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Originally posted by darkbluesky
American politicians and business leaders of today, as well as those of earlier generations, are no more, or less, manipulative, greed or power driven, charitable, altruistic, good, or evil, than any of their European counterparts.
You Eurpoeans must really get over yourselves. You are no better than anyone else. We're all the same on the inside, some of us just have more stuff.
The economic pie is getting bigger -- how can it be true that most Americans are getting smaller slices? The answer, of course, is that a few people are getting much, much bigger slices. Although wages have stagnated since Bush took office, corporate profits have doubled. The gap between the nation's CEOs and average workers is now ten times greater than it was a generation ago.
Originally posted by rich23
I'm certainly not trying to make out that the UK is saintly or any better than the US... just not as hypocritical. There isn't any of that pompous pigswill about bringing democracy to the middle east, that's all.
Originally posted by darkbluesky
Fair enough. If I could press you to admit there are plenty of other areas in which Brittish pomposity is truly marvelous, I think we can call it a day.
Originally posted by Gools
Originally posted by Freedom_for_sum
Well; Europe is well on its way toward Islamification.
That's perhaps the stupidest statement I've seen on here this week. Not only is this a made up word (Islamification) it has nothing to do with the topic.
Tehran lacks the freedom and transparency needed for a successful oil exchange.
By Milton Ezrati
JERSEY CITY, N.J. – If, as is widely believed, the original tales of the 1001 Arabian Nights came out of Persia, then Iran, Persia's modern successor, has just given the world yet another great fantasy: the Iranian oil bourse.
Surely Tehran lost touch with reality when it developed its plan to use a new, euro-based oil exchange, on Kish Island in the Persian Gulf, to dethrone the greenback from its position as the world's reigning reserve currency. Such a project is neither likely to attract much business nor to have Tehran's desired effect on the dollar or the United States.
Tehran's plan of attack has the virtue of economic logic at least. Iran's planners recognize that the heavy use of the dollar in international trade sustains its foreign exchange value by forcing people to hold greater dollar balances than they otherwise would. The dollar's consequent strength encourages its use in other transactions, which requires still greater dollar holdings in a dollar-boosting cycle. Iran's planners hope that their euro-based exchange will disrupt this pattern. By forcing oil traders to hold euro balances instead of dollar balances, Tehran expects the oil bourse to induce dollar selling and consequently force a drop in value. Those foreign exchange losses will draw still more trading away from the dollar, further weakening it, until, ultimately, it loses its world-leading position. Iran's planners expect to do the US great harm in this way.
This economic logic, though reasonable from a theoretical standpoint, misses some very practical hurdles to success. Tehran's exchange simply is not attractive compared with the exchanges in London and New York, where dealers and traders are prospering amid their well-developed networks. On distant Kish Island, they would: (1) lack trained locals to work in their operations, (2) have to deal with a notoriously corrupt bureaucracy, (3) lose contact with a transparent financial, regulatory, or banking system, (4) lack the necessary technological infrastructure, and (5) sever most links to the globe's electronic commercial structures on which trading relies.
Because Iran is not even a member of the World Trade Organization, dealers who move to Kish Island would also miss the kind of legal structures on which they rely to facilitate trading and secure the contracts that support it. Furthermore, a firm's move to Kish would subject any staff assigned there to Islamic sharia law. Western oil company employees tolerate that burden because they must go where the oil is. The same is not true of futures traders.
Against this list of drawbacks, it is difficult to see how such an exchange could even get started. Tehran is unconvincing with its argument that proximity to the Middle East oil fields can overcome other reservations, especially in today's electronic, information-laden world. Neither can Tehran use its oil production, as it has hinted, to force traders and dealers to its exchange. As long as Iran sells its oil onto world markets, it has no control over where it gets traded. And Iran, whatever its political agenda, simply does not have the economic and financial wherewithal to hold back its oil altogether. Petroleum amounts to 80 percent of all Iranian exports, 45 percent of the country's GDP, and 60 percent of the government's revenues. With the economy there already rickety, any shortfall in oil sales would tempt financial, economic, and consequently political suicide for Iran's current regime.
