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Recognizing the failure to adequately respond to the most heinous crimes known to humankind, world leaders made a historic commitment to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity at the United Nations (UN) 2005 World Summit. This commitment, entitled the Responsibility to Protect, stipulates that:
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this responsibility.
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council.
”Meanwhile, Libya, as an actor in global politics, is said to be a sovereign state. The Security Council resolution thus “reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity” of Libya. Under “normal” conditions, that is, within limits, Libya is recognized as an autonomous actor, capable of self-determining its “internal” and “external” affairs without international interference. On the other hand, the very framing of the state violence unleashed against the uprising citizens of Libya as a potential “crime against humanity” suggests that the limits of state-sovereignty may have been reached. What are these limits, who draws them, and how?”
”Thus the implication is that foreign intervention is more likely to occur not in a vacuum (as in state failure), but in direct opposition to a sovereign state. The question then is what to do with the hostile state, short of direct war, which Resolution 1973 does not address. Certain states, such as those in ASEAN, have asserted sovereignty as inviolable. Others, especially the backers of RtoP and the leaders of the current intervention in Libya, have argued that sovereignty is a responsibility that will be forfeit in the event of crimes against humanity.”
The Security Council allowed itself to be informed by what the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its June 6, 2011 Report on Libya characterises as the “more sensational reports that the regime was using its air force to slaughter demonstrators”.
On this basis it adopted Resolution 1973 which mandated the imposition of a “no-fly zone” over Libya, and resolved “to take all necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya…”
Thus, first of all, the Security Council used the still unresolved issue in international law of “the right to protect”, the so-called R2P, to justify the Chapter VII military intervention in Libya.
In this context the UN Security Council has committed a litany of offences which have underlined the further transformation of the Council into a willing instrument of the most powerful among its Member States.
Contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council authorised and has permitted the destruction and anarchy which has descended on the Libyan people.
At the end of it all:
#many Libyans will have died and have been maimed;
#much infrastructure will have been destroyed, further impoverishing the Libyan people;
#the bitterness and mutual animosity among the Libyan people will have been further entrenched;
#the possibility to arrive at a negotiated, inclusive and stable settlement will have become that much more difficult;
#instability will have been reinforced among the countries neighbouring Libya, especially the countries of the African Sahel, such as Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania;
#Africa will inherit a much more difficult challenge successfully to address issues of peace and stability, and therefore the task of sustained development; and,
#those who have intervened to perpetuate violence and war in Libya will have the possibility to set the parameters within which the Libyans will have the possibility to determine their destiny, and thus further constrain the space for the Africans to exercise their right to self-determination.
LIBYA, AFRICA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER:
As Africans we have predicated our future as relevant players in an equitable system of international relations on the expectation that the United Nations would indeed serve “as the foundation of a new world order.”
If we really do look at the world in terms of governments and societies and the relationship between them, and do recognize that both governments and their citizens have rights as subjects of international law and have agency as actors in international politics, then what exactly is the international community ‘intervening’ in?
The UN Charter
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.
”138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. [...]”
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state..."
"The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter..."
[...]
The concept of viewing both governments and societies as “subjects” of international law is a fairly new one, though in the realm of international law it’s been a fundamental assumption for some time. At the same time, Slaughter’s redefinition of “intervention,” based on the idea that there is no such thing as traditional sovereignty, is a brand new way of glossing over the thorny problems that undermine a policy of humanitarian intervention.
[...]
Much as advocates of the “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P, like to say that sovereignty is irrelevant to the relationship of a society to its government (which Slaughter explicitly argues), it is that very sovereignty which also creates the moral and legal justification to intervene. For example, the societies of the United States and NATO did not vote to intervene in Libya — their governments did. And if the polls were any indication, the public was very skeptical of the reasons for intervening.
[...]
Among the chief reasons for intervening in Libya was the prevention of a massacre in the eastern city of Benghazi. Despite hazy evidence, at best, this was destined to happen — shelling a few neighborhoods in a civil war is hardly evidence of an imminent Rwanda-style genocide, and other rebel-controlled areas Gaddhafi’s regime has reoccupied did not see mass slaughter — the notion of engaging in preventive warfare has a checkered track record.
[...]
