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Originally posted by StellarX
A twenty megaton warhead used against London is going to cause as much devastation as the 10 750 Kt warheads the SS-18 were formally equipped with before some in the disarmament crowd decided to restrict warheads instead of megatonage. Either way active defenses is of far more use against single warhead missiles ( even with countermeasures) than they would be against Mirv'ed weapons.
The problem with that theory is that Britain never had anywhere near enough to deter possible Russian aggression
Switzerland is not richer by most any means of comparison
2) Culture - the Swiss have a long tradition of civil defence; you can't create it out of the blue
'Culture'? Are you joking? The Swiss have a culture of building underground shelters for long duration wars involving aircraft and nuclear weapons? Are you one of those people who believe in ancient high tech civilization or what are you on about?
3) Geology (a lot of British homes are built on flood plains - no cellars!)
Then you build community air raid shelters above ground;
Accidental first strikes then?
Frankly i am more disappointed than anything else that you wish to maintain that civil defenses could not have been successfully implemented
Originally posted by Wembley
But any kind of civl defence against a 20 Mt warhead is futile. That's the point you seem to have trouble getting to. No shelter is going to help.
Only if you go with the theory that the Russians would just shrug off the loss of umpteen million people, which is absurd.
The "Great Patriotic War " left huge scars in the national psyche - nobody wants to go through that again. The UKs nuclear arsenal might not be able to obliterate the USSR entirely, but it would effectively finish it.
GNP is generally quoted a a lot higher than the UK per capita.
I'm talking about Swiss culture, which you seem to have missed. Going right back to the federation of the Cantons they have had a highly colelctive view of defending the population - even now they have virtually no standing army, it's all citizen-based.
Their civil defence program is an extension of the idea that responsibility is shared out all the way down to the very lowest level of individual houses, each of which is required to have a shelter. You can't introduce that sort of culture overnight
Crucially also, Switzerland is determinedly neutral and is never going to be the target for a nuclear attack.
There's a big difference between being ready for fall-out when France get blasted to having to take hits on Geneva and Zurich - either of which would be obliterated by a single direct hit.
..which would be completely different to the Swiss model. The point of their system is that the shelters are integrated into buildings and costed as part of them. You don't need separate buildingsd or land for shelters.
In each of those cases, one side might have responded to an apparent first strike fromt he other side with a 'retaliation' which would have been seen as a total surprise first strike.
Because they couldn't. There is no meaningful civil defence against a multi-megaton strike, as was repeatedly proven.
Your fantasy of evacuating everyone to 'a safe place' is just that
- a fantasy. Even if it were possible, anywhere you evacuated the population to would itself simply become a target.
And if you think that reducing deaths from (say) 20 million to (say) 10 million is something that would be applauded...I think you're crazy.
Originally posted by zero lift
What are you on about - 'Struggle For Survival' was published in the past couple of years, not 1955?
From 1949 onwards, the US considered the UK to be the 'biggest aircraft carrier in the world'; that's why they based much of their strategic and tactical nuclear threat capability on airbases throughout the UK.
Then there's the fact that the UK operated their own retaliatory nuclear threat.
Couple that with the blindingly obvious fact (but unfortunately not obvious to StellarX), that the UK was the main rendezvous point for the massive number of US service personnel (who were to reinforce the European battelfronts), and I think you'll agree that the Soviet Union would have allocated a significant number of their warheads to UK targets.
And then in the eighties, the US added more UK targets by basing their mobile cruise missile launch systems in the UK. In effect, this meant that the Soviets would have had to blanket southern England with nuclear warheads to ensure that they destroyed this capability.
I'm not surprised, I gave you a link.
The short answer is that they didn't think they would survive intact - if you read the book you'll discover that fact!
By 1963 it had become obvious that nowhere in the UK could be considered safe from nuclear attack (the same fact was dawning on the Soviets and the US); all that a Government could do was to disperse across the UK during the Precautionary Period and hope that the few survivors would somehow manage to accrete at specific locations.
Strath recommended a programme of shelter building for the population, but estimates put the cost at £1.25bn. At today's prices, that would amount to almost £23bn. It was considered too costly, so military planners determined that the best form of defence was the guarantee of immediate retaliation against an aggressor. And to do that, someone would have to be tucked away safely ready to push the button.
www.guardian.co.uk...
