It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
In 2004 it was reported to be a growing $8-billion to $10-billion industry with over 15 billion gallons of propane being used annually in the U.S.[5]
The energy density of propane is 46.44 megajoules per kilogram[9] (91,690 BTU per gallon).
Anyone that thinks that they an accurately estimate the volume of oil flowing from the Maconda is deluded... to put it nicely.
Originally posted by Cloudsinthesky
"Texas A&M University oceanography professor John Kessler, just back from a 10-day research expedition near the BP Plc oil spill in the gulf, says methane gas levels in some areas are astonishingly high."
This is from Reuters www.reuters.com...
""There is an incredible amount of methane in there," Kessler told reporters in a telephone briefing."
"In some areas, the crew of 12 scientists found concentrations that were 100,000 times higher than normal."
If the alarm bells are not ringing now I am not sure when they will ring..........
Originally posted by JustMike
reply to post by N.of norml
Thanks for your response. I was beginning to wonder if anyone had followed what I was getting at in my post. I think what you've said is probably right: there is not a great deal of difference between those two pressures and that's a concern.
I think it's also important to repeat that those who were making decisions in this case had to be aware that the pressures in that well had been reported at above 13,000 psi, but even so, they used a BOP that was rated to "only" 15,000 psi. (I say "only" because that is still a pretty huge number.) This means that they were allowing only a fairly small amount of leeway as a safety margin -- even under ideal conditions and if everything in the BOP functioned perfectly and continued to do so.
Is it normal practice in most industries to employ absolutely vital "fail safe" shutdown equipment that itself has a safe working limit only about 15% above known and rather extreme conditions? That seems like a very slim margin to me, especially considering what the consequences would be in the event that the "fail safe" also fails.
Like it did in this case.
Here's the table which shows these parameters. I've added "dots" in so that it will more-or-less line up:
1.2 Parameters
Fracture Zone Measured Depth..........................18305.0 ft
Fracture Zone Gradient.....................................0.779 psi/ft
Fracture Zone Density......................................15.00 Ib/gal
Fracture Zone Pressure....................................14255 psi
Reservoir Measured Depth................................18200.0 ft
Reservoir Pore Pressure...................................13197 psi
Reservoir Zone Gradient...................................0.726 psi/ft
Reservoir Zone Density....................................13.97 Ib/gal
Back Pressure..................................................0 psi
Height - Mud Line to Mean Sea Level..................4992.0 ft
Height - Mean Sea Level to Rotary Kelly Bushing 75.0 ft
Sea Water Density............................................8.54 Ib/gal
Returns To Surface
Simulator Volume Increment..............................5.00 bbl
Surface Iron Displacement.................................0.41 bbl
Shoe Track Length............................................189.0 ft
Additional Pressure to Seat Plug.........................500 psi
Eccentricity Enhanced Calculations......................No
Erodibility Enhanced Calculations........................Yes
Mud Erodibility Measured Depth..........................17168.0 ft
Mud Erodibility Number......................................20.69
Mud Required Shear Stress................................29.00 Ibf/(100*ft2)
Use Coupling Information...................................No
Created: April 18, 2010 at 11:25 AM
OptiCem v6.4.8 (OC v6.4.8)
Business Confidential
Here is a link to obtain a pdf copy of the complete Halliburton Production Casing Design Report 4.18.2010 for the Macondo Prospect MC 252 #1 well, from which the above data is taken.
Here is a link to obtain a pdf copy of the Transocean-Deepwater Horizon BOP Subsea Test of Feb 10, 2010, which shows (among other things) that no component of this BOP was tested beyond 7,200 psi.
For anyone who wants more documents that might be otherwise hard to find, you can obtain them at this link to the Energy & Commerce Committee's page where many documents are available for download. Well, they are at the moment, anyway...
