Bulava will remain, as will the doubts

Bulava remains:

The meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) that was expected to consider the future of the Bulava missile apparently took place a week or so ago. The commission agreed that at this point there is no alternative to the Bulava project, so it will continue. Yuri Solomonov promised that MITT will deliver the goods eventually.

russianforces.org...


The only other alternative would be the r-29rm which finished its flight tests in 2004. The Yuri Dolgorukiy, originally configured for the r-39m, would have to be reconfigured for a liquid propellant missile if Bulava fails, as it will be the only alternative.

The constant failures of bulava are not surprising, especially to those with an intimate knowledge of the Russian defense infrastructure. Yuri Solomonow had commented on the "loss of crucially important technologies" along with poor quality control measures. The foregoing of ground tests along with the limited experience with solid propellant slbms was a recipe for disaster.

Since the Bulava is the only viable option, It almost certainly will be made to work, but at what cost and in how long???

This is going to be easy. It's in my ball-field now, so there will be no "doubts" left when I'm done with this one.

Here's what Russian version of FOX news look like;

Investigations

Atomic roulette of Admiral Masorin

Five out of seven flight tests of Bulava have failed since September 2005

Novaya Gazeta № 60 August 09, 2007

Pavel Felgengauer
observer of the Novaya Gazeta


....It’s difficult to find appropriate word for all that. Maybe “Russian roulette”? But now it’s not the case of a man holding a revolver with one cartridge inside to his head. We are talking about the crew and the big submarine. By the way, Yuri Solomonov, chief designer of Bulava, points out that failures of previous tests were due to lowering quality of materials and components, also “loss of crucially important technologies” by the defense establishment, and rising degradation and slovenliness in production process. So no one can guarantee failures won’t repeat. They say, though, that it was Solomonov who persuaded the military that 10 tests of Bulava would be enough to adopt it.

en.novayagazeta.ru...

Here's the low down;

General Information

Novaya Gazeta is known for being critical of Russian government policy. Anna Politkovskaya wrote for Novaya Gazeta until her assassination on October 7, 2006. The journalist told in an essay that the editors received

en.wikipedia.org...

With the support of Bushes administration, Novaya Gazeta consistently runs anti-Russian/anti-Putin propoganda all while Putin and his cabinet has the support and votes of over 94% of all Russians.

A Centre-Right Political allegiance = a personal indorsment from Condoleezza Rice, becasue Center-Right =

Centre-right can also describe a coalition of centrist and right-wing parties. Many political parties of the centre-right are known to have various factions and members who advocate right-wing policies.

en.wikipedia.org...

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice with Novaya Gazeta's Editor-in-Chief Dmitriy Muratov, Deputy Editor Andrey Lipskiy, Ilya Politkovskiy, and Reporter Zoya Yaroshok
Moscow
October 21, 2006

moscow.usembassy.gov...

Another clear example;

Novaya Gazeta Struggles to Stay Alive in Russia

The Wall Street Journal is running an interesting article today about Novaya Gazeta, one of Russia's few remaining independent newspapers and the former employer of the slain journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

Some excerpts:

As opposition voices are slain, exiled or intimidated into silence, Novaya is one of the last outposts of free speech left in Russia -- a status that has earned it influential friends in the West. On a trip to Moscow in October, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pointedly invited the paper's editors to her hotel. "I want to stress that you are not alone in your struggle," she told them.

www.robertamsterdam.com...

Moving on.


russianforces.org is a product of Pavel Podvig, a Stanford man, a US resident, acting as sciantific/political liasion/anylist on the matters of Russo-American nuclear armed forces.

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Pavel Podvig, PhD Download vCard
CISAC Research Associate

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Project

Pavel Podvig joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He worked as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years.

Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

His research has focused on technical and political issues of missile defense, space security, U.S.-Russian relations, structure and capabilities of the Russian strategic forces, and nuclear nonproliferation. He was the head of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces research project and the editor of a book of the same title, which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces.

cisac.stanford.edu...

