How safe are russian nuclear launch codes.

Could someone tell me how safe are Russian nuclear launch codes on Russian suberines.Are the codes as safe as the ones deployed by the US navy.If terrorists took control of a Russian suberine could they by pass the nuclear launch codes and fire the missles.If a Russian suberine crew went rouge.Could they fire the nuclear missles with or without launch codes.Do the launch codes have to come directly from the kremlin in emergency situations.What is your opinion.

Depends which ones you are referring to.

Did you mean: 2112-6578-48932-66-257-556-qg3
or
6731-h655-85648-2-3335-7fg5-33

Because the 1st one is really the least secure of the two!!

I'm not sure how your question would be answered without an enormous amount of speculation.

Becker

there is very little known info about this, but it is assumed that there are 3 people who have access to the launch codes: president, minister of defense and chief of the general staff (they carry black suitcases around, not unlike the one Obama has) and without their launch codes (don't know if you need all three or just one will do or what) the warheads simply won't arm.

+ there is a policy of no nuclear weapons at sea under normal circumstances, they are stored in facilities on land (or that's what russian officials claim, and i think there is also some international agreement with the US about this), so that should rule out the sub taken over scenario

but as the poster above me said, most of it it just speculation, there really isn't much official info about nuke launch codes

as for the comparison between US and Russian navy... i don't see a reason why should people think the Russian nukes are less secure...

The truth is, no matter what any arm chair general on this board posts, NO ONE KNOWS. There literally is no believable information because it is all very classified. Nothing but hearsay. We'd like to hope they're secure though and I assume they are decently secure.

Perhaps you might worry more about their early warning system?

The Russian that saved the world:

On September 26, 1983, Stanislav Petrov, an Air Defence lieutenant colonel, was the officer on duty at the Serpukhov-15 bunker near Moscow which housed the command center of the Soviet Early warning system, code-named Oko[5]. Petrov's responsibilities included observing the satellite early warning network and notifying his superiors of any impending nuclear missile attack against the Soviet Union. If notification was received from the early-warning systems that inbound missiles had been detected, the Soviet Union's strategy was an immediate nuclear counter-attack against the United States (launch on warning), specified in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.[citation needed][1][dead link]

Shortly after midnight, the bunker's computers reported that an intercontinental ballistic missile was heading toward the Soviet Union from the US.[6] Petrov considered the detection a computer error, since a United States first-strike nuclear attack would be likely to involve hundreds of simultaneous missile launches, in order to disable any Soviet means for a counterattack. Furthermore, the satellite system's reliability had been questioned in the past.[7] Petrov dismissed the warning as a false alarm, though accounts of the event differ as to whether he notified his superiors[8] or not[6] after he concluded that the computer detections were false and that no missile had been launched. Later, the computers identified four additional missiles in the air, all directed towards the Soviet Union. Petrov again suspected that the computer system was malfunctioning, despite having no other source of information to confirm his suspicions. The Soviet Union's land radar was incapable of detecting missiles beyond the horizon,[citation needed] and waiting for it to positively identify the threat would limit the Soviet Union's response time to minutes.

Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles, his superiors might have launched an assault against the United States, precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States. Petrov declared the system's indications a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that he was right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false alarms had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites' Molniya orbits, an error later corrected with cross-reference to a geostationary satellite.[9]

Petrov later indicated the influences in this decision included: that he had been told a US strike would be all-out, so that five missiles seemed an illogical start;[citation needed][1][dead link] that the launch detection system was new and, in his view, not yet wholly trustworthy;[citation needed] and that ground radars were still failing to pick up any corroborative evidence, even after minutes of delay.

en.wikipedia.org...

[edit on Thu Sep 17th 2009 by TrueAmerican]

Far more worrying to me is the couple hundred of missing USSR-days nukes.
Who has them, and for what purpose?
Freaky.

