USN cancels LCS

www.janes.com...

The US Navy (USN) has announced that it has cancelled LCS 4, the fourth Littoral Combat Ship, stating that it "could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract" with shipbuilder General Dynamics.

At a press conference on 1 November, reporters were informed that the contract for the ship with General Dynamics was cancelled during a late-evening phone call on 31 October, after arrangements to move from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract fell through.

ouch

edit

ok 1 word answers isn`t great

This isn't very good news at all - maybe a wake up call for the industry - you have a budget so stick to it.

mod edit: changed quote tags to external quote tags.
Quote Reference (review link)

[edit on 4-11-2007 by UK Wizard]

Just some clarification, the Navy cancelled LCS-3 and LSC-4, not the Littoral Ship Program. The USN still remains committed to procuring roughly 55-60 ships of this class. Lockheed and General Dynamics will just have to stick to the price they agreed to, it's too big a contract for either of them to drop out of.

Part of the problem with the entire LCS program (and the big reason that the contractors want cost-plus reimbursement vs fixed-price) is that the program's goals and specifications keep getting changed. Until the Navy can finalize such minor design criteria as 'what, exactly, does this ship do?', and 'how big are various mission modules going to be?', I can't blame a contractor for refusing to put a fixed price on development and construction.

Then again, I"m one of those cynical folks who thinks the whole LCS concept is questionable. It sounds like one of Admiral A.K. Cebrowski's really 'interesting' ideas given a budget.

Originally posted by Brother Stormhammer
Until the Navy can finalize such minor design criteria as 'what, exactly, does this ship do?', and 'how big are various mission modules going to be?', I can't blame a contractor for refusing to put a fixed price on development and construction.

They did that when they announced the program. The fault here is not with the Navy, it is with the builders who are constantly changing the price and the date construction can be completed by.

This is part of the reason why the Homeland Defense cutter program was also taken away from NGSS.

reply to post by COOL HAND


The impression I've gotten from other sources (mostly "Proceedings" articles, and discussions on a couple of navy-oriented message boards) is that LCS has suffered from a severe case of 'mission creep'. If it hasn't, then I'm vastly relieved, somewhat shocked, and hereby offer apologia. If it has, then it's in regrettably crowded company.

I've also read (same sources as above) that some of the specifications for certain mission modules have been changed (and in some cases, still aren't finalized). Again, if my information is incorrect, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa.

Anybody want to start a new thread on ways to overhaul the procurement process? Or can we just sum it up as "Hang the *******s from a tall tree"?

reply to post by Brother Stormhammer


No, the NAVY has not changed the original specs too much. The missions were determined during the design process and then agreed upon by the manufacturers for set delivery dates at set prices.

Now the builders maintain they original misquoted the NAVY and the costs would have to increase due to unforeseen difficulties in the manufacturing process.

Since they can't provide their product at the agreed upon cost and date, the NAVY excercised its out clause.

OK, I'm going to be the skunk at the garden party by asking "WTH do we even need a LCS?" I mean what does it even do that other ships we already have in the fleet already do?

Answer: Nothing, just another shallow (pun intended) excuse to hose the taxpayers.

Let me say that the official stated role of the Littoral Combat Ship and the operational requirement which it will attempts to fill are both legitimate and necessary. The Littoral Combat Ship was considered when several trends started to emerge. Namely the future of the USN in terms of ship building (development) project and the associated price of each one thereof, the likely future threat areas and weapons development and the need to replace decommissioned warships in the emergence of a future (see mid term) credible blue water opposing force. First, the current fleet of US Naval vessels consists of highly expensive, complex, large, essentially fixed design (capability) and very powerful warships. Now this is useful and serves it's purpose but it also means that there are limitations when one considers other factors. The US is likely not going to continue building such warships are the rate and pace which it has done so in the past, historical trends and figures point to this. As such, it is imperative that we preserve our current high end force for essential and comparative missions only utilizing it as little as possible for roles which they were not designed for. For example, a Burke class has no business patrolling international waters for pirating activities and or performing other duties which do not necessarily rewire it's impressive firepower (capability) nor which put it's considerable investment in harms way. Shadowing the PLAN, patrolling strategic location around the world etc... are what that force should be doing. Another example would be sending in an expensive Burke class into littoral waters to again perform duties which do not require it's overkill firepower set, again putting it in unneeded risk. As the USS Stark, USS Samuel B. Roberts and INS Hanit (just to name a few) incidents illustrate unexpected and costly events can occur in such an environment.

