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Originally posted by dillweed
reply to post by pteridine
That sounds fair. But moving forward means that what we know now to be insufficient evidence, is improved. What's ironic is, I'm not satisfied with what I've been told, and you're not satisfied that I'm not satisfied. One of us is wasting their time.
Originally posted by dillweed
reply to post by GoodOlDave
If, I were here just to annoy you, I'm sure that my time has been well spent. But, I'm here because my country has been hi-jacked by a few people that are evil. Because I include you among that group, then it follows that beyond the necessary respect required by the 'mods' and T&C's, I loathe what you are attempting to do here. I'm not in the least ashamed of what I'm trying to do here, but you should be.
Originally posted by dillweed
reply to post by GoodOlDave
You're right about one thing, there may be some who question my methods, or even my motivation, but there's no doubt about why you're here, and the pursuit of truth is not compatible with that. Keep posting, it's priceless.
Originally posted by GoodOlDave
Hey, wait a minute- ARE you a secret gov't disinformation agent? That would explain a lot of things, actually.
Originally posted by vipertech0596
reply to post by Skadi_the_Evil_Elf
Just how long do you think it takes to prep a fighter for combat? Let alone get a pilot into it and launch? We dont keep weapons loaded on our fighters 24/7.
We dont keep weapons loaded on our fighters 24/7.
Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks WILLIAM B. SCOTT/ROME, N.Y., HERNDON, VA., and COLORADO SPRINGS On-the-fly innovation, backed by excellent training, 'probably saved many lives' when terrorists struck the U.S. Sept. 11, 2001: "American 11 heavy, Boston Center. Your transponder appears to be inoperative. Please recycle. . . . American 11 heavy, how do you read Boston Center? Over. AW2200 Air National Guard F-15s from Otis ANGB, Mass., scrambled in response to the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11. They flew supersonically to New York, then intercepted about 100 aircraft during the next 5.5 hr. "Watch supervisor, I have a possible hijack of American 11 heavy. Recommend notifying Norad." At 8:40 a.m. EDT, Tech. Sgt. Jeremy W. Powell of North American Aerospace Defense Command's (Norad) Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, N.Y., took the first call from Boston Center. He notified NEADS commander Col. Robert K. Marr, Jr., of a possible hijacked airliner, American Airlines Flight 11. "Part of the exercise?" the colonel wondered. No; this is a real-world event, he was told. Several days into a semiannual exercise known as Vigilant Guardian, NEADS was fully staffed, its key officers and enlisted supervisors already manning the operations center "battle cab." In retrospect, the exercise would prove to be a serendipitous enabler of a rapid military response to terrorist attacks on Sept. 11. Senior officers involved in Vigilant Guardian were manning Norad command centers throughout the U.S. and Canada, available to make immediate decisions. Marr ordered two F-15 fighters sitting alert at Otis Air National Guard (ANG) Base, Mass., to "battle stations." "The fighters were cocked and loaded, and even had extra gas on board," he recalled. AW2202 SCOTT GWILT/ROME SENTINEL Relying on "skin-paint" radar returns, Air National Guard troops at Norad's Northeast Air Defense Sector tried to locate hijacked aircraft after terrorists silenced the transponders. Marr called Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold, commander of the Continental U.S. Norad Region (Conar), at Tyndall AFB, Fla., told him about the suspected hijacked aircraft and suggested interceptors be scrambled. Arnold, who also heads the 1st Air Force for Air Combat Command, was in his Air Operations Center preparing for another day of the exercise. "I told him to scramble; we'll get clearances later," Arnold said. His instincts to act first and get permission later were typical of U.S. and Canadian commanders that day. On Sept. 11, the normal scramble-approval procedure was for an FAA official to contact the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and request Pentagon air support. Someone in the NMCC would call Norad's command center and ask about availability of aircraft, then seek approval from the Defense Secretary--Donald H. Rumsfeld--to launch fighters. Lt. Col. Timothy (Duff) Duffy, a 102 Fighter Wing (FW) F-15 pilot at Otis ANGB, had already heard about the suspected hijacking, thanks to a phone call from the FAA's Boston Approach Control. He had the call transferred to the unit's command post, grabbed Maj. Daniel (Nasty)Nash, his wingman, and started suiting up. Another officer told Duffy, "This looks like the real thing." "Halfway to the jets, we got 'battle stations,' and I briefed Nasty on the information I had about the American Airlines flight," Duffy said. "About 4-5 min. later, we got the scramble order and took off." Also an airline pilot, Duffy had a bad feeling about the suspected hijacking; something didn't feel right. Consequently, he jammed the F-15's throttles into afterburner and the two-ship formation devoured the 153 mi. to New York City at supersonic speeds. "It just seemed wrong. I just wanted to get there. I was in full-blower all the way," he said. Unknown to Duffy, Nash and every commander being notified at the time, American Flight 11 had crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) about the time both F-15s were taking off. America's terrorist nightmare had begun. Almost simultaneous with Marr's call to Arnold at Conar, the same hijack notification was being passed by phone to a Norad command center deep inside Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, and the joint FAA/ Defense Dept. Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) colocated with the FAA's ATC System Command Center in Herndon, Va. (AW&ST Dec. 17, 2001, p. 96). "NEADS instantly ordered the scramble, then called me to get Cinc [Norad commander-in-chief] approval for it," said Capt. Michael H. Jellinek, a Canadian Forces (Navy) officer serving as Norad command director that morning. He's also director of plans, requirements and readiness at Norad's Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station. Fortunately, Maj. Gen. Eric A. Findley, another Canadian and Norad's director of operations, was already in the mountain for the Vigilant Guardian exercise. He quickly approved the fighters' launch. Back at the NEADS Operations Center, identification technicians were sorting thousands of green dots on their radar scopes, looking for American Flight 11. Since terrorists had turned off the Boeing 767's transponder, FAA controllers could only tell NEADS technicians where the flight had last been seen. The NEADS radar screens showed "primary" or "skin-paint" returns, the raw radar pulses reflected from an aircraft's surface. Ironically, FAA officials only a few months earlier had tried to dispense with "primary" radars altogether, opting to rely solely on transponder returns as a way to save money. Norad had emphatically rejected the proposal. Still, on Sept. 11, Norad's radars were spread around the periphery of the U.S., looking outward for potential invaders. Inside U.S. borders, very few radars were feeding NEADS scopes. In essence, technicians were half-blind, trying to separate hijacked airliners from thousands of skin-paint returns. At the time, more than 4,000 aircraft were airborne over the nation, most in the northeast sector, which monitors half a million square miles of airspace. "We were trying to determine which [radar return] was him. But we couldn't get what we needed just from our scopes," said MSgt. Maureen Dooley, a noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of NEADS' identification technicians. She and other troops were constantly on the phone with the FAA, airlines and others, looking for clues. "If we could get good last-known-positions and tail numbers, that would help the fighters pick out the right aircraft." "The biggest task was maintaining track continuity," echoed Tech. Sgt. Jeffrey Lamarche, NCOIC of the air surveillance section. Later, his team thought they had spotted a fifth hijacked aircraft. "This fifth guy made an abrupt turn toward a major city--but it was OK. He was told to land there. It sure had our hearts going and adrenaline pumping. We didn't know what he was doing." Marr capsulized the tense moments: "The NEADS battle managers get the last known location, estimate [Flight AA11's] speed and find a green dot that's not identified. Almost as soon as it's discovered, it disappears. It's 8:46 a.m. A shocked airman rushes from the computer maintenance room saying, 'CNN is reporting that the World Trade Center has been hit by an airliner.' There are no other missing aircraft. As we watch the TV, another airliner shows up on the screen, aimed for the second tower [9:02 a.m.]. The shocking reality becomes apparent. This is no longer 'an accident.' New York City is under attack." Flying supersonically, the F-15s were still 8 min. from Manhattan when United Airlines Flight 175 smashed into the WTC's south tower. "Huntress," the NEADS weapons control center, had told Duffy his hijacked target was over John F. Kennedy International Airport. He hadn't heard about the United aircraft yet. "The second time I asked for bogey dope [location of AA11], Huntress told me the second aircraft had just hit the WTC. I was shocked . . . and I looked up to see the towers burning," Duffy said. He asked for clarification of their mission, but was met with considerable confusion. In Norad's command center, "a bunch of things started happening at once," Jellinek said. "We initiated an Air Threat Conference [call]. We were getting information about other possible hijackings." Telephone links were established with the NMCC, Canada's equivalent command center, Strategic Command, theater Cincs and federal emergency-response agencies. At one time or another, President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld and key military officers were heard on the open line. Confusion was rampant, but officers and enlisted troops immediately reverted to their professional roles, trying to sort rumor from fact. Findley and his senior staff in the Norad Battle Management Center told each air defense sector to "generate, generate, generate" sorties--get as many fighters in the air as possible. AT THE TIME, NORAD had 20 fighters on armed alert throughout the North American continent. Only 14 were in the continental U.S. at seven bases; the rest were in Alaska and Canada. Within 18 hr., 300 fighters would be on alert at 26 locations. Calls from fighter units also started pouring into Norad and sector operations centers, asking, "What can we do to help?" At Syracuse, N.Y., an ANG commander told Marr, "Give me 10 min. and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 min. and I'll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams]." Marr replied, "I want it all." NEADS controllers put F-16s at Langley AFB, Va., on battle-stations alert at 9:09 a.m., prepared to back up the F-15s over New York. But the FAA command center then reported 11 aircraft either not in communication with FAA facilities, or flying unexpected routes. At 9:24, the Langley-based alert F-16s were scrambled and airborne in 6 min., headed for Washington. By 9:26 a.m., the FAA command center stopped all departures nationwide. At 9:41, American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, elevating tension levels even further. NEADS' Sr. Airman Stacia Rountree, an identification technician, said, "We had three aircraft down and the possibility of others hijacked. We had to think outside the box," making up procedures on the fly. Before the day ended, 21 aircraft across the U.S. had been handled as "tracks of interest."
Originally posted by GoodOlDave
Originally posted by vipertech0596
reply to post by Skadi_the_Evil_Elf
Just how long do you think it takes to prep a fighter for combat? Let alone get a pilot into it and launch? We dont keep weapons loaded on our fighters 24/7.
I don't know where I read this, but supposedly the fighters at Andersen AFB weren't even remotely interceptor ready. For safety reasons someone decided to store the missiles on the opposite side of the base from the planes to prevent one of the missiles going BOOM and taking a nearby plane along with it. When the SHTF they were spending the whole time trying to get the missiles from the depot to arm the planes. When I read that, I thought, "Yep, that's exactly something the gov't would do".
Does anyone have more information on this?
Anyways, I'm not talking about the actual response times, which were understandably in several cases, slow. NORAD and the military were doing the best they could with what little they had. it is the lack of orders to scramble in the first place, from the highest levels of the government That laxness is of interest to me, not the actual response of air defense that day.
Shortly after the second WTC crash, calls from fighter units begin “pouring into NORAD and sector operations centers, asking, ‘What can we do to help?’” From Syracuse, New York, a commander of the 174th Fighter Wing of the New York Air National Guard calls and tells NEADS commander Robert Marr: “Give me ten [minutes] and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 [minutes] and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams].” Marr replies, “I want it all.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; News 10 Now,