Big Bang Theory: a load of rubbish???

i've just been thinking about how the univers started (as you do of course ) and i was thinking, if that is the theory everyone believes, what did actually bang? something had to have blown up or banged to produce this so what was there before the big bang? i mean all the univers can't just explode into existence from nothing... can it? this is driving me mad please state something about this!

Do some research on "Super String Theory", although I'll warn you, it's a lot of complex physics, and can grow quite tedious after a while.

So you are saying that something must have created the mass that blew up in the first place? Some people look to a creator to have created all this mass. Call him what you will, God, Allah, etc. But then this just leads to another question of where did the creator come from. Some will say that the creator or the mass itself has always been but I find that answer unsatisfying. I am afraid that these questions may never be answered as an aswer just seems to lead to more questions.

It's the chicken and egg debate. Our very existence proves that either

A. Something came out of nothing or
B. Something has always been there

Not believing it or not being able to conceptualize it is only a limitation of human understanding.

The issue with the beginning of the universe. This is the sole reason humans believe in god. I am not saying there is no god. Our minds cannot understand something that has no beginning. Nor can we understand something starting out of absolutely nothing. We can say it. That doesnt mean we understand it. This lack of understanding forces us to look at things like god. As far as the string theory goes, it will be a long time before they know enough about what they are talking about in that field to say it is legitimate. It does provide intresting insite into things, and can accomodate several new theories. It may one day be the final law of physics. Right now we have no clue. So as far as the big bang goes. It seems to fit what we see, but does it even matter? Our minds are limited. We cannot understand the big bang or beginning. I am not sure that humans will ever be able to understand that though I hope so some day. Thats just some of my opinions on the subject.

Using the philosophy of Seneca's Stoicism best explains this =)

It does not matter how the universe was actually created, only that it was created and we are here now.

Anytime you hear about theories on how "everything" started it all leads back to one thing. Theology. Its the same with evolution, the truth of the matter is that the answers will probably never be known.

Heres a good article I found that might be interesting to some here. Proquest.

British Journal for Philosophy and Science

This paper is a sequel to my 'Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology' (Foundations of Physics [1996], 26 (4); revised in Philo [1998], 1 (1). There I argued that the Big Bang models of (classical) general relativity theory, as well as the original 1948 versions of the steady state cosmology, are each logically incompatible with the time-honored theological doctrine that perpetual divine creation (*creatio continuans') is required in each of these two theorized worlds.

Full Text (18848 words)
Copyright Oxford University Press(England) Mar 2000


[Headnote]
ABSTRACT
This paper is a sequel to my `Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology' (Foundations of Physics [1996], 26 (4); revised in Philo [1998], 1 (1)). There I argued that the Big Bang models of (classical) general relativity theory, as well as the original 1948 versions of the steady state cosmology, are each logically incompatible with the time-honored theological doctrine that perpetual divine creation (`creatio continuans') is required in each of these two theorized worlds. Furthermore, I challenged the perennial theological doctrine that there must be a divine creative cause (as distinct from a transformative one) for the very existence of the world, a ratio essendi. This doctrine is the theistic reply to the question: `Why is there something, rather than just nothing?'
I begin my present paper by arguing against the response by the contemporary Oxford theist Richard Swinburne and by Leibniz to what is, in effect, my counterquestion: `But why should there be just nothing, rather than something?' Their response takes the form of claiming that the a priori probability of there being just nothing, vis-avis the existence of alternative states, is maximal, because the non-existence of the world is conceptually the simplest. On the basis of an analysis of the role of simplicity in scientific explanations, I show that this response is multiply flawed, and thus provides no basis for their three contentions that (i) if there is a world at all, then its `normal', natural, spontaneous state is one of utter nothingness or total non-existence, so that (ii) the very existence of matter, energy and living beings constitutes a deviation from the allegedly `normal', spontaneous state of `nothingness', and (iii) that deviation must thus have a suitably potent (external) divine cause. Related defects turn out to vitiate the medieval Kalam Argument for the existence of God, as espoused by William Craig.
Next I argue against the contention by such theists as Richard Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn that (i) the specific content of the scientifically most fundamental laws of nature, including the constants they contain, requires supra-scientific explanation, and (ii) a satisfactory explanation is provided by the hypothesis that the God of theism willed them to be exactly what they are.
Furthermore, I contend that the theistic teleological gloss on the `Anthropic Principle' is incoherent and explanatorily unavailing.
Finally, I offer an array of considerations against Swinburne's attempt to show, via Bayes's theorem, that the existence of God is more probable than not.
1 Introduction
2 The nonexistence of the actual world as its purported `natural' state
2.1 Swinburne and Leibniz on the normalcy of nothingness 2.2 Leibniz's and Swinburne's simplicity argument for the normalcy of nothingness 2.2a Leibniz's simplicity argument 2.2 Swinburne's simplicity argument 23 The role of the normalcy of nothingness in the medieval Arabic Kalam Argument
3 Critique of the `explanation' of the most fundamental laws of nature by divine creative volition
4 The Anthropic Principle'
4.1 The scientific status of the Anthropic Principle 4.2 Critique of the theistic design interpretation of the Weak Anthropic Principle
5 Critique of Swinburne's Bayesian argument for the existence of God
5.1 The incoherence of Swinburne's apologia 5.2 Swinburne's Bayesian argument for the existence of God 5.3 The problem of `old evidence'
6 Conclusion


1 Introduction

In Richard Gale's ([1991]) book On the Nature and Existence of God, he devotes a very penetrating chapter ([1991], Ch. 7) to a critique of cosmological arguments for the existence of God, after giving a generic characterization of all such arguments. As is well known, there are different species of such arguments. But Gale reaches the following negative verdict on the genus (p. 284):

My two arguments [. . .] constitute ontological disproofs of the existence of the very sort of being whose existence is asserted in the conclusion of every version of the cosmological argument, thereby showing that these arguments are radically defective. These ontological disproofs, however, do not pinpoint the defective spot in these arguments.

My initial aim in this paper is precisely to pinpoint the defects of the timehonored arguments for perpetual divine creation given by a succession of theists including Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, as well as by the presentday theists Richard Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn. One of these defects will also turn out to vitiate a pillar of the medieval Arabic Kalam argument for a creator (Craig [1979]).

2 The nonexistence of the actual world as its purported 'natural' state

2.1 Swinburne and Leibniz on the normalcy of nothingness

In Richard Swinburne's extensive writings in defense of (Christian) theism, notably in his books ([1991], [1996]), he presents two versions of his argument for his fundamental thesis that `the most natural state of affairs of the existing world and even of God is not to exist at all!' As he put it ([1996], p. 48): `It is extraordinary that there should exist anything at all. Surely the most natural state of affairs is simply nothing: no universe, no God, nothing. But there is something.' It will be expeditious to deal first with the more recent ([1996]) version of his case, and then with his earlier ([1979], [1991]) substantial articulation of Leibniz's argument from a priori simplicity.

Surprisingly, Swinburne deems the existence of something or other to be `extraordinary', i.e. literally out of the ordinary. To the contrary, surely, the most pervasively ordinary feature of our experience is that we are immersed in an ambiance of existence. Swinburne's initial assertion here is, at least prima facie, a case of special pleading in the service of a prior philosophical agenda. Having made that outlandish claim, Swinburne builds on it, averring that `surely the most natural state of affairs is simply nothing.' Hence he regards the cosmic existential question `Why is there anything at all, rather than just nothing?' as paramount.

As we know, the Book of Genesis in the Old Testament starts with the assertion that, in the beginning, God created heaven and earth from scratch. And, as John Leslie ([1978], p. 185) pointed out, `when modern Western philosophers have a tendency to ask it [i.e. the existential question above], possibly this is only because they are heirs to centuries of Judaeo-Christian thought.' This conjecture derives added poignancy from Leslie's observation that `To the general run of Greek thinkers the mere existence of a thing [or of the world] was nothing remarkable. Only their changing patterns provoked [causal] inquisitiveness.' And Leslie mentions Aristotle's views as countenancing the acceptance of `reasonless existence'.

Yet there is a long history of sometimes emotion-laden, deep puzzlement, even on the part of atheists such as Heidegger, about the mere existence of our world (Edwards [1967]). Thus, Wittgenstein ([1993], p. 41) acknowledged the powerful psychological reality of wondering at the very existence of the world. Yet logically, he rejected the question altogether as `nonsense', because he `cannot imagine its [the world's] not existing' (pp. 41-42), by which he may perhaps have meant not only our world, but more generally, as Rescher ([1984], p. 5) points out, some world or other. Wittgenstein could be convicted of a highly impoverished imagination, if he could not imagine the nonexistence of just our particular world.

