Unstoppable - Russian next gen stealth hypersonic ramjet/scramjet cruise/anti-ship missiles.

Originally posted by doctorfungi
Lol,

Funny how the thread's gone so off-topic.

It did?

As for the missile being 'unstopable'... that's a claim that Russia's going to have to proove.

Some here and in defense circle's are making the claim so not sure where you got that from.

And Russia doesn't have a good history of providing evidence that their weapons systems are 'unstopable'.

It's like the Second world war and the last 60 odd years of history just never happened? Have you read anything generally related to this topic or are you as bored as you are ignorant? I'm just not sure how else you would have ended up here saying what you just did...

The funniest thing is you're providing all these different weapons systems and sources basically trying to say that Russian firepower is greater than the United States...

It is if we consider what's operational in both countries....

are you failing to realise half these things you're posting are only on paper? The United States already has stuff very similar to these things.

Well feel free to try prove that the US navy currently operates anything but the Harpoon cruise missile in the anti shipping role from their naval ships and submarines. We are talking about systems and principle's that have been is use for decades.

Stellar

One AWACS per 400 km of borders flying high enough in order to detect low flying missiles linked with Patriot batteries should be more than enough.

Originally posted by longbow
One AWACS per 400 km of borders flying high enough in order to detect low flying missiles linked with Patriot batteries should be more than enough.

Please investigate the Patriot's combat record against cruise missiles and or ballistic missiles.

Here's some information to get you started.

Accounts from the field indicate that the Patriots are being used in a manner known as the ripple-fire, where multiple Patriots are launched against a single threat in the hopes that their lethality will be increased simply by sheer dint of numbers. The ripple-fire method is more or less how the Patriot was designed to be operated, so it is not unusual that it is being applied in Iraq. But it is important to note this doctrine, because otherwise the impression might be gained that the missiles were destroying their targets on a one-to-one basis. Also, some of the Iraqi missiles are simply being let to fly unmolested if U.S. forces deem that they will land in unpopulated areas. This would imply that Patriot missile battery commanders are reserving their limited number of missiles for the most pressing threats.

Finally, the accidental downing of a British Tornado fighter by a Patriot missile on Sunday is a terrible reminder of the system’s limitations. Even if the operators do everything they are supposed to do, technical problems can and do crop up. Expectations of the Patriot's effectiveness must be reined in so that such tragedies can be side-stepped in the future.

www.cdi.org...

To begin, the 32d AAMDC claims that the Patriot made nine intercepts out of nine engagements, allowing it a 100 percent success rate. This seems to be the result of a rather tortuous portrayal of the facts given in their own history. Reading through it, 23 Iraqi missile launches are documented (9 Ababil-100s, 4 Al Samouds, 4 CSSC-3s, 4 FROG-7s, and 2 unknowns). Of these, indeed, 9 apparently were intercepted by U.S. or Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, thanks to the at least 24 Patriot-type missiles (PAC-2, GEM, GEM+, and PAC-3) that were fired. However, that leaves 14 Iraqi missiles which were not intercepted. Excluding the one Ababil-100 which malfunctioned and blew up shortly after launch and the four FROG-7s which were outside of the Patriot’s range, leaves 9 Iraqi missiles which were not destroyed by the Patriot. The fact that they landed “harmlessly” in the desert or the Persian Gulf, in the words of the authors of the report, does not change the fact that they were not intercepted. In the CENTCOM area of responsibility at the time of the war, there were 1069 Patriot missiles (54 of which were PAC-3 missiles), and 29 U.S. and 5 Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, so there should have been ample assets on the U.S. side to counter these Iraqi threats. Claiming that the Patriot had a 100 percent interception rate seems disingenuous at best and an outright manipulation of events at worst. Also surprising is that after 12 years of criticism, following the dismal performance of Patriot in the first Persian Gulf War, the Army is still calling an "engagement" an interception, when by their own descriptions sometimes "engaged" Iraqi missiles were not intercepted. For example, the history for March 21, 2003, reports six Iraqi TBMs "successfully engaged and destroyed by Patriot systems to date." But that counts an Ababil-100 and an Al Samoud that were NOT intercepted on March 20th. This calls into question what evidence the Army has for the nine intercepts it does claim.

www.cdi.org...

We conclude that the body of video we have reviewed contains data on at least 22 to 23 out of roughly 47 Desert Storm engagements. Of even greater significance, the video appears to include 17 to 18 out of roughly 30 engagements in Saudi Arabia. This indicates that there is a very substantial base of video information from which an assessment of Patriot's performance can be made.

We have found no convincing evidence in the video that any Scud warhead was destroyed by a Patriot. We have strong evidence that Patriots hit Scuds an two occasions (in WSMR Events 8 and 13), but in both cases we found video evidence that the Scud warheads fell to the ground and exploded. These clips suggest that even when Patriots could hit Scuds they were still not able to destroy the Scud warheads. We also have several other clips where it is possible that Patriots hit Scuds without detonating their warheads. but the evidence in these clips is quite ambiguous (see, for example, Additional Event 3).

