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At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: “We’re looking – we also lost American 77.” The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.
At 9:24 the FAA reports a possible hijack of 77. That's sometime after they had been tracking this primary target. And at that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.
Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the FAA immediately established several phone bridges that included FAA field facilities, the FAA command center, FAA headquarters, DOD, the Secret Service and other government agencies. The U.S. Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line. The FAA shared real-time information on the phone bridges about the unfolding events, including information about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77. Other parties on the phone bridges in turn shared information about actions they were taken. NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. But information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges before the formal notification.
- American Flight 77 - Dulles enroute to Los Angeles
- FAA Notification to NEADS – 0924
- Fighter Scramble - Order (Langley AFB, Hampton, Va. 2 F-16s) – 0924
- Fighters Airborne 0930
- Airline Impact Time (Pentagon) - 0937(estimated)
- Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location - approx 12 min/105 miles
…report that American 11 was heading south [when it had actually hit WTC1 at 8:46], as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.
Sir, my belief is that it helped because of the manning, because of the focus, because the crews - they have to be airborne in 15 minutes and that morning, because of the exercise, they were airborne in six or eight minutes. And so I believe that focus helped.
MR. HAMILTON: We thank you for that. I wanted to focus just a moment on the Presidential Emergency Operating Center. You were there for a good part of the day. I think you were there with the vice president. And when you had that order given, I think it was by the president, that authorized the shooting down of commercial aircraft that were suspected to be controlled by terrorists, were you there when that order was given?
MR. MINETA: No, I was not. I was made aware of it during the time that the airplane coming into the Pentagon. There was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president, "The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to, "The plane is 10 miles out," the young man also said to the vice president, "Do the orders still stand?" And the vice president turned and whipped his neck around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?" [later in his testimony, Mineta says that this series of exchanges began “Probably about five or six minutes” after entering the PEOC] Well, at the time I didn't know what all that meant. And –
MR. HAMILTON: The flight you're referring to is the –
MR. MINETA: The flight that came into the Pentagon.
MR. HAMILTON: The Pentagon, yeah.
MR. MINETA: And so I was not aware that that discussion had already taken place. But in listening to the conversation between the young man and the vice president, then at the time I didn't really recognize the significance of that.
And then later I heard of the fact that the airplanes had been scrambled from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10 minutes away. And so then, at the time we heard about the airplane that went into Pennsylvania, then I thought, "Oh, my God, did we shoot it down?" And then we had to, with the vice president, go through the Pentagon to check that out.
MR. HAMILTON: Let me see if I understand. The plane that was headed toward the Pentagon and was some miles away, there was an order to shoot that plane down.
MR. MINETA: Well, I don't know that specifically, but I do know that the airplanes were scrambled from Langley or from Norfolk, the Norfolk area. But I did not know about the orders specifically other than listening to that other conversation.
MR. HAMILTON: But there very clearly was an order to shoot commercial aircraft down.
MR. MINETA: Subsequently I found that out.
There is conflicting evidence about when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room. We have concluded, from the available evidence [principally the Shelter Log], that the Vice President arrived in the room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58.
At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon
You have voted coughymachine for the Way Above Top Secret award. You have two more votes this month.
Based upon the information available, it’s difficult to believe, as Mineta did, that it was a shoot-down order. If the order had been to shoot Flight 77 down, it would be difficult to explain why the aide repeatedly asked if the order still stood. Clearly such an order, having been given, would have stood until the aircraft had been shot down. In this context, it seems that Cheney’s order must have been not to shoot Flight 77 down and instead to allow it to hit the Pentagon building.
Originally posted by Caustic Logic
As for the timeline, I’m still vague on the details… 9:34 the plane hit? Typo?
So, Colonel Alan Scott, the FAA and NORAD all concur on the notification time – 9:24 – yet the 9/11 Commission concluded that “NORAD was unaware that the plane had even been hijacked until after it crashed into the Pentagon at 9:34." How did the Commission reach this conclusion?
So, Colonel Alan Scott, the FAA and NORAD all concur on the notification time – 9:24 – yet the 9/11 Commission concluded that NORAD was unaware that the plane had even been hijacked until 9:34, shortly before it crashed into the Pentagon. How did the Commission reach this conclusion?