And as for your BS about the UK Government providing protected accommodation for "tens of thousands" - care to provide proof that the number was that high; or did you just pluck it out of the air like so much of your evidence?
Until two years ago, the existence of this complex, variously codenamed Burlington, Stockwell, Turnstile or 3-Site, was classified. It was a huge yet very secret complex, where the government and 6,000 apparatchiks would have taken refuge for 90 days during all-out thermonuclear war. Solid yet cavernous, surrounded by 100ft-deep reinforced concrete walls within a subterranean 240-acre limestone quarry just outside Corsham, it drives one to imagine the ghosts of people who, thank God, never took refuge here.
Local councils, too, had their underground bunkers. Some are now used for storage. Others, such as one in Cambridge, have been retained and upgraded, today housing "emergency planning" facilities with half an eye on possible attacks by terrorists using chemical or biological weapons.
www.guardian.co.uk...
[Ah, that explains your earlier cock-ups.
Your arrogance knows no bounds, does it?
Don't be so quick to dismiss facts which go against your opinion StellarX;
read the entire book and you might realise that your position is based on very shaky foundations.
read the entire book and you might realise that your position is based on very shaky foundations.
I would add that much of the source material has only been recently declassified, hence there is a mountain of info in the book to which you will never have previously had access.
Ooh goody!
Will it be up to your previously excellent standards (NBC suits protect the wearer from gamma-emitting radioactive fallout)?
Ironically, the development of the upgraded ground-based battle-management radars, which can track MIRVed RVs, was carried out during the ABM Treaty negotiations. Construction of these facilities could hardly have gone unnoticed by the West, for they resemble several Manhattan skyscrapers joined together in one unit. Construction began in 1972, and the first units became operational in the1980s. The well-known Krasnoyarsk Radar-the sixth of nine such radars--was a deliberate treaty violation by the Soviet leadership. Is it possible that United States and NATO spy satellites did not detect these massive structures? If not, then why are these flagrant treaty violations being ignored?
In total the U.S.S.R. deployed two generations of national missile defenses, consisting of 18 large radars and 12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors at 280 complexes. Moscow itself is protected not only by 100 ABM missiles, as permitted by the treaty, but also by several thousand SAM/ABM interceptors.
newsmax.com.../4/24/53247
Immediately prior to the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviets had developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-5, which was observed to have a peculiar trajectory. The SA-5 was fired high above the atmosphere and then would descend to intercept and destroy enemy bombers. While technically such a trajectory could not be ruled out, logically, however, it could not be accepted as this type of trajectory represents the least efficient way to shoot down enemy aircraft. On the other hand, the SA-5?s trajectory would be just the ticket for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles which themselves travel above the atmosphere. Taking this into account, the SA-5 had to be an ABM weapon. But with the ABM treaty almost in hand, this fact was ignored and the treaty went into effect. The treaty remains in effect, limiting development of a U.S. ABM system. Meanwhile, Russian dual-purpose (anti-aircraft/anti-missile) missile systems like the SA-5 continue to exist.
www.thenewamerican.com...
However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.
Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.
In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).
www.jinsa.org...
Russia inherited most of the Soviet empire's illegal national ABM defenses. Although the Hen Houses and LPARs located in the successor states created significant gaps in coverage, Russia still controls 12 or 13 of those radars. Consequently, SAM/ABMs still defend most of the Russian Federation from U.S. ICBMs, much of the SLBM threat, and Chinese missiles. Scheduled completion of the LPAR in Belorus will restore complete threat coverage, except for the gap left by the dismantled Krasnoyarsk LPAR. Granted, the Hen Houses are old, but the United States has been operating similar radars for 40 years.
Despite its economic difficulties, Russia continued development and production of the SA-10, adding (in 1992-1993 and 1997) two models with new missiles and electronics and replacing more than 1000 SA-5 missiles with late model SA-10s having greatly improved performance against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Russia is protected by as at least as many (about 8500) SAM/ABMs as in 1991, and they are more effective. No wonder Russia shows little concern for its proliferation of missile and nuclear technology.
Even more impressively, Russia has begun flight-testing the fourth generation "S-400" ("Triumph") SAM/ABM designed not only to end the "absolute superiority" of air assault demonstrated by the United States in the 1992 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo operation, but also to improve Russia's illegal ABM defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The S-400 is scheduled to begin deployment in 2000, more testimony to Russia's commitment to maintaining its national ABM defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty.
www.security-policy.org...