In addition, we have estimated minimum miss distances for all cases where we could clearly observe Patriot missing Scuds. We present our summarized findings in tabular and graphical form in figures 8, 9 and 1O. The median minimum miss distance was roughly 600 meters. This is much larger than the press video minimum resolvable miss distance of 35 to 70 meters. To achieve lethality against Scud targets, a system like the Patriot must routinely achieve miss distances of meters to tens of meters, not hundreds to thousands of meters as observed in the video. This result of the video review by itself indicates unambiguously that there was a serious problem with Patriot during the Gulf War.

www.fas.org...

Marines deployed north and east of the headquarters suddenly observe a low-flying missile passing overhead, pointed towards Kuwait in the direction of Camp Commando. IMEF’s air defense computer terminals display nothing out of the ordinary, and no Scud alert is sounded. Marines in the headquarters are astonished and surprised to hear the signature of a low-flying jet engine overhead, followed by the noise and concussion from a large warhead blast.
An Iraqi Seersucker antiship cruise missile converted into a land attack role has just missed decapitating IMEF by a mere one hundred yards. The missile, launched from the Faw peninsula, flew undetected and unengaged straight through the heart of an alert and robust U.S. theater air and missile defense system. Following this attack, the U.S. Marines maintained a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) of F/A-18s over the Faw peninsula for several days.
Fortunately, the cruise missile in this instance was armed with only a conventional warhead. Because of their payload capabilities and their inherent ability to fly over large swaths of land, land attack cruise missiles (LACM) are a platform optimized for the employment of chemical or biological weapons. Currently, such an attack would likely go undetected, preventing U.S. forces from donning protective equipment and taking shelter.
During OIF, five Chinese-built CSSC-3 “Seersucker” antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) were launched by Iraq against land targets in Kuwait. The attack described above was the first. A second attack, using two Seersucker cruise missiles on 28 March, was aimed at ships at the naval base of Kuwait City. One missile homed in on a radar reflector, the other on a seafront shopping center. Two Seersuckers were also launched on 31 March—one at the port at Umm Qasr and the other at troops at Safwan. Not a single one of these missiles was targeted or even detected in-flight.

www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Cruise_Missile_Defense_Final.doc

Israeli officials and experts agree that the Patriot failed in its military mission. The only debate in Israel is whether the Patriot hit one or none of the Scuds it attempted to intercept. Israeli officials tracked each Scud to the ground and thus had the craters to prove that the initial claims of intercept success were false.

The Army claims, with varying degrees of confidence, that the Patriot Missile system destroyed 52 percent of the Scuds.

The General Accounting Office does not share that confidence. Independent review of the evidence in support of the Army claims reveals that, using the Army’s own methodology and evidence, a strong case can be made that Patriots hit only 9 percent of the Scud warheads engaged, and there are serious questions about these few hits. (GAO Report: "Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed, " September 1992, NSIAD 920340) The speed of the Scuds, the limitations of the Patriot missile system, and the confusion and targeting difficulties caused by the break-up of the Scud missile as it re-entered the atmosphere seem to have contributed to the high failure rate.

www.ceip.org...

I think this will get you as close to the truth as we outsiders manage on our best days.

Stellar

[edit on 9-10-2006 by StellarX]

stellar, I saw you say that Russia would have a greater chance of winning a conventional war against US in this or other thread. Can you please sammarize and explain how this is, I mean russia doesnt have the number of tanks or jets that america does. I just dont get how its possible. Just a brief sammary in any thread, thx..

Again, we need to stop judging the USSR based on what we see in the Russian Federation. The two countries have become apples and oranges. While Russia can still come up with advanced weapons systems, we have to remember that unless you have the R&D support for the long run, those projects will go nowhere.

And yes, the Russian Federation is not even a shadow of what it once was. It had to resort to a military beauty pageant in order to boost enlistment. That speaks volumes to me.

Originally posted by sweatmonicaIdo
Again, we need to stop judging the USSR based on what we see in the Russian Federation. The two countries have become apples and oranges. While Russia can still come up with advanced weapons systems, we have to remember that unless you have the R&D support for the long run, those projects will go nowhere.

So why have they deployed numerous NEW ICBM's/SKBM's after the end of the cold war? I am surprised that people can not see just how very little has in fact changed in the strategic military sense.

And yes, the Russian Federation is not even a shadow of what it once was. It had to resort to a military beauty pageant in order to boost enlistment. That speaks volumes to me.

So why are the Russian federation still deploying a more effective nuclear strategic force? Why do the Russian federation have a nation wide ABM system when the USA( nothing declared anyways) has nothing like it? I just fail to understand how people have come to believe that the USSR just evaporated even thought Russian retains everything that made the USSR such a threat to the west.

Stellar

what about a conventional war?

Originally posted by zikan42
stellar, I saw you say that Russia would have a greater chance of winning a conventional war against US in this or other thread. Can you please sammarize and explain how this is, I mean russia doesnt have the number of tanks or jets that america does. I just dont get how its possible. Just a brief sammary in any thread, thx..

Russia operates far more tanks/artillery (far more than the USA )does and they deploy Sam's in such numbers that one must question how effective American air power can possible be against such when it could not even prevent the Serb army with ancient Sa-6's from prosecuting a ground offensive. I would be very hard for me to provide you with a simple summary of all the information that has led me to my current conclusion so I'm not sure where to really start... This is predicated on the notion that NATO chooses to invade Russia at some stage as the Russians are imo unlikely to invade Western Europe now when they could have done so at any time since the middle 70's. The Russians clearly have a obsession with self defense while the USA and allies are mostly interested in destroying any countries who get ideas about independent foreign/domestic policies.