Before turning to the logical aspects of the cosmic existential question, let me mention a psychological conjecture as to why not only theists, but also some atheists, find that question so pressing. For example, Heidegger ([1953], p. 1) deemed `Why is there anything at all, rather than just nothing?' the most fundamental question of metaphysics. Yet he offered no indication of an answer to it, and he saw its source in our facing nothingness in our existential anxiety.

I gloss this psychological hypothesis as surmising that our deeply instilled fear of death has prompted us to wonder why we exist so precariously. And we may then have extrapolated this precariousness, more or less unconsciously, to the existence of the universe as a whole.

Psychological motivations aside, let me recast Swinburne's aforecited statement `The most natural state of affairs is simply nothing' to read instead `The most natural state of the existing world is to not exist at all'. This reformulation avoids the hornet's nest inherent in the question as to the sheer intelligibility of utter nothingness qua purportedly normal state of our world.1

Yet my reformulation is still conceptually troublesome: How can nonexistence at all be coherently a state, natural or otherwise, of the actual, existing world? Swinburne speaks vaguely of `the most natural state of affairs', leaving it unclear whether his `state of affairs' pertains only to our actual world or also to any other logically possible world that might have existed instead. But it is clear that he has in mind at least our actual world, in which case my reformulation of his claim is incoherent and not helpful. The stronger claim pertaining to any alternative world as well was perhaps intended by Derek Parfit ([1998]), who wrote (p. 24): `why is there a Universe at all? It might have been true that nothing ever existed: no living beings, no stars, no atoms, not even space or time [. . .] No question is more sublime than why there is a Universe: why there is anything rather than nothing.'

No matter whether one is considering Swinburne's original formulation, or Parfit's `It might have been true that nothing existed', it is surely epistemically appropriate to ask for the grounds on which Swinburne and Parfit respectively rests his assertion. Parfit does not tell us, whereas Swinburne does. Therefore, I shall scrutinize Swinburne's argument for it, and also Leibniz's.

I shall offer my own reasons for endorsing Henri Bergson's injunction as follows: We should never assume that the `natural thing' would be the existence of nothing. He rested this proscription on grounds radically different from mine, when he declared: `The presupposition that de jure there should be nothing, so that we must explain why de facto there is something, is pure illusion.' 2 But Bergson's reasons for charging illusoriness are conceptual and a priori, whereas mine will turn out to be empirical.

As we know, a long theistic tradition has it that this de jure presupposition is correct and that there must therefore be an explanatory cause external to the world for its very existence; furthermore, it is argued that this external cause is an omnipotent, omni-benevolent and omniscient personal God.

But, in outline, my challenge to this reasoning will be as follows: (i) In this context, the question `What is the external cause of the very existence of the universe?' is avowedly predicated on the doctrine that, in Swinburne's words, `Surely the most natural state of affairs is simply nothing'; (ii) Yet, as I shall argue in detail, just this doctrine is ill-founded, contrary to the arguments for it offered by Leibniz and Swinburne; and (iii) Therefore, the question calling for an external cause of the very existence of the world is a non-starter, i.e. it poses a pseudo problem. By the same token, the answer that an omnipotent God is that cause will turn out to be ill-founded.

What are the appropriate grounds for gleaning what is indeed the natural, spontaneous, normal state of the world in the absence of an intervening external cause? In opposition to an a priori conceptual dictum of naturalness, I have previously argued from the history of science that changing evidence makes the verdict inevitably empirical rather than a priori (Grunbaum [1996], [1998]). Here, a summary will have to suffice.

I welcome Swinburne's use of the phrase `natural state of affairs' ([1996], p. 48), which dovetails with the parlance I used, when I elaborated on the notion of `natural state' by speaking of it as the `spontaneous, externally undisturbed, or normal' state. In essence, Swinburne's claim that `the most natural state of affairs is simply nothing' had been enunciated essentially by Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, and a host of other theists. Hereafter, I shall designate this thesis as asserting `the spontaneity of nothingness', or `SoN' for brevity.

In my parlance, the terms `natural', `spontaneous', `normal', and `externally unperturbed' serve to characterize the historically dictated theory-relative behavior of physical and biological systems, when they are not subject to any external influences, agencies or forces. In earlier writings (Grunbaum [1954], [1990], [1996], [1998]), I called attention to the theory-relativity of such naturalness or spontaneity by means of several examples from physics and biology.

Thus, I pointed out ([1996], [1998], sections 3 and 4) that the altogether `natural' behavior of suitable subsystems in the now defunct original Bondi & Gold Steady-State World is as follows: Without any interference by a physical influence external to the subsystem, let alone by an external matter-creating agency or God, matter pops into existence spontaneously in violation of Lavoisier's matter-conservation. This spontaneous popping into existence follows deductively from the conjunction of the theory's postulated matterdensity-conservation with the Hubble law of the expansion of the universe. For just that reason, I have insisted on the use of the agency free term `matteraccretion' to describe this process, and have warned against the use of the agency-loaded term `matter-creation'.

In the same vein, I emphasized that according to Galileo and to Newton's first law of motion, it is technically `natural' that a force free particle moves uniformly and rectilinearly, whereas Aristotle's physics asserted that a force is required as the external cause of any sublunar body's non-vertical uniform rectilinear motion. In short, Aristotle clashed with Galileo and Newton as to the `natural', spontaneous, dynamically unperturbed behavior of a body, which Aristotle deemed to be one of rest at its proper place. Thus, Galileo and Newton eliminated a supposed external dynamical cause on empirical grounds, explaining that uniform motion can occur spontaneously without such a cause.

But, if so, then the Aristotelian demand for a causal explanation of any nonvertical motion whatever by reference to an external perturbing force is predicated on a false underlying assumption. Clearly, the Aristotelians then begged the question by tenaciously continuing to ask: `What net external force, pray tell, keeps a uniformly moving body going?' Thus, scientific and philosophical questions can be anything but innocent by loading the dice with a petitio principii!

An example from biology yields the same lesson. It has been said that Louis Pasteur `disproved' the `spontaneous' generation of life from nonliving substances. Actually, he worked with sterilized materials over a cosmically minuscule time-interval, and showed that bacteria in an oxidizing atmosphere would not grow in these sterilized materials. From this he inferred that the natural, unperturbed behavior of nonliving substances precludes the spontaneous generation of living things. That was in 1862. But in 1938, A. I. Oparin in the then Soviet Union, and in 1952, H. Urey in the United States rehabilitated the hypothesis of the spontaneous generation of life to the following effect: Life on earth originated by spontaneous generation under favorable conditions prevailing some time between 4.5 billion years ago and the time of the earliest fossil evidence 2.7 billion years ago. I have summarized this rehabilitation as follows ([1973], pp. 573-74): When the earth was first formed, it had a reducing atmosphere of methane, ammonia, water, and hydrogen. Only at a later stage did photochemical splitting of water issue in an oxidizing atmosphere of carbon dioxide, nitrogen and oxygen. The action of electric discharges or of ultra-violet light on a mixture of methane, ammonia, water, and hydrogen yields simple organic compounds such as amino acids and urea, as shown by work done since 1953 [footnote omitted]. The first living organism originated by a series of non-biological steps from simple organic compounds which reacted to form structures of ever greater complexity until producing a structure that qualifies as living.

Indeed, in a new book, Paul Davies ([1999]) has argued persuasively that progress in biology and astronomy is transforming the one-time mystery of the origin of life into a soluble problem. The clash between the inferences drawn by Pasteur, on the one hand, and by Oparin and Urey, on the other, provides a biological illustration of the theory-dependence of the `natural', spontaneous behavior of a system, just as the theory-shifts from Aristotle to Galileo, and from matter-energy conservation to matter-accretion provide vivid illustrations from physics. And in each case, empirical evidence was required to justify the avowed naturalness.

As illustrated by the ill-conceived question put to Galileo by his Aristotelian critics, it is altogether misguided to ask for an external cause of the deviations of a system from the pattern that an empirically discredited theory tenaciously affirms to be the `natural' one (Grunbaum [1973], pp. 406-7).

The proponents of SoN have not offered any empirical evidence for it. Yet the lesson of the history of science appears to be that just such evidence is required. However, some of the advocates of SoN have offered an a priori conceptual argument in its defense. I now turn to their defense.

