It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
DJW001
reply to post by Agit8dChop
The world cannot sanction Russia, Russia is the key holder to European energy. I
The United States can supply Europe's energy more cheaply. Obama will use the sanctions against Russia as an excuse for finally clearing the Keystone Pipeline.
buster2010
DJW001
reply to post by Agit8dChop
The world cannot sanction Russia, Russia is the key holder to European energy. I
The United States can supply Europe's energy more cheaply. Obama will use the sanctions against Russia as an excuse for finally clearing the Keystone Pipeline.
You seem to forget there is another nation that can provide energy to Europe even cheaper than America and that is Iran. With sanctions being lifted people will line up to buy oil and gas from them and it won't take a couple of years to get it there like it would with the Keystone which the president is against being built.
DJW001
reply to post by Agit8dChop
The world cannot sanction Russia, Russia is the key holder to European energy. I
The United States can supply Europe's energy more cheaply. Obama will use the sanctions against Russia as an excuse for finally clearing the Keystone Pipeline.
rigel4
reply to post by Xcathdra
Your wrong
he's winning by a mile..
He's bitterly running circles round the West.
All these Western leaders are terrified of him.
DJW001
rigel4
reply to post by Xcathdra
Your wrong
he's winning by a mile..
He's bitterly running circles round the West.
All these Western leaders are terrified of him.
Perhaps you would like to respond to this post, then:
www.abovetopsecret.com...
Russia doesn't expect you or me or anyone else to believe their story.
DJW001
reply to post by rigel4
Russia doesn't expect you or me or anyone else to believe their story.
So... if you don't believe their story, why are you rooting for them?
We could have built bridges with Russia.. not humiliated them at every turn.
Do your own research bud!
DJW001
rigel4
DJW001
reply to post by rigel4
Do your own research bud!
Translation: you cannot think of any. The US and Russia have been co-operating in space as equal partners. Russia has had a tendency to back governments the US does not like, but any humiliation that came from that was self-inflicted.
Is that the opinion of a paid shill?
You going to apologize when i bring examples?
Or just more shillin'
Of course I will apologize when you provide examples! You're the one whose credibility is on the line, not mine.
Context: Past Grievances Much of what Russia is saying now involves grievances the country has been harboring since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. These issues have been around for the past two decades, and relate to what the West did and did not do during the time that Russia was in no position to object. In the minds of Russia’s leaders and in the Russian psyche in general, these perceived slights, snubs, and even transgressions are hardly water under the bridge – rather, they live as vivid symbols of the West’s arrogance, disrespect and even opportunism in the face of Russia’s weakness and turmoil in the early post-Soviet era. Now, with its wealth, patriotism, and clout on the international stage resurgent, Russia seeks recognition and perhaps redress for what it believes were crimes perpetrated against the Russian people as well as affronts to Russia’s pride and historical legacy. They include: The failure of the US and Europe to help the struggling USSR as it faced near economic collapse in the late 1980s, even in the midst of Glastnost and Perestroika reforms and conciliatory rhetoric towards the West. When financial aid came, it came after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it mostly came in the form of loans with strings and austerity measures attached. This sentiment is echoed by many Western experts as well who believe that the West was too quick to declare “victory” in the Cold War and missed a critical opportunity to shore up their erstwhile enemy. No Marshall Plan for Russia materialized as had occurred with the defeated Axis powers of WWII, and the Russian people suffered enormously during the early post-Soviet era. Expansion of NATO into former Warsaw Pact countries in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Western and Russian experts agree this expansion occurred despite promises made to Russia that the Atlantic Alliance would stay out of Central and Eastern Europe in return for Russia’s acquiescence to the reunification of Germany. Many of these former Soviet republics and satellites countries were “fast-tracked” into NATO, even while technically ineligible for membership by NATO’s own rules regarding the existence of territorial disputes. Many of these territorial disputes were with Russia, who was never offered full NATO membership. Other promises regarding the de-militarization of NATO went similarly unfulfilled. The establishment of offensive military bases in Romania and Bulgaria on Russia’s strategic Black Sea – again, considered a violation of promises made by NATO to Russia in the 1990s. NATO’s pursuit of war in the Balkans against traditional Russian ally Serbia, initiated without consultation of the United Nations Security Council where Russia would have wielded a veto. US rejection of Russian offers in 1999 for a joint offensive against Muslim terrorist groups including Chechen