I should state that when i talk about 'conventional' war i am including nuclear weapons as they are 'conventional' in terms of Russian strategic thinking; they might not use ICBM/SLBM against the North American mainland (weapons which will be devastating beyond comprehension anyways) other than the EMP types but they will be used everywhere else. Once one starts thinking of the war in those terms one might begin to understand why Russian will not lose; they are prepared to go all the way and sacrifice more than their adversaries.

If you want the technical material you will find ample resources here on how i believe they would have fought.

www.abovetopsecret.com...

www.abovetopsecret.com...

www.abovetopsecret.com...

Some indication of current force levels...

warfare.ru...

warfare.ru...

warfare.ru...

Stellar

Originally posted by StellarX
So why are the Russian federation still deploying a more effective nuclear strategic force? Why do the Russian federation have a nation wide ABM system when the USA( nothing declared anyways) has nothing like it? I just fail to understand how people have come to believe that the USSR just evaporated even thought Russian retains everything that made the USSR such a threat to the west.

A natipn wide ABM system ? I have proven yu incorrect many times with this, with your own sources as well, yet you persist in this fantasy. that is why people are very cautious about what you say.

Hi everybody, I've been away for a few days.

Glad to see that this thread is still generating food for thought.

As for the missile being 'unstopable'... that's a claim that Russia's going to have to proove. And Russia doesn't have a good history of providing evidence that their weapons systems are 'unstopable'.

Such rationale is just as saying that a .308 rifle will just have to prove that it's a much more capable weapon when compared to a muzzle loading musket.

As for Soviet/Russian history of their weapon effectiveness, do your own research and feel free to start with over a decade of international arms shows, at which time and again Russian weapon were openly tested and repeatedly proved their effectiveness just as it was stated.

The funniest thing is you're providing all these different weapons systems and sources basically trying to say that Russian firepower is greater than the United States...

No, I for one did not pose any firepower comparisons.

are you failing to realise half these things you're posting are only on paper? The United States already has stuff very similar to these things.

Oh come on, don't be lazy, list to the first page and actually take the time to go through the links provided.

Also again to the advantages of those hypersonic cruise missiles - surely they might be better than subsonic ones but as said is one X-90 hypersonic missile better than 10-12 subsonic stealthy AGM-129 with the same range and payload? Especially if this supersonic missile needs to fly a lot of time quite high too, while AGM-129 flies constantly 50 meters over surface? Because those 12 subsonic missile are equal in weight to just 1 X-90.

longbow, I see that you are determined to constantly repeat your self over and over again, while purposefully ignoring the information which is actually being provided to you.

Such approach is anti-productive, and definitely does not fall into the "deny ignorance" category.

My very point on the issue is that Russians have BOTH hypersonic and stealth sub-sonic cruise missiles. Once again, they are X-90 and X-101.

Once again, X-90 was not just a prototype or a conceptual test bed. Naturally the platform was extensively used as a lab, but bu 1989 is was ready for serial production, carried twin warheads, and was to be deployed in pairs.

I'm really at a loss why you are so determined to ignore these basic facts, and result to repeating the same invalid statements.

Do you think it is worth it? Certainly russians realized it's not, because they cancelled it in favour of subsonic variant.

Again, longbow, at this point this is simply a matter of basic respect and consideration. I have taken the time to address your assumptions time and time again, yet you simply choose just to ignore them. I don't really know how to proceed at this point, and can only assume that you are not interested in a constructive debate, but are simply set on denying what ever does not fit into your belief system.

This is the LAST time I will urge you to simply flip back a page or two to get the answer to that question.

e same about Brahmos or Sunburn - surely one is better than Harpoon, but is this 2 ton missile better than 3 Harpoons fired at once?

longbow, do your self a favor and really take the time to take a deep look into the current generation of ship defense systems.

Points to investigate; speed, kinetics, payload/range, defense systems response time, and available performance statistics of such defense systems.

To the IR sensors used for long range detection - it is certainly not difficeult - Airborne Laser is based on them, it has no radars at all. If the plane with IR detector flies high it can see cruise missile 300-400km away because the terrain would not protect it.

One AWACS per 400 km of borders flying high enough in order to detect low flying missiles linked with Patriot batteries should be more than enough.

My apologies, but such a statement is just a bare and unsupported assumption. Please read up on it, and then support your statements with factual data and not just wishful thinking and overactive imagination.

Again, we need to stop judging the USSR based on what we see in the Russian Federation. The two countries have become apples and oranges. While Russia can still come up with advanced weapons systems, we have to remember that unless you have the R&D support for the long run, those projects will go nowhere.

Man, do I get tired of having to repeat my self, over and over again.

What are the supporting facts behind such "opinions" on the state of post USSR R&D funding levels?

And yes, the Russian Federation is not even a shadow of what it once was.

Let's make sense of this statement to start with. I take it the meaning here is that Russian Federation "is not even a shadow" of what USSR was.

In order to , one has to understand the fundamental changes that took place, and necessary restructuring they have caused.