2.2 Leibniz's and Swinburne's simplicity argument for the normalcy of nothingness

The imposition of a priori notions of naturalness is sometimes of-a-piece with the imposition of tenaciously held criteria of the mode of scientific explanation required for understanding the world. The demise of Laplacean determinism in physics, and its replacement by irreducibly stochastic, statistical models of micro-physical systems, is a poignant case of the empirical discreditation of a tenacious demand for the satisfaction of a previously held ideal of explanation: It emerges a posteriori that the universe just does not accommodate rigid prescriptions for explanatory causal understanding that are rendered otiose by a larger body of evidence.

Relatedly, the stochastic theory of radioactive decay in nuclear physics, for example, runs counter to Leibniz's demand for a `sufficient reason' for all logically contingent states of affairs. Thus, since the existence of our actual world is logically contingent, he insisted that there must be a sufficient reason for its existence.

2.2a Leibniz's simplicity argument

I now cite this demand in context from Leibniz's ([1714]) essay, `The Principles of Nature and of Grace Based on Reason':

7. Thus far we have spoken as simple physicists: now we must advance to metaphysics, making use of the great principle, little employed in general, which teaches that nothing happens without a sufficient reason; that is to say that nothing happens without it being possible for him who should sufficiently understand things, to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is so and not otherwise. This principle laid down, the first question which should rightly be asked will be, why is there something rather than nothing?

To justify this question, he now resorts to an a priori argument from simplicity:

For nothing is simpler and easier than something. Further, suppose that things must exist, we must be able to give a reason why they must exist so and not otherwise.

8. Now this sufficient reason for the existence of the universe cannot be found in the series of contingent things [... I (Wiener [ 1951 ], p. 525; most of the italics in original except for the one sentence 'nothing is simpler and easier than something').

Contextually, Leibniz implicitly enunciated SoN, when he declared that `nothing is simpler and easier than something'. Having thus assumed SoN by recourse to a priori simplicity, he is in a position to reason as follows about the different states of the world:3 every subsequent state is somehow copied from the preceding one

(although according to certain laws of change). No matter how far we may have gone back to earlier states, therefore, we will never discover in them a full reason why there should be a world at all, and why it would be such as it is. Even if we should imagine the world to be eternal, therefore, the reason for it would clearly have to be sought elsewhere [. . .]

As for Leibniz's claim that `nothing is simpler and easier than something' (italics added), I ask: But why is this conceptual claim, if granted, mandatory for what is the ontologically spontaneous, externally undisturbed state of the actual world? Alas, Leibniz does not tell us here. Yet, as I argued in Section 2.1 above, according to our best scientific knowledge, spontaneity is relative to changing empirically-based scientific theories.

Furthermore, Philip Quinn has, in effect, issued an important demurrer (private communication): Let us suppose that the purported state of nothingness is conceptually non-elusive and the most simple. Then it would still not follow from this maximum conceptual simplicity that SoN is the simplest hypothesis within the set of all logically possible hypotheses, a set that we do not encompass intellectually. In short, conceptual simplicity does not necessarily bespeak theoretical simplicity, as Quinn has illustrated for this context by the following example:

Suppose the purpose of an hypothesis is to explain how the observed universe is produced from a postulated initial state. Perhaps the hypothesis that postulates the most simple initial state will be forced to postulate a complex productive mechanism in order to achieve its explanatory purpose, while the same purpose can be achieved by a rival that postulates a slightly less simple initial state together with a vastly simpler productive mechanism. In such a case the hypothesis that postulates the most simple initial state will not be the hypothesis with the greatest overall simplicity.

The moral of this sketchy history is twofold: (s) The character of just what behavior of the actual world and of its subsystems is `natural' is an empirical a posteriors matter, rather than an issue that can be settled a priori; yet (ii) SoN has no empirical credentials at all, as acknowledged, in effect, by the purely conceptual arguments for it which have been offered by its recent defenders.

Given this empiricist moral, I must dissent from Leslie's ([1998], p. 2) view that beliefs about the natural state of the universe are matters of `intuition'. Says he: `intuitions about what should be viewed as a universe's "natural state"-where this means something not calling for explanation by a divine person or any other external factor-can be defended or attacked only very controversially.' As I have argued, however, the naturalness or spontaneity of the states of physical and biological systems or of the cosmos is epistemologically a matter of empirical evidence and not of the conflict of personal intuitions regarding naturalness.

But the question could be and has been asked why this form of `scientism' should be mandatory. Friedrich von Hayek (1952) and his acolytes have characterized scientism as a doctrine of explanatory scientific imperialism with utopian pretensions. Much more precisely, Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss ([in press]) defined scientism as implying that everything that is explained is explained by either science or some kind of explanation having strong affinities to actual scientific explanation. Thus, in their construal, scientism is not taken to assert that everything is explained by science tout court, but only that everything that is actually explained, is explained by science.

It is easy enough, as theists like Leibniz, Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn ([1993]) have done, to disavow scientism as just defined, although Swinburne insists ([1991]) that his version of theism is methodologically of-a-piece with various modes of scientific inference, such as the use of Bayes's theorem to credibilify scientific hypotheses. And he then marshals that theorem to aver that God probably exists.

But such a theistic disavowal of scientism calls for a potent justification of the theistic explanatory alternative. The most prominent alternative that theists have proffered is modeled on volitional agency-explanations of human actions, as distinct from ordinary event-causation.

Yet in Section 3, I shall argue that a divine volitional explanation of the actual topmost or most fundamental laws of nature, of their constants, and of the pertinent boundary or initial conditions founders multiply.

2.2b Swinburne's simplicity argument

With no help from Leibniz toward a cogent defense of SoN by reference to simplicity, I turn to Swinburne's quite general argument from simplicity for which he claims multiple sanction from science ([1996]). And I note first that he claims probity for his appeal to simplicity by maintaining that it has `the same structure' as the use of simplicity in scientific theorizing. In his words:

The structure of a cumulative case for theism was thus, I claimed [in The Existence of God], the same as the structure of a cumulative case for any unobservable entity, such as a quark or a neutrino. Our grounds for believing in its existence are that it is an entity of a simple kind with simple modes of behavior which leads us to expect the more complex phenomena which we find.4

Furthermore, having argued that an infinite capacity is simpler than any one finite capacity, Swinburne ([1991], Ch. 5, [1996], Ch. 3) contends that in a rank-ordering of graduated properties, God's omnipotence, omniscience and (presumably) omni-benevolence are the simplest. Hereafter, I shall refer to this triad as `God's triplet of omnis'. He puts his case for the simplicity of this triplet as follows ([1991], p. 322):

The postulation of God [. . .J is the postulation of one entity of a simple kind, the simplest kind of person there could be, having no limits to his knowledge, power, and freedom.

Yet Swinburne ([1996], p. 48) had also told us that a natural state of nothingness without God is simpler than a world containing God. And furthermore, he deems the cardinal number zero of entities simpler than the number 1 for which he just claimed simplicity vis-d-vis a larger cardinal.

Occam's injunction, as symbolized by his razor, is to abstain from postulating entities beyond necessity. Mindful of this prescription, Swinburne ([1991], p. 84) characterizes the simplicity and complexity of hypotheses in terms of the number of entities, the sorts of entities, and the kinds of relations among entities that they postulate. But clearly, in scientific theorizing, the regulative ideal of Occam's razor is subject to the crucial proviso of heeding the total available evidence, including its complexity.

Thus, it now turns out that there were important episodes in the history of actual science, in which increasingly greater theoretical faithfulness to the facts required the violation of Swinburne's a priori criterion of simplicity with respect to the number of postulated entities. Thus, such numerical simplicity as can be achieved while explaining the phenomena is an empirical matter, and not subject to Swinburne's legislative a priori conceptual simplicity.

Ironically, this lesson is spelled by one of his own examples. In his view, the putative infinite speed of a particle is simpler than some finite value. Yet the velocity of light is known to be finite, and the special theory of relativity tells us that this finite velocity is an upper bound for the transmission of any causal influence. Other examples from actual science that violate Swinburne's mandate of conceptual simplicity abound. Let me enumerate some of them.

(i) By Swinburne's normative criterion of numerical simplicity, the preSocratic Thales's monistic universal hydro-chemistry of the world's substances is about a hundredfold simpler than the empirically discovered periodic table of the elements. And there are even two isotopes of Thales's water, one heavier than the other. Furthermore, in organic chemistry, isomerism is a complication. Moreover, the single frequency of monochromatic light is simple for Swinburne, but ubiquitous white light is composed of a whole range of spectral frequencies.