Iran's proposed bourse would also face serious diplomatic and religious problems. To work, the exchange would require a free flow of funds and oil, but Iran's membership in OPEC subjects it to strict production and sales quotas. It is not at all clear how Tehran plans to reconcile one requirement with the other. Most fundamental of all, at least for many Iranians, is the likely violation of Islamic law. The Koran forbids either paying or receiving interest; futures contracts always carry an implicit interest for the time value of money. On this basis, the bourse could pose more of a problem for relations between Iran's government and its people than for the dollar.
Even if by some miracle of legal maneuvering and commercial seduction, Tehran established its euro-based oil bourse, trading there would likely fail to move the dollar from its dominant position. Even a wildly successful Iranian exchange would have only a short-lived currency effect. Once traders and dealers had adjusted their transactions balances to accommodate the euro-based trading, they would have no reason for further dollar sales or euro purchases. Currency values would then stabilize at a new level.
Clearly, Tehran has failed to think through its bourse project thoroughly. For the time being then, such talk of dollar destruction from Tehran resembles hopes and dreams more than practice and probability. To steal a phrase from that inspired Middle Eastern thinker, Fouad Ajami, the Iranian oil bourse would seem then to fit best with the many other Middle Eastern "dream palaces."
Originally posted by semperfoo
I already posted this in the original topic about iran dumping the dollar. But what the hell. Since beating a dead horse in the head is popular around here why not a repost??
Irans plan to weaken the US dollar will fail!
Even a wildly successful Iranian exchange would have only a short-lived currency effect. Once traders and dealers had adjusted their transactions balances to accommodate the euro-based trading, they would have no reason for further dollar sales or euro purchases. Currency values would then stabilize at a new level.
Ill leave it up to you doom and gloomers now.
Originally posted by semperfoo
JERSEY CITY, N.J. – If, as is widely believed, the original tales of the 1001 Arabian Nights came out of Persia, then Iran, Persia's modern successor, has just given the world yet another great fantasy: the Iranian oil bourse.
Surely Tehran lost touch with reality when it developed its plan to use a new, euro-based oil exchange, on Kish Island in the Persian Gulf, to dethrone the greenback from its position as the world's reigning reserve currency. Such a project is neither likely to attract much business nor to have Tehran's desired effect on the dollar or the United States.
Tehran's plan of attack has the virtue of economic logic at least.
Iran's planners recognize that the heavy use of the dollar in international trade sustains its foreign exchange value by forcing people to hold greater dollar balances than they otherwise would. The dollar's consequent strength encourages its use in other transactions, which requires still greater dollar holdings in a dollar-boosting cycle.
Iran's planners hope that their euro-based exchange will disrupt this pattern.
By forcing oil traders to hold euro balances instead of dollar balances, Tehran expects the oil bourse to induce dollar selling and consequently force a drop in value. Those foreign exchange losses will draw still more trading away from the dollar, further weakening it, until, ultimately, it loses its world-leading position.
Iran's planners expect to do the US great harm in this way.
Tehran's exchange simply is not attractive compared with the exchanges in London and New York, where dealers and traders are prospering amid their well-developed networks. On distant Kish Island, they would: (1) lack trained locals to work in their operations, (2) have to deal with a notoriously corrupt bureaucracy, (3) lose contact with a transparent financial, regulatory, or banking system, (4) lack the necessary technological infrastructure, and (5) sever most links to the globe's electronic commercial structures on which trading relies.
Because Iran is not even a member of the World Trade Organization, dealers who move to Kish Island would also miss the kind of legal structures on which they rely to facilitate trading and secure the contracts that support it.
Furthermore, a firm's move to Kish would subject any staff assigned there to Islamic sharia law. Western oil company employees tolerate that burden because they must go where the oil is. The same is not true of futures traders.
Neither can Tehran use its oil production, as it has hinted, to force traders and dealers to its exchange. As long as Iran sells its oil onto world markets, it has no control over where it gets traded.
With the economy there already rickety
Iran's proposed bourse would also face serious diplomatic and religious problems.
To work, the exchange would require a free flow of funds and oil, but Iran's membership in OPEC subjects it to strict production and sales quotas.
The Koran forbids either paying or receiving interest; futures contracts always carry an implicit interest for the time value of money. On this basis, the bourse could pose more of a problem for relations between Iran's government and its people than for the dollar.
Even a wildly successful Iranian exchange would have only a short-lived currency effect. Once traders and dealers had adjusted their transactions balances to accommodate the euro-based trading, they would have no reason for further dollar sales or euro purchases. Currency values would then stabilize at a new level.