Cold War is OVER, and asinine statements like "Russia in not USSR, therefore it's weaker", are based only on the lack of basic education on the issues at hand.

Russia in NOT USSR, and that is precisely the POINT! Russia no longer has the need to keep an enormous standing army, and that is precisely why they are actively developing high-tech solutions which were simply to expensive to realize during Cold War days given the massive requirements of the entire system.

It had to resort to a military beauty pageant in order to boost enlistment. That speaks volumes to me.

No, that speak volumes on the lack of insight into Russian Federation challenges.

For ones that are not aware, since 1991 Russia has been involved in numerous regional civil war type conflicts do to the collapse of the USSR.

Chechnya is one, and recruiting 18 year old to their deaths is not an easy thing to do, just as it's not easy to recruit American kids to go and die in Afghanistan and Iraq.

What speak volumes to me, is the ever increasing recruitment advertising budget of US armed forces, and the ever dwindling numbers of recruits.

Going back to the topic at hand, as of now, X-90 is the most sophisticated cruise missile in the world, which so far does not have a single countermeasure system.

All tastes of ABM concepts are designed to deal with ballistic threats, all of which have a predictable flight path and behavior. High/low hypersonic cruise missile presents an entirely new set of challenges.

If somebody has any information on any system (other then S400/500) which can intercept a long range, maneuvering hypersonic target capable of variable approach vectors (high/low), let me know, I'm all ears.

My point here is simple. Whit all this talk on various ABM defense networks and trillions of tax dollars they require, nobody ever seems to mention the little simple fact that Russians fully developed a hypersonic cruise missile back in the 80s, and how exactly does this new ABM concept is supposed to protect us from such fundamentally new approach.

X-90 by default carries twin nuclear OR conventional warheads, and seeing how fast Russians always manage to transfer high technologies to their customers to manufacture on their own systems under license, what will stop them from doing the same with hypersonic technologies in a decade or two?

And that's after we already invested unknown trillions into a defense system designed to counter a ballistic threat, NOT a hypersonic cruise missile threat.

Simple stuff here.

Originally posted by StellarX
Please investigate the Patriot's combat record against cruise missiles and or ballistic missiles.

StellarX,

I think you are making a great point, but I think it goes both ways. The US Patriot system is the only long range anti-aircraft/missile system of its kind actually deployed in combat, starting in 1991 and again in 2003, and both times there were major problems discovered. Considering the missile was never tested against a ballistic missile until the Gulf War itself, it did a pretty good job even though it couldn't destroy the incoming missile.

However, I'd also point out none of the problems of 1991 were visable in 2003, instead it was a different set of issues. The Patriot I was used in 1991, the Patriot II was used in 2003, and today the US deploys the Patriot III. While tested as often as international competitors, it is still considered the defacto standard of anti-missile weapon systems, because it is the only weapon system to be thoroughly tested in combat with an abundence of data to draw from, and improve upon.

If it was me, I'd take the Patriot over any other system, because it is the only proven system against Ballistic missiles. I'll take a proven system that has been heavily tested and invested in over a leading competitor with no practical experience outside of controlled testing anyday, and that goes for any military product.

And btw, that is why I am against many of the 'futuristic' style weapon proposals that are unproven, when proven alternatives should be persued and enhanced instead (IMO). In combat, "neato" doesn't carry much weight, but "reliable" sure as hell does.

And what about Metal Storm?

Given the fire rate and speed it could even take down incoming, supersonic missiles?
Or are there other problematic factors like sensors and aiming at those missiles properly?

Originally posted by rogue1
A natipn wide ABM system ? I have proven yu incorrect many times with this, with your own sources as well, yet you persist in this fantasy. that is why people are very cautious about what you say.

You never did but i guess we have to start this all over again from the bottem up.

Here is some of the information that i will use to support my views if you have any interest in a technical discussion.

1

By the end of the 1960s, targeting may have focused on Moscow, with all the missiles of a nuclear submarine committed to destroying the ABM system and the city. The capability of the Moscow ABM system might have limited the flexibility of British targeting by tying down most of the deployed force. Polaris appears to have been judged much more effective against the SA-5B Gammon interceptors of the Tallinn system. A 1970 study published by the British Atomic Energy Authority concluded that SA-5B interceptors were not a threat to British Polaris missiles, and that it would take only two Polaris missile payloads to saturate a standard SA-5B battery.

In 1972, the British government decided to develop a new front end for the Polaris missiles "designed specifically to penetrate [the] anti-ballistic missile defenses" around Moscow. This improved system, called Chevaline, was deployed in 1982. It carried pen-aids and three 40-kiloton maneuverable reentry vehicles that were "hardened" against the radiation effects of the nuclear ABM interceptors.

www.thebulletin.org... art_ofn=ma04kristensen

2

This new evidence reinforces longstanding concerns about systematic Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. Battlefield management radars are
the long leadtime component of any ABM defense system and the Soviets seem to have gained a great deal of experience in this field since 1975 when they installed an ABM-X-3 radar in the Kamchatka impact area for their ICBM tests. Over the years, the Soviets have also been upgrading their surface-to-air (SAM) bomber defense systems--now presumed to perform an ABM role. Since the Carter Administration, the Soviets repeatedly have tested various types of SAM missiles in'a discernable ABM mode at altitudes above 100,000 feet and have deployed thousands of less capable SA-5 missiles around-Soviet cities. These illegal ABM activities and the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missle system clearly point to a Soviet decision to subvert the ABM Treaty shortly after signing it.