(ii) Yet again, suppose that fundamental physics were reduced to the wellknown quadruplet of forces, then these four forces are numerically less simple than a single such force, not to speak of Swinburne's much simpler number zero of them. Evidently, our world does not accommodate a priori conceptual decrees of simplicity! Thus, it is unavailing for Swinburne to tell us ([1991], pp. 283-84): `If there is to exist something, it seems impossible to conceive of anything simpler (and therefore a priori more probable) than the existence of God' (italics added). But Swinborne has not shown cogently that greater conceptual simplicity automatically makes for greater a priori probability.

Indeed, this claim boomerangs, as Keith Parsons ([1989], p. 84) has pointed out as follows:

A demon, for instance [especially Satan], is a single entity, it is a spiritual being and hence not composed of parts; it presumably exercises its power over persons and physical objects in some direct and simple way, and it is in all its deeds actuated by a single motivating drive-malevolence. Hence, explanation of a case of psychosis in terms of demon[ic] possession seems much simpler than any of the current psychological or neurological explanations. The simplicity and untestability (How could it ever be shown that demons do not cause psychoses?) of such hypotheses gives them great obscurantist potential.

(ii) Among laws of nature, van der Waals's laws for gases are more complicated than the Boyle-Charles law for ideal gases. Again, in the Newtonian two-body system of the earth and the sun, Kepler's relatively simple laws of planetary motion are replaced by more complicated ones that take account of the sun's own acceleration. Third, Einstein's field equations are awesomely complicated, nonlinear partial differential equations, and as such are enormously more complicated than the ordinary second order differential equation in Newton's law of universal gravitation. Remarkably, Swinburne himself mentions this greater complexity of Einstein's gravitational field equations, but his comment on it does not cohere with his demand for a priori simplicity. He says ([1991], p. 79):

Newton's laws [. . .] are (probably) explained by Einstein's field equations of General Relativity [as special approximations under specified restrictive conditions]. In passing from Newton's laws to Einstein's there is I believe a considerable loss of [a priori] simplicity [. . .] But there is some considerable gain in explanatory power.

Note, however, that the sacrifice of a priori simplicity for the sake of greater explanatory power is dictated by empirical constraints. Thus, Swinburne seems to admit, in effect, that empirical facts override his a priori simplicity qua the governing heuristic criterion of theory-formation. In sum, epistemologically, all of the more complicated laws I have mentioned were of course prompted by empirical findings.

(iii) Simplicity enters into curve fitting to a finite number of data points. But just how? Glymour ([1980], pp. 77-79), in effect, answers this question tellingly as follows:

It is common practice in fitting curves to experimental data, in the absence of an established theory relating the quantities measured, to choose the `simplest' curve that will fit the data. Thus linear relations are preferred to polynomial relations of higher degree, and exponential functions of measured quantities are preferred to exponential functions of algebraic combinations of measured quantities, and so on (p. 78).

The trouble is that it is just very implausible that scientists typically have their prior degrees of belief distributed according to any plausible simplicity ordering, and still less plausible that they would be rational to do so. I can think of very few simple relations between experimentally determined quantities that have withstood continued investigation, and often simple relations are replaced by relations that are infinitely complex: consider the fate of Kepler's laws (p. 79).

I presume that Glymour's remark about Kepler's three laws does not pertain just to the complication arising from the two-body problem, which I already mentioned (under (ii)), but a fortiori to the ten-body problem of the Newtonian gravitational interaction of the sun with all of the nine planets. The solutions of these equations of motion are infinitely complex in the sense that they take the form of infinite series rather than featuring a much simpler closed, finite form. Besides, Richard Feynman has pointed out that this full planetary system is `chaotic' in the technical sense of modem chaos theory: Very slight differences in the initial velocities or accelerations issue after a while in very large orbital differences.

It emerges that empirical facts as to how much or little `simplicity' there is in the world undermine Leibniz's and Swinburne's notion that the conceptual deliverances of epistemically a priori simplicity-even if they were coherent-can at all be mandatory for what is ontologically the case.

In a perceptive critical review of Swinburne's Is There a God ([1996]), Quentin Smith ([1998]) examines his argument that theism is the simplest hypothesis, since God is infinite, while infinity and zero are the simplest notions employed by scientists. And Swinburne's reason for claiming that a state of nothing, excluding God, is the most natural state of the world is likewise that such a presumed state is conceptually the simplest.

Smith points out, however, that Swinburne equivocates on four different senses of `infinity' which need to be distinguished. Briefly, Smith explains, these four senses are the following: (i) `Infinite' refers to Georg Cantor's lowest transfinite cardinal number Aleph-zero; (ii) `Infinite' refers to a speed, as in an instantaneous transmission of an effect, which is familiar from Newtonian gravitational interaction but is clearly different from the transfinite cardinal Aleph-zero; (iii) A third sense, different from the first two, pertains to the maximum degree of a graduated qualitative property. In this sense, God is infinite, because he is presumed to have the maximum degree of power, knowledge and goodness.

Parsons ([1989], Ch. 2) and Michael Martin ([1990], pp. 110-118) had offered other objections to Swinburne's notion of simplicity.

Recall Swinburne's contention that `If there is to exist something, it seems impossible to conceive of anything simpler (and therefore a priori more probable) than the existence of God' ([1991], pp. 283-84; italics added). Recall also that this claim does not heed Quinn's aforestated caveat not to slide unsupportedly from being the simplest concept to being the simplest hypothesis. Then we can see that, for Swinburne, conceptual simplicity has ontological significance by being legislative for what does exist. Thus, for him, conceptual simplicity is not, at least in the first instance, a methodological, pragmatic, or inductive criterion.

Accordingly, Swinburne's writings do not, I believe, bear out the following suggestion as a counter to me: What he really had in mind was not a criterion of absolute simplicity based on concept-simplicity alone, but rather an injunction to `always accept that theory which is the simplest one consistent with the data'. But this reading would turn Swinburne's thesis into a rather commonplace version of Occamite methodology. Thus construed, he would then be defending the hypothesis that God exists as the simplest explanation of the world's existence and content consistent with all known data. Admittedly-so the suggestion runs-this retort would not save Swinburne's espousal of SoN, but it might allow him to parry a number of my animadversions.

To this I say: I doubt that his philosophical framework could compatibly incorporate this suggestion. Besides, one basic part of that framework is the supposed divine volitional explanation of the existence of the world, and of its contents. But, as I shall argue in Section 3, that explanation fails on several counts.5

Evidently, Swinburne presents us with a misdepiction of the use of simplicity criteria in actual science, although he claims continuity with actual scientific theory-construction for his conceptual standard of simplicity. Just as the lesson spelled out by scientific theoretical progress undermined his a priori conceptual avowal of SoN as a basis for external divine creation, so also his pseudoOccamite argument for normative a priori simplicity fails. Thus, Swinburne's attempt to underwrite SoN by recourse to simplicity is abortive. But, in the absence of SoN, the logical contingency of the existence of the world does not jeopardize its existence one iota! Accordingly, the claim that a divine external cause is needed to prevent the world from lapsing into nothingness is baseless. 2.3 The role of the normalcy of nothingness in the medieval Arabic Kalam Argument

To conclude my contention that the appeal to SoN wrought philosophical mischief in several of the major theistic cosmological arguments, let me consider the medieval Arabic Kalam argument for a creator, as articulated and championed by William Craig ([1979]).

We shall see that, contrary to Craig's assertion, the so-called Kalam version of the cosmological argument, which he defends, is likewise predicated, though only quite tacitly and insidiously, on the baseless SoN. The Kalam argument was put forward by such medieval Arab philosophers as al-Kindi and others (see Craig [1979]).

In Craig's 1994 `A Response to Grunbaum on Creation and Big Bang Cosmology' (Craig [1994b], p. 247), he wrote:

Grunbaum conflates three versions of the cosmological argument. The Kalam version, which I have defended, says nothing about a causa/ratio essendi. The Thomist version, as it comes to expression in Aquinas's Tertia Via, argues for a causa essendi on the basis of the real distinction between essence and existence in contingent things, a distinction which disposes them to nothingness. The Leibnizian version in no way presupposes a disposition toward nothingness in contingent things, but seeks a ratio for the existence of anything, even an eternal thing which has no disposition to nothingness, in a being which is metaphysically necessary [. . .] Thus Grunbaum's demand for evidence of the spontaneity of nothingness is not in every case a relevant demand [italics added).

But I claim that I am not guilty of any conflation of the three versions of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. In the case of Aquinas, Craig acknowledges my demand for evidence supporting SoN as `a relevant demand'. But since he gives no hint as to how this demand could be met, I presume that he has no response to my argument against SoN. As for Leibniz, I have documented above that, contrary to Craig, Leibniz's cosmological version does presuppose SoN, so that Craig's denial that it does so is just incorrect. Yet I allow that Leibniz's sundry publications may not be coherent on this issue.

