Risky Geopolitical Game: Washington Plays ‘Tibet Roulette’ with China
by F. William Engdahl
Washington has obviously decided on an ultra-high risk geopolitical game with Beijing’s by fanning the flames of violence in Tibet just at this
sensitive time in their relations and on the run-up to the Beijing Olympics. It’s part of an escalating strategy of destabilization of China which
has been initiated by the Bush Administration over the past months.
It also includes the attempt to ignite an anti-China Saffron Revolution in the neighboring Myanmar region, bringing US-led NATO troops into Darfur
where China’s oil companies are developing potentially huge oil reserves.
It includes counter moves across mineral-rich Africa. And it includes strenuous efforts to turn India into a major new US forward base on the Asian
sub-continent to be deployed against China, though evidence to date suggests the Indian government is being very cautious not to upset Chinese
relations.
The current Tibet operation apparently got the green light in October last year when George Bush agreed to meet the Dalai Lama for the first time
publicly in Washington.
The President of the United States is not unaware of the high stakes of such an insult to Beijing. Bush deepened the affront to America’s largest
trading partner, China, by agreeing to attend as the US Congress awarded the Dalai Lama the Congressional Gold Medal...
There is no need for any conflict and war between USA/Russia/China.
They can co-exist peacefully, if those in power WANT to.
Tragedy and Hope? The tragedy of the period covered by this book is obvious, but the hope may seem dubious to many. Only the passage of time will
show if the hope I seem to see in the future is actually there or is the result of mis-observation and self-deception.
The historian has difficulty distinguishing the features of the present, and generally prefers to restrict his studies to the past, where the evidence
is more freely available and where perspective helps him to interpret the evidence.
Thus the historian speaks with decreasing assurance about the nature and significance of events as they approach his own day. The time covered by this
book seems to this historian to fall into three periods: the nineteenth century from about 1814 to about 1895; the twentieth century, which did not
begin until after World War II, perhaps as late as 1950; and a long period of transition from 1895 to 1950. The nature of our experiences in the first
two of these periods is clear enough, while the character of the third, in which we have been for only half a generation, is much less clear.
A few things do seem evident, notably that the twentieth century now forming is utterly different from the nineteenth century and that the age of
transition between the two was one of the most awful periods in all human history. Some, looking back on the nineteenth century across the horrors of
the age of transition, may regard it with nostalgia or even envy.
But the nineteenth century was, however hopeful in its general processes, a period of materialism, selfishness, false values, hypocrisy, and secret
vices. It was the working of these underlying evils that eventually destroyed the century's hopeful qualities and emerged in all their nakedness to
become dominant in 1914. Nothing is more revealing of the nature of the nineteenth century than the misguided complacency and optimism of 1913 and
early 1914 and the misconceptions with which the world's leaders went to war in August of 1914.
The events of the following thirty years, from 1914 to 1945, showed the real nature of the preceding generation, its ignorance, complacency, and false
values.
Two terrible wars sandwiching a world economic depression revealed man's real inability to control his life by the nineteenth century's techniques
of laissez faire, materialism, competition, selfishness, nationalism, violence, and imperialism. These characteristics of late nineteenth-century life
culminated in World War II in which more than 50 million persons, 23 million of them in uniform, the rest civilians, were killed, most of them by
horrible deaths.
The hope of the twentieth century rests on its recognition that war and depression are man-made, and needless.
They can be avoided in the future by turning from the nineteenth-century characteristics just mentioned and going back to other characteristics
that our Western society has always regarded as virtues: generosity, compassion, cooperation, rationality, and foresight, and finding an increased
role in human life for love, spirituality, charity, and self-discipline.
We now know fairly well how to control the increase in population, how to produce wealth and reduce poverty or disease; we may, in the near future,
know how to postpone senility and death; it certainly should be clear to those who have their eyes open that violence, extermination, and despotism do
not solve problems for anyone and that victory and conquest are delusions as long as they are merely physical and materialistic.
Some things we clearly do not yet know, including the most important of all, which is how to bring up children to form them into mature, responsible
adults, but on the whole we do know now, as we have already shown, that we can avoid continuing the horrors of 1914-1915, and on that basis alone we
may be optimistic over our ability to go back to the tradition of our Western society and to resume its development along its old patterns of
Inclusive Diversity.