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Iran plans 10 enrichment plants for next year
Iran plans to build 10 new uranium enrichment facilities during the next Iranian year, its atomic energy chief was quoted as saying, in comments likely to further raise tension with the West.
The Iranian year starts on March 21
Iran also plans to unveil a domestically manufactured air-defense system with at least the same capability as Russia's S-300 anti-aircraft hardware, an Iranian air force commander was quoted as saying on Monday.
Palin beating drums for war on Iran
US conservative darling Sarah Palin says she thinks President Barack Obama should declare war on Iran.
The one-time Republican vice presidential candidate said in an interview with Fox News that Obama should play the war card if he wants to get re-elected in 2012.
"Say he decided to declare war on Iran or decided really to come out and do whatever he could to support Israel, which I would like him to do," she said on Sunday.
The war drums are being beaten as new reports have revealed that the Israeli navy has dispatched two ships armed with missiles into the Persian Gulf.
Originally posted by rhines
reply to post by December_Rain
"It will simply drive the program underground while creating or hardening Iran's resolve to pursue nuclear weapons in secret."
It is already underground, what you are saying is ex post. If Iran is only enriching uranium for civil purposes why do they prevent the IAEA inspectors to overview the process,
why do Iran reject the uranium swap deal ? Because they are dead set on target, make nuclear weapons. I am 99% certian that Mahmoud will make a release about a new rocket and Iran sending up satellites, the same rockets can serve as icbms, just like Israel have the Shavit rockets for launching both their Jericho (3) icbm's and Ofek spy-satellites.
Originally posted by December_Rain
Originally posted by rhines
reply to post by December_Rain
"It will simply drive the program underground while creating or hardening Iran's resolve to pursue nuclear weapons in secret."
It is already underground, what you are saying is ex post. If Iran is only enriching uranium for civil purposes why do they prevent the IAEA inspectors to overview the process,
Here visit the website of IAEA - www.iaea.org... yourself and find out if Iran has allowed inspectors to visit their site or not. I believe you already are aware they have allowed but still repeating same statement again and again to make it look like truth whilst it's a lie.
why do Iran reject the uranium swap deal ? Because they are dead set on target, make nuclear weapons. I am 99% certian that Mahmoud will make a release about a new rocket and Iran sending up satellites, the same rockets can serve as icbms, just like Israel have the Shavit rockets for launching both their Jericho (3) icbm's and Ofek spy-satellites.
Because all NPT signatories are free to enrich uranium in their own reactors. Iran is not obligated (forced) to not practice their right, they can be "asked". Even then Iran:
* Iran has already stated it's ready to exchange it's raw material in batches but USA declined the offer,
* Iran asked to swap total uranium in Turkey but that offer was also declined.
* Iran asked to talk without precondition, but the offer was declined.
Considering the history when US took money from Iran and refused to return it or the material, what's the assurance US won't do it again this time?
You can be certain about anything but that is not a fact or proof that Iran is building a nuclear weapon, which Imo they should considering the threat of nuclear armed Israel which does not follow IAEA at all.
14. The Agency further indicated that it still had questions about the purpose for which the facility had been intended and how it fit into Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency also indicated that Iran’s declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.
17 .... Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
35. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.
Originally posted by Foppezao
You keep coming with the NPT, the whole problem with the NPT is that "third pillar", "peacefull" using of nuclear technology and specially the help with that.
How come North Korea got nuclear weapons and still they signed the NPT? hmmm same story with Lybia who had the same intentions through that third Pillar.Countries such as those have only bad intentions and bend the treaty at their will, people at IAEA call the third provision "the archilles heel" of the treaty...WHen enriching to 20% and beyond it goes a lot more easier [to go from 20% to 80/90], then from 0 to 3%..which should be enough for power plants..
You remind me of the infamour minister of propaganda Al Sahaf..
