Why did Georgia’s air defenses work and Syria’s didn’t?

While the Russian Army pretty much had its way, the skied over Georgia was a bit different. Last weeks AWST took a look at the Russian made systems of both countries and came to this conclution. The Simplicity of Gerorgias system and its lack of intergration made it hard to take down huge chunks of it. The possiblity of the Russian shooting down thier own aircraft was also raised.

In addition the loss of the Tu-22M3 that the Russians claimed to have been from one of thier SA-5 they sold, may simply be a smoke screen to cover the fact that one of thier rop line bombers was taken out by a relativly primative air defence system.

Georgia’s relative success against the Russian air force, compared with its unalloyed failure against the Russian army, is shedding light on other recent air campaigns. In particular, why was the Israeli air force able to penetrate Syria’s Russian-made air defenses while Moscow was unable to finesse Georgia’s Russian-made weaponry?

U.S. analysts suggest that the simplicity of the Georgian air defenses, with far less dependence on networking, made it tougher to knock out or blind major parts of the system.

U.S. and European defense specialists say Georgians operated the low-to-high-altitude SA-11 Buk-1M and the low-to-medium-altitude SA-15 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems. There also are reports that Georgia used the Polish Grom, a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile that can hit high-speed, incoming aircraft; the Grom is similar to the Russian-built SA-18 Igla.
aviationnow.com.../awst_xml/2008/08/18/ AW_08_18_2008_p34-74156.xml&headline=Russian+Air+Versus+Georgian+Defenses

Originally posted by FredT
The Simplicity of Gerorgias system and its lack of intergration made it hard to take down huge chunks of it. The possiblity of the Russian shooting down thier own aircraft was also raised.

So net-centric has its weaknesses?



The interdependency of systems on each other?

Even though the article came out of "Aviation & Space Technology", it is important to understand that due to the potential opponent (Russia) you should not believe what you hear regarding system capabilities, etc.
Every one I talk to concerning the technological abilities in this conflict tell me there is massive misinformation coming from the west and little or no accurate information coming from Russia.

Things are not as they seem.

simply:

1) people is the determinative, Syrian believe Anla not tech, how good caliber operator have, how close the weapon capability could be reached.

2) electronic opposition is the advantage US equipment was designed for, this why Syria lost, whereas, Georgia used same weapon as Russian used, which is our Chinese idiom "be self-contradictory" pointed

Originally posted by intelgurl
Even though the article came out of "Aviation & Space Technology", it is important to understand that due to the potential opponent (Russia) you should not believe what you hear regarding system capabilities, etc.
Every one I talk to concerning the technological abilities in this conflict tell me there is massive misinformation coming from the west and little or no accurate information coming from Russia.

Are you talking about capabilities specific to this conflict or generally? It seems that this (Georgian) conflict is pretty Vietnam-esque with exception of a couple of UAVs. And where can we get good information without having to be able to read Russian?

Originally posted by HatTrick
And where can we get good information without having to be able to read Russian?

Do what I do... make it all up as you go along...


or maybe thats where I'm going wrong

Here's an older Aviation Week article talking about the subject.

Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses

If the land war in Georgia so far seems to be going decidedly in favor of the Russian army and navy, the Georgians seem to be racking up a lopsided score with their air defenses.

However, Georgian air defenses appear to be taking a steady toll on Russian aircraft. Russia has admitted to losing a total of four aircraft (the Georgians claim 10) in the conflict. So far they've admitted to the destruction of three Su-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft and a Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber that was flying a reconnaissance mission.

Photos from the combat area show the wreck of the Tu-22 and a Frogfoot as well as a picture of the Backfire pilot in a Georgian hospital. The pilot was Col. Igor Zinov, a 50 year-old Tu-22M3 instructor pilot stationed at the Russian Flight Test Center at Akhtubinsk.
Link

If Russia failed to suppress Georgia's air defense systems, largely made by Russian hardware then I have to ask how they might have faired against a much better equipped opponent with both IDAS and an air force. Perhaps we're seeing how conventional non low observable aircraft without a considerable EW/S.E.A.D./D.E.A.D. support package fare against modern SAMs.

[edit on 2-9-2008 by WestPoint23]

Mod Edit: Trimmed link

[edit on 9/2/08 by FredT]

Part of the issue is simply cultural - the Russian's don't put nearly as high a premium on force protection as the US, because the Russian public isn't as sensitive to losses as the US. They're also generally fighting closer to home, and the Russian public sees these border conflicts as a matter of compelling national interest. Thus they're willing to take greater risks, like flying Tu-22's at treetop altitudes over enemy forces.

Four to ten airframes, for an operation the size of Russia's Georgian invasion, probably falls well within the Russian definition of "acceptable losses."

Originally posted by WestPoint23
If Russia failed to suppress Georgia's air defense systems, largely made by Russian hardware then I have to ask how they might have faired against a much better equipped opponent with both IDAS and an air force. Perhaps we're seeing how conventional non low observable aircraft without a considerable EW/S.E.A.D./D.E.A.D. support package fare against modern SAMs.

Perhaps.


But perhaps, with it being a limited campaign, there were limitations enforced on doctrine.

Everyone knows Russian and Soviet doctrine was always based on overwhelming force and combined arms. It is very possible that neither of those general tactical concepts could have been fully applied due to political considerations.


For example:

Airforce: Can we saturate those SAM sites with cluster munitions?

Kremlin: Sorry, no go. No cluster munitions or non-PGM attacks allowed.

Given that Russia bombed cities and other civilian sites one wonders if ROE were that big of an issue, more so then say general technology and circumstance. I know you used it as an example but cluster munitions would not be ideal for counter SAM missions, especially given the type operated by Georgia. I just think Russia did not have time to methodically conduct a protracted air war with Georgia. Their main goal was to drive them out of the two regions and set up a hedge inside Georgian territory. International intervention would have arrived before Russia could have done that if they had gone with the long air war before any ground action deal. So given their forced and rushed campaign against Georgian forces they were bound to take some losses. I still think they were surprised by their air losses, as should we all, to some degree. And this is definitely going to be a topic both the West and East look at for further study.

[edit on 3-9-2008 by WestPoint23]