rebels, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban following the first World Trade Center attack, the attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Chechen insurgency. Construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline to move oil from Central Asia through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey – bypassing Russia. Failure of the US and NATO to give the Russians adequate credit for help in the initial Afghanistan offensive following the attacks of September 11, including the use of Russian airspace, access to bases in Central Asia, and connections with the Russian-backed opposition to the Taliban (the Northern Alliance) in Afghanistan left over from the Russian-Afghan war of the 1980s. US decision to invade Iraq over the objections of Russia and other UN Security Council members. US support for “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgystan ousting Communist dictators and establishing quasi-democracies on Russia’s borders. US decision to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In Russia’s eyes, the Atlantic powers had not only ignored Russia’s national and security interests, but they had done so with willful arrogance. As Dimitri Simes has written, “Great powers - particularly great powers in decline – do not appreciate such demonstrations of their irrelevance.” Others have noted that Russian grievances against the West have much deeper historical roots and that current tensions still reflect a sense in Russia that Europe has been “saved” several times by Russian sacrifices made in wars (against the Mongols, Napoleon, and Hitler), and that Europe has in turn not shown the proper appreciation or even recognition of this reality.
They include: The failure of the US and Europe to help the struggling USSR as it faced near economic collapse in the late 1980s, even in the midst of Glastnost and Perestroika reforms and conciliatory rhetoric towards the West. When financial aid came, it came after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it mostly came in the form of loans with strings and austerity measures attached. This sentiment is echoed by many Western experts as well who believe that the West was too quick to declare “victory” in the Cold War and missed a critical opportunity to shore up their erstwhile enemy. No Marshall Plan for Russia materialized as had occurred with the defeated Axis powers of WWII, and the Russian people suffered enormously during the early post-Soviet era.
Expansion of NATO into former Warsaw Pact countries in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Western and Russian experts agree this expansion occurred despite promises made to Russia that the Atlantic Alliance would stay out of Central and Eastern Europe in return for Russia’s acquiescence to the reunification of Germany.
Many of these former Soviet republics and satellites countries were “fast-tracked” into NATO, even while technically ineligible for membership by NATO’s own rules regarding the existence of territorial disputes. Many of these territorial disputes were with Russia, who was never offered full NATO membership. Other promises regarding the de-militarization of NATO went similarly unfulfilled. The establishment of offensive military bases in Romania and Bulgaria on Russia’s strategic Black Sea – again, considered a violation of promises made by NATO to Russia in the 1990s.
NATO’s pursuit of war in the Balkans against traditional Russian ally Serbia, initiated without consultation of the United Nations Security Council where Russia would have wielded a veto.
US rejection of Russian offers in 1999 for a joint offensive against Muslim terrorist groups including Chechen rebels, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban following the first World Trade Center attack, the attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Chechen insurgency.
Construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline to move oil from Central Asia through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey – bypassing Russia.
Failure of the US and NATO to give the Russians adequate credit for help in the initial Afghanistan offensive following the attacks of September 11, including the use of Russian airspace, access to bases in Central Asia, and connections with the Russian-backed opposition to the Taliban (the Northern Alliance) in Afghanistan left over from the Russian-Afghan war of the 1980s.
US decision to invade Iraq over the objections of Russia and other UN Security Council members.
US support for “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgystan ousting Communist dictators and establishing quasi-democracies on Russia’s borders.
US decision to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
In Russia’s eyes, the Atlantic powers had not only ignored Russia’s national and security interests, but they had done so with willful arrogance. As Dimitri Simes has written, “Great powers - particularly great powers in decline – do not appreciate such demonstrations of their irrelevance.” Others have noted that Russian grievances against the West have much deeper historical roots and that current tensions still reflect a sense in Russia that Europe has been “saved” several times by Russian sacrifices made in wars (against the Mongols, Napoleon, and Hitler), and that Europe has in turn not shown the proper appreciation or even recognition of this reality.