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originally posted by: cavtrooper7
WE DON'T WANT TO OCCUPY RUSSIA.
We want Russia to back off Ukraine and surrounding countries.
originally posted by: deadcalm
a reply to: cavtrooper7
IF the US is SO HOSTILE and voracious WHY does Russia still exist?
Russia is a bit too big a fish to fry for the Americans....they can slaughter innocent people all day long...but a well equipped, motivated, and well trained force....LOL...NOT.
You my sadly misguided friend, have been watching too much Fox News...and you are a prime example that there are some men you just can't reach.
Good day to you sir.
Have you missed the fact that Russia's air force is literally falling apart? Or what about the fact that most of Russia's military is composed of one year conscripts with only a few months training?
Russia hardly has well trained and motivated forces. This is something they admit and have desperately tried to fix. The goal was to have professional Russian military along the lines of the West. Professional soldiers, a strong NCO corps, and a trained reserve.
NOT when the wall came down you weren't.
We could have overun to the point where you had ONLY nukes
SAME SIDE.
Just less informed I guess.
originally posted by: deadcalm
a reply to: cavtrooper7
SAME SIDE.
I'm on my own side. I decide what I believe is right or wrong based on my own morals...and my own research. I served my country....I know many career officers and enlisted men that feel the same as I do.
Right now I'm ashamed of my government's complicity in war crimes...and of their ridiculously hypocritical support for Israel....and the US.
Just less informed I guess.
You would be entirely mistaken if you believed that.
ALAS....we must agree to disagree.
In fact, the chapter on Russian military reform prior to the Georgian conflict shows that the decline of the Russian military largely paralleled that of the Ukrainian military until the late 2000s. There was a little more funding, to be sure, which allowed for more capabilities to be preserved through better maintenance and slightly more training. And Russia’s strategic nuclear component continued to receive preferential treatment and higher levels of funding even at the worst of economic times. But both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries were dependent on outdated mobilization schemes that were impractical outside of a dictatorial system. In both services, low pay and poor living conditions discouraged potential recruits from signing up as professional soldiers, while demographic decline and draft avoidance had a negative effect on conscription rates. As a result, both militaries were seriously understaffed, with few units at anything approaching full manning levels.
Mikhail Barabanov, the author of the chapters on Russian military reform, highlights the importance of the Serdyukov reform in creating a more effective Russian military over the last five years. He shows that most of the Russian military’s problems stemmed from its effort to maintain two armies at the same time – the traditional mobilization army and a constant readiness rapid response force – while barely having enough money for one. The key aspects of the Serdyukov reform have been described in numerous publications and do not need to be reprised here. The book summarizes them quite effectively, discussing both the successes and failures of the effort. Oddly, though, while Barabanov views the reform as quite successful overall, every aspect of the reform that he discusses at any length is shown to have largely failed. This leaves the reader wondering how it is possible that a reform that was mostly unsuccessful in achieving any of its specific goals resulted in such an increase in military effectiveness. In reality, several aspects of the reform have been remarkably successful, including the elimination of mass mobilization as the core concept of the military structure, the shift to mobile brigades, and increased training. Other aspects, such as streamlining command and control and improving joint operations among services, are still a work in progress. Finally, the reform did effectively fail in a few areas, especially in manpower and improving the education system. The Russian military today continues to be divided into a less effective set of regular units, many with vacant billets and older equipment, and a smaller number of permanent readiness units that have been first in line for new weapons and are largely staffed by professional soldiers who train regularly under a variety of conditions.
Mr Serdyukov smashed through the remaining resistance. The size of the armed forces would be cut from 1.2m to about 1m. The bloated officer corps was to be slimmed by almost 50%, while the creation of well-trained NCOs became a priority. Conscription would stay, but better pay and conditions would create a more professional army. The reforms replaced the old four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments with a two-tier system of strategic commands and leaner, more mobile combat brigades. Nikolas Gvosdev of the US Naval War College says: “The intention was to be able to throw force around in the region and create ‘facts on the ground.’”
A fast-rising defence budget provided more money for maintenance and training, allowing large-scale exercises to become routine, while funding pensions and housing for retired officers. Mr Serdyukov also set out to instil better accountability and to attack corruption that, by some estimates, was siphoning off a third of the equipment budget. But the biggest reform was a ten-year weapons-modernisation programme launched in 2010, at a cost of $720 billion. The aim was to go from only 10% of kit classed as “modern” to 70% by 2020. According to IHS Jane’s, Russia’s defence spending has nearly doubled in nominal terms since 2007. This year alone it will rise by 18.4%.
originally posted by: deadcalm
a reply to: Vector99
On the other hand, if the US wasn't there Russia likely would have fully invaded Ukraine by now.
What evidence do you have of that?
Ukraine was a sovereign nation for more than 24 years, yet Russia made no move to invade any part of it. Let me assure you that if Russia wants the Ukraine....they can take it any time they choose. But they don't.
Remember that this was all started by the US backed coup (via Victoria Nuland)...which overthrew a DEMOCRATICALLY elected leader and put a bunch of ultra nationalist fascists in power in Kiev.
originally posted by: HUMBLEONE
How would you like Russian paratroopers in Mexico?
originally posted by: deadcalm
a reply to: MrSpad
Russia hardly has well trained and motivated forces. This is something they admit and have desperately tried to fix. The goal was to have professional Russian military along the lines of the West. Professional soldiers, a strong NCO corps, and a trained reserve.
A well thought out response...well done.
But absolutely no credible sources to back up any of the assertions you have made.
originally posted by: pheonix358
They reacted when the US installed a puppet regime after throwing out the democratically elected government.
originally posted by: MrSpad
originally posted by: deadcalm
a reply to: MrSpad
Russia hardly has well trained and motivated forces. This is something they admit and have desperately tried to fix. The goal was to have professional Russian military along the lines of the West. Professional soldiers, a strong NCO corps, and a trained reserve.
A well thought out response...well done.
But absolutely no credible sources to back up any of the assertions you have made.
Granted this is all a great deal of reading and research but, if you really want to know it is not hard to find.
originally posted by: MrSpad
None of this comes from anything but, open sources. Granted you need to read about 7 years worth of material. I would suggest starting with reading about the Russian Georgian conflict in 2008. Then follow up with reading on different reforms attempted in the Russian military since.