More here;

2008 Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Recipient
Email | Print

podvig
Pavel Podvig
Stanford University
Citation:

"For establishing a center for scientific study of arms control, for landmark analyses, and for courage in supporting open discussion of international security in Russia."
Background:

Pavel Podvig is a researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Before coming to Stanford in 2004, he worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). Podvig graduated from MIPT with a degree in physics in 1988 and in 1990 he was one of the young-generation scientists who helped Anatoli Diyakov to establish the Center for Arms Control Studies as the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues related to arms control and disarmament. Podvig’s work at the Center included research on technical and political aspects of missile defense, early-warning, command and control, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. He had an opportunity to work with the leading technical groups in the United States at MIT and Princeton University. At the Moscow Center, Podvig was the leader of a major research project and the editor of the book “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces” (MIT Press, 2001), which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces. In 2004 Podvig received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Since 2001 he has served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He has been a member of the APS Committee on International Freedom of Scientists since 2006 and has been appointed Chair of that committee for 2008.
Selection Committee:

Peter Zimmerman (Chair), M. Bunn, J. Hansen, V. Thomas, C. Herzenberg

www.aps.org...

Here's an example of his logical "trajectory";

The truth about Russia's military "resurgence"

By Pavel Podvig | 29 January 2008

www.thebulletin.org...

It's hardly surprising that the military-industrial complex is pushing the "resurgence" agenda--generals always fight the last war. There's little doubt that they will convince the government to keep its number of missiles and submarines at a "respectable" level. Or that the military will be able to maintain these missiles at a reasonable degree of readiness. With a strong economy, Russia can certainly afford strategic forces that would be considered impressive by Cold-War standards. But these standards are irrelevant today and the strategic forces designed to fight the Cold War are useless when it comes to the security threats that exist today. Therefore, this "grandiose resurgence" will eventually prove unnecessary, expensive, and dangerous.

And here's a truly independent and logical anylysis;

I disagree on one of three points. Russia's strategic buildup is inarguably expensive, and almost certainly dangerous. But I feel that it may be far more "necessary" than Podvig gives it credit for. Firstly, the arms race has its own perverted logic. The only reason these systems were ever "needed" was to match the other side, and despite the end of the Cold War this still makes as much "sense" as ever. Secondly, the possession of a credible nuclear deterrent increases the freedom of the Russians in their own "sphere of influence" quite a bit, which could prove important as they move to secure their strategic interests- most importantly, the energy resources of the Central Asian former Soviet republics. While the Russians do not need to conquer these countries, they need to ensure that the region remains under Russian economic and political domination. Losing this domination would weaken the Russians politically and economically to an extent I believe that Putin probably regards as totally unacceptable. So long as the Russians can match the US in nuclear weapons, the United States will have a difficult time doing something like, say, providing military support to prop up an anti-Russian Kazakh government. They can threaten us with nuclear annihilation- and if we impinge on their interests and pride enough, they will.

sovietologist.blogspot.com...

A run down of Mr. Podvigs articles, so it'll be easy to establish his patterns;

www.thebulletin.org...

Putin's Boost-Phase Defense: The Offer That Wasn't

www.csis.org...

START and the ABM Treaty: Is a Compromise Possible?

www.csis.org...

A History of the ABM Treaty in Russia

www.csis.org...

Russia and nuclear disarmament

By Pavel Podvig | 17 October 2007

www.thebulletin.org...

As far as Bulava, it's simple, in light of American escalation of the nuclear arms race and the drive for the development of ABM systems, further development and upgrades of Bulavas active electronic defensive systems were insisted upon.

All liquid propellant SLBMs (Bark/r-39m/r-29rm) were rejected precisely because of their increased vulnerability to direct energy AMB weapons.

