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Originally posted by Zaphod58
Other planes also didn't have the pilots killed as soon as the hijackers got into the cockpit. And at least one plane DID get a call off, just nothing understandable. ATC reported hearing struggling, "Get out of here!" repeated several times, and then other sounds.
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Having a warning to secure the cockpit, just means lock the door.
Originally posted by ULTIMA1
But they also had the warning of the other 2 hijackings so they had 2 different warnings. They should have been on alert, they should not have been that surprised and should have been able to get off a call or signal.
Originally posted by LeftBehind
As has been stated, there were never hijackings that crashed on purpose, and there had never been multiple hijackings at once before 911.
It is unfair of you to call the pilots actions suspicious merely because you want to believe in a conspiracy.
All of these pilots we speak of died that day. How dare you analyze their actions and act like you would have acted differently or followed protocol better.
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Crashing planes as weapons had APPARENTLY been TRIED twice before, but it had never HAPPENED. [edit on 4/6/2007 by Zaphod58]
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Those two incidents were 20 years apart.
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Somewhere in the Pentagon they may have come up with a situation like 9/11, but that doesn't mean that A. the President knew about it, or B. the FAA was even involved with it, or C. that it had even been looked at in years.
Originally posted by Zaphod58
The first incident was 1974, the next was 1994. Operation Bojinka's second wave was a little known bit of information and was never passed onto the people that could have used it. It wasn't even shown in the FBI reports from the time.
As a former Team Leader of the Red Team it was my sole job to execute this mandate. Some of my colleagues and I, using Red Team type tactics, did find major vulnerabilities in aviation security. We reported these through our chain of command. The managers in FAA (including the highest offices in FAA) deliberately choose to ignore our warnings. This is particularly grievous in light of the ever-growing terrorist threat of which they were also aware. For example, FAA issued 15 terrorism warnings to the air carriers in the year prior to 9-11. On April 6, 2000 the Associate Administrator of FAA for Security stated in open testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation Security, "…[M]oreover, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established capability and infrastructures here…."
Coupled with this; virtually every expert on terrorism for several years prior to 9-11 had been screaming about the ever growing threat to the United States by a new breed of terrorists willing to inflict mass casualties on civilians. The first major wake-up call occurred in 1994, when terrorists planned on blowing up a dozen US commercial aircraft over the Pacific Ocean. This was thwarted by an accidental fire in the apartment where the bombs were being constructed. The second major wake-up call occurred in 1995 when terrorists planned on crashing an airliner into the Eiffel Tower in Paris. Only quick and decisive action by French commandos prevented this disaster. There were also additional indicators.
The specific issues I outlined in my Whistleblower Disclosure included the following:
In 1996 I worked on a 6-month project in which we injected simulated bombs through the checked baggage system at a major European airport. We were successful in getting 31 out of 31 of these simulated explosives on US commercial aircraft. No action was taken to remedy this security problem and we have never been back to this airport to re-test security. In fact our results were so deplorable that FAA prevented us from testing in this manner at any foreign airport ever again.
In year 2000-01, in other testing conducted at a different major European airport the Red Team obtained equally abysmal results, even though this airport had the latest bomb detection equipment. FAA Security management was equally remiss in not correcting these problems.
In 1998, I was the team leader testing the access control system at a major domestic airport. We were successful in breaching their multi-million dollar computer controlled access system approximately 85% of the time. No action was taken to remedy this security problem and we have never been back to this airport (or any airport) to re-test access control security.
In 1998, the Red Team completed extensive testing of screening checkpoints at a number of domestic airports. Basically our test results were the inverse of the results FAA field offices achieved (i.e.: where a field office reported an airport having a 90% success rate in detecting FAA test objects; we would report a success rate of about 10%. In one case we even had documented an airport detection rate of about 3%).
In the 1997-8 time frame, I was the team leader for some testing at another major domestic international airport. Purely by accident we conducted testing at an extremely busy time when cruise ships were loading and unloading passengers at the same time. The airport was extremely overcrowded with people. Security simply broke down in these conditions. After failing all of our tests and reporting this fact through my chain of command, I reported this abhorrent state of security to my immediate manager. He ordered me not to make a written report on this, and to stop all further testing at this airport.
Since 1998, almost all of our domestic work had been limited to testing the CTX explosives detection machines. By August of 1999, our test results were so poor that my boss ordered us to no longer do surreptitious (i.e.: unannounced) testing. Instead, we were ordered to notify the appropriate FAA field office a couple of days before we were to commence our "secret" testing. My first 2 missions after receiving these instructions resulted in both of these airports achieving a 100% success rate regarding our testing. I stopped notifying the field after that, and the results returned to their normal low success rates.
Originally posted by Griff
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Somewhere in the Pentagon they may have come up with a situation like 9/11, but that doesn't mean that A. the President knew about it, or B. the FAA was even involved with it, or C. that it had even been looked at in years.
Not to derail this thread, but (I'm going to anyway) didn't the pentagon have a drill about planes flying into it about a year prior? And wasn't the pilot in the flight that hit the pentagon involved in that drill somehow?
Now, back to topic.
Originally posted by Zaphod58
Where does it say that he notified the FAA of the planned second wave of Bojinka? The only mention it makes of it at all was the planned bombings, nothing about hijackings with OB.