much for the explanation!

You are very kind to respond to questions from a person who can contribute NOTHING to the thread. I appreciate that you take the time to explain very basic concepts and procedures. Thanks!

a reply to: 1947boomer

Yes, that should have read "the left side read +20 while the right read normal", my phone is occasionally possessed.

I read the same thing, and how those are vital safety features, but god knows how many aircraft don't have them and do just fine.

The MCAS training wasn't offered to anyone. Boeing didn't put anything about MCAS in the manual, or inform the airlines until after Lion Air. It all boils down to training though. The CVR apparently shows they were discussing airspeed and altitude, but neither pilot ever once mentioned the elevators or elevator trim.

a reply to: Flyingclaydisk

My Engineering Professor told us to work out a problem by hand once in a while to double check the computer.

a reply to: Zaphod58

There certainly may be, and probably is, communication between AP and MCAS, but they each stand alone.

AW&ST has a good explanation of the system.

Now the FBI is in on it according to MSM.

a reply to: Salander

I've read several explanations of the system.

And no one can explain what law was broken to involve the FBI.

a reply to: JIMC5499

I'm no longer convinced there ever was any kind of problem with MCAS, beyond engineers stupidly allowing a single point failure.

My iPad is apparently also occasionally possessed since I wrote "+200" instead of "+20".

You would think that someone in Boeing must have done a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and realized that the AOA sensor failing in the +20 degree mode would have precipitated a very dangerous condition. But, I dunno, maybe FMEAs aren't required for FAA certification.

Seriously? Boeing didn't put MCAS training in the curriculum or manual?

It definitely seems that better training would have helped the clueless pilots figure out the problem in time to do something about it. However, building in a single point failure by Boeing seems like a pretty crappy design decision, as well.