NK Nuclear Test Faked?

While watching the various news reports from around the world it appears that the NK Nuclear Test yield was at a level of 550tons of Dynamite without any detectable radiation. 550 tons, not Kilotons, not Megatons, 550 tons. That would effectively be 1/2 the explosive power shown on this map.

Just two years ago the U.S. Air Force was asking that the Spratt-Furse provision be abolished so that they could develop weapons with yields lower than 5kt, thats Kilotons, not tons. The question becomes that of whether North Korea has the knowledge and education to develop weapons with such small yields while having a program that is in an 'infant' state. It has always been my understanding, from educators, physicists and weapons experts alike that it is easier to build a weapon with a medium yield than it is to build a specialized large or small yield weapon due to the amounts of material, the refinements to the materials, the types of materials required and the cost of the weapon.

My conjecture in another thread was that NK had actually detonated 550 tons of dynamite in order to simulate the nuclear explosion, as they had reported no leaks of, or detectable radiation, from the site. What if there was another quite different scenario at work though, what if the powers that be, decided to pay-off NK and have them fake the test in order to promote programs in their home countries that would enable them to better control populations and shipping? While China has no real problem controlling their population, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan have remarkebly free populations without many Governmental restrictions. Of course China would eventually benefit from Taiwanese local restrictions and militarization, but what benefit would North Korea receive from such an action. The United States dictatorship benefits due to the great fear that is now instilled in the predominately democratic west coast of a potential, and 'real' nuclear threat from a 'mad man'. Current actions before the UN are restrictions on shipped high-technology equipment, which NK is used to, but there are no restrictions on food, medical and humanitarian aid. So the status quo for North Korea remains basically unchanged as a pariah in Asia, with the exception that the local boogeyman is now a perceived nuclear boogeyman.

The home advantages are too great to be considered out of the question, so did a consortium, or even a lone country, undertake an operation to allow North Korea to fake a nuclear detonation, with financial incentives being paid to NK in exchange for the raising of NK status to Nuclear North Korea?

Its still very up in the air and has not been verified by the US and surely they must be able to detect a definate Nuclear blast. There were definate systems in place a few years ago during the Cold War.
I may lean towards the fake option - a political tool.
Even if it was real it obviously failed and they have no decent way to deliver the weapon.... only a glorified Scud !
Don't panic yet.

I was under the impression that the air had been tested and showed radiation all I know is that when that test came in alot of orders came to base about sending troops to South Korea and a few unit of soliders got sent there maybe just doing an over seas tour but kind of makes me think it was just a small yeild but since the radiation they want to be in position in case something goes down.

It was either a fake or the failed attempted detonation of a nuclear device.

It's certainly not possible that it was a successful test.

Its not hard to mess up a nuke but you never know right! Anyway I dont think it was a successfull test if so it would have a much bigger yeild. But it was something with a larger than normal exploision because it registered on a seismograph in america and bombs leave unique lines alot different than an earthquake.

They're definitely was an explosion that happened, because SK and China reported recieving rayleigh waves at seismic stations.
But just what was exploded is a question.

I think that NK just detonated a big pile of dynomite to push its propaganda machine along.

If it was a legitimate nuclear weapon, it definitely malfunctioned. No way that a real nuke could generate such a low level of shock.

Theyre probably as far away from the bomb as Iran is.

IMO that doesn't make sense, Don W.

If you go into a test bragging your little arse off about how you're going to detonate a 400kT weapon, and instead you get a crappy little fizzle yield, you aren't going to be heralded for having designed a crafty suitcase weapon...you're going to be derided for fizzling your first one.

Pakistan fizzled three in May of 1998, but fixed whatever the issue was.

Only the big nations have the technology for mini-nukes, such as America, Israel (where it was pioneered if im not mistaken), the UK etc..

I think the test was fake, and the big powers know it was, yet they lie about it because obviously it benefits them to say it was nuclear.

I say that with no degree of certainty, because i don't have enough knowledge on NK, its relations to the US and NWO etc.

Originally posted by shrunkensimon
Only the big nations have the technology for mini-nukes, such as America, Israel (where it was pioneered if im not mistaken), the UK etc..

I think the test was fake, and the big powers know it was, yet they lie about it because obviously it benefits them to say it was nuclear.

I say that with no degree of certainty, because i don't have enough knowledge on NK, its relations to the US and NWO etc.

Anyone can fizzle one. They were saying going in to the test that the yield would be 400kT. Instead, they got more like 0.4kT. That is a fizzle. The thing sort of worked, but didn't. Bang, lose your test rig, lose your fissiles, start over.

If the bomb were nuclear then it would not have been a Plutonium bomb. With a Plutonium fission bomb you have to precisely implode multiple elements of Pu239 so they reach criticality at the same millisecond.

If you are off by so much as a whisker the explosion will not occur. That is why Plutonium and not Uranium is used for military A-bombs. Using Pu239 allows one to create failsafe locks. A Uranium warhead is so fragile that it could explode accidentally by rough handling.

On the other hand a Uranium bomb is extremely easy to detonate which makes it the weapon of choice for terrorists. Obtaining highly enriched uranium is the big challenge to a terrorist.

