It's been said that bad politics is bad politics, no matter which party you belong to. Much of what the bush administration is doing as I type this
in could be perpetrated by Democrats, too. Some ATS members have called me "too right-wing." Well...I'd like to show you a very left wing media
source that states many of the same arguments I've made...but with more specifics, as they relate to the battle over subpoeneas.
The following blog entry from
The Daily Kos comes from a very liberal source.
Please note the date on this item, so that you can see just how long this debate has been going on.
Looking ahead: what happens when the subpoenas are defied?
by Kagro X
Mon Mar 26, 2007 at 11:28:21 AM PDT
Last week, both the House and Senate Judiciary committees approved the issuance of -- but have not yet issued -- subpoenas compelling the testimony of
Karl Rove, Harriet Miers and others who are or were among George W. Bush's inner circle during the decision-making on the firing of the eight
dismissed U.S. Attorneys. Bush, for his part, has signaled his intention to have his aides defy those subpoenas, saying he'd fight it out in court to
the bitter end.
But what kind of battle can we expect over these subpoenas? How might such a fight turn out? What issues would be raised? And are the courts the only
arena in which the questions might be settled?
The AP's Matt Apuzzo examines the risks:
President Bush has tried for years to reassert a White House right to keep secrets from Congress. Now he must decide how far he wants to go to keep
aides from testifying about the firing of federal prosecutors.
If he claims executive privilege and the dispute ends up in court, the fight with Congress will be refereed by a judicial branch that recently has not
been kind to the presidency in fights over subpoenas. Lawmakers, meanwhile, risk seeing a judge permanently curtail their power to summon presidential
aides to Capitol Hill.
That's a high stakes game. So high, in fact, that it's precisely the sort of case the courts tend to punt, under the so-called "political question
doctrine." Political questions are those the courts will -- at least initially -- refuse to decide, preferring to leave the outcome in the hands of
the political branches (the executive and legislative), on the theory that the power to decide them resides more properly with those who derive their
authority from the voters.
Indeed, Apuzzo's article illustrates the point with this comment:
"I don't think anyone would want this in court. If anything is to be politically settled, it's this one," said Louis Fisher, a Library of Congress
specialist on constitutional and an expert on presidential powers.
Fisher's "anyone" could refer just as easily to any or all of the three branches. Both the executive and the legislature have substantial powers at
risk, while the judicial branch would simply want no part in settling the question.
How do we know this about the courts? Because that's exactly what they did the last time such a case was brought. And that case is instructive
today.
The last time the Congress actually voted to hold an executive branch official in contempt of Congress was in the 1982 case of EPA Administrator Anne
Gorsuch Burford. Gorsuch (who was later remarried, to Bureau of Land Management head Robert Burford) was found in contempt by a House vote of 259-105
(with 55 Republicans voting in favor). The charges were, in keeping with practice in statutory contempt cases, referred to the U.S. Attorney for the
District of Columbia for prosecution.
And a lightbulb switches on! The actual prosecution of contempt of Congress charges is the responsibility of a U.S. Attorney.
What an extraordinary piece of bad luck, given the current situation!
So now, obviously, the most recent case of contempt of Congress brought against a high-ranking administration official takes on added importance as
precedent. Does it not? And just what happened in that case? (PDF)
The Justice Department, anticipating the House vote, moved quickly: "Immediately after the House vote and prior to the delivery of the contempt
citation," the department chose not to prosecute the case. [Notes omitted]
Surprise!
But that's not all:
Instead, it asked a district court to declare the House action an unconstitutional intrusion into the President’s authority to withhold information
from Congress.
Stanley S. Harris, responsible for bringing the case to a grand jury, listed his name on the Justice Department complaint and advised Congress that
"it would not be appropriate for me to consider bringing this matter before a grand jury until the civil action has been resolved."
The Justice Department occupied an unusual ethical position. First it had advised Gorsuch to withhold the documents, and now it decided not to
prosecute her for adhering to the department’s legal analysis. In court, the department argued that the contempt action marked an "unwarranted
burden on executive privilege" and an "interference with the executive’s ability to carry out the laws." [Notes omitted]
So, what happened in court?
The court dismissed the government’s suit on the ground that judicial intervention in executive-legislative disputes "should be delayed until all
possibilities for settlement have been exhausted." The court urged both parties to devote their energies to compromise and cooperation, not
confrontation. [Notes omitted]
Dismissed. Because the case turned on a political question.
So Congress was right? Right? Not according to the Reagan administration:
Following the Gorsuch contempt, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote an opinion on May 30, 1984, concluding that as a matter of statutory interpretation
and separation of powers analysis, a U.S. Attorney is not required to bring a congressional contempt citation to a grand jury when the citation is
directed against an executive official who is carrying out the President’s decision to invoke executive privilege. [Notes omitted, and emphasis
supplied]
----------------------------
You don't have to be a conspiracy theorist to know what's at stake in this "Bush gambit." This showdown over subpoenas can have lasting
repercussions.