As for Craig's endorsement of the Kalam version, I can now show that, malgre lui, it derives its spurious plausibility from a tacit, though subtle, appeal to SoN. In his attack on my views, which was replete with red herrings, Craig ([1992]) claimed that the old Kalam Cosmological Argument justifies a creationist theological interpretation of the big bang world. Specifically, in my paraphrase, he offers the following Kalam proposition to be metaphysically necessary ([1979], pp. 141-48, [1994a], [1994b]; Craig and Smith [1993], pp. 147, 156): `Anything that begins to exist but does not have a transformative cause must have a creative cause ex nihilo, rather than no cause at all'.

Yet in the big bang universe, we have an unbounded interval of past time that is only metrically finite in years. This means that there is no first moment of time. Ordinally and topologically, the past-open time interval is isomorphic with a time that is metrically infinite in years. But Craig untutoredly declares an infinite past time to be logically impossible! And he speaks of the big bang universe as `beginning to exist' by misdepicting the big bang singularity as a genuine first-moment of time (Grunbaum [1994], (1998], section SA, pp. 25-26).

But why, I ask, does a big bang universe that `begins to exist', in the special sense that there were no instants of time preceding all of the moments in the metrically finite unbounded past, require an external creative cause at all in the absence of a transformative cause? Is it not because Craig tacitly embraces SoN and uncritically assumes that the externally uncaused, natural state of the world is one of nothingness? What else makes it psychologically compelling to Craig and some others that an externally uncaused physical universe is `metaphysically' impossible tout court? Would Craig's intuition of metaphysical necessity not dissipate, once its tacit reliance on the baseless SoN, and its misextrapolation from cases of warranted external causation are made explicit?

SoN as a source of Craig's avowed `metaphysical intuition that something cannot come out of absolutely nothing'-which is akin to the scholastic dictum `ex nihilo nihil fit'-seems also to be subtly present in his quasiLeibnizian argument from the supposed potentiality of the universe to exist. That potentiality, Craig tells us, is causally but not temporally prior to the Big Bang. And he relies on it to buttress his stated metaphysical intuition as follows (Craig [1991]):

A pure potentiality cannot actualize itself [. . .] On the theistic hypothesis, the potentiality of the universe's existence lay in the power of God to create it. On the atheistic hypothesis, there did not even exist the potentiality for the existence of the universe. But then it seems inconceivable that the universe should become actual if there did not exist any potentiality for its existence. It seems to me therefore that a little reflection leads us to the conclusion that the origin of the universe had a cause.

Here Craig is telling us that an external cause is required to effect the realization of `the [mere] potentiality of the universe's existence', and that if the latter potentiality did not exist, `then it seems inconceivable that the universe should become actual' (italics added). But what reason is there in the temporally unbounded big bang model for claiming that the big bang universe ever `became actual'? The most immediate reason seems to be the ill-founded SoN, and the question-begging supposition that `the potentiality of the universe's existence lay in the power of God to create it', a potentiality, which then required divine creation to be actualized.

Yet Craig insists that since the singularity of the big bang model avowedly had no earlier cause, it must have had a simultaneous one, because it is metaphysically impossible that it be uncaused or `come out of absolutely nothing'. And he charges me with having overlooked this `obvious alternative' of a simultaneous cause, claiming that the Big Bang singularity and its purported divine cause `both occur coincidentally (in the literal sense of the word), that is, they both occur at to' (Craig [1994a], pp. 218> 222, fn. 1). But surely the temporal coincidence of events is not tantamount to literal coincidence. And, as is well known to physical cosmologists, if to is used as a label for the singularity, it does not designate a bona fide instant of physical time (Grunbaum [1998], pp. 25-26). Instead, the term `the big bang' is short, in this instance, for the behavior of the universe during its unbounded early temporal past.

Now I must ask anew: What, other than the insidious SoN, could make psychologically compelling Craig's avowed `metaphysical intuition that something cannot [spontaneously] come out of absolutely nothing' (Craig [1991])? I answer: Once we abandon his misleading language of `coming out of nothing', we can describe the situation as follows: The big bang models feature a world whose past time is unbounded (open) but metrically finite in years. Absent the tacit presupposition of the baseless SoN, there is just no cogent reason for requiring an external creative cause for the existence of that world! We must be ever mindful to extirpate the baseless SoN from our cognitive (unconscious) awareness.

John Earman ([1995], p. 208), when presumably speaking of the Kalam argument, writes:

A seemingly more sophisticated but not essentially different response is that something cannot begin to exist without a cause so if there is no physical cause of the beginning to exist, there must be a metaphysical one. Here I am in complete agreement with Professor Grunbaum in that the standard big bang models [. . .] imply that for every time t there is a prior t' and that the state at t' is a cause (in the sense of causal determinism) of the state at t (fn. 7 omitted here).

Samuel Clarke, Leibniz and, in their wake, other philosophers have asked for an explanation of the existence of this set of states as whole, and indeed of the conjunction of all facts (Gale [1991]), over and above the explanation of each individual state t by some prior state or other t'. But why is it thought that the entire series of states requires an external cause, instead of being a fundamental, logically contingent brute fact? If the Clarkians envision divine volition as providing the explanation they demand (Quinn [1993]), then I argue, as I am about to do, that such a theological explanation fails multiply. Besides, Quentin Smith, in a perceptive paper `Internal and External Causal Explanations of the Universe' ([1995]), contended that contemporary discussions of the Clarke and Leibniz challenge `are vitiated by an inadequate understanding of the relation between a cause external to a whole and the whole itself (in the broad sense of "whole" that includes sets, mereological sums, aggregates and organic unifies).' Smith argues that, regardless of what kind of whole the universe may be, it cannot be externally caused by the God of classical theism, who supposedly created it ex nihilo.

I conclude from the foregoing that Craig has failed to show cogently that the universe ever `became actual' at the phantom time to, let alone that the atheist, anti-creationist position is damaged by not countenancing a corresponding potentiality.

3 Critique of the `explanation' of the most fundamental laws of nature by divine creative volition

Philip Quinn wrote ([1993], pp. 607-08):

The conservation law for matter-energy is logically contingent. So if it is true, the question of why it holds rather than not doing so arises. If it is a fundamental law and only scientific explanation is allowed, the fact that matter-energy is conserved is an inexplicable brute fact. For all we know, the conservation law for matter-energy may turn out to be a derived law and so deducible from some deeper principle of symmetry or invariance. But if this is the case, the same question can be asked about this deeper principle because it too will be logically contingent. If it is fundamental and only scientific explanation is allowed, then the fact that it holds is scientifically inexplicable. Either the regress of explanation terminates in a most fundamental law or it does not. If there is a deepest law, it will be logically contingent, and so the fact that it holds rather than not doing so will be a brute fact. If the regress does not terminate, then for every law in the infinite hierarchy there is a deeper law from which it can be deduced. In this case, however, the whole hierarchy will be logically contingent, and so the question of why it holds rather than some other hierarchy will arise. So if only scientific explanation is allowed, the fact that this particular infinite hierarchy of contingent laws holds will be a brute inexplicable fact. Therefore, on the assumption that scientific laws are logically contingent and are explained by being deduced from other laws, there are bound to be inexplicable brute facts if only scientific explanation is allowed.

There are, then, genuine explanatory problems too big, so to speak, for science to solve. If the theistic doctrine of creation and conservation is true, these problems have solutions in terms of agent-causation. The reason why there is a certain amount of matter-energy and not some other amount 6 or none at all is that God so wills it, and the explanation of why matter-energy is conserved is that God conserves it. Obviously nothing I have said proves that the theistic solutions to these problems are correct. I have not shown that it is not an inexplicable brute fact that a certain amount of matter-energy exists and is conserved. For all I have said, the explanatory problems I have been discussing are insoluble. But an insoluble problem is not a pseudoproblem; it is a genuine problem that has no solution. So Granbaum's claim that creation is a pseudoproblem for big bang cosmogonic models misses the mark (italics added).

In the same vein, Quinn ([1993], p. 606) cites Swinburne's book The Existence of God ([1979 edn], pp. 123-25). Speaking of the laws of nature L, Swinburne declared: `L would explain why whatever energy there is remains the same; but what L does not explain is why there is just this amount of energy.'

