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Originally posted by Astyanax
reply to post by constantwonder
The theory of determinacy eliminates free will altogether. Without the aid of the supposed "hidden variable" (convienient that their hidden huh!?) determinacy falls apart in the face of quantum theory.
Curious that you should see indeterminacy as a prop for the concept of free will. Surely indeterminacy should be, if anything, an obstacle to the exercise of will?
Besides, I don't think quantum theory eliminates determinism at a macroscopic level. There is certainly no evidence, nor any mathematical grounds for claiming that it does.
Probability is everything. Every state has multiple possible outcomes some of which can occur without a measurable causal link.
But do those acausal outcomes ever, in fact, occur? How could we even know if they did?
However one major difficulty in arguments that free will arises from quantum indeterminacy has been the lack of an agreed physical mechanism by which quantum effects can affect cognition.
When an individual observes the universe, he can observe and conclude about nearly any part of it. However, the incompleteness theorem prevents him from making consistent conclusions about his own conclusion-making device, his brain, in the same way that a ruler can measure anything but itself.
Let’s assume the ruler can be manipulated by the environment in the same way our brain can. If it’s stretched or contracted through whatever interaction, it can’t tell. As far as it knows, it’s still 12 inches long. Instead, it would perceive every other object in the universe as changing in length.
Just like the ruler can’t perceive its changing length because it’s using itself to measure, we cannot perceive our own decision-making process because we’re using that subsystem to come to conclusions about itself.
The mind needs to create plans for complicated actions. It creates a
model of future behaviour in the (unconscious) mind and then follows
through on this step by step, revealing what is to be done only at the
point it needs to be done.
William James, the American pragmatist philosopher who coined the term "soft determinist" in an influential essay titled The Dilemma of Determinism, held that the importance of the issue of determinism is not one of personal responsibility, but one of hop He believed that thorough-going determinism leads either to a bleak pessimisem or to a degenerate subjectivism in moral judgment. The way to escape that dilemma is to allow a role of chance. He said that he would not insist upon the name "free will" as a synonym for the role chance plays in human actions, simply because he preferred to debate about objects, not words.
An argument can be made which claims that the aspects of reality that are important to hope are unaffected by determinism. Whether or not the universe is determined does not change the fact that the future is unknown, and that a person's actions help determine that future. In fact, it is even conceivable that a lack of belief in determinism could lead to 'bleak pessimism', or fatalism, since one could potentially believe that their actions did nothing to determine future events.
Mark Twain, a skeptic of the idea of free will, argues in his essay "What Is Man?" that humans do not command their minds or the opinions they form.
"You did not form that [opinion]," a speaker identified as "old man" says in the essay. "Your [mental] machinery did it for you—automatically and instantly, without reflection or the need of it."
Twain's views get a boost this week from researchers at Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis and University of Chieti, Italy. In Nature Neuroscience, scientists report that a simple decision-making task does not involve the frontal lobes, where many of the higher aspects of human cognition, including self-awareness, are thought to originate. Instead, the regions that decide are the same brain regions that receive stimuli relevant to the decision and control the body's response to it. . . .
Scientists concentrated on regions of the brain that are responsible for planning actions (eye or hand movements) in the parietal lobe. Activity in these different regions would increase in correspondence with the type of stimulus a subject was being shown (face or building) and the type of response they were planning as a result (eye or hand movement). When the stimulus had less noise and subjects were more confident in their choice, brain activity levels in the appropriate area rose proportionally. In addition, these regions showed activity that related to the choice even when the stimulus was ambiguous.
"This suggests that these regions in the parietal lobe processed all the sensory, decision and motor signals necessary to make and act on the decision," Tosoni says. "In contrast, no area in the frontal lobe, thought to be involved in decision-making, significantly increased its activity at the time of decision."
The training period that preceded the scans could have involved the frontal lobes, Corbetta notes. Those areas may have delegated responsibility for the decision to premotor brain regions as the volunteers learned the task. But once the task was learned, the frontal lobes were silent.
"Even for arbitrary and somehow complex visual decisions, it seems to be purely a matter of the amount of sensory information pushing the brain toward one choice or another " he says
Originally posted by ghostsoldier
reply to post by bobs_uruncle
What's your definition of Free Will?
Of course we don't have control and autonomy over our microscopic identities (directly that is). Are you suggesting we are nothing but rocks? A construction of sub-atomic particles that just exists and reacts to other sub-atomic conditions? If that's the case we have control and autonomy over the sub-atomic structures (macro-sized) we come into contact with. Does that not reflect a degree of Free Will?
*
The incompleteness theorem prevents (an observer) from making consistent conclusions about his own conclusion... (If a) ruler can be manipulated by the environment in the same way our brain can. If it’s stretched or contracted through whatever interaction, it can’t tell. As far as it knows, it’s still 12 inches long...
Just like the ruler can’t perceive its changing length because it’s using itself to measure, we cannot perceive our own decision-making process because we’re using that subsystem to come to conclusions about itself.
Originally posted by Astyanax
reply to post by OnceReturned
'Ah, so that's what red looks like!'
Poor, deprived Mary.
All its life, the biological computer of that name has been forced to learn about the world, and interact with it, through an information transducer that radically filters out data of fundamental relevance to its proper operation, data it needs if it is to work the way it is designed to. Finally, the transducer is removed; the proper routes the data should take to the processor are unblocked. Mary at last experiences reality the way she is built to experience it. Obviously it's going to look different--and better, more 'right'.
What, if anything, does this prove?
Originally posted by slank
In a sense freewill IS an imaginary idea,