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When biologist Anthony Cashmore claims that the concept of free will is an illusion, he's not breaking any new ground. At least as far back as the ancient Greeks, people have wondered how humans seem to have the ability to make their own personal decisions in a manner lacking any causal component other than their desire to "will" something. But Cashmore, Professor of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania, says that many biologists today still cling to the idea of free will, and reject the idea that we are simply conscious machines, completely controlled by a combination of our chemistry and external environmental forces.
In a recent study, Cashmore has argued that a belief in free will is akin to religious beliefs, since neither complies with the laws of the physical world. One of the basic premises of biology and biochemistry is that biological systems are nothing more than a bag of chemicals that obey chemical and physical laws. Generally, we have no problem with the “bag of chemicals” notion when it comes to bacteria, plants, and similar entities. So why is it so difficult to say the same about humans or other “higher level” species, when we’re all governed by the same laws?
No causal mechanism
As Cashmore explains, the human brain acts at both the conscious level as well as the unconscious. It’s our consciousness that makes us aware of our actions, giving us the sense that we control them, as well. But even without this awareness, our brains can still induce our bodies to act, and studies have indicated that consciousness is something that follows unconscious neural activity. Just because we are often aware of multiple paths to take, that doesn’t mean we actually get to choose one of them based on our own free will. As the ancient Greeks asked, by what mechanism would we be choosing? The physical world is made of causes and effects - “nothing comes from nothing” - but free will, by its very definition, has no physical cause. The Roman philosopher and poet Lucretius, in reference to this problem of free will, noted that the Greek philosophers concluded that atoms "randomly swerve" - the likely source of this movement being the numerous Greek gods.
It’s our consciousness that makes us aware of our actions, giving us the sense that we control them, as well. But even without this awareness, our brains can still induce our bodies to act, and studies have indicated that consciousness is something that follows unconscious neural activity.
Another criticism of epiphenomenalism is that the presence of the theory of epiphenomenalism seems to contradict the very idea. Most would agree that thinking is a mental process, but, if epiphenomenalism is true, how could someone ever express the idea of epiphenomenalism? It would be impossible, because this "expressing" would require the banned connection between mind and behavior. If epiphenomenalism is true and thinking is a mental process, then its truth is ineffable.
Originally posted by loner007
[...]
So by the same reasoning i can assume he also thinks conciousness is also an illusion.....
Originally posted by ghostsoldier
A clear observation of free will:
A person with access to a large amount of food decides to commit suicide by starvation.
Originally posted by ghostsoldier
reply to post by RestingInPieces
To Illustrate his free will.
or
To project an opinion (ie hunger strike).
Will : the mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course of action.
Originally posted by predator0187
I have to ask just because 'god' gives us free will. If he gives us free will and free will is an illusion is he then, too?
Originally posted by predator0187
We have been programmed with survival instincts from our evolution that makes us act and behave the way we do, so just in that, how can anything be 'free?'
Riddle me this Cashmore and others: If consciousness merely follows neural activity and does not drive it, then how did we ever get ourselves in the neural state which we are in now; the state in which we are thinking about consciousness?
We wouldn't be talking about consciousness if we weren't conscious, because we wouldn't have the concept. Therefore, consciousness has somehow caused us to be having this conversation. This conversation is clearly a function of our brains, and if we are having a conversation that we wouldn't be having without consciousness, then consciousness must have somehow influenced our brains. This proves that consciousness - at least sometimes - does exert causal influence on neural activity.
Most would agree that thinking is a mental process, but, if epiphenomenalism is true, how could someone ever express the idea of epiphenomenalism? It would be impossible, because this "expressing" would require the banned connection between mind and behavior.
Originally posted by Astyanax
Riddle me this Cashmore and others: If consciousness merely follows neural activity and does not drive it, then how did we ever get ourselves in the neural state which we are in now; the state in which we are thinking about consciousness?
How does this differ from the question 'how did we get ourselves into the neural state in which we are thinking about dinner?'
You say
We wouldn't be talking about consciousness if we weren't conscious, because we wouldn't have the concept. Therefore, consciousness has somehow caused us to be having this conversation. This conversation is clearly a function of our brains, and if we are having a conversation that we wouldn't be having without consciousness, then consciousness must have somehow influenced our brains. This proves that consciousness - at least sometimes - does exert causal influence on neural activity.
Surely this is a tad casuistic, if indeed it is a point at all. A precisely equivalent argument would run as follows: 'We wouldn't be talking about dinner if we didn't have dinners, because we wouldn't have the concept. Therefore, dinner has somehow caused us to be having this conversation. This conversation is clearly a function of our brains, and if we are having a conversation that we wouldn't be having without dinner, then dinner must have some influenced our brains. This proves that dinner - at least sometimes - does exert causal influence on neural activity.'
And of course, dinner does exert causal influence on neural activity. Clearly there is nothing very special about the influence of consciousness.
Most would agree that thinking is a mental process, but, if epiphenomenalism is true, how could someone ever express the idea of epiphenomenalism? It would be impossible, because this "expressing" would require the banned connection between mind and behavior.
If such were the case, surely it would apply to all abstract thought, not merely the concept of epiphenomenalism?
I look forward eagerly to your reply.