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FOIA: DRV Radar Operations in Gulf of Tonkin, 31 July - 8 August 1964

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posted on Mar, 19 2008 @ 02:34 AM
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relea00138.pdf
DRV Radar Operations in Gulf of Tonkin, 31 July - 8 August 1964
This report gives info of DRV Radar tracking of US vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin between 31 July and 8 August 1964.

Document date: 1964-09-03
Department: NSA Headquarters, Ft. Meade, MD (DIRNSDA)
Author: SIGINT
Document type: Report
pages: 3

 

Archivist's Notes: Analysis of surface radar of the DRV has identified at least 3 and possibly 4 surface radar. This was detected during the DRV's monitoring of the USS Maddox position in the gulf. This report also gives possible ground position of these Radar stations.
 




[edit on 3/19/2008 by JacKatMtn]



posted on Mar, 20 2008 @ 01:25 AM
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North Vietnamese (DVR) In Gulf of Tonkin
31 July - 8th August 1964

Naval analysis of DVR Surface Radar Tracking code has located:
Three possibly four Coastal Observation Posts (COP'S) possessing
radar tracking and reporting capabilities.

Analysis of this tracking code located radar sites in the vicinities of :
Long V island
Cape Saint Anne
Vin Son

And one such COP had been identified at Bach Long Vi Island.
A COP was possibly located on Hon Matt Island but its observations were usually limited
to less than 25 nautical miles so it is speculated that it could have been derived from visual rather than radar surveillance.

The Maddox was first observed being tracked from Vin Son 13 nautical miles east north east
on July 31st.
Moving North east it was tracked by Cape saint Anne on the First of August
at about 32 nautical miles south east.
Hon Matt reported the Maddox 5 nautical miles northeast of the island.

The last reported observation was 11 nautical miles to the north.

My Duc began tracking August second and continuously during the first attack on the Maddox .

Although the COP's normally reported to Naval Headquarters at Haiphong, Ben Thuy or Van Hoa,
My Duc reported its findings to Patrol Vessell T146 during second of August to keep a close watch on the location of the Maddox as it was attacked that day.

After the attack, the Maddox retired in a southeasterly course being tracked by both Cape saint Anne and by Vin Son which was the last tracking on August 2nd.

By the 3-4 of August the tracking of the Maddox was now joined by the USS C, Turner Joy were negligible.
tracking on August 5-8th were almost totally absent although Maddox was close to three surface radar stations.

The attack of August fourth, was not presaged by any significant radar tracking,
it was however shadowed by vessel T142 before the attack.

The findings in this report realize that if a vessel is considered hostile it is actively tracked if punitive damage is intended. On the other hand if a vessel is not tracked then it is possible it is not then targeted, such as the case with the USS Craig. The USS Maddox was under constant survelliance until its first attack on August 2nd.

The main finding which from this report is not completely conclusive due to the lack of knowledge of tracking on August 5-8th, finds that heavy radar surveillance on hostile vessels as well as the
transmission of radar tracking reports, indicate strongly that hostile actions are imminent.

[edit on 20-3-2008 by antar]



posted on Apr, 15 2008 @ 08:01 PM
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This document is a summary of radar tracking of the USS Maddox by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) throughout the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Starting on July 31st, 1964, the ship was being tracked by four radar stations. After the first attack on Aug. 2nd and the supposed second attack on the 4th, they stopped tracking the ship for three days, even though it was close to three stations. They probably turned off the radar sites to keep from being detected, but the locations were already known. The conclusion of the report was that radar tracking was an indication of an immanent attack.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident prompted the US Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave President Johnson authority to use military force to defend allies in the area and ultimately lead to the beginning of the Vietnam War.

Related FOIA Documents:
FOIA: DRV attack on US Ships in Gulf of Tonkin; 2 - 4 August 1964
FOIA: Summary of DRV Naval Communications Revealing Pre-Planned Attacks on USS Maddox



 
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