Who is Philip Zelikow?
November 1997-August 1998: Future 9/11 Commission Staff Attend Terrorism Study Group; Predict Consequences of ‘Catastrophic Terrorism’
Over a period of nine months, faculty from Harvard University, Stanford University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of
Virginia meet in a collaborative effort called the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group. Its members include experts on terrorism, national security,
intelligence, and law enforcement. The project director is Philip Zelikow, future executive director of the 9/11 Commission. Future 9/11 Commissioner
Jamie Gorelick is also a member, along with Ernest May, who will be a senior advisor to the 9/11 Commission. The culmination of the group’s efforts
is a report written by Zelikow and its two co-chairs: former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and former CIA Director John Deutch. A
condensed version of the report is published in the journal Foreign Affairs in late 1998. They write: “Long part of the Hollywood and Tom Clancy
repertory of nightmarish scenarios, catastrophic terrorism has moved from far-fetched horror to a contingency that could happen next month. Although
the United States still takes conventional terrorism seriously… it is not yet prepared for the new threat of catastrophic terrorism.” They predict
the consequences of such an event: “An act of catastrophic terrorism that killed thousands or tens of thousands of people and/or disrupted the
necessities of life for hundreds of thousands, or even millions, would be a watershed event in America’s history. It could involve loss of life and
property unprecedented for peacetime and undermine Americans’ fundamental sense of security within their own borders in a manner akin to the 1949
Soviet atomic bomb test, or perhaps even worse. Constitutional liberties would be challenged as the United States sought to protect itself from
further attacks by pressing against allowable limits in surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects, and the use of deadly force. More violence
would follow, either as other terrorists seek to imitate this great ‘success’ or as the United States strikes out at those considered responsible.
Like Pearl Harbor, such an event would divide our past and future into a ‘before’ and ‘after.’” [Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, 10/1998;
Foreign Affairs, 11/1998; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. xi-xiv]
January 3, 2001: Clarke Demoted by Rice and Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director
National Security Adviser Rice decides this day to retain Richard Clarke, counterterrorism “tsar” for the Clinton administration, and his staff.
However, she downgrades his official position as National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. While he is still known as the counterterrorism
“tsar,” he has less power and now reports to deputy secretaries instead of attending Cabinet-level meetings. He no longer is able to send memos
directly to the president, or easily interact with Cabinet-level officials. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 227-30; Guardian, 3/25/2004] Clarke will not be able to
meet with President Bush even a single time before 9/11 to discuss al-Qaeda (see January 25, 2001-September 10, 2001). In 2004, Rice will reveal that
the person she tasks with considering changes to Clarke and his staff is Philip Zelikow, the future Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. Zelikow
recuses himself from those parts of the 9/11 Commission’s investigation directly relating to his role in this and other matters. However, 9/11
victims’ relatives are not satisfied. For instance, one relative says, “Zelikow has conflicts. I’m not sure that his recusal is sufficient. His
fingerprints are all over that decision [to demote Clarke].” [United Press International, 4/10/2004]
June 1, 2002: Bush Launches Doctrine of Preemptive Attack
In a speech, President Bush announces a “new” US policy of preemptive attacks: “If we wait for threats to fully materialize we will have waited
too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” [New York Times, 6/2/2002]
This preemptive strategy is included in a defensive strategic paper the next month (see July 13, 2002), and formally announced in September 2002.
Despite the obvious parallels, the mainstream media generally fails to report that this “new” antiterrorism strategy was first proposed by
Bush’s key administration officials in 1992 (see March 8, 1992) and has been continually advocated by the same people ever since. [New York Times,
9/20/2002; Washington Post, 9/21/2002; Guardian, 9/21/2002] Furthermore, State Department Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass originally drafted
this new national security strategy. However, Condoleezza Rice had ordered that it be completely rewritten, reportedly wanting “something bolder.”
The man responsible for this task was Philip Zelikow, who in 2003 will be appointed executive director of the 9/11 Commission. [Mann, 2004, pp.