My response is twofold: (i) I contend that Quinn offers a non-sequitur in his conclusion `So Grunbaum's claim that [the problem of] creation is a pseudoproblem for big bang cosmogonic models misses the mark', and (ii) The theistic volitional explanations for the existence and nomic structure of the world championed by Quinn and Swinburne are inherently defective.

(i) In Quinn's argument for his complaint that I had leveled an unsound charge of pseudo-problem, he conflates two different problems, only one of which I had indicted as a pseudo-issue. In a passage that he himself (Quinn [1993], p. 605) had adduced from Leibniz, that philosopher had lucidly stated the pertinent two distinct questions when he demanded `a full reason why there should be a world at all, and why it should be such as it is' . Quinn reasoned fallaciously ([ 1993], p. 607) that if the latter question is a `genuine explanatory problem' even when addressed to the most fundamental laws and facts of nature-as he claims-then so also the former question `why is there is a world at all?' must be genuine. But in my complaint of pseudo-problem, I had targeted only the question: `What is the external cause of the very existence of the universe?' It is this problem that is at issue when Quinn speaks of my dismissal of `the problem of creation'.

I had rejected it as misbegotten, because it is avowedly or tacitly predicated on the SoN doctrine, a tenet that I have been at pains to discredit as ill-based. And I favor the use of the pejorative term `pseudo-problem' to derogate a question that rests on an ill-founded or demonstrably false presupposition; yet in so doing, I definitely do not intend to hark back to early positivist indictments of `meaninglessness'.

Assuming that the most fundamental laws and facts of the world are logically contingent, one can clearly allow the question why they are what they are, as contrasted with logically possible alternatives to them, even as one rejects the different existential question `Why is there anything at all, rather than just nothing?' Thus, when I indicted the latter as a pseudo-problem, I did not thereby disallow the former. Yet Quinn reasons illicitly that since the former question is genuine, my rejection of the latter `misses the mark'.

In the opening paragraph of his lengthy critique of my rejection of theological interpretations of physical cosmology, Quinn ([1993], p. 589) had declared that the aim of his critique is to refute my charge of pseudo-problem. I claim that he failed, when he conflated Leibniz's two questions.

(ii) This brings me to the theological answer given by Swinburne and Quinn to their question why the nomological structure and content of the world are what they are.

To set the stage for my array of animadversions against their divine volitional answer, let me mention Richard Gale's view ([1999]) that `[. . .] ultimate disagreements between philosophers are due to their rival sentiments of rationality as to what constitutes a rationally satisfying explanation of reality.' Two such rival views of rationality, Gale points out, are the scientific world view, on the one hand, and the man-centered one, which employs anthropomorphisms, on the other. Theistic advocates of `natural religion' champion the anthropomorphic perspective of personhood in their proffered explanations of everything via divine creative volition, a standpoint rejected by Santayana, Bertrand Russell, and a host of others.

Let me defer, for now, adjudicating the merits of these two competing world views, and first set forth some fundamental epistemological and methodological differences between them. These deep differences exist, despite Swinburne's claim of solid methodological continuity between the two world views and their respective criteria of rationality. Says he ([1996], p. 2): `The very same criteria which scientists use to reach their own theories lead us to move beyond those theories to a creator God who sustains everything in existence.' Moreover, he asserts theistic pan-explainability, declaring (ibid.): `[. . .] using those same [scientific] criteria, we find that the view that there is a God explains everything we observe, not just some narrow range of data. It explains the fact that there is a universe at all [via SoN], that scientific laws operate within it' (cf. also his [1991], Ch. 4 on `Complete Explanation').

Note, however, that Swinburne and others who offer divine volitional explanations would offer precisely such an explanation, if the facts of our world were radically different, or even if, in a putative world-ensemble of universes, each of them had its own laws, vastly different from the respective laws in the others. Their schema of theistic volitional explanations relies on roughly a model of intentional action affine to Aristotle's practical syllogism (hereafter `PS') for intentional action.

As we just saw, Swinburne maintains that the hypothesis of divine creation `moves beyond' scientific explanations via the very same epistemological criteria. As against that contention, let me now set forth the substantial explanatory discrepancies between them.

Neither Swinburne nor Quinn spelled out the provision of a deductive theistic volitional explanation, which they claim for the hypothesis of divine creation. I now offer a reconstruction of essentially the deductive explanatory reasoning that, I believe, they had in mind. And I am glad to report that Quinn (private communication) authenticated my reconstruction, at least in regard to himself. It reads:

Premise 1. God freely willed that the state of affairs described in the explanandum ought to materialize.

Premise 2. Being omnipotent, he was able to cause the existence of the facts in the explanandum without the mediation of other causal processes.

Conclusion: Our world exists, and its contents exhibit its most fundamental laws.

It is to be understood that this reconstruction is only schematic, since the actual specifics of the most basic laws are not stated in the Conclusion.

But two basic considerations jeopardize the epistemic viability of this proffered volitional theological explanation:

(i) Epistemically, it will succeed only if the theist can produce cogent evidence, independent of the explanandum, for the very content of the volition that the proffered explanation imputes to the Deity; failing that, the deductive argument here is not viable epistemically; but where has the theist produced such independent evidence? Moreover, Premise 2 unwarrantedly assumes the availability of a successful cosmological argument for the existence of the God of theism.

(ii) Relatedly, the explanation is conspicuously ex post facto, because the content of the volition imputed to God is determined retrospectively, depending entirely on what the specifics of the most fundamental laws have turned out to be.

William James has beautifully encapsulated the ex post facto character of the relevant sort of theological explanation, in which God is Hegel's Absolute. Speaking of the facts of the world, James ([1975], p. 40) declared:

Be they what they may, the Absolute will father them. Like the sick lion in Esop's fable, all footprints lead into his den, but nulla vestigia retrosum [i.e. no trace leads back out of the den]. You cannot redescend into the world of particulars by the Absolute's aid, or deduce any necessary consequences of detail important for your life from your idea of his nature.

But no such ex post facto deficiency is found in typical explanations in physics or biology such as (i) the Newtonian gravitational explanation of the orbit of the moon; (ii) the deductive-nomological explanations of optical phenomena furnished by Maxwell's equations, which govern the electromagnetic field, or in a statistical context; (iii) the genetic explanations of hereditary phenotypic human family resemblances.

But according to familiar scientific evidential criteria which Swinburne tirelessly professes to employ-as in his appeal to Bayes's theorem-his and Quinn's deductive argument appear to be epistemologically frivolous by being altogether ex post facto. None the less, Swinburne ([1991], p. 109), speaking of the explanandum e, is explicitly satisfied with such an ex post facto mode of explanation: `[. . .] clearly whatever a is, God being omnipotent, has the power to bring about e. He will do so, if he chooses to do so.' Yet since we obviously have no independent evidential access to God's choices, Swinburne has to infer completely ex post facto whether God's choices included a from whether or not a is actually the case.

In ordinary action-explanations on the model of Aristotle's PS, we often, if not typically, do have independent evidence-or at least access to independent evidence-as to the content of the agent's motives. That is to say, we have evidence for the imputed motives other than the action taken by the agent. And, absent such evidence, we reject the proffered action-explanation as viciously circular. Thus if I explain an unreasonable reprimand of an academic colleague by the department chairman as vindictive, I may do so on the basis of independent evidence that the chairman harbors aggressive feelings toward the colleague, because of the colleague's repeated expressions of disrespect for the chairman. By the same token, we reject imputations of motives for given actions as facile, when there is no independent evidence for the agent's possession of the attributed motives.

In this sense, I claim that the attribution of the existence of the world to God's willing that it exist is unacceptably ex post facto. Let me emphasize that, as I lodge it, the complaint that ex post facto explanations afford no independent empirical check on their premisses is not focused on their being non-predictive. Non-predictiveness is not tantamount to untestability, since a theory may be retrodictive without being predictive. For example, (neo)Darwinian evolutionary theory is essentially unpredictive in regard to the long-term evolution of species, but it retrodicts numerous previously unknown past facts in the fossil record. Similarly, being an untreated syphilitic is not predictive of affliction with neurologically degenerative paresis. Yet, since only untreated syphilitics become paretics, being paretic testably retrodicts having been an untreated syphilitic. But an explanation that is neither retrodictive nor predictive and whose premisses have no corroboration by evidence independent of the given explanandum, is paradigmatically ex post facto.

There are further difficulties in the theistic explanation above: God's omnipotence will now serve to show that Swinburne's and Quinn's deductive volitional explanation does not meet Leibniz's aforecited demand for a `full reason why', if there is a world at all, `it should be such as it is'. Having harped on God's omnipotence earlier, Swinburne develops it further ([1991], p. 295):

God, being omnipotent, cannot rely on causal processes outside his control to bring about effects, so his range of easy control must coincide with his range of direct control and include all states of affairs which it is logically possible for him to bring about (italics added).