Mike
Hi Mike, Here is a quote from this thread: www.abovetopsecret.com... The Max BOP pressure was supposed to be 15,000 psi, and the reservoir was known to be above 13,000 psi, so their "fail safe" only had a 15% margin of error. With the Methane "burps" and the seismic activity created by the oil and gas rumbling through 7 miles of pipe, could (and did) easily overwhelm the supposed fail-safe. The question now is whether or not the they learned from this and used bigger and better BOP on the relief wells?
Originally posted by DEEZNUTZ
I think the point they are making about the "Gas Burbs" and the long pipe is that if a high pressure/large volume "Burb" happens then it has 7 miles of pipe to gain momentum before hitting the BOP. If the well was known to be at 13 000 psi then it's not hard to imagine that a "Burb" increase in pressure of even 10% of the total well pressure could cause a blowout and they cut their safety margin quite a bit. BOP rated to blow at 15000psi.
There was a lack of testing and BP/Transocean knowingly used potentially faulty equipment that could not handle the job. BP's own internal memos call this well a "Nightmare". They gambled and it didn't work out for them. It may cost them everything. The MMS part as well as government also needs to be examined.
The vast deepwater methane hydrate deposits of the Gulf of Mexico are an open secret in big energy circles. They represent the most tantalizing new frontier of unconventional energy — a potential source of hydrocarbon fuel thought to be twice as large as all the petroleum deposits ever known.
For the oil and gas industry, the substances are also known to be the primary hazard when drilling for deepwater oil.
Methane hydrates are volatile compounds — natural gas compressed into molecular cages of ice. They are stable in the extreme cold and crushing weight of deepwater, but are extremely dangerous when they build up inside the drill column of a well. If destabilized by heat or a decrease in pressure, methane hydrates can quickly expand to 164 times their volume.
Even a solid steel pipe has little chance against a 164-fold expansion of volume — something that would render a man six feet six inches tall suddenly the height of the Eiffel Tower.
Scientists are well aware of the awesome power of these strange hydrocarbons. A sudden large scale release of methane hydrates is believed to have caused a mass extinction 55 million years ago. Among planners concerned with mega-disasters, their sudden escape is considered to be a threat comparable to an asteroid strike or nuclear war. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a Livermore, Ca.-based weapons design center, reports that when released on a large scale, methane hydrates can even cause tsunamis.
The Deepwater Horizon rig was drilling in Block 252 of an area known as the Mississippi Canyon of the Gulf, thought to contain methane hydrate-bearing sediments, according to government maps. The platform was operating less than 20 miles from a methane hydrate research site located in the same canyon at Block 118.
GAS COMPOSITION
Gas samples have been collected in the SW Complex from three vents and one intact piece of outcropping hydrate. Chemical analyses [1] show the vent gas to be thermogenic from deep hot source rocks and to average 95% methane, 3% ethane, 1% propane with minor other gases. There is no significant biogenic component. The outcropping hydrate is Structure II with gas composition 70% methane, 7.5% ethane, 15.9% propane with minor other gases. The difference between the gas compositions from the vents and the hydrate is due to molecular fractionation during hydrate crystallization (Sassen, pers. com.).
Originally posted by Mike6158
reply to post by JBA2848
The point that I keep trying to make is that it takes a lot of energy to vaporize a methane hydrate. A lot more than I think the average person realizes.
Originally posted by getreadyalready
reply to post by Mike6158
I think we are arguing entirely separate points?
I am agreeing that it takes a lot of energy to sublimate Methane Hydrates that may be frozen in the seabed.
I am trying to point out that I am unconcerned with that energy, because it is only a secondary consideration. The main concern is the dissolved Methane Gas in the seawater from the oil well.
encyclopedia.airliquide.com...
Play with that link and the PV=nRT formula. You will see that 40,000 barrels of Methane per day at 2400 psi and 0 deg C equals a lot of potential stored energy when it is converted to 30 psi and 25 deg C. That potential energy, or potential volume increase is the problem. The sea water is overly saturated with a dissolved gas, and the sea water is constantly agitated by wave action and storms. It could release this supersaturated gas instantly!
[edit on 1-7-2010 by getreadyalready]
[edit on 1-7-2010 by getreadyalready]