Refusals to acknowledge these Soviet treaty violations point to the perennial dilemma of what to do after detecting cheating. The Administra-. tion is doingitself and the country no favor by refusing to acknowledge the mounting evidence that the Soviets are developing a capability which seriously erodes strategic stability and will soon permit the Soviet Union to break out of the ABM Treaty. The Administration should document and publicize Soviet ABM activities and Treaty violations. It should accele- rate the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BDM) program. Unless Moscow can refute the evidence that its radar and weapons programs are not de- signed for an ABM role, the U.S. should abrogate the ABM Treaty.


www.heritage.org...

3

Ironically, the development of the upgraded ground- based battle-management radars, which can track MIRVed RVs, was carried out during the ABM Treaty negotiations. Construction of these facilities could hardly have gone unnoticed by the West, for they resemble several Manhattan skyscrapers joined together in one unit. Construction began in 1972, and the first units became operational in the1980s. The well-known Krasnoyarsk Radar-the sixth of nine such radars--was a deliberate treaty violation by the Soviet leadership. Is it possible that United States and NATO spy satellites did not detect these massive structures? If not, then why are these flagrant treaty violations being ignored?

In total the U.S.S.R. deployed two generations of national missile defenses, consisting of 18 large radars and 12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors at 280 complexes. Moscow itself is protected not only by 100 ABM missiles, as permitted by the treaty, but also by several thousand SAM/ABM interceptors.

newsmax.com.../4/24/53247

4

Immediately prior to the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviets had developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-5, which was observed to have a peculiar trajectory. The SA-5 was fired high above the atmosphere and then would descend to intercept and destroy enemy bombers. While technically such a trajectory could not be ruled out, logically, however, it could not be accepted as this type of trajectory represents the least efficient way to shoot down enemy aircraft. On the other hand, the SA-5?s trajectory would be just the ticket for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles which themselves travel above the atmosphere. Taking this into account, the SA-5 had to be an ABM weapon. But with the ABM treaty almost in hand, this fact was ignored and the treaty went into effect. The treaty remains in effect, limiting development of a U.S. ABM system. Meanwhile, Russian dual-purpose (anti- aircraft/anti-missile) missile systems like the SA-5 continue to exist.

www.thenewamerican.com... 2001/vo17no01_false.htm

5

However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA- 10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.

Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.

In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).

www.jinsa.org... ategoryid/170/documentid/440/history/3,2360,652,170,440

6

Washington, D.C.): Today's Wall Street Journal features an extraordinarily timely column by the newspaper's highly respected Assistant Editorial Page Editor, Melanie Kirkpatrick. Thanks to Ms. Kirkpatrick, a dirty little secret is now in the public domain: Even as Russian President Vladimir Putin goes to great lengths to denounce President Bush's commitment to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack, railing about the threat thus posed to the sacrosanct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and seeking to divide United States from its allies, Russia is maintaining a national missile defense of its own that is clearly inconsistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

This revelation demands several responses: 1) President Bush should task his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board or some other independent blue-ribbon group to perform an immediate and rigorous assessment of former Defense Intelligence Officer William Lee's work on the Soviet/Russian NMD system and the classified official analyses that have, to date, minimized its strategic capabilities and significance. 2) Present the findings of such a study to the American people and U.S. allies. And 3) end the official U.S. practice inherited by Mr. Bush of allowing the United States to be the only nation whose missile defense programs are encumbered by the outdated and increasingly dangerous ABM Treaty, thereby clearing the way for deployment as soon as possible of effective anti- missile protection for this country, as well as Russia.

www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org... section=papers&code=01-F_18

7

Russia inherited most of the Soviet empire's illegal national ABM defenses. Although the Hen Houses and LPARs located in the successor states created significant gaps in coverage, Russia still controls 12 or 13 of those radars. Consequently, SAM/ABMs still defend most of the Russian Federation from U.S. ICBMs, much of the SLBM threat, and Chinese missiles. Scheduled completion of the LPAR in Belorus will restore complete threat coverage, except for the gap left by the dismantled Krasnoyarsk LPAR. Granted, the Hen Houses are old, but the United States has been operating similar radars for 40 years.

Despite its economic difficulties, Russia continued development and production of the SA-10, adding (in 1992- 1993 and 1997) two models with new missiles and electronics and replacing more than 1000 SA-5 missiles with late model SA-10s having greatly improved performance against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Russia is protected by as at least as many (about 8500) SAM/ABMs as in 1991, and they are more effective. No wonder Russia shows little concern for its proliferation of missile and nuclear technology.

Even more impressively, Russia has begun flight-testing the fourth generation "S-400" ("Triumph") SAM/ABM designed not only to end the "absolute superiority" of air assault demonstrated by the United States in the 1992 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo operation, but also to improve Russia's illegal ABM defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The S-400 is scheduled to begin deployment in 2000, more testimony to Russia's commitment to maintaining its national ABM defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty.

www.security-policy.org...

