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Originally posted by Jean Paul Zodeaux
reply to post by 4by4dave
Talk about a useful idiot. When jurisdiction is properly challenged, the charges are dropped and no trial moves forward. Without a trial there is no case law to cite. How many time must I explain this?
Originally posted by 4by4dave
Originally posted by Jean Paul Zodeaux
reply to post by 4by4dave
Talk about a useful idiot. When jurisdiction is properly challenged, the charges are dropped and no trial moves forward. Without a trial there is no case law to cite. How many time must I explain this?
If folks out there who are reading this can't see whats going on with this ridiculous and dangerous sovereignty stuff by now, then America is in more trouble that I was afraid of.
I just asked this poster to please prove their claims of having won a sovereignty case by providing links to the case itself on publicly available websites and the only reponse that was provided was more "take it on faith" nonsense.
It's simple question. You can't answer it because you were lying in the first place.
Originally posted by ProjectJimmy
It is interesting that this idea of Sovereign Citizens still is believed by so many after being so completely debunked. I think it's because it is seen as a kind of holy grail for people whom do not like the idea of a government. It's got a lot of the promises that some Libertarians and Anarchists have been wanting for a long time.
Just looking at how rabidly some of the members of this site defend it, and from the discussions I had earlier this month in the United States, it's like a promised land really, somewhere over the horizon, but there are people that believe it absolutely, positively exists despite all of the judicial evidence.
Originally posted by Jean Paul Zodeaux
Originally posted by 4by4dave
Originally posted by Jean Paul Zodeaux
reply to post by 4by4dave
Talk about a useful idiot. When jurisdiction is properly challenged, the charges are dropped and no trial moves forward. Without a trial there is no case law to cite. How many time must I explain this?
If folks out there who are reading this can't see whats going on with this ridiculous and dangerous sovereignty stuff by now, then America is in more trouble that I was afraid of.
I just asked this poster to please prove their claims of having won a sovereignty case by providing links to the case itself on publicly available websites and the only reponse that was provided was more "take it on faith" nonsense.
It's simple question. You can't answer it because you were lying in the first place.
And this poster who has accused me of lying is now clearly lying. I made perfectly clear that I did not make any arguments of sovereignty and all I did was challenge jurisdiction. That is all. Yet, clearly this poster has a desperate agenda, so desperate lying even though anyone reading the posts knows he is lying.
If legislation does not conform to the constitution, that legislation has no legal weight. To stupidly walk into court and enter a plea when charged for violating this bogus legislation, is to beg for the mercy of the court. Clearly this poster wants you to make a plea, but if the law is unconstitutional then making a plea is not necessary and all need be done is challenge the jurisdiction. The judge might attempt to dismiss these challenges, but I have posted several citations of case law in previous posts in this thread, that are case law that can be used to convince the judge that if the legislation has legal authority, then it becomes the judge who must prove on record this is so.
Take note how easily offended this poster was by the use of the phrase anti-sovereignty movement, and take note at how desperate this poster is to stop people from coming to know the law. Sleep well.
Trust Fund
Property (e.g, money or securities) held in a trust; that is, property held legally by one party (the legal owner) for the benefit of another party (the equitable owner). The legal owner, or trustee, has the right of possession and the right of use of the property, but must exercise those rights to the benefit of the equitable owner, or beneficiary. In Anglo-American law, trust funds are set up principally for family settlements and for charitable giving. In the commercial sector, trust funds are often set up to provide for employee pensions and profit-sharing programs.
I am the legal owner of my trust, and no body can touch it, legally, without my express permission. This is UCC Law. You can go into a courtroom certify that you are on record, State for the record that you are Beneficiary of the Trust, name the Judge Trustee over the Trust, and order him/her to pay you a stipend from the court fund for taking up your valuable time.
Both Sections 7 and 8 of Article I support my contention that Congress has the complete and plenary power of taxation.
Your citation of Article II Section 1 is only relevant in that the IRS by default fall under the Treasury Department, being a part of the Executive branches cabinet.
Article I Section 2 establishes an authority for Congress to create an administrative agency such as the IRS, (and it is Congress that created this agency), and to a lesser extent allowing the Courts to interpret legislation regarding taxation.
Article II, Section 3 is again another irrelevant citation as the President has nothing at all to do with the enforcement of taxes, except for the fact that the Treasurer falls within his purview, all the President can do is choose who that Treasurer is.
Finally Article III, Section I merely establishes a limited jurisdiction for the SCOTUS.