It's literally THIS simple;

The subsequent redesigned submarine was designated as Project 955. A new missile called the Bulava was developed in parallel with project 955. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology was mainly responsible for the Bulava missile development. The Bulava is capable of penetrating missile-defense systems using evasive maneuvering, decoys and mid-course countermeasures. The Bulava warhead is shielded from both EMP and physical damage.

www.brtsis.com...

The Russian military developed Bulava to possess advanced defense capabilities making it nearly impervious to existing missile-defense systems. Among its claimed abilities are evasive maneuvering, mid-course countermeasures and decoys and a warhead fully shielded against both physical and EMP damage. The Bulava is designed to be capable of surviving a nuclear blast at a minimum distance of 500 meters. [2] President Putin has stated that Bulava could penetrate any potential anti-missile defence system.

en.wikipedia.org...(missile)

Thats where all the extra weight is, thus the reduced throw weight. Just as the Tolpol-M, the whole damn thing is literally ARMORED.

The missile (NATO reporting name SS-27), with a range of about 7,000 miles (11,000 kms), is said to be immune to any current and future U.S. ABM defense. It is capable of making evasive maneuvers to avoid a kill using terminal phase interceptors, and carries targeting countermeasures and decoys.

It is also shielded against radiation, electromagnetic pulse, nuclear blasts, and is designed to survive a hit from any form of laser technology.

en.rian.ru...

"Doupts", please, this is easy.

Here's what Russian version of FOX news look like;

Instead of addressing the issue, you attack the Novaya Gazeta. Why don't you address the issue? Yuri's comments are true or false?

en.wikipedia.org...With the support of Bushes administration, Novaya Gazeta consistently runs anti-Russian/anti-Putin propoganda all while Putin and his cabinet has the support and votes of over 94% of all Russians.

So a piece critical of the failings of the russian slbm is is anti-russian. I would say it is pro russian. And this has what to do with the bulava?

russianforces.org is a product of Pavel Podvig, a Stanford man, a US resident, acting as sciantific/political liasion/anylist on the matters of Russo-American nuclear armed forces.

Please stay on topic!!!

Here's an example of his logical "trajectory";

Please try to separate opinion from fact and stay on topic.

A run down of Mr. Podvigs articles, so it'll be easy to establish his patterns;

Please, try to separate fact from opinion.

s far as Bulava, it's simple, in light of American escalation of the nuclear arms race and the drive for the development of ABM systems, further development and upgrades of Bulavas active electronic defensive systems were insisted upon.

So the delays have nothing to do with all the failings of bulava launches. Only you can look at the bulava launches and determine that the bulava will be delayed because of active electronic defensive systems.

All liquid propellant SLBMs (Bark/r-39m/r-29rm) were rejected precisely because of their increased vulnerability to direct energy AMB weapons.

R-29rm had just finished its flight tests in 2004 and production was restarted. Why was that? Could it be that Bark failed? Solid propellant slbms are the logical next step in slbm development. France with there m-51, China with there jl-2, U.S. with trident. Liquid propellant slbms don't go over well today.

The Bulava is capable of penetrating missile-defense systems using evasive maneuvering, decoys and mid-course countermeasures. The Bulava warhead is shielded from both EMP and physical damage.

Sorry. Bulava will be deployed with 6 conventional mirvs. The rs-24 will probably be deployed with 6 mirvs as well. Yuri solomonov hinted that this will be the case. This is also where the commonality between the rs-24 and the bulava is.

Thats where all the extra weight is, thus the reduced throw weight. Just as the Tolpol-M, the whole damn thing is literally ARMORED.

Mid course countermeasures, decoys, marvs, etc. count as PART OF THE THROW WEIGHT!!!! ITS THAT SIMPLE

An armored missile that has its first and third stage motors blowing up is not that well armored!!!

ITS THAT SIMPLE

Everything I’ve posted is to the point, factual, self explanatory, and backed up by numerous sources so ATS members are free to inform them selves at will.

I’m done here.