It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
is that possible? i mean to depressurize below 8000 ft cabin pr altitude. surely there must be fail safe systems that prevent the pilot from doing so ( to increase the cabin pr altitude beyond 8000 ft)
originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: Soloprotocol
All he had to do was depressurize the aircraft and they'd all pass out.
So there is no fail safe system in place. rather uncharcteristic of boeing
originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: Nochzwei
It's a simple matter of opening the outflow valve. Flip a couple switches and it's done. Set it to manual and open before takeoff and the aircraft would never pressurize in the first place.
that seems plausible. so the mh370 capt depressurize, the oxygen masks come down, eventually the oxygen runs out. this capt is a murderer if he indeed did that
originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: Nochzwei
There isn't on any aircraft. If there's a fire in the cabin the crew can flip the switches, depressurize and put it out.
At the height of 1900 ft (approx. 600 m) after reaching the pitch angle of 18° the pilot flying pushed on the control column, which led to a decrease in vertical acceleration of up to 0.5, increase in forward speed and, consequently, automatic retraction of flaps from 15° to 10° at a speed of over 200 knots.
The short-term decrease in engine thrust within 3 seconds resulted in decreasing speed and flaps extension to 15°, although the following crew inputs to regain maximum takeoff/go-around thrust led to speed increase and reiterated automatic flaps retraction to 10°. The flaps remained in the latter configuration until the impact.
The pilot flying, by pulling up the control column, continued climbing with a vertical speed of as much as 16 m/s (3150 ft/m).
At a height of 900 m there was a simultaneous control column nose down input and stabilizer nose down deflection from -2,5 deg (6,5 units) to +2,5 deg (1,5 units). The FDR recorded a nose down stabilizer input from the stabilizer trim switch of the control wheel lasting 12 seconds, while the CVR record contains a specific noise of rotation of the trim wheels located on both sides of the central pedestal. As a result the aircraft, having climbed to about 1000 m, turned into descent with a negative vertical acceleration of -1g. The following crew recovery actions did not allow to avoid an impact with the ground.
The aircraft hit the runway about 120 m from the threshold with a speed of over 600 km/h and over 50 degrees nose down pitch.