[edit on 8-2-2010 by Foppezao]
Originally posted by rhines
reply to post by DOADOA
Remember Iraq, WMD and UN weapons inspector Hans Blix ? He said its like looking for a needle in a haystack, considering that Iran is a lot more difficult country to penetrate due to its geography but also their more advanced intelligence and military i would consider the IAEA task to be almost impossible. Iran can hide their nuclear facilities anywhere in the mountains or deep inside them.
Originally posted by rhines
reply to post by December_Rain
I have already posted that link to IAEA in another thread, it shows that inspections have been blocked. Read the reports yourself thank you.
6. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that the declared maximum enrichment level (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at either plant.6 Since the last report, the Agency has conducted two unannounced inspections at FEP, for a total of 31 since March 2007.
8. During a meeting with the Director General in Tehran on 4 October 2009, Iran agreed to provide the Agency with access to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Under cover of a letter to the Agency dated 18 October 2009, Iran also submitted a preliminary DIQ for FFEP.
9. On 26 and 27 October 2009, the Agency carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP, which is located about 20 km north of the city of Qom.
10. The DIV included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of photographs of cascade piping and other process equipment, the taking of environmental samples and a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components and
systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility
18. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. The Agency carried out a DIV at TRR on 19 August 2009 and on 9 November 2009 at the MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.
19. The Agency has reviewed the updated DIQ for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan provided by Iran on 21 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 9).
carried out at FMP in August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 10), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at FMP as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with fabrication plants of similar throughput. On 24 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at FMP. It confirmed that the status of the facility had remained unchanged and that no further assemblies, rods or pellets have been produced.
20. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV)
24. On 25 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF. At that time, the plant was undergoing maintenance.
Here is from the latest report; IAEA Board Report, 16 November 2009:
14. The Agency further indicated that it still had questions about the purpose for which the facility had been intended and how it fit into Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency also indicated that Iran’s declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.
The Agency also indicated that Iran’s declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.
15. In light of the above, the Agency requested access to the FFEP project manager and those responsible for the design of FFEP, along with access to original design documentation, such as engineering drawings, with a view to confirming Iran’s statements regarding the chronology and
purpose of the facility.
16. Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction or in operation that had not yet been declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future facilities would “be reported to the Agency according to Iran’s obligations to the Agency”. In a letter dated 6 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.
17 .... Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
17. For reasons set out in previous reports to the Board of Governors, Iran remains bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it had agreed in 2003,7 which requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear facility
as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facility is taken. The revised Code 3.1 also requires that Iran provide the Agency with further design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.8 Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
F. Summary
33. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. While Iran recently submitted preliminary design information on the Darkhovin reactor, it continues to assert that
it is not bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it agreed in 2003, and which it ceased to implement in March 2007.
35. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.
Iran is upping the number of centrifuges and the efficiency of the same.
Low-enriched uranium (LEU)
Low-enriched uranium' (LEU) has a lower than 20% concentration of 235U. For use in commercial light water reactors (LWR), the most prevalent power reactors in the world, uranium is enriched to 3 to 5% 235U. Fresh LEU used in research reactors is usually enriched 12% to 19.75% U-235, the latter concentration being used to replace HEU fuels when converting to LEU.
I am still convinced that Iran is speeding up to make nuclear weapons AND that they already have an effective delivery system (rockets) that also can be used to launch satellites into orbit. Anyway, we will see this February what it is and what happens. Interesting times.
"Based on their experience in the Iran-Iraq War—during which exchanges of ballistic missiles caused modest destruction yet had great impact on civilian morale—Iranian leaders appear convinced that ballistic missiles are the most reliable means for attacking deep targets, and that they would have psychological effects disproportionate to their destructive power."
Originally posted by rhines
You are mixing apples with pears, however its not worth debating any further, you have your view and I have mine.
Its only a few days to 11 feb. then we will all know what Mahmoud will declare to 'planet earth' - Iran a "space" faring nation ?