Mr. Lee's analysis is complex. To vastly simplify, he says he has evidence that Russia's surface-to-air interceptor missiles carry nuclear warheads and therefore are capable of bringing down long-range ballistic missiles, not just aircraft and shorter-range missiles, which is their stated purpose. Russia has 8,000 of these missiles scattered around the country, and Mr. Lee says he has found numerous Russian sources that describe how successive generations of SAMs were in fact designed with the express intention of shooting down ballistic missiles, which is illegal under the treaty.
www.opinionjournal.com...
Originally posted by 1000hanz
Hey Stellar most of your "LINKS" are NOT showing any pages, can you do a "MUCH BETTER" job at posting links that we can all link to,
I'm starting to think, your making these "QUOTES" up and posting a link that doesn't work, thinking we might not try and click on to it.
Thanx
Originally posted by pepsi78
Stelar I think you are being unrealistic.
First of all it's the radiaton, it would penetrate anything.
Forms of radiation such as gamma and xray will penetrate deep in to the ground, they put a thick bar of led when you take a lame x-ray and it only lasts for like 3 seconds
and you are talking of covering water with blankets.You will vomit your liver out from the aftermath if you are lucky to survive the blast
Civil defense is no more practical or impractical against a single twenty megaton warhead than it is against 10 750 KT warheads which could be carried by other versions of the SS-18.....The most serious consequence of the single twenty megaton burst is that the damage will be more concentrated and shelters in the near vicinity far more likely to be destroyed.
The Uk's nuclear capacity could potentially be easily be countered by Russian active ABM defenses
The Swiss have no standing army? Where do they send the conscripts then?
You don't think the British government could have enforced shelter preparation ( the Swiss after all didn't start building air raid shelters in medieval European times) with less public outcry than taking all that money from things that could not protect Britain?
Crucially also, Switzerland is determinedly neutral and is never going to be the target for a nuclear attack.
So they are so well prepared despite being not even targeted for nuclear attack while the UK that is isn't prepared at all? Can you explain how that is?
Wars didn't even break out during the Cuban missile crisis, Korea, the Berlin Blockade or similar events
every ten million saved is something quite worthy of applause. I think not preparing defenses while you build weapons is crazy.
Originally posted by StellarX
Originally posted by 1000hanz
Hey Stellar most of your "LINKS" are NOT showing any pages, can you do a "MUCH BETTER" job at posting links that we can all link to,
Yes, i suppose i should check them every time before i post them being forced as i am to repeat the same old stuff for the benefit of the newly uninformed. Thanks for pointing out just how thankless a 'job' i have chosen.
[edit on 31-10-2008 by 1000hanz]
Originally posted by StellarX
Originally posted by zero lift
What are you on about - 'Struggle For Survival' was published in the past couple of years, not 1955?
In all fairness it has not been updated with the last 50 years worth of knowledge. My apologies for that blunder...
Then there's the fact that the UK operated their own retaliatory nuclear threat.
Which was never sufficient to prevent a war against the USSR without the presence of the US nuclear arsenal.
Couple that with the blindingly obvious fact (but unfortunately not obvious to StellarX), that the UK was the main rendezvous point for the massive number of US service personnel (who were to reinforce the European battelfronts), and I think you'll agree that the Soviet Union would have allocated a significant number of their warheads to UK targets.
Why allow Britain to be used in American aggression in the first place? Let them build more aircraft carriers if they want to have their war with Russia? You don't think cooperation between European states would have been sufficient to deter aggression by Russian? Why did the USSR have to start a arms race any ways? The only thing that this exposes is the fact that the UK government would spend vast amounts of money building the same type of weapons the US deployed IN THEIR COUNTRY without doing anything to protect it's citizens from the added threats.
even the 1960's the Warsaw pact would have had to use every and any warhead on the United States, not Britain.
And then in the eighties, the US added more UK targets by basing their mobile cruise missile launch systems in the UK. In effect, this meant that the Soviets would have had to blanket southern England with nuclear warheads to ensure that they destroyed this capability.
So who's side where the British government on given how they made Britain ever and ever more vulnerable at a time when the USSR surpassed NATO in strategic capacity in the late 70's? When were either the British government or NATO going to start working on a credible defense that would not have resulted in both their populations being largely annihilated for lack of preparedness?