Originally posted by ranswer
and without their launch codes (don't know if you need all three or just one will do or what) the warheads simply won't arm.

but as the poster above me said, most of it it just speculation, there really isn't much official info about nuke launch codes

I believe it's possible for SSBN COs to order a launch without codes. SSBNs are constantly in communications with shore, waiting for the order. I read if UK SSBN captains had strong reason to believe there had been a hostile surprise first strike, they had authority to fire all their birds. I read Russian SSN commanders during the Cuban missile crisis, had advance authorization to use nuclear weapons.

SSBNs are the "ace in the hole" of the triad of strategic nuclear deterrence. ICBMs are powerful, but susceptible to covert sabotage or other hostile action before they can launch. There were instances when UFOs disabled whole flights of ICBMs inside of their silos. Malstrom AFB, Minot AFB, a base in Maine.

Originally posted by ranswer+ there is a policy of no nuclear weapons at sea under normal circumstances, they are stored in facilities on land (or that's what russian officials claim, and i think there is also some international agreement with the US about this), so that should rule out the sub taken over scenario

I don't believe Russia maintains a 365 day a year SSBN nuclear deterrent. It became too expensive. However the US always maintains at least a few Ohio SSBNs on alert. I believe the reason they don't max out the MIRVs is due to the START II Treaty ?

Or maybe you're thinking of the targeting. I remember the military announced a long time ago, sometime in 1990s, that US Trident missiles no longer had target data pre-programmed. Although I speculate they can be programmed in a matter of seconds.

Instead of a rogue SSBN commander, I'm more worried about glitchy satellites falsely detecting an attack. There was an instance back in the 50s , a US EW radar showed a "Russian first strike" across the N. Pole. Not much info is available, informed speculation is a squadron of UFOs tripped the sensor. I read in Dolan's latest book, modern DSP satellites can distinguish the difference. Good thing. A document in the book indicates the Russians had the same concern of a false alert caused by UFOs.


[edit on 18-9-2009 by Schaden]

Originally posted by ranswer
+ there is a policy of no nuclear weapons at sea under normal circumstances, they are stored in facilities on land (or that's what russian officials claim, and i think there is also some international agreement with the US about this), so that should rule out the sub taken over scenario

I really don't think so - do you have any thing you could link for that??

It would make absolutely no sense what so ever to have subs capable of launching nuke weapons just roaming around MINUS any nukes!!!

Even if they are involved in an exercise they would have at least some of their nuke capability with them... Case in point the Kursk, it is generally accepted that she was packing heat.

How much of a deterrent would it be if after the first volley is launched Russian subs have to return to a base and pick up some nukes?? I can guarantee you that the base will not be there by the time they arrive!!

Brit subs carry nukes ready to go and we have a tiny arsenal compared to Ivan.

reply to post by mpriebe81


I did not read anywhere about missing Russian nuclear weapons.I had always thought the Russians had accounted for them all.That would be a serious matter.Hundreads of missing nuclear weapons.By the way.Thoses nuclear weapons are not really missing at all.The Russians have deployed them where the Americans will never find them.They are proberly ready to be deployed at a moments notice.I guess this may worry the Americans some what.If i was the Americans i would be giving Siberia a real look over.

Originally posted by Becker44
Depends which ones you are referring to.

Did you mean: 2112-6578-48932-66-257-556-qg3
or
6731-h655-85648-2-3335-7fg5-33

Because the 1st one is really the least secure of the two!!

I'm not sure how your question would be answered without an enormous amount of speculation.

Becker

, I'm glad I'm not holding the Russian football. Actually, do they have an equivalent "football" to the one in the US?

[edit on 20-9-2009 by ineverknew]

reply to post by ineverknew


Did you know at one point on Brit subs all that was required (apparently) to fire the nuke missiles was a key that looked very much like a bike D lock key Just one of the things! - no code or anything!

Now if you could not be bothered to 'pick' the lock you could of jimmeyed the panel with a screwdriver and shorted the switch - apparently this is no joke!! - The deal was that the sub crews were so loyal that absolute security at all times was assured - different now a days of course, but I thin that was only a couple of decades ago.


[edit on 20/9/2009 by Now_Then]