Back to the topic, North Korea had a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor since 1965 which was designed to use Uranium enriched to 10% U235. In 1974 the North Koreans modified that reactor to use fuel enriched to 80% U235, which effectively made it a Plutonium breeder reactor.

The implication is therefore that North Korea has a source of highly enriched Uranium. North Korea has been closely involved with setting up Burma's nuclear program. Burma/Myanmar, ships rice and uranium to North Korea in return for technological assistance and weapons.

It is plausible that the October 2006 test was a fizzled Uranium A-bomb. It is not plausible that it was a fizzled Plutonium bomb. It is also possible that it was a TNT explosion. However one needs to ask oneself why the explosion would be faked with TNT and the answer to that is what is really interesting ?

Originally posted by sy.gunson
If the bomb were nuclear then it would not have been a Plutonium bomb. With a Plutonium fission bomb you have to precisely implode multiple elements of Pu239 so they reach criticality at the same millisecond.

If you are off by so much as a whisker the explosion will not occur. That is why Plutonium and not Uranium is used for military A-bombs. Using Pu239 allows one to create failsafe locks. A Uranium warhead is so fragile that it could explode accidentally by rough handling.

(snip)

It is plausible that the October 2006 test was a fizzled Uranium A-bomb. It is not plausible that it was a fizzled Plutonium bomb. It is also possible that it was a TNT explosion. However one needs to ask oneself why the explosion would be faked with TNT and the answer to that is what is really interesting ?

Well, no. It's tough not to fizzle a plutonium weapon. The reason why is Pu240 contaminants. Pu240 spontaneously emits neutrons, and thus can initiate an assembly before it's at optimum supercriticality.

Any plutonium weapon is an exercise in statistics. You have to compress the pit to super-criticality as fast as possible in order to reduce the likelihood of having a spontaneous emission occur during the window between break-even criticality and your desired optimum.

But it's strictly the Pu240 contaminant that causes the issue. If you could magically remove all of it, you could build a gun type bomb with plutonium. If you can't remove enough of it, you run the risk of having a fizzle yield due to predetonation. This is why Khan didn't design any plutonium devices. Most plutonium produced in power reactors is chock-full of Pu240; to minimize its production, you have to optimize your rod formulations and the reactor design.

So, yes, you most definitely CAN have a fizzle yield from a plutonium device. You can get one from having a "Munroe effect" jet form during compression so that you don't get the density you want. You can get one from having an initiation failure. You can get one from having predetonation due to crappy material. You can get one from not having proper reflectors. Lots of ways to mess up. The US fizzled a couple of shots, but they were generally trying something outlandish when it happened.

Thanks I appreciate the input. I was unaware of the Pu240 issues. So that means North Korea has come back to the negotiating table because they failed ?

Most likely. I can't imagine wanting to fizzle one on purpose, or to simulate a fizzle, because all you're saying is "we couldn't do it on the first shot". Pakistan blew a couple of their first tests too, but that was with Uranium designs, which you'd have thought they could do easily.

I have heard that NK bought Uranium bomb designs from Khan but chose to try for a thermonuclear device, not a good design for your first shot.

But they have a good bit of plutonium on hand, and it's easier to get for them than centrifuging for Uranium isotopes, all they have to do is extract it from their research reactors, and they have a PUREX line just for that purpose.

If all their Pu is crappy with 240 though, then they might not be able to deal with it. Separating out 240 from your 239 is damn nigh impossible.

Separating out 240 from your 239 is damn nigh impossible.

That would require isotope separation every bit as complex as Uranium enrichment. In fact more dangerous because the Plutonium would be hot and radioactive.

Is Pu240 contamination a consequence of impurity in the original Uranium ores, or a failure in the reactor design. The North Koreans modified the Soviet supplied reactor to use 80% enriched Uranium from it's original 10% enriched fuel.

Does the Pu240 impurity imply therefore that the reactor's modification may itself have led to Pu240, or should they have used more enriched Uranium ?

North Korea appears to be sourcing Uranium from a mine in Northern Burma/Myanmar. Where are they enriching it ?

I have read of an underground nuclear complex in Myanmar linked to a nearby hydroelectric power station and with a purpose built airport which receives flights from North Korea.

The problem comes when you have an atom of U238 that picks up two neutrons. It picks up one and becomes Pu239, which is what you want, but as you build up more and more 239 in the fuel rod, you increase the chance that an atom of Pu239 will intercept a neutron. When this happens, you have about a 38% chance (in a reactor) that the Pu239 atom will transmute to Pu240.

You can reduce this likelihood by starting off with fuel rods that are depleted, and by cycling them out early. The higher you let the Pu239 concentration go, the more 240 you will produce. On the other hand, it's less cost effective. A poor country would tend to leave it in there and get all the Pu they could, but it also tends to produce crappy Pu.

You also want your reactor's neutron flux pattern to be as even as possible, so you try to design for that. If you have "hot spots" you will tend to produce Pu240 there.

Navy "SuperAlloy" has dramatically reduced Pu240, because they have less shielding for the bubbleheads. So there's a way to cut back on 240 in your end product, but I couldn't tell you that I knew how that worked.

Thanks I really appreciate your guidance. Gee that means these guys could get it right if they had more time and changed their technique ?

That is not very comforting. NK, Iran and Myanmar are very good at stalling with spurious objections.