Precisely because God is omnipotent, however, he could clearly have chosen any one of the logically possible sets of fundamental laws to achieve his presumed aims-goals that are outlined by Swinburne-rather than the actual laws. Yet, if so, then exactly that latitude shows that, if the stated epistemic defects are to be avoided, the theological explanatory scenario fails to satisfy Leibniz's demand. Swinburne himself concedes that the theistic explanation is wanting: `It is compatible with too much. There are too many different possible worlds which a God might bring about' ([1991], p. 289). Thus, God's supposed choice to create the actual world is presumably a matter of brute fact.

How, then, does Swinburne justify that his theological explanation above improves upon a scientific system in which explanation is envisioned as departing from the most fundamental laws of nature, which are themselves taken to hold as a matter of brute fact? In the face of the epistemic flaws I have set forth, Swinburne's and Quinn's theological superstructure appears to be an explanatorily misguided step.

Furthermore, the details of the proposed theological explanation, employing the aforementioned modified version of the PS, is beset by difficulties of its own. Swinburne ([1991], p. 296) opines that `[. . .] although certain physical conditions of the brain need to occur if human agents are to have intentions which are efficacious, the human model suggests a simpler model in which such limitations are removed.' Leaving aside his hapless a priori simplicity, let me recall that he and Quinn rely on direct, unmediated divine volitional creation of the world ex nihilo (Swinburne [1991], p. 294; Quinn [1993], p. 602). Yet Quinn cautions us ([1993], p. 597): `I leave open the question of whether God and his volitions are timelessly eternal by not building into this locution [of direct bringing about] a variable ranging over times of occurrence of divine willings.' On the other hand, Swinburne ([1991], p. 8) dissociates himself from the notion of divine timeless eternity, and says: `I understand by God's being eternal that he always has existed and always will exist.'

Like many others, I find it unintelligible to be told by Quinn that any mental state, especially a volitional one that creates ex nihilo, can be `timelessly eternal'. A fortiori it defies comprehension how such a timeless state can `bring about' a state of existence at any one ordinary worldly time. The reply that this complex event happens

I always thought that the so called science behind the big bang was ridiculous. They have no probable way of knowing the age of the universe or the speed of the expansion of the universe - yet they spout their numbers as if they were facts. Cosmological physics is far from being an exact science like most of applied physics. They add all sorts of nonsense like "dark matter" (western science is heavily materialistic) to try and patch the many holes in their model.

As far as the origin of the universe, anything goes. We'll never know for sure anyway so it's pointless to argue over that.

Originally posted by Helioform
I always thought that the so called science behind the big bang was ridiculous. They have no probable way of knowing the age of the universe or the speed of the expansion of the universe - yet they spout their numbers as if they were facts. Cosmological physics is far from being an exact science like most of applied physics. They add all sorts of nonsense like "dark matter" (western science is heavily materialistic) to try and patch the many holes in their model.

As far as the origin of the universe, anything goes. We'll never know for sure anyway so it's pointless to argue over that.

Scientists don't claim to know everything or anything about how the universe started, but they are trying to figure it out. Nobody has a satisfactory answer for how the universe was created. Some people may be happy with the explanation that god created the universe or that the big bang created the universe, but for those who question a little more deeply, there is no answer. But that doesn't mean we should stop looking for one.

Seapeople please, God has nothing to do with the universe itself. Why do you keep on thinking that? Almost the whole bible is based upon the stories which happened to menkind, just a small small small fraction about the creation of the universe. The idea that the Gods are thought up because of those kind of things is not real in which way you will also try to look at it.

Then for the BigBang itself
www.space.com...

It didn't came out of nothing most probably, the idea of a singularity is philosofically also impossible.

The bigbang is the opposite of the singularity, and it didn't come from nothing because singularities don't exist.

E=MC2 says that the summary of energy and mass stay the same, so time was endless. Just like time will be endless. I can give the philosofical reasons as well:

* the bigbang had 100% energy when it exploded (saying it came out of a singularity) reverse this and when it will almost be a singularity it does have almost 100% energy, so the singularity cannot be made because of the knowledge of the Bigbang.
* In an exact stable situation there cannot be something which makes something happen.
* quantum theories don't accept loss of information.
* It is in violation with the laws of physics.
* Mass flows over in energy, therefore more power against the gravity, the closer to the singularity the more of that anti-gravity (that is the matter of which they say it was gravity but becomes the opponent of gravity).
* In an endless period of time everything what can happen will happen.
* The Bigbang began at a certain time during the attraction of the gravity into a singularity and therefore it wasn't a singularity.

---------------------------------------------------------------

There was just as much mass and energy before the bigbang as after, and time is endless.

(And God wasn't thought up to explain that in hundreds of thousands of pages, with all kinds of pyramids, buildings, airplane describtions, technologies etc. just to explain those kind of things !!!!!!!!!!!!!)

longyforlife

posted on 27-11-2003 at 04:55 PM
"i've just been thinking about how the univers started (as you do of course ) and i was thinking, if that is the theory everyone believes, what did actually bang? something had to have blown up or banged to produce this so what was there before the big bang? i mean all the univers can't just explode into existence from nothing... can it? this is driving me mad please state something about this!

I have been trying to get my head around the same thing. check this tread out if you want but all it'll do is screw your head up even more.


www.abovetopsecret.com...

I'm trying to give my brain a rest from the whole thing.We need to have one hell of a scientific breakthrough before we can figure this question out.

Here is a nice explanation, although it's strictly theoretical. It involves the Higgs field.

www.findarticles.com...

Fields are structures that carry latent energy even under conditions in which the space they control is to all intents and purposes empty. The natural and stable state of the Higgs field is one in which its latent energy is at a minimum. Such is its true vacuum state, the word "vacuum" indicating that the field is empty, and the word "true" that the field is in its lowest energy configuration. But under certain physically possible circumstances, the Higgs field can find itself adventitiously trapped in a false vacuum state, a condition in which, like a spring, it is loaded with potential energy. It is thus, Guth conjectured, that the Higgs field might have found itself fluttering about the early universe, energetically throbbing and dying to be of use.

The wish is father to the act. The energy within the Higgs field is repulsive: it pushes things apart. When released, it contributes a massive jolt to the process of cosmic expansion already under way. The universe very quickly doubles in size. Space and time stretch themselves out. Particles zoom from one another. If the ordinary course of cosmic expansion is linear, inflationary expansion is exponential, like the gaunt, hollow-eyed guest gobbling the hors d'oeuvres--and everything else--at a previously decorous cocktail party. Only as the Higgs field tumbles down to its true vacuum state does inflation come to a halt, and the ordinary course of the Big Bang resume.


Btw, Dreamz: If you could, please post just the link and a small portion of the text to save the xeon server's space...

Pantha this text is of you in that other topic :

logically everything has a begining but how can something come from nothing in the first place?

Logic is based upon what you see in your live, the information which you get. On earth all things have an beginning and an end, that is the logic. However you are working with extreme aspects, and therefore the idea of "everything has a beginning" isn't applyable.

It is not logical that the universe should have a beginning, the only reason that it is thought it must be is because people can't understand, while all the philosofical and now also scientific reasoning says that the idea of a beginning is false.

Generally speaking metaphysics, be it god or something else, was never a satisfactory explanation of anything; it seems just a convenient device to close an argument when a natural conclusion remains out of reach. I don't mean to insult believers, but in fact the true origins of what we charmingly call "the universe" may never be satisfactorily known to us. Such a profoundly depressing reality is often interpreted by believers as substantial proof for the existence of god, although why that would follow is totally beyond me.

There is no explanation for the origin of god, nor is there tangible proof of god's presence in the world; so then how can the concept of god be extended to explain the origin of anything else? When one compares the theory of god with that of the Big Bang, the Big Bang theory wins the contest solely on the basis of measurable proof based in existing evidence. Hovever much more aesthetically attractive the god thing is when compared to the messy Big Bang theory, with all of its tantalizing hard questions unanswered, we can nevertheless hear and see the evidence of the latter without having anything but religous tracts to support the former.

But it is without reservation that I support those who choose aesthetics over science,; it is hard not to be moved by such sentimentality. They can crawl into the bunker of Absolute Truth and be pleased that from fthat vantage there is nowhere else to go. Their journey is complete.

