posted on Jun, 5 2010 @ 03:44 PM
This is good information
Allow me to introduce myself and intentions of my participation on forum. I currently am student at University of Massachusetts Boston and from the
oil producing country Kuwait, over the next several weeks my focus will be on the MMS also known as Minerals Management Service, and why this agency
should be held as the main perpetrator in the GOM crisis. Hopefully I can persuade many of you (Americans) to write/call politicians in your country,
disband this corrupt branch and jail those responsible for the current crisis. Please excuse any anti-American rhetoric and understand my anger is
directed at the Government and not the people of the USA..
Information that MMS doesn't want you to know
Investigation and Report
Authority On July 13, 2001, at approximately 0415 hours, an uncontrolled flow occurred on Well 1
during drilling operations on The William G. Helis Company's (Helis) Lease OCS-G
22190, Brazos Block 417, in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore the State of Texas. This
resulted in a blowout, injuries, and a fatality that occurred aboard the jack-up drilling rig
Marine IV (currently owned by Pride Offshore Drilling). Pursuant to Section 208,
Subsection 22(d), (e), and (f), of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act, as
amended in 1978, and the Department of the Interior Regulations 30 CFR 250, the
Minerals Management Service (MMS) is required to investigate and prepare a public
report of this accident. On July 13, 2001, the following MMS personnel were named to
the investigation panel:
Investigation and Report
Authority On 8 August 2002, the jack-up rig Ocean King (hereinafter referred to as the “Rig”), was
engaged in drilling operations for BP Exploration & Production Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as “Operator”) on Grand Isle (GI) Block 93 Well C-4ST. The Rig was in place next to
the GI 93 “C” platform (hereinafter referred to as the “Platform”). Drilling was being
conducted with the Rig cantilevered over the Platform by using the existing slot of the C-
4 well, which had been plugged and abandoned (P&A).
Normal directional drilling operations were progressing through conductor casing set at
approximately 1,200’. The well had been kicked off at 2,421’ and drilling had reached
3,590’ when it was decided to make a short trip. During the short trip, as the seventh
stand of drill pipe was being pulled, the well suddenly began flowing. The uncontrolled
flow and pressure rapidly built up, causing the crew to close the annular diverter element,
sending the gas, mud, and sand flow into the diverter. The Rig and Platform were
abandoned, and shortly thereafter the diverted flow caused the end of the portside diverter
line to be blown off. The flow through this line subsequently caught fire and burned for
upwards of ten minutes before bridging. The flames of the diverted flow ignited
combustibles on the Rig floor that burned for several hours after the main uncontrolled
well flow had ceased.
The event occurred 8 August 2002 at approximately 0830 hrs. on the Operator’s Lease
OCS-G 2628 Grand Isle Block 93 in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore the State of Louisiana.
Pursuant to Section 208, Subsection 22 (d), (e), and (f), of the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) Lands Act, as amended in 1978, and the Department of the Interior Regulations 30
CFR 250, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) is required to investigate
Description A blowout occurred on Well A-5 ST01 BP 00 during the period from May 9 to May 18,
of Incident
2001, after the 13⅜–inch surface casing was cemented. The mobile offshore drilling unit
(MODU) Glomar Baltic I was cantilevered over “Platform A.” The rig is owned by
Global Marine Drilling Company. The plan called for the A-5 ST to be directionally
drilled with a drift angle of approximately 55 degrees.
On May 8, 2001, after the 13⅜-inch surface casing was cemented, a slight flow was
noted coming from the annulus between the surface casing and the 18⅝-inch conductor
casing. The diverter was closed and pressure started increasing on the annulus. Valves
and piping were rigged up to the 18⅝-inch A section to permit monitoring of pressure
and transport of fluids to and from the annulus. Throughout the night of May 8 and
through 0730 hrs on May 10, unsuccessful attempts were made to bleed off the annular
pressure.
3
On May 10, 2001, gas belched from the 22-inch drive pipe of Well A-10 ST01, located
one slot south of Well A-5 ST01. There were no gas bubbles coming from the A-5 ST01
drive pipe at this time. However, in the ensuing 15 minutes, gas bubbles were observed
around other wells at the water line. Within an hour, all 57 personnel on the rig and
platform were safely evacuated.
The flow eventually ceased, and the rig was re-manned on May 12, 2001. Attempts to
salvage the well failed, the well was successfully plugged, and the rig was released on
June 16, 2001.