There's another blog entry which comes from
The Next Hurrah,
which is another liberal source that
helps to summarize what many ATS members are worried about.
March 27, 2007
Dusting off "Inherent Contempt"
by Kagro X
Yesterday, we discussed the fact that the standard, statutory contempt of Congress procedure was probably inadequate to the task of enforcing the
Democratic Congress' hard-won subpoena power:
The last time the Congress actually voted to hold an executive branch official in contempt of Congress was in the 1982 case of EPA Administrator Anne
Gorsuch Burford. Gorsuch (who was later remarried, to Bureau of Land Management head Robert Burford) was found in contempt by a House vote of 259-105
(with 55 Republicans voting in favor). The charges were, in keeping with practice in statutory contempt cases, referred to the U.S. Attorney for the
District of Columbia for prosecution.
And a lightbulb switches on! The actual prosecution of contempt of Congress charges is the responsibility of a U.S. Attorney.
What an extraordinary piece of bad luck, given the current situation!
A few astute commenters observed that Congress has another weapon in its arsenal for backing up the subpoena power: the long-dormant "inherent
contempt" process, described below in the Congressional Research Service's "Congressional Oversight Manual" (PDF):
Under the inherent contempt power, the individual is brought before the House or Senate by the Sergeant-at-Arms, tried at the bar of the body, and can
be imprisoned. The purpose of the imprisonment or other sanction may be either punitive or coercive. Thus, the witness can be imprisoned for a
specified period of time as punishment, or for an indefinite period (but not, at least in the case of the House, beyond the adjournment of a session
of the Congress) until he agrees to comply. The inherent contempt power has been recognized by the Supreme Court as inextricably related to
Congress’s constitutionally-based power to investigate.
The most obvious benefit of inherent contempt is that it's conducted entirely "in-house," that is, entirely on the authority of the legislative
branch. The most obvious drawback? Spending time on a trial. Well, that and the scene of having the Sergeant at Arms and the Capitol Police physically
barred from entering the White House to arrest those who've defied subpoenas.
But is there another choice? What other power, besides impeachment, does the Congress have in its arsenal to enforce the "subpoena power" we were
all told this election was about? There are no other direct options, only oblique approaches to using indirect leverage.
The next question, then, is whether or not anybody in Congress has bothered to think things through to this point, and begin preparing for this
possibility. And here, I finally have some good news.
Rep. Brad Miller of North Carolina, in his capacity as chairman of the Science committee's Investigations and Oversight panel, has encountered the
same sort of intransigence from the Bush "administration" that is threatened over the investigation into the U.S. Attorney firings. Only in the case
of his investigation, involving the Department of Education, the "administration" hasn't even really done him the courtesy of making up an excuse
for why they're not providing the requested documents. They're just not doing it.
So as Rep. Miller has become increasingly pessimistic about the chances that the "administration" will relent in his case, he's been consulting the
same Congressional Oversight Manual, and was dismayed to learn that the enforcement options are indeed quite limited. Inherent contempt, he's
discovered, is perhaps the only way Congress will be able to enforce its subpoena power with this "administration," and he's been talking with CRS
experts to explore how a modern inherent contempt procedure might be established. Even better, he's been sharing that information with Rep. Linda
Sanchez, chair of the Judiciary committee's Commercial and Administrative Law panel that's handling the subpoenas in the U.S. Attorneys matter.
Unfortunately, the current thinking among most Members of Congress is that the subpoena showdown will be settled in court. But as we discussed
yesterday, that's highly unlikely. Rather, it seems most probably that the courts will dismiss such a case under the "political question doctrine,"
as they did in the Burford case in 1982.
Is there a stronger and more direct signal to send to the White House that the Congress is serious about its oversight authority than the one that
would come from the House taking the time to dust off the inherent contempt concept, and establish a modern procedure for it? If so, I can't think of
it.
At the very least, it's going to pay to be prepared sooner rather than later. Once those subpoenas are issued, it won't be long before we know
precisely what the White House plans to do when the chips are down. And if we're sitting around looking at one another when the White House signals
its final defiance, we're likely to lose a lot of momentum.
Let's face it: if the "administration" simply refuses to budge, the Congress either has to fold its tent and go home, or enforce on its own
authority the subpoena power the American people voted for. Given that we've reached this impasse -- and we knew it was coming -- over an
investigation into the hyper-partisan and hyper-politicized nature of the U.S. Attorneys, inherent contempt proceedings would appear to be the first
and most direct resort of Congress in enforcing its mandate.
It would also appear to be the last stop short of impeachment. And with that remedy currently "off the table," Congress needs to speak -- and speak
soon -- about how it intends to protect its prerogatives.
-----------------------------
I'm showing you the source in it's entirety, with links to back it up, so there's no plagarism here. Again, take note of those post dates. March.
ATS membes hve been on the cutting edge of this for a while now, but some are still not aware of the back story.
What you see here is nothing short of an all out battle to break the Congress. If the Bush team succeeds, you won't need to talk about a conspiracy
theory because you won't be debating what-if's. You'll be talking about what actually happened...after the fact.