8

Mr. Lee's analysis is complex. To vastly simplify, he says he has evidence that Russia's surface-to-air interceptor missiles carry nuclear warheads and therefore are capable of bringing down long-range ballistic missiles, not just aircraft and shorter-range missiles, which is their stated purpose. Russia has 8,000 of these missiles scattered around the country, and Mr. Lee says he has found numerous Russian sources that describe how successive generations of SAMs were in fact designed with the express intention of shooting down ballistic missiles, which is illegal under the treaty.

www.opinionjournal.com...

9

The SA-5 was designated the S-200 Volga by the Soviets — the SA-5A and SA-5C are conventional versions; the SA-5B is nuclear. The warhead probably has the option for either command or proximity detonation. It was designed in the 1950s to counter American high-altitude aircraft such as the B-70 Valkyrie and SR-71 Blackbird, as well as the new stand-off missiles such as the Hound Dog, Blue Steel, and Skybolt. The United States has long claimed the SA-5B has an ABM capability (and was tested in this role in the 1970s), particularly given the sizable 25 kiloton nuclear warhead it carries. Over 2,000 missiles are deployed (the percentage of the nuclear SA-5B version is unknown), though the aging SA-5 has increasingly been replaced by the SA-10 Grumble. However, the SA-5 has received numerous upgrades and modifications, including terminal maneuvering capabilities.

It is interesting to note that the warhead of this anti- aircraft missile has a larger yield than the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Part of the SA-5B network consists of a line of bases across the northwest approaches to Russia, known as the Tallinn Line. The current status of the nuclear warheads assigned to the strategic SAMs is unknown — they may have been placed with the tactical weapons in centralized storage. Yeltsin did announce in January 1992 that one half of all anti-aircraft nuclear warheads would be destroyed, and because of its age, the SA-5B Gammon

www.cdi.org...&f/database/rusnukes.html

10

In 1968, the total Tallinn system consisted of nearly 30 operational launch complexes with a similar number under construction. Each complex generally consisted of three launch sites. Each site had six SA-5B Gammon launchers and a modest-sized Square Pair radar. Of the 30 operational complexes, only six were close enough to the Hen House radars in Olenegorsk and Skrunda to have a potential ABM role (see "Soviet ABM System, 1968").

There was considerable disagreement within the U.S. intelligence community at the time about whether the improved Tallinn system was to defend against aircraft, ballistic missiles, or some combination of the two. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) agreed with the air force, which in late 1967 concluded that the system "possesses significant capabilities in both a terminal defense and area ABM role." But six months later, in a memorandum for President Lyndon Johnson, newly appointed Defense Secretary Clark Clifford said an ABM capability "now appears unlikely."

The CIA concluded that it did "not believe there is any deployment of ABM defenses outside the Moscow area," and the Tallinn system was "unlikely to have a present ABM capability," though it acknowledged, "the state of available evidence does not permit us to exclude this possibility." This view was shared by the navy, which decided that the system had "negligible capabilities against ballistic missiles."

There was general agreement that the limited Moscow and Tallinn systems would not be able to counter a large U.S. ballistic missile attack. In fact, the CIA later concluded that it "doubt[ed] that the Soviets will have an ABM system worth deploying against the U.S. threat in the foreseeable future."

www.thebulletin.org... art_ofn=ma04kristensen

11

The Bush administration’s policy was not an automatic continuity or continuation of all treaties with the USSR, but provided a framework to review each agreement and determine necessary changes. Such a review was particularly important for arms control agreements. As President Clinton stated in a letter to Congressman Gilman in March 1997, and I quote, “Particularly in the area of arms control, a case -by-case review of each agreement was necessary.” In that case-by-case review, the administration negotiated a memorandum of understanding [MOU] on succession to the ABM Treaty. The MOU, was concluded in September 1997 and identified Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia as the successor states to the treaty. This selection of successor states seemed to be consistent with a statement by the President that, and I quote, “neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet States with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS, Newly Independent States, as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.” That was the letter from the President to Congressman Gilman. The administration went on to reiterate in that same letter that the MOU on succession “works to preserve the original object and purpose of the treaty.” To summarize, the administration believed in 1997 that recognition of Russia alone or all of the successor states together would not have preserved the original purpose of the treaty.

www.missilethreat.com... l

12

In mid-1994 the Belarusian air force operated two interceptor regiments with MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-29 aircraft; three strike regiments with MiG-27, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-25 aircraft; and one reconnaissance regiment with MiG-25 and Su-24 aircraft. Four regiments had 300 helicopters, and one transport regiment had more than forty helicopters. Personnel numbered 15,800.

Belarus also had an air defense force with 11,800 personnel and 200 SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-10 surface-to-air missiles. The system was being integrated into Russia's air defenses in 1994 owing to Belarus's lack of resources.

www.globalsecurity.org...

13

Kazakhstan is investing the equivalent of one billion dollars to upgrade its air defense system, reports Interfax, with the upgrades reportedly being made by a British company, BAE Systems. The systems upgraded reportedly include the S-75, S-125, S- 200, and S-300 . The size of the contract reflects the extent of the defense systems built by the Soviet Union

www.missilethreat.com... PAGE_PRINT=yes

14

THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Structurally consist of three Corps, deployed correspondingly in Lviv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs'k. The Force HQ is located in Kyiv.
48 000 men are in Air Defense service. The Force is armed with Air Defense complexes S-75; S-125, S-200, S-300 . It also includes Fighter Aviation.
The Air Defense Force of Ukraine was developed at the basis of formations, deployed in Ukraine at the moment of its independence's proclamation.

ukraineinfo.us...