316-317]
Mid-December 2002-March 2003: 9/11 Commission Gets Off to Slow Start
After experiencing some problems at its inception due to the resignation of its chair and vice-chair (see December 11, 2002 and December 13, 2002),
the 9/11 Commission spends much of the next four months hiring staff, getting security clearances (see March 27, 2003), finding office space, and
asking for a budget increase (see March 26, 2003). One of the first employees hired is executive director Philip Zelikow, but disputes within the
Commission over who will be general council last until March, when Dan Marcus is hired. The Commission is unable to even have a telephone until
February, when it finds an official security facility for its offices. However, then most of the Commission’s staff cannot enter their offices,
because they do not have the relevant security clearances yet, even though there are no secret documents actually in the offices at this point. [Kean
and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 34-45]
January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commission Starts Off with Little Funding
The 9/11 Commission, officially titled the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, holds its first meeting in Washington. The
commission has $3 million and only a year and a half to explore the causes of the attacks. By comparison, a 1996 federal commission to study legalized
gambling was given two years and $5 million. [Associated Press, 1/27/2003] Two months later the Bush administration grudgingly increases the funding
to $12 million total (see March 26, 2003). Philip Zelikow, the director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and
formerly in the National Security Council during George H. W. Bush’s administration, is also appointed executive director of the commission.
[Associated Press, 1/27/2003] Zelikow cowrote a book with National Security Adviser Rice and was also, in 2002, responsible for completely rewriting
President Bush’s national security strategy. [9/11 Commission, 3/2003; Mann, 2004, pp. 316-317] A few days later, Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton says,
“The focus of the commission will be on the future. We want to make recommendations that will make the American people more secure.… We’re not
interested in trying to assess blame, we do not consider that part of the commission’s responsibility.” [United Press International, 2/6/2003]
October 2003: Members of 9/11 Commission Meet with ISI
9/11 Commission staff director Philip Zelikow and several members of his staff embark on a fact-finding mission to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other
countries. While in Pakistan, they interview at least two senior members of the ISI. Whether they are investigating a possible ISI role in the 9/11
plot remains unclear. [United Press International, 11/5/2003]
October 21, 2003: 9/11 Commission Staff Meet Member of Able Danger Unit
Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, along with two members of the commission’s staff and an unnamed “representative of
the executive branch,” meets at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan with three individuals doing intelligence work for the US Defense Department. [CNN,
8/17/2005; Sacramento Bee, 11/24/2005] Among these is Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, an Army intelligence officer who worked closely with a military
intelligence unit called Able Danger, which between fall 1999 and spring 2001 was tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda networks around
the world (see Fall 1999 and January-March 2001). According to Shaffer’s own later account, he gives the commission staff a detailed account of what
Able Danger was, and tells them, “We found two of the three cells which conducted 9/11, to include [Mohamed] Atta.” At the end of the meeting,
Philip Zelikow approaches him and says, “This is important. We need to continue this dialogue when we get back to the states.” [Government
Security News, 9/2005] Following the meeting, Zelikow calls back to the 9/11 Commission’s headquarters in Washington to request that staff draft a
document request, seeking information on Able Danger from the Department of Defense. [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 pdf file]
According to Anthony Shaffer, “My understanding from talking to another member of the press is that [Zelikow’s] call came into America at four o
clock in the morning. He got people out of bed over this.” [Government Security News, 9/2005] Shaffer subsequently tries contacting Philip Zelikow
in January 2004 (see Early January 2004). After it is revealed in the press that the commission, which includes no mention of Able Danger in its final
report, had been briefed on the unit, spokesmen for commission members will insist that while they were informed of Able Danger at this time, they
were not informed that it had identified Mohamed Atta or any other hijackers as threats. [New York Times, 8/10/2005] Head commissioners Thomas H. Kean
and Lee H. Hamilton will later say in an official statement that a memorandum prepared by the commission staff after the meeting “does not record
any mention of Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers, or any suggestion that their identities were known to anyone at DOD before 9/11. Nor
do any of the three Commission staffers who participated in the interview, or the executive branch lawyer, recall hearing any such allegation.”
[Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 pdf file]
Early January 2004: Able Danger Intelligence Officer Tries Contacting 9/11 Commission
Following an October 2003 meeting with three members of the 9/11 Commission’s staff (see October 21, 2003), Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer tries
contacting Philip Zelikow, the commission’s executive director, as requested by Zelikow himself. Shaffer is an Army intelligence officer who worked
closely with a military intelligence unit called Able Danger, which identified Mohamed Atta and three other future 9/11 hijackers in early 2000 (see
January-February 2000). He phones Zelikow’s number the first week of January 2004. The person who replies tells him, “I will talk to Dr. Zelikow
and find out when he wants you to come in.” However, Shaffer receives no call back, so a week later he phones again. This time, the person who
answers him says, “Dr. Zelikow tells me that he does not see the need for you to come in. We have all the information on Able Danger.” [Government
Security News, 9/2005] Yet the commission doesn’t even receive the Able Danger documentation they had previously requested from the Defense
Department until the following month (see February 2004). [Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 8/12/2005 pdf file]
January 28, 2004: CIA Director Privately Tells 9/11 Commission about Urgent Pre-9/11 Warning, but His Testimony Is Kept Secret
Former CIA Director George Tenet privately testifies before the 9/11 Commission. He provides a detailed account of an urgent al-Qaeda warning he gave
to the White House on July 10, 2001 (see July 10, 2001). According to three former senior intelligence officials, Tenet displays the slides from the
PowerPoint presentation he gave the White House and even offers to testify about it in public. According to the three former officials, the hearing is
attended by commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, the commission’s executive director Philip Zelikow, and some staff members. When Tenet testifies
before the 9/11 Commission in public later in the year, he will not mention this meeting. The 9/11 Commission will neglect to include Tenet’s
warning to the White House in its July 2004 final report. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] Portions of a transcript of Tenet’s private testimony
will be leaked to reporters in 2006. According to the transcript, Tenet’s testimony included a detailed summary of the briefing he had with CIA
counterterrorism chief Cofer Black on July 10 (see July 10, 2001). The transcript also reveals that he told the commission that Black’s briefing had
prompted him to request an urgent meeting with Rice about it. This closely matches the account in Woodward’s 2006 book that first widely publicized
the July meeting (see September 29, 2006). [Washington Post, 10/3/2006] Shortly after Woodward’s book is published, the 9/11 Commission staff will
deny knowing that the July meeting took place. Zelikow and Ben-Veniste, who attended Tenet’s testimony, will say they are unable to find any
reference to it in their files. But after the transcript is leaked, Ben-Veniste will suddenly remember details of the testimony (see September
30-October 3, 2006) and will say that Tenet did not indicate that he left his meeting with Rice with the impression he had been ignored, as Tenet has
alleged. [New York Times, 10/2/2006] Woodward’s book will describe why Black, who also privately testified before the 9/11 Commission, felt the
commission did not mention the July meeting in their final report: “Though the investigators had access to all the paperwork about the meeting,
Black felt there were things the commissions wanted to know about and things they didn’t want to know about. It was what happened in investigations.
