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Originally posted by randyvs
there are many ancient prophecies the world over that fortell the return
of the car people. so don t LOL laugh.
Originally posted by Eye of Horus
Ive been in the currency exchange market for 10 years, and I understood him completely. He wasn't just going off the deep end, there were code words he was using. Thanks for the post. Goes back to making $$$ the old fashion way.
S&F
Originally posted by GreenBicMan
This guy flips out and gets excited all the time
The only guy i trust on that show is the skinny younger guy with black hair but i cant remember his name right now.. he is pretty smart
I certainly dont trust the optionmonster.com guys.. those guys love to steal your money, along with finnermann, either she is a disinfo player or she is a terrible market player
EDIT** Believe it is Tim Seymour
[edit on 20-5-2009 by GreenBicMan]
We've also been told Macke was behaving erratically even before he went on camera Tuesday, which makes you wonder why they let him on in the first place. It also means that the outburst wasn't just some kind of self-aware joke he was playing on Kneale. One source familiar with the situation speculates the talks utimately will end with Macke leaving the network, a la Dylan Ratigan.
The war of attrition cannot be properly solved using the payoff matrix. The players' available resources are the only limit to the maximum value of bids; bids can be any number if available resources are ignored, meaning that for any value of α, there is a value β that is greater. Attempting to put all possible bids onto the matrix, however, will result in an ∞×∞ matrix. One can, however, use a pseudo-matrix form of war of attrition to understand the basic workings of the game, and analyze some of the problems in representing the game in this manner.
The game works as follows: Each player makes a bid; the one who bids the highest wins a resource of value V. Each player pays the lowest bid, a.
The premise that the players may bid any number is important to analysis of the game. They may even exceed the value of the resource that is contested over. This at first appears to be a non sequitur, as it would be foolish to pay more than the value for a resource. Remember, however that each bidder only pays the low bid. Therefore, it would seem to be in each player's best interest to bid the maximum possible amount rather than an amount equal to or less than the value of the resource.
There is a catch, however; if both players bid higher than V, the high bidder does not so much win as lose less. This situation is commonly referred to as a Pyrrhic victory. In contrast, if each player bids less than V, the player bidding a will lose, and the other player will benefit by an amount of V-a. If each player bids the same amount for a less than V/2, they split the value of V, each gaining V/2-a. For a tie such that a>V/2, they both lose the difference of V/2 and a. Luce and Raffia referred to the latter situation as a "ruinous situation"; the point at which both players suffer, and there is no winner.
The conclusion one can draw from this pseudo-matrix is that there is no value to bid which is beneficial in all cases, so there is no dominant strategy. However, this fact and the above argument do not preclude the existence of Nash Equilibria. Any pair of strategies with the following characteristics is a Nash Equilibrium:
* One player bids zero
* The other player bids any value equal to V or higher, or mixes among any values V or higher.
With these strategies, one player wins and pays zero, and the other player loses and pays zero. It is easy to verify that neither player can strictly gain by unilaterally deviating.
The evolutionary stable strategy below represents the most probable value of a. The value p(t) for a contest with a resource of value V over time t, is the probability that t = a. This strategy does not guarantee the win; rather it is the optimal balance of risk and reward. The outcome of any particular game cannot be predicted as the random factor of the opponent's bid is too unpredictable.
Another popular formulation of the war of attrition is as follows: Two players are involved in a dispute. The value of the object to each player is vi > 0. Time is modeled as a continuous variable which starts at zero and runs indefinitely. Each player chooses when to concede the object to the other player. In the case of a tie, each player receives vi / 2 utility. Time is valuable, each player uses one unit of utility per period of time. This formulation is slightly more complex since it allows each player to assign a different value to the object. Its equilibria are not as obvious as the other formulation.[\quote]
Originally posted by worldwatcher
btw, I haven't seen Macke on tv today, did I miss him?
He's definitely not on Fast Money tonight.
intriguing!