My biggest objection to the new doctrine of interventionism is that it seem to rely so much on whim. I still don’t understand why we needed to intervene in Libya, but not Yemen and Syria. I have yet to see a framework that guides action. How do we determine when, to borrow Slaughter’s New Sovereignty concept, a government violates its responsibility to its citizens. Defined broadly enough, every government violates some theoretical norm about its own conduct. Did the Clinton Administration rescind its right to govern the country after storming David Karesh’s compound in Waco? Did Kim Jong-Il rescind his right to govern after starving millions of his own people to death through economic mismanagement in the 1990s? These are clearly very different situations, but where is the line, and how is it drawn?
Even among critics of the Libyan intervention, there tends to be some acknowledgement that Libya was where America could make a difference, whereas the United States could not “make a difference” in other, more violent scenes of the failure to uphold the norms of R2P.
This is rather misleading, because the reduction of R2P to a merely opportunistic concept undermines the principles of R2P itself. After all, if R2P is only undertaken when action can cheaply and presumably quickly “make a difference” then it’s not very much of a responsibility.
[...]
The national interest justifications for Libya and Iraq, at least the most powerful ones, were about sending messages and changing perceptions. As Obama said in his March 18 speech to retroactively sell the war:
"[A]s president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action."
The key problem for American interests was what it would look like for the United States to stand aside. The idea was to send a message to the Arab world that America was on the side of the Arab people – never mind, of course, that the US was decidedly not on the side of those Arabs if they happened to be Saudi, Bahraini, Qatari, or Emirati – and to show dictators that America did not like it when they slaughtered their own people, a lesson which dictators have heard and ignored for the past few decades.
[...]
Intervening when we can to “send a message” encourages the sloppy thinking about US foreign policy which has contributed to our grand strategic insolvency and incoherence in the post-Cold War era. Our concerns with looking tough, looking responsible, looking altruistic, or looking credible lead us to wage or join wars in places where we have very little, if anything, immediately at stake. Fighting wars for narrative or image, as I have argued before, is foolish. Since there is no such thing as “Arab opinion” as a political force, only specific manifestations of the opinions of discrete Arabs within the particular political entities they participate in (just as there is no such thing as European opinion or world opinion in this quasi-mystical sense)[...]
[...]The best thing the Libyan intervention has to be said for it is that instability there is not a US problem even if it takes a particularly nasty form. Libya is not in the heart of the Middle East and does not significantly affect the calculus of many regional powers the way Iraq did. However, pursuing the illusion of a strategic goal at relatively low cost to concrete US interests is merely a milder form of incoherence made palatable by the notion that the US was fulfilling a responsibility it had virtually no intention of fulfilling anywhere else. So, opportunity might answer the question of “Why not Syria?” or “Why not Congo?” but at the end of the day we are still left with the shaky argument for “Why Libya?”
[...]R2P will be just as prone to the geopolitical pitfalls of previous forms of humanitarian intervention and just as unhealthy and confounding for American foreign policy. Recognizing the radical changes such ideas about American power pose to the international order, we ought to be very concerned that these flimsy strategic rationales are the only reward for American interests and that we are supposed to rely on an opportunistic mindset as a bulwark against exhaustive implementation of the doctrine.”
What are these limits, who draws them, and how?
• Supremacy of authority or rule as exercised by a sovereign or sovereign state.
• Royal rank, authority, or power.
• Complete independence and self-government.
• A territory existing as an independent state.
According to Amnesty International, a proponent of universal jurisdiction, certain crimes pose so serious a threat to the international community as a whole, that states have a logical and moral duty to prosecute an individual responsible for it; no place should be a safe haven for those who have committed genocide,[3] crimes against humanity, extrajudicial executions, war crimes, torture and forced disappearances.
Universal jurisdiction or universality principle is a principle in public international law (as opposed to private international law) whereby states claim criminal jurisdiction over persons whose alleged crimes were committed outside the boundaries of the prosecuting state, regardless of nationality, country of residence, or any other relation with the prosecuting country. The state backs its claim on the grounds that the crime committed is considered a crime against all, which any state is authorized to punish, as it is too serious to tolerate jurisdictional arbitrage.
The doctrine becomes less coherent in a civil war in which one side is winning and promising to slaughter its enemies, Libya being the obvious example. Those intervening can claim to be carrying out a neutral humanitarian action, but in reality, they are intervening on one side’s behalf. If the intervention is successful — as it likely will be given that interventions are invariably by powerful countries against weaker ones — the practical result is to turn the victims into victors. By doing that, the humanitarian warriors are doing more than simply protecting the weak. They are also defining a nation’s history.
There is thus a deep tension between the principle of national self-determination and the obligation to intervene to prevent slaughter.