The exact jurisdiction required to interpret those rules and judge the merits of the tax law cases brought before it. The jurisdiction to rule on claims of 'Sovereignty' or 'the IRS is illegal' or any of the other myriad attempts along these lines and to find them ridiculous on their face.
...What is important in this assessment of their own origins is not that they gloss over the actual evolution of it, but that they contradict themselves from one paragraph to the next...
Sovereignty (in your meaning of the word) is a will-o-the-wisp. It doesn't exist, and no hallucination will make it so. There have been dozens of cases of people claiming to be sovereign in one way or another, how many have succeeded? Exactly Zero!
Yes! Precisely! There is exactly Zero case because the sovereign was successful and thus no trial took place. Hello! But you continue with your remarkably dim understanding of law, and by continue I mean backwards, with this;
Your assertion that government officials are not allowed to interpret the Constitution and the law, and must rely on legal counsel is just a lie, there is no better word to describe it.
Thank you for posting. The law is always self evident and requires no explanation. No one needs explained to them why murder, rape, and theft is against the law. Conversely there are literally hundreds of thousands of statutes, codes and ordinances currently on the books, most require some sort of explanation, and what is that explanation?
If this tax is actually an indirect tax, but those enforcing it are treating it as if it were a direct tax, then they are operating outside of the bounds of their jurisdiction.
This is my argument. The IRC is a five volume set so tautological and circumlocutory in its definitions that I have not yet met a single soul who understands this legislation, myself included. How can any one possibly enforce a law they don't understand?
Pollack did not strike down a general income tax, it only struck down an unapportioned tax on income from rents and dividends and the like. Likewise, the 16th amendment did not authorize a general income tax, it only authorized an unapportioned tax on income from rents and dividends and the like.
The various propositions are so intermingled as to cause it to be difficult to classify them. We are of opinion, however, [240 U.S. 1, 11] that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows: (a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment, and is void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned.
But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions [240 U.S. 1, 12] under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states. This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.
In fact, the two great subdivisions embracing the complete and perfect delegation of the power to tax and the two correlated limitations as to such power were thus aptly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. supra, at page 557: 'In the matter of taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts, and excises.' It is to be observed, however, as long ago pointed out in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. ed. 482, 485, that the requirements of apportionment as to one of the great classes and of uniformity as to the other class were not so much a limitation upon the complete and all-embracing authority to tax, but in their essence were simply regulations concerning the mode in which the plenary power was to be exerted. In the whole history of the government down to the time of the adoption of the 16th Amendment, leaving aside some conjectures expressed of the possibility of a tax lying intermediate between the two great classes and embraced [240 U.S. 1, 14] by neither, no question has been anywhere made as to the correctness of these propositions.
Moreover, in addition, the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class [240 U.S. 1, 17] of direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary, recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to disregard form and consider substance alone, and hence subject the tax to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise would not apply to it.
Second, that the contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax although it is relieved from apportionment and is necessarily therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as such rule only applies to taxes which are not direct, thus destroying the two great classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the beginning, is also wholly without foundation since the command of the Amendment that all income taxes shall not be subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the taxed income may be derived [240 U.S. 1, 19] forbids the application to such taxes of the rule applied in the Pollock Case by which alone such taxes were removed from the great class of excises, duties, and imposts subject to the rule of uniformity, and were placed under the other or direct class.
Indeed, in the light of the history which we have given and of the decision in the Pollock Case, and the ground upon which the ruling in that case was based, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the future with the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided; that is, of determining whether a tax on income was direct not by a consideration of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it directly operated, but by taking into view the burden which resulted on the property from which the income was derived, since in express terms the Amendment provides that income taxes, from whatever source the income may be derived, shall not be subject to the regulation of apportionment.
Indeed, from another point of view, the Amendment demonstrates that no such purpose was intended, and on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation.
We say this because it is to be observed that although from the date of the Hylton Case, because of statements made in the opinions in that case, it had come to be accepted that direct taxes in the constitutional sense were confined to taxes levied directly on real estate because of its ownership, the Amendment contains nothing repudiation or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution,-a condition which clearly demonstrates that the purpose was not to change the existing interpretation except to the extent necessary to accomplish the result intended; that is, the prevention of the resort to the sources from which a taxed income was derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to be a direct tax on the source itself, and thereby to take an income tax out of the class of excises, duties, and imposts, and place it in the class of direct taxes.