There were questions they wanted to ask, and questions they didn’t want to ask.” [Woodward, 2006, pp. 78]
March 21, 2004: Victims’ Relatives Demand That 9/11 Commission Executive Director Resign
Philip Zelikow.Philip Zelikow. [Source: Miller Center]The 9-11 Family Steering Committee and 9-11 Citizens Watch demand the resignation of Philip
Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission. The demand comes shortly after former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke told the New York
Times that Zelikow was present when he gave briefings on the threat posed by al-Qaeda to National Security Adviser Rice from December 2000 to January
2001. The Family Steering Committee, a group of 9/11 victims’ relatives, writes, “It is clear that [Zelikow] should never have been permitted to
be a member of the commission, since it is the mandate of the commission to identify the source of failures. It is now apparent why there has been so
little effort to assign individual culpability. We now can see that trail would lead directly to the staff director himself.” Zelikow has been
interviewed by his own commission because of his role during the transition period. But a spokesman for the commission claims that having Zelikow
recluse himself from certain topics is enough to avoid any conflicts of interest. [New York Times, 3/20/2004; United Press International, 3/23/2004]
9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean defends Zelikow, calling him “one of the best experts on terrorism in the whole area of intelligence in the
entire country” and “the best possible person we could have found for the job.” [NBC, 4/4/2004] However, Salon points out that the “long
list” of Zelikow’s writings “includes only one article focused on terrorism,” and he appears to have written nothing about al-Qaeda. [Salon,
4/6/2004]
February 28, 2005: 9/11 Commission’s Executive Director Gets Job With Bush Administration
It is announced that Philip Zelikow, Executive Director for the 9/11 Commission, has been chosen to serve as a senior adviser for Condoleezza Rice in
her new position as Secretary of State. [Richmond Times-Dispatch, 2/28/2005] 9/11 victims’ relatives groups had demanded Zelikow’s resignation
from the 9/11 Commission, claiming conflict of interest, including being too close to Rice (see March 21, 2004).
September 30-October 3, 2006: 9/11 Commissioners Claim to Be Furious They Were Not Told of July 2001 Warning, When In Fact They Were
In late September 2006, a new book by Bob Woodward reveals that CIA Director Tenet and CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black gave National Security
Adviser Rice their most urgent warning about a likely upcoming al-Qaeda attack (see July 10, 2001 and September 29, 2006). Tenet detailed this meeting
to the 9/11 Commission in early 2004 (see January 28, 2004), but it was not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission’s final report later that year.
According to the Washington Post, “Though the investigators had access to all the paperwork on the meeting, Black felt there were things the
commissions wanted to know about and things they didn’t want to know about.” [Washington Post, 10/1/2006] The 9/11 Commissioners initially
vigorously deny that they were not told about the meeting. For instance, 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick says she checked with commission staff who
told her they were never told about a meeting on that date. She says, “We didn’t know about the meeting itself. I can assure you it would have
been in our report if we had known to ask about it.” [Washington Post, 9/30/2006] Commissioner Tim Roemer says, “None of this was shared with us
in hours of private interviews, including interviews under oath, nor do we have any paper on this. I’m deeply disturbed by this. I’m furious.”
Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste says the meeting “was never mentioned to us.” Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, says
the commissioners and their staff had heard nothing in their private interviews with Tenet and Black to suggest that they made such a dire
presentation to Rice. “If we had heard something that drew our attention to this meeting, it would have been a huge thing.” [New York Times,
10/2/2006] However, on October 3, 2006, a transcript of Tenet’s private testimony to the 9/11 Commission is leaked to reporters and clearly shows
that Tenet did warn Rice of an imminent al-Qaeda threat on July 10, 2001. Ben-Veniste, who attended the meeting along with Zelikow and other staff
members, now confirms the meeting did take place and claims to recall details of it, even though he, Zelikow, and other 9/11 Commissioners had denied
the existence of the meeting as recently as the day before. In the transcript, Tenet says “the system was blinking red” at the time. This
statement becomes a chapter title in the 9/11 Commission’s final report but the report, which normally has detailed footnotes, does not make it
clear when Tenet said it. [Washington Post, 10/3/2006] Zelikow had close ties to Rice before joining the 9/11 Commission, having co-written a book
with her (see March 21, 2004), and became one of her key aides after the commission disbanded (see February 28, 2005). Zelikow does not respond to
requests for comments after Tenet’s transcript surfaces. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006; Washington Post, 10/3/2006]
www.cooperativeresearch.org
edit on 16-9-2011 by NewAgeMan because: (no reason given)