For large capitol ships blue water is much safer and accommodating as it allows maximum efficiently and output. This is why an alarming number of countries are focusing on relatively cheap and less capable weapon systems for use in this area. On paper they may be no match for our systems but their operational environment coupled with careful planning will increase their effectives. While they may not be able to ultimately defeat the USN just denying us operational freedom in a certain area due to unacceptable loss ratios and recourse consumption is unacceptable.

The USN, given that most of our ships were designed and built during the Cold War, focused most on this environment, winning against comparable Soviet fleets. With brown water operations not given much consideration or left up to other NATO member states. Problem is that with the end of the Cold War and the castration of NATO, compared to what it was, the USN finds itself having to perform several roles with less and less resources.

By having a, relatively speaking, cheap warship which only has the minimum armament requited and which can easily be outfitted with different mission models if a situation calls for a more specialized role we can increase the effectiveness of our force. Ships like the LCS can handle the day to day activates and the low end of the USN's requirements while the larger ships are utilized for more strategic roles. They can also, given the mission module component be highly effective in a number of roles, more so than even the larger warships, not to mention being complimented by their large force size. Currently we can manage due to an insufficient rise in blue water opposition. However once China and or Russia (even India as I'm not entirely convinced of their future path) gain blue water credibility the USN will be unable to fulfill all it’s responsibilities.

This would not be an issue if money was not that big of an object, if our military industrial production capacity had not been weakened. If we could continue to develop and produce ships at cold war rates then it would not matter if they were all large capitol ships as we would have so many we could afford to take such risks. However we have been distracted and slow to react to recent indications that old strategic rivalries are not a thing of the past. In part due to the recent conflict(s) we are involved in which are wasting resources and capability but also due to long terms historical factors. Such as our public being brainwashed into believing that after the Berlin wall come down we would live in harmony for all time. That our position would not be challenged even if we purposely reduced our capability and if our leadership had not lost our main strategic view which guided us for the better part of half a century. But I digress that is for another topic...

For more detailed sources just Google Littoral Combat Ship and any various related phrase you are interested in.

Originally posted by totalvigilance
OK, I'm going to be the skunk at the garden party by asking "WTH do we even need a LCS?" I mean what does it even do that other ships we already have in the fleet already do?

Answer: Nothing, just another shallow (pun intended) excuse to hose the taxpayers.

To put it simply, it can go faster and closer into shore than anything we have right now.

It can adapt to different missions and the needs of the NAVY.

It was supposed to be cheap and quick to make, but that didn't turn out the way we wanted it to.

You want to see hosing the taxpayers, just look up how much we gave in foregin aid last year.

don't get me started on foreign aid
do you know where the US would be
if for just one year the government
only spent money on us. billions upon
billions of dollars.



reply to post by COOL HAND

Well if the Navy decides they don't want them, why, I'd be more than happy to offer.. uh... disposal services of the prototypes...

I'll do it for 5 million a pop. :-)

bumping this with more bad news :

www.defenseindustrydaily.com...-4730

costs are up again per ship - closing on 3/4 billion usd (over the just over 1/2 billion there were supposed to cost) and there still not ready

Originally posted by Harlequin
costs are up again per ship - closing on 3/4 billion usd (over the just over 1/2 billion there were supposed to cost) and there still not ready

Actucally, they were supposed to cost about $400 million per hull with module.

It sure would be nice if the contractors could suck up the R&D costs themselves.