By 1963 it had become obvious that nowhere in the UK could be considered safe from nuclear attack (the same fact was dawning on the Soviets and the US); all that a Government could do was to disperse across the UK during the Precautionary Period and hope that the few survivors would somehow manage to accrete at specific locations.
Strath recommended a programme of shelter building for the population, but estimates put the cost at £1.25bn. At today's prices, that would amount to almost £23bn. It was considered too costly, so military planners determined that the best form of defence was the guarantee of immediate retaliation against an aggressor. And to do that, someone would have to be tucked away safely ready to push the button.
www.guardian.co.uk...
How could no area be safe in a bunker underground? What kind of nonsense is this and why do you keep repeating it? You would not be safe ABOVE GROUND standing around in the streets of large cities for sure but how do you get from that rather obvious fact to 'nowhere in the UK could be considered safe from attack'? Would they send commando's by airplane to attack the bunkers or what? Why do you so desperately want to believe that the fact that so little preparations where made PROVES that preparations could not be made? Do you know how 'accurate' nuclear weapons were in 1963 and how little effect they could or would have had against even known buried targets? What about then nearly twenty years that had passed since the inception of the nuclear age? How can not doing much serve as evidence that not much can be done? Is the absence of airplanes in the middle ages evidence that airplanes could never be built?
Your whole train of logic was never on rails.
And as for your BS about the UK Government providing protected accommodation for "tens of thousands" - care to provide proof that the number was that high; or did you just pluck it out of the air like so much of your evidence?
Until two years ago, the existence of this complex, variously codenamed Burlington, Stockwell, Turnstile or 3-Site, was classified. It was a huge yet very secret complex, where the government and 6,000 apparatchiks would have taken refuge for 90 days during all-out thermonuclear war. Solid yet cavernous, surrounded by 100ft-deep reinforced concrete walls within a subterranean 240-acre limestone quarry just outside Corsham, it drives one to imagine the ghosts of people who, thank God, never took refuge here.
www.guardian.co.uk...
I meant the 'few tens of thousands' with respect to most governments ( UK, US and others) but as you can see it may in fact be ten thousand ( depending on what ' the government' + 6000 means) in just that one until-two-years-ago classified complex.
read the entire book and you might realise that your position is based on very shaky foundations.
You don't have to read an entire book of supposed' fact' to realise that it's not based on facts.
I would add that much of the source material has only been recently declassified, hence there is a mountain of info in the book to which you will never have previously had access.
Does the book for instance disclose the fact that the UK government believed that it could ride out a nuclear war in it's 6000+ sleeper shelter?
read the entire book and you might realise that your position is based on very shaky foundations.
You don't have to read an entire book of supposed' fact' to realise that it's not based on facts.
In part
Ironically, the development of the upgraded ground-based battle-management radars, which can track MIRVed RVs, was carried out during the ABM Treaty negotiations. Construction of these facilities could hardly have gone unnoticed by the West, for they resemble several Manhattan skyscrapers joined together in one unit. Construction began in 1972, and the first units became operational in the1980s. The well-known Krasnoyarsk Radar-the sixth of nine such radars--was a deliberate treaty violation by the Soviet leadership. Is it possible that United States and NATO spy satellites did not detect these massive structures? If not, then why are these flagrant treaty violations being ignored?
In total the U.S.S.R. deployed two generations of national missile defenses, consisting of 18 large radars and 12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors at 280 complexes. Moscow itself is protected not only by 100 ABM missiles, as permitted by the treaty, but also by several thousand SAM/ABM interceptors.
findarticles.com...
Immediately prior to the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviets had developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-5, which was observed to have a peculiar trajectory. The SA-5 was fired high above the atmosphere and then would descend to intercept and destroy enemy bombers. While technically such a trajectory could not be ruled out, logically, however, it could not be accepted as this type of trajectory represents the least efficient way to shoot down enemy aircraft. On the other hand, the SA-5?s trajectory would be just the ticket for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles which themselves travel above the atmosphere. Taking this into account, the SA-5 had to be an ABM weapon. But with the ABM treaty almost in hand, this fact was ignored and the treaty went into effect. The treaty remains in effect, limiting development of a U.S. ABM system. Meanwhile, Russian dual-purpose (anti-aircraft/anti-missile) missile systems like the SA-5 continue to exist.
www.thenewamerican.com...
Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.
The Moscow-system missiles, the SA-5 and SA-10/12, were tipped with small nuclear warheads so they didn't require the incredible bullet-hitting-bullet complexity of the U.S. systems developed during the Clinton years. U.S. spy satellites repeatedly identified tactical nuclear-warhead storage sites at the interceptor bases spread across the Soviet empire.
* G.V. Kisun'ko, the chief designer of the ABM systems developed or deployed around Moscow for more than three decades, confirms in a 1996 memoir that large Hen House and Dog House radars at Sary Shagan were designed as battle-management radars for the early Soviet ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Kisun'ko also stated that the SA-5 was designed as a dual-purpose SAM/ABM in conjunction with the Hen House radars.
* B.V. Bunkin, the designer of the follow-on SA-10 and SA-12 (S-300 PMU and S-300V in Russian nomenclature) missile systems, and several other Russian sources, confirmed that these also were dual-purpose SAM/ABMs. SA-10s largely have replaced the thousands of SA-5 interceptors deployed across the Soviet empire during the Cold War. Bunkin's latest SAM/ABM design, the SA-20, is scheduled to begin deployment this year.
www.findarticles.com...
"Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R"
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...
Note: SA-5 is actually a reused NATO reporting name: it originally referred to the Russian V-1000 Anti Ballistic Missile system, introduced in 1963 and retired the following year for unknown reasons. The SA-5 (as described here) is apparently considered to be a "highly modified version of it".
everything2.com...
On 04 March 1961 an R-12 ballistic missile fitted with a mockup in the form of a 500-kg steel plate, simulating a standard warhead, was launched from the State proving ground at station Sary-Shagan. The target was detected by proving ground radars at a range of 1,500 km and destroyed by a V-1000 antimissile missile, outfitted with a high-explosive-payload.
In 1963 the Griffon [NATO reporting name] interceptor was paraded in Red Square, and characterized as an ABM interceptor. The Griffon was a two-stage liquid fueled interceptor that was 16.5 meters long with a range of over 250 kilometers. Construction of the RZ-25 ABM system, which employed the V-1000 interceptor, was first detected in the early 1960's near the Estonian capital Tallinn. However this construction soon ceased. A highly modified version of the Griffon, the Gammon, was subsequently developed.
www.fas.org...
However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.
Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.
In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).
www.jinsa.org...
Neither of these changes in CIA assessments was the result of evidence on either SA-5 and Hen House design, or actual radar operations. In rare moments of candor, CIA acknowledged that there simply were too many ``intelligence gaps'' in the evidence from U.S. technical collection systems to resolve these issues. The CIA and the NIE majority simply systematically violated the rule that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, e.g. if satellites did not detect the Soviet radars passing battle management target tracking data, therefore, only early warning data were being passed. When the U.S. identified nuclear warhead storage at the SA-5 complexes in the early 1970s NIE positions remained the same. Conclusive evidence filling in the ``intelligence gaps'' began to surface publicly from U.S. and Russian sources only in 1992. The principal Russian sources for that evidence are: --A.N. Kosygin, former Premier and Politburo member for over three decades; --Gen. Col. Yu.V. Votintsev, Commander ABM (PRO) and Space Defense (PKO) Troops, 1967-85; --G.V. Kisun'ko, Chief Designer of the Moscow ABM system 1954-75, General Designer of the Soviet Empire's ABM systems from 1956 until the mid-1970s, and two of his colleagues; --two Soviet Military Attaches--one a military intelligence (GRU) general officer; and --various books and articles from the Russian press. The top three Russian sources--Kosygin, Votintsev, Kisun'ko--had unique access to all Soviet ABM programs. All the Russian sources are consistent on three critical points refuting CIA's position: --the SA-5 and SA-10 were designed as dual purpose SAM/ABMs from relatively low cost air defense components; --the Hen House and LPAR radars were designed to provide target tracking (battle management) data to the SAM/ABMs; and --a national ABM and space defense command-control system was installed by the mid-1970s.
