posted on Oct, 23 2004 @ 01:56 AM
A while back I contended that terrorists win because they're a decentralized force attacking a centralized one. Like the American colonists battling
the British Empire in the 1770s, they only have to stay alive to win. Political opposition (world criticism) and renewed attention (the beheading
videos) equate to a sustained victory.
The conclusion is that the best way to meet small groups of opposition (terrorists) is to decentralize and work "horizontally," or in a series of
small groups with little hierarchy.
We see this happening in Afghanistan, here:
www.technologyreview.com...
Better, some say, that information and decision-making should flow horizontally. In fact, that�s how the 2001 war in Afghanistan was fought.
Special-operations forces organized into �A teams� numbering no more than two dozen soldiers roamed the chilly mountains near the Pakistan border on
horseback, rooting out Taliban forces and seeking al-Qaeda leaders. The teams and individuals were all linked to one another. No one person was in
tactical command.
(start of the article here:
www.technologyreview.com... )
War by attrition went out of style in Vietnam and the U.S. military is finally catching on. But the article tells us that the pervasive
communicatation needed for "horizontal battle" didn't work all the time in Iraq. Or did it?
It's commonly known that the army operates by the principle of "need to know." One interesting thing I find with the War on Terror is how the
largest and most powerful centralized army is chipping away at its very composition.
It seems as if the wave of the future is decentralized special forces teams. This leads me to wonder if, in the future, roving bands of militias,
each operating by slightly different agendas, will "defend" the population. How the army eventually evolves and interacts with the War on Terror
will be interesting to see indeed. Any speculations?