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Modus operandi (often used in the abbreviated form MO) is a Latin phrase, approximately translatable as "mode of operation." It is used in police work to describe a criminal's characteristic patterns and style of work. The term is also commonly used in the United States of America in a non-criminal sense to describe someone's habits
“Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars,” was Roosevelt’s famous campaign statement of 1940. He wasn’t being ingenuous. FDR’s military and State Department leaders were agreeing that a victorious Nazi Germany would threaten the national security of the United States. In White House meetings the strong feeling was that America needed a call to action. This is not what the public wanted, though. Eighty to ninety percent of the American people wanted nothing to do with Europe’s war.
According to Day Of Deceit, in October 1940 FDR adopted a specific strategy to incite Japan to commit an overt act of war. Part of the strategy was to move America’s Pacific fleet out of California and anchor it in Pearl Harbor. Admiral James Richardson, the commander of the Pacific fleet, strongly opposed keeping the ships in harm’s way in Hawaii.
The first attempt to quantify reasonable doubt was made by Simon in 1970.... From this, she gauged that the cutoff for reasonable doubt fell somewhere between the highest likelihood of guilt matched to an innocent verdict and the lowest likelihood of guilt matched to a guilty verdict. From these samples, Simon concluded that the standard was between .70 and .74.
Immediately after Day of Deceit appeared in bookstores in 1999, NSA began withdrawing pre-Pearl Harbor documents from the Crane Files housed in Archives II. This means the government decided to continue 60 years of Pearl Harbor censorship. As of January 2002, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices have triggered the removal of Pearl Harbor documents from public inspection.
Originally posted by jprophet420
Not one reply? Not one debunker and not one supporter? I made a post even the 'truthers' wont touch? Is it to scary to associate your name with this thread?
Originally posted by Gawdzilla
It's not even worth debunking, really, but I'm bored, so here goes.
What logic calls for getting into the war in the Pacific on the chance that Hitler would declare war on the US? (Remember, we didn't ask for a declaration of war on Germany until AFTER they had declared war on us.)
Also, why would FDR "just let it happen"? After all, an successful defense against at "sneak attack" would have kept the fleet intact and still provided a causus belli.
posted by Gawdzilla
Also, why would FDR "just let it happen"? After all, an successful defense against at "sneak attack" would have kept the fleet intact and still provided a causus belli.
posted by rich23
Drama. It had to be a "day that would live in infamy". That's how you stampede public opinion.
Originally posted by rich23
Originally posted by Gawdzilla
It's not even worth debunking, really, but I'm bored, so here goes.
What logic calls for getting into the war in the Pacific on the chance that Hitler would declare war on the US? (Remember, we didn't ask for a declaration of war on Germany until AFTER they had declared war on us.)
The logic of imperial expansion. The US had already taken Hawaii and (in an utter bloodbath) the Philippines.
But more to the point, Japan and Germany were allies. To be at war with one is to be inevitably at war with the other.
Japan was a major naval power in an arena (the Pacific) where the US wanted primacy, They were trying to create a unified East Asia in the same way Hitler was trying to unify Eurpoe. Through conquest.
Bear in mind that the way FDR provoked Japan into attacking was to disrupt their supplies of fuel for their ships.
Also, why would FDR "just let it happen"? After all, an successful defense against at "sneak attack" would have kept the fleet intact and still provided a causus belli.
Drama. It had to be a "day that would live in infamy". That's how you stampede public opinion.
Originally posted by Gawdzilla
The US was barely holding its own right then, they weren't interested in expansion. So that bit of "logic" is a fail.
"I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents."[
- 27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
- 31 March 1941 - A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the American fleet wherever it was - it was the greatest danger from Japan. The fleet was the only threat to Japan's plans. The fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only High Value Target. Logically, Japan couldn't engage in any major operation with the American fleet on its flank. Initial seriously crippling attacks on the US fleet in Hawaii would be the only chance the Japanese military would have for eventual victory. The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.
- 10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
- July - The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
- 24 September 1941, the "bomb plot" message in J-19 code from Japan Naval Intelligence to Japan' s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships in harbor, unless to attack them - it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based on it ... from being passed to Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced because he insisted on warning HI.
On 7 October 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote the eight-action memo.
This memo outlined eight different steps the United States could do that he predicted would lead to an attack by Japan on the United States. The day after this memo was giving to Franklin D. Roosevelt, he began to implement these steps. By the time that Japan finally attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, all eight steps had occurred (Willy 1). The eight steps consisted of two main subject areas; the first being a sign of United States military preparedness and threat of attack, the second being a forceful control on Japans trade and economy. The main subject area of the eight-action memo was the sign of United States military preparedness and threat of attack. McCollum called for the United States to make arrangements with both Britain (Action A) and Holland (Action B), for the use of military facilities and acquisition of supplies in both Singapore and Indonesia.