--A.N. Kosygin, former Premier and Politburo member for over three decades; --Gen. Col. Yu.V. Votintsev, Commander ABM (PRO) and Space Defense (PKO) Troops, 1967-85; --G.V. Kisun'ko, Chief Designer of the Moscow ABM system 1954-75, General Designer of the Soviet Empire's ABM systems from 1956 until the mid-1970s, and two of his colleagues; --two Soviet Military Attaches--one a military intelligence (GRU) general officer; and --various books and articles from the Russian press. The top three Russian sources--Kosygin, Votintsev, Kisun'ko--had unique access to all Soviet ABM programs. All the Russian sources are consistent on three critical points refuting CIA's position: --the SA-5 and SA-10 were designed as dual purpose SAM/ABMs from relatively low cost air defense components; --the Hen House and LPAR radars were designed to provide target tracking (battle management) data to the SAM/ABMs; and --a national ABM and space defense command-control system was installed by the mid-1970s.
www.fas.org...
Russia inherited most of the Soviet empire's illegal national ABM defenses. Although the Hen Houses and LPARs located in the successor states created significant gaps in coverage, Russia still controls 12 or 13 of those radars. Consequently, SAM/ABMs still defend most of the Russian Federation from U.S. ICBMs, much of the SLBM threat, and Chinese missiles. Scheduled completion of the LPAR in Belorus will restore complete threat coverage, except for the gap left by the dismantled Krasnoyarsk LPAR. Granted, the Hen Houses are old, but the United States has been operating similar radars for 40 years.
Despite its economic difficulties, Russia continued development and production of the SA-10, adding (in 1992-1993 and 1997) two models with new missiles and electronics and replacing more than 1000 SA-5 missiles with late model SA-10s having greatly improved performance against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Russia is protected by as at least as many (about 8500) SAM/ABMs as in 1991, and they are more effective. No wonder Russia shows little concern for its proliferation of missile and nuclear technology.
Even more impressively, Russia has begun flight-testing the fourth generation "S-400" ("Triumph") SAM/ABM designed not only to end the "absolute superiority" of air assault demonstrated by the United States in the 1992 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo operation, but also to improve Russia's illegal ABM defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The S-400 is scheduled to begin deployment in 2000, more testimony to Russia's commitment to maintaining its national ABM defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty.
www.fas.org...
Mr. Lee's analysis is complex. To vastly simplify, he says he has evidence that Russia's surface-to-air interceptor missiles carry nuclear warheads and therefore are capable of bringing down long-range ballistic missiles, not just aircraft and shorter-range missiles, which is their stated purpose. Russia has 8,000 of these missiles scattered around the country, and Mr. Lee says he has found numerous Russian sources that describe how successive generations of SAMs were in fact designed with the express intention of shooting down ballistic missiles, which is illegal under the treaty.
www.opinionjournal.com...
They don't penetrate deeply ( unless that's what you mean by a meter or two) and as for the thick bar of led there is a reason we are talking sand and not led.
Feel free to discover the difference with some easy to do internet research.
Why? As long as particle's can't and don't get in there is no ionizing effect that i am aware of.
Originally posted by pepsi78
Sand would not be efficient in dealing with this kind of radiation, lead is the most efficient kind of shielding because it has a higher atomic number than sand, electrons and protons can be deflected with aluminium and sand, but you are talking about pure gamma emisions besides particles.
Sand won't stop that
Yes I expected that since you did not know what to imput here.
In an nuclear explosion you have gamma emisions ranging from 1 to 7 MeV
For 7 mev gamma emmisions you would need around 10 cm of lead shielding to reduce the dosage to half life, and that would only cut the radiation in half.
For other materials such as concrete you would need to almost double that amound to shield from that type of radiation.
You would die after a few days.
It's simply enough to be exposed to 10 rem per hour since radiation is a cumulative factor it would add up and in a few days you would acumulate above 1000 rem because you would be constantly exposed, since gamma radiation is very persistant it can even last off for 100 years or more.
Particles similar to the charged electrons may be easyer to block, but not a direct gamma emission, because we are not talking about particles that may produce radiation, we are talking about pure emisions of gamma radiation resulting from a nuclear fallout, not particles coliding and producing radiation, there is also that, but the most important factor is the high type of radiation in the spectrum of radiation mejurment.
One nuke would insure total anihilation of any city, it would mostly wipe out any sign of life, you would simply glow in the dark for sure.
If you manage to survive underground the radiation would get to you in a few days, you would first start to vomit, then your hair would fall off, after than you would pass out and die.
To survive you need a very deep hole, make it 10 meeters or more.