Of course there was a big bang.
Its not no rubbish.They have more evidence for a big bang than anything else.
Even if you believe in God then he would've made the Big Bang.
People who think of the bible so literally, like Ned Flanders talking to god, and God zapping everything into existence like a cartoon are delusional.

This is from another post I made, and I personally think it is probably the best way to think about the beginning of the universe.

"Before" is a concept inherently linked to our concept of linear time. That is, we think of ourselves moving on a line from the past to the future and "before" refers to a past-ward direction from a specific point on that line. Given, however, that the direction we label "past" is not necessarily the same direction labeled as "past" in some other part of the universe, The universe does not have an absolute time line, only a local one.

The second key fact that must be understood is that matter and energy are interdependent with spacetime. Without matter and energy, there can be no spacetime. Without spacetime, there is nowhere for matter to be. The reason for this is beyond the scope of this article.

The third key fact is that the current best theory is that the Big Bang was triggered by quantum fluctuations, which are the spontaneous creation and subsequent destruction of quantum level pieces of matter. Again, the reason why this happens is beyond the scope of this article.

Now, given that spacetime is dependent upon the existence of matter and energy, the quantum fluctuation that was responsible for triggering the Big Bang is also responsible for bringing spacetime into existence. More to the point of this discussion and in everyday terms, it brought time into existence. Thus, it is nonsensical to talk of a time "before the Big Bang" because it is equivalent to talking of a time "before time" or asking "What is North of the North Pole ?"

I would also suggest reading up on Quantum Fluctuations and CP Violation. To greatly simplify them, quantum fluctuations happen randomly and seemingly without causation. Take a point in space and observe it on the quantum level. You will see pairs of virtual particles flash into and out of existence. Coming from nothing, then destroying themselves and not existing. It is the nature of the universe to have random energy fluctuations on the quantum level of existence that momentarily break the law of conservation, allowing the creation and evaporation of energy.

There are other theories though, like the universe being started in a Black Hole. [1] [2]

There are theories to explain the big bangs' origins, despite what a lot of people seem to claim. Scientists are working very hard to figure out which one (or more than one?) are correct, and there is a lot of observable evidence for the Big Bang theory. I am in no rush for them to find out, ultimately. I will live and die whether or not I know exactly how I came to exist. However, if they get a reasonable single theory (string theory hasn't provided observable empirical evidence yet, they hope the LHC will) that combines General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics (it seems more and more likely each day), it will be very interesting indeed.

[edit on 25-8-2008 by OnionCloud]

[edit on 25-8-2008 by OnionCloud]

Originally posted by longyforlife
i've just been thinking about how the univers started (as you do of course

) and i was thinking, if that is the theory everyone believes, what did actually bang? something had to have blown up or banged to produce this so what was there before the big bang? i mean all the univers can't just explode into existence from nothing... can it? this is driving me mad please state something about this!

I just want to tell you that you are on the right track. Nothing can come out of nothing. It is common sense.

If there is something it has to come from an other sourse. And thats common sense.

It like a crime seen. You try to finde clues to pin point to a owner.



[edit on 27.06.08 by spy66]

Originally posted by spy66
I just want to tell you that you are on the right track. Nothing can come out of nothing. It is common sense.

If there is something it has to come from an other sourse. And thats common sense.

It like a crime seen. You try to finde clues to pin point to a owner.



[edit on 27.06.08 by spy66]

Nothing can come from nothing (or cant it?), but nothing can exist eternally. Our existence is a paradox. See my post above. Ultimately, no one knows for certain what created the big bang, just like absolutely no one knows what created a god since it cant be measured, and since a god would need to be created. If a universe can't pop into existence, neither can the thing that created it. Paradoxes can be fun, and they can be stressful.


[edit on 25-8-2008 by OnionCloud]

Originally posted by OnionCloud

Originally posted by spy66
I just want to tell you that you are on the right track. Nothing can come out of nothing. It is common sense.

If there is something it has to come from an other sourse. And thats common sense.

It like a crime seen. You try to finde clues to pin point to a owner.



[edit on 27.06.08 by spy66]

Nothing can come from nothing (or cant it?), but nothing can exist eternally. Our existence is a paradox. See my post above. Ultimately, no one knows for certain what created the big bang, just like absolutely no one knows what created a god since it cant be measured, and since a god would need to be created. If a universe can't pop into existence, neither can the thing that created it. Paradoxes can be fun, and they can be stressful.


[edit on 25-8-2008 by OnionCloud]

Yes i have read yours and the other long poste above. But i feel that they should try and figure out God to. What is a God! Do we realy know what God is. Or are we trying very hard to put him in a box with a lidd on.

What the others are realy saying is that everything happend by chance. Like it just happend. They are trying to figure out a thought that would make sense. But they cant. The only thing that makes sense is that in the beginning there was nothing. When they start with nothing and bring in their thought abut creation nothing makes sense.

It is like if you walk in the dessert and finde a mobile phone. Which is made out off oil and sand. And you start to wonder what put that there. You would realy say who put that there. You know that the phone is made by a human. I know this is going to be silly.

But you could realy streach this very far if you dissbelive a human made the phone and put it there. You could start to cook up a story about evelution. That after billions of years ouer mother nature made the plastick out of oil and the chip out of sand. Because thats what we humans do and it makes sense to us.

I know youre common sense has punshed in by now. But i am trying to make a point.

[edit on 27.06.08 by spy66]

Originally posted by spy66
Yes i have read yours and the other long poste above. But i feel that they should try and figure out God to. What is a God! Do we realy know what God is. Or are we trying very hard to put him in a box with a lidd on.

God is undefinable. No one can know what he is because you can't test it reliably with proven methods.

What the others are realy saying is that everything happend by chance. Like it just happend. They are trying to figure out a thought that would make sense. But they cant. The only thing that makes sense is that in the beginning there was nothing. When they start with nothing and bring in their thought abut creation nothing makes sense.

I still strongly doubt that you've read and considered what I've said, because it explains that the very nature of the universe is one that is in constant fluctuation, seemingly creating virtual particles out of nothing, and then evaporating in themselves. It is true that we cannot explain how the universe came to be explicitly, but I am sure that you understand this is no easy task, and that science is working very hard and diligently to solve this.

This also seems to be the typical reaction of someone who is religious and/or spiritual. I was there before, and I felt the same way. If it can't be explained or doesn't seem logical, then it must be attributed to god or some supernatural cause. I learned, however, that there were many many things that we struggled to define in the past, and that religion claimed it was just god, and that's it, but we know better now. We used to think that the sun and the rest of existence revolved around us. We now know that we revolve around the sun, and that everything is expanding away from every point in space, like a point on the surface of a balloon, if you want to do a thought experiment on it.

I also realized that creation myths and religion in general are extremely inconsistent, and that so many philosophical and theocratic theories exist that it's essentially like picking the lotto. You just have to hope that the god you chose is correct, among the thousands that have existed in the past and the hundreds that are worshiped right now.

I also came to the realization that even within a single religion (like Christianity), there are many, many, many different denominations to choose from, which is just amazing considering that it makes it progressively hard to say what is a "true Christian". I also realized that there are terrorist groups [2] [3] [4] [5] that kill because their beliefs tell them to, and it's never one-sided. They don't even have to be considered "terrorists".

The historical record is rife with massacres and war crimes committed by theists, often for explicitly religious motivations. One of the more infamous was that of Arnold Amalric, Papal Legate during the 13th century Albigensian Crusade, who told the besiegers at the city of Beziers to "Kill them all, God will recognize His own." Estimates of the number of civilians killed range from twenty thousand to one hundred thousand.

Lack of being able to explain how something happened exactly is not a reason to attribute some magical source, and it is not something to be ashamed of. There is much we don't know, and science loves it. Scientists love it because it gives them opportunities to explore and discover new things. To boldly go where no one has gone before, to quote Star Trek.

It is like if you walk in the dessert and finde a mobile phone. Which is made out off oil and sand. And you start to wonder what put that there. You would realy say who put that there. You know that the phone is made by a human. I know this is going to be silly.

But you could realy streach this very far if you dissbelive a human made the phone and put it there. You could start to cook up a story about evelution. That after billions of years ouer mother nature made the plastick out of oil and the chip out of sand. Because thats what we humans do and it makes sense to us.

Sadly, that is nothing like anything I've said. Evolution would not result in a "mobile phone made of oil and sand". Oil and sand aren't subject to evolution, they aren't living organisms. Unless the cell phone is some sort of rock-based life form that hasn't been discovered. That would be interesting.

[edit on 25-8-2008 by OnionCloud]