15

These elaborate preparations mean that the Soviets are nearly capable of deploying the nationwide missile defense specifically prohibited by the ABM Treaty.This approach of stockpiling existing ABM components has also allowed the Soviets to proceed with their build-up of missile defenses in a way that makes it difficult for the U.S. to verify full compliance with the ABM Treaty, unlike the testing or deployment of space-based systems that would be readily detectable ABM Violations. The Soviets have continued to upgrade their vast air defense network.This violates the ABM Treaty because it gives Soviet surface-to-air missiles the ability to intercept and destroy missile reentry vehicles.The ABM Treaty allows the deployment of missiles capable of intercepting and destroying ICBM reentry vehicles only at designated sites.

Soviet surface-to-air missiles are deployed throughout Soviet territory. Tests of the SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12 surface-to-air missiles against ballistic missile reentry vehicles in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated the capability of these weapons to fill limited ballistic missile defense missions. According to defense reporter Peter Samuel, in some 100 cases "these classes of surface-to-air missiles have been observed in tests against ballistic missile warheads Moscow continues to violate ABM Treaty provisions that prohibit the deployment of ABM radars in the interior of the country. Specifically, the Soviets have not dismantled their illegal Pechora class radar at Krasnoyarsk Elaborate Preparations. Moscow also has been stockpiling such 10 The Washington Times, op.cit 11 Defense 2000, March 1988, p. 121 6 I I I although they pledged to do so at the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, providing they were reassured that U.S. radars in Greenland and Britain do not violate the ABM Treaty. So far, however, the Krasnoyarsk radar has not been dismantled.
This programmobilizes tee of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians to develop high- energy battle lasers, particle beams, and other directed energy systems that could disrupt or destroy ballistic missiles or their components. Radio frequency weapons, which can disable ballistic missiles by interfering with their electronic components, and kinetic energy devices, which destroy missiles and reentry vehicles by the force of collision, are also being explored.

www.heritage.org...

16

Critics of the ABM treaty argue that the
treaty is no longer binding because the Soviet
Union no longer exists and because the
Soviets were, and the Russians continue to be,
in violation of the treaty. They contend that
the Russians have more than the one ABM
system permitted by the treaty.

Joseph Arminio, chairman of the National Coalition
for Defense, states:
Not only did the U.S.S.R., unlike the
U.S., deploy the one missile defense
permitted by the treaty, ringing
Moscow with the 100 interceptors
sanctioned by law. It also littered
about Soviet territory with another
10,000 to 12,000 interceptors, and 18
battle-management radars. Together
the Moscow defense and the vast
homeland defense formed an interlocking
system—nearly all of it illicit.10

The “10,000 to 12,000 interceptors” to which
Arminio refers are SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12
anti-aircraft missiles that some ABM treaty
opponents argue have an anti-ballistic missile
capability.1

www.cato.org...

17

The missile troops are equipped with about 150 SA-2 Guideline, 100 SA-3 Goa, 500 SA-5 Gammon, and 1,750 SA-10 Grumble missile launchers. A program to replace all of the older systems with the SA-10, well under way by 1996, has been considered by experts to be one of the most successful reequipment programs of the post-Soviet armed forces. Seven of the military districts have at least one aviation air defense regiment each; two districts, Moscow and the Far Eastern, have specially designated air defense districts.

The borders of the Moscow Air Defense District are the same as those of the Moscow Military District. The Far Eastern Air Defense District combines the territory of the Far Eastern Military District and the Transbaikal Military District. Presumably, the boundaries of the other military districts are the same for air defense as for other defense designations.

Data as of July 1996

www.country-data.com...

18

By the time the Empire collapsed, more than 10,000 dual purpose SAM/ABM interceptor missiles were deployed at SA- 5/10 complexes. Yet the U.S. officially counts only the l00 interceptors of the "ABM X-3" system at Moscow, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. ABM X-3 is a scaled up model of the NIKE-X system, vintage late

www.fas.org... m

19

"Full antimissile defence the length of the perimeter of the borders
of Europe and Russia is not planned," Ivashov said. "It is intended to
concentrate all that we already have, coordinating ABM systems, obtaining
opportunities to destroy ballistic missiles and opportunities in the
command structure, and directing those opportunities in directions
presenting a missile danger."

He said that the systems should cover peacekeeping contingents, and
the civilian population and civilian facilities as well as military
facilities, damage to which could cause significant harm to civilians.

The Russian side has no doubt that "NATO members will not start
purchasing Russian ABM systems on a large scale, like the modernized
S-300PMU or the new S-400, which can effectively combat ballistic
missiles, although NATO's European members do not have systems like
these", Ivashov said. Moscow does not in any case intend to extend its
missile technology to NATO countries, and Sergeyev said this frankly in
Brussels a few days ago.

www.fas.org... 0611.htm

20

Correspondent] The upgraded S-300 can hit a warhead even in space. This is exactly what the Americans are dreaming of when they speak about the ABM system. As soon as it is known about the launch of a combat missile, its trajectory is calculated immediately and air defence experts begin acting. There are just 7-10 seconds to locate a target, acquire it and launch an interception missile. They have done it.

www.missilethreat.com...

