Another 737 MAX-8 down

a reply to: Zaphod58

That's true, but with AP disconnect button pushed, MCAS continues to operate, according to a friend who flies them for Southwest.

Yes, it can be disabled they have finally discovered, but turning off the AP does not disable it.

a reply to: Salander

No, it doesn't. Which is why I said MCAS finished the crash. If the autopilot pitched them over, they would have disconnected the autopilot, engaging MCAS, which started reacting to their attempts to recover from the pitch over.

a reply to: Zaphod58

MCAS started and finished the crash.

The several reported non-crash incidents on carriers in this country suggest that US crews either understood the system better despite proper treatment in the AFM or they were luckier. I suspect the former.

Yes, there is an AP component for the system, but it is essentially a modern computerized version of a runaway trim situation. There is an AP disconnect switch, as there has been ever since the 50's, but there is no MCAS disconnect switch labelled that way.

Boeing swept things under the rug in bringing this machine to market, and somebody is going to pay for that.

a reply to: Salander

After Lion Air crews were trained on how to turn MCAS off. But the reports by US pilots all state that the nose pitched down only after the autopilot was engaged. That means that initial pitch over couldn't have been MCAS, since it's deactivated when the autopilot is engaged.

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: KansasGirl

Oh the stories I could tell. The FAA should have been disbanded or gone after years ago.

So, nothing will come of it.

Terrifying.

a reply to: KansasGirl

This time it might, since the DOJ is involved, but don't expect much.

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: KansasGirl

This time it might, since the DOJ is involved, but don't expect much.

I guess that's better than nothing.

From Lion Air 737 Max 8 fatal crash

Has Boeing admitted that the software wasn't up to snuff for that system?

a reply to: roadgravel

The software wasn't the issue. They didn't train the crews on how to deal with MCAS reacting to differential data.

Might be back to software, too little or too much, being part of the issue in these events.

a reply to: roadgravel

With Lion Air there's a definitive maintenance issue that can be pointed to, to go with a lack of training. There's definitely a software issue that is showing up, but the question is, in what system.

Why am I thinking of a "perfect storm" here? Take a relatively new aircraft with control software that is still getting dialed in. Add poor maintenance and/or poor maintenance training. Then throw in an inexperienced and possibly poorly trained flight crew.

a reply to: JIMC5499

I don't care what ICAO minimums are, at 350 hours you're pretty useless in an emergency.

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: JIMC5499

I don't care what ICAO minimums are, at 350 hours you're pretty useless in an emergency.

I agree 100%. Odds are that if this happened to a well trained, experienced crew, the flight continues safely and there is a maintenance gripe written up to check "that damned AOA sensor". I think that both crews got behind the aircraft.

I do think that the trial lawyers are starting to smell money around Boeing though. Start watching the advertisements for Dateline and the other "news" shows. If they start a string of segments on the 737's dump your Boeing stock. Many of those segments are funded by lawyers planning lawsuits. Remember the Ford truck gas tank segment?

a reply to: JIMC5499

I think MCAS reacted normally in this case, but crews are so on guard against it, that they reacted like it wasn't and started fighting the aircraft. I'll double check in a little bit, when I have time, but JT610 went pretty quickly into some very high descent rates. This flight didn't.

originally posted by: Zaphod58
So, you know how you're laying in bed, trying to fall asleep, and that thought hits and you're wide awake again?

I think MCAS caused the crash, but didn't start it. I think the crew engaged the autopilot, the aircraft pitched down, they disengaged the autopilot and pulled up, at which point MCAS did its thing and started pushing the nose down, resulting in rapid oscillations, and at some point they either had some kind of structural failure, or lost power.

That is something to lose sleep over. Especially if you don't have a way to contact someone at Boeing and give that crucial bit of possibility/Info if true. If I was boeing, I wouldn't want to take a Top Trained pilot with well over the flight hours and test that theory. Even though it's a good theory among many other possibilities. Does Boeing have a hotline you can call? I know you know people in the industry and FAA...

Wandering if there is a way boeing could place that theory of yours into a real world test with a trained crew to be able to recover the Max in mid emergency.


Edit: I realize Boeing has a hotline for pilots to give their complaints to. But why not folks who study and are very well versed in the aviation field per se.

a reply to: Bigburgh

If the parameters that caused the crashes become known, I would like to see a simulator programmed by an outside party, not, Boeing. Then run the simulation with crews of differing experience levels and see what the results are. This should be a totally blind test, the crews are to have no idea of what's going to happen.

I remember hearing about the US Air flight that landed in the Hudson River being recreated in a simulator. Only one crew was able to make an airport and several of them botched the water landing.

a reply to: JIMC5499

That would be a good way to obtain results once the cause is confirmed. But won't France and Ethiopian authorities be informed or upfront about their findings? Boeing will get a chance to review the CVR and FDR since it's their aircraft?

Seems pointless for boeing to make a patch or fix in the software if the cause is unknown.
Similarities are not always the very same.

Capt. Sully ( whom had previous military training and a great pilot ) was a 1 in a million shot in a AirBus A320. Airbus headquartered in the Netherlands and built in France (wink). Glad A crew got the plane back on the ground safely in the simulator. The flight in Canada years ago were the aircraft wasn't fully fueled ( tv movie but true ) landed safely which was also added to training.

How bout this weather today

originally posted by: Bigburgh
Capt. Sully ( whom had previous military training and a great pilot ) was a 1 in a million shot in a AirBus A320. Airbus headquartered in the Netherlands and built in France (wink). Glad A crew got the plane back on the ground safely in the simulator. The flight in Canada years ago were the aircraft wasn't fully fueled ( tv movie but true ) landed safely which was also added to training.

How bout this weather today

I met Capt. Sully a long time before the Hudson Landing. A friend of mine was a Senior pilot with US Air and I was introduced to him when they were flying my friend's Cessna 340.

The damn weather can't make up it's mind. Possible snow on Friday when last Thursday was 78 degrees. The only good thing is that I am sitting here at work listening to the Pirate game and opening day is 9 days away.

a reply to: JIMC5499

I did see you met Cpt. "Sully" Sullenberger, never thought then he'd be a national hero I'll bet. Not to mention his service like many here (another wink). He has weighed in on the MAX Aircrafts, Boeing and FAA... scathing.

www.marketwatch.com...

Let me be clear, without effective leadership and support from political leaders in the administration, the FAA does not have sufficient independence to be able to do its job, which is to keep air travelers and crews safe. Oversight must mean accountability, or it means nothing.

thepointsguy.com...

In his social media post, Sullenberger writes, “It has been obvious since the Lion Air crash that a redesign of the 737 MAX  8 has been urgently needed, yet has still not been done, and the announced proposed fixes do not go far enough.”

Sunday is looking warm

Oh, some folks are gonna get hammered. The original plan was that MCAS could move the elevators 0.6 degrees. The final configuration allowed 2.5 degrees, but no one passed this on to the safety assessment team. If it had been, the requirement would have been changed to require the system to read multiple AoA inputs, instead of one.

The software update, among other changes, will require input from both sensors and only allow the elevator to be moved once. On JT610, it moved 21 times, with a force that exceeded 100 pounds.

AvWeb Eletter.

The DOT has formally requested an audit of the certification process.

And a former Delta executive will be nominated to head the FAA.