21

In total the U.S.S.R. deployed two generations of national missile defenses, consisting of 18 large radars and 12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors at 280 complexes. Moscow itself is protected not only by 100 ABM missiles, as permitted by the treaty, but also by several thousand SAM/ABM interceptors.

newsmax.com.../4/24/53247

22

Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.

www.findarticles.com... _74337128/pg_3

23

Over the past decade, Russia has deployed thousands of S-300V and Antey-2500 missiles around its key military and industrial complexes. In addition, it has exported these systems throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East as a means of financing its ailing economy in the wake of the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse. According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, “in the worldwide competition to sell ballistic missile defense systems, the Russian Antey Corp.’s S-300V is a main contender.”(8) The advantage for buyers of Russian surface-to-air missiles is that, unlike buying from the U.S., there are no political strings attached and, more often than not, the weapons are significantly cheaper than their U.S. counterparts

www.missilethreat.com...

24

First, the SA-5 system was tested and developed at the officially declared ABM test range, Sary-Shagan.28 Second, medium- and intermediate-range missiles were fired to impact areas located at Sary-Shagan. Senators John "Jake" Garn and Gordon J. Humphrey have charged that many of these missiles could have served as the targets for ABM intercept programs.29 If so, the target most closely approximated in terms of range, radar cross section, and trajectory would be SLBMs. Third, if such a system as the SA-5 were to act as a terminal atmospheric defense weapon, it would require all-azimuth radar data for warning, acquisition, and pointing inputs to the SA-5 intercept radar. The Hen House long-range radar deployment was coincident in time with initiation of the SA-5 deployment.30 Hen House radars are deployed (in accordance with the ABM treaty) on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., scanninig outward over U.S. SLBM launch areas.31 As a linear array radar, Hen House can handle multiple targets limited only by internal computer configurations that can never be physically seen or assessed directly by U.S. intelligence.32 Acknowledged ABM radars such as the Dog House and Cat House also possess the capability to be used by the SA-5 in an ABM role as does a new class of large ABM capable phased-array radars publicly announced by Senator Garn.33 Fourth, and most important, the assessed technical characteristics of the SA-5 system itself indicated a clear capability to perform as a terminal ABM system to destroy ballistic missile targets of the SLBM variety given adequate radar acquisition data.34

Because of this relative wealth of uncertainty, the final ABM treaty included an explicit obligation in Article VI not to test SAMs "in an ABM mode." Since the ABM testing of the SA-5 could have been completed for some years prior to 1972, the treaty’s impact on an SA-5 ABM capability would be slight. Even at that, the reported repeated violations of the treaty after 1972 by the use of the SA-5 radar in tracking ballistic missiles resulted in Soviet tests against missiles similar in range to a normal SLBM trajectory.35 The Soviets claimed (and the administration) accepted) that the SA-5 radar was not being tested in an ABM mode, but rather was being used in a "legitimate range instrumentation role."36 Whether it is designated as a "range instrumentation radar" does not alter the fact that it has been used in a missile-tracking role. Its ability to track missile warheads on the range is therefore prima facie evidence of its ABM capability. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil... 981/sep-oct/barlow.htm

25

Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.


The Moscow-system missiles, the SA-5 and SA-10/12, were tipped with small nuclear warheads so they didn't require the incredible bullet-hitting-bullet complexity of the U.S. systems developed during the Clinton years. U.S. spy satellites repeatedly identified tactical nuclear-warhead storage sites at the interceptor bases spread across the Soviet empire.


* G.V. Kisun'ko, the chief designer of the ABM systems developed or deployed around Moscow for more than three decades, confirms in a 1996 memoir that large Hen House and Dog House radars at Sary Shagan were designed as battle- management radars for the early Soviet ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Kisun'ko also stated that the SA-5 was designed as a dual-purpose SAM/ABM in conjunction with the Hen House radars.

* B.V. Bunkin, the designer of the follow-on SA-10 and SA- 12 (S-300 PMU and S-300V in Russian nomenclature) missile systems, and several other Russian sources, confirmed that these also were dual-purpose SAM/ABMs. SA-10s largely have replaced the thousands of SA-5 interceptors deployed across the Soviet empire during the Cold War. Bunkin's latest SAM/ABM design, the SA-20, is scheduled to begin deployment this year.

www.findarticles.com... _74337128/pg_3

26

The SA-5 was designated the S-200 Volga by the Soviets — the SA-5A and SA-5C are conventional versions; the SA-5B is nuclear. The warhead probably has the option for either command or proximity detonation. It was designed in the 1950s to counter American high-altitude aircraft such as the B-70 Valkyrie and SR-71 Blackbird, as well as the new stand-off missiles such as the Hound Dog, Blue Steel, and Skybolt. The United States has long claimed the SA-5B has an ABM capability (and was tested in this role in the 1970s), particularly given the sizable 25 kiloton nuclear warhead it carries. Over 2,000 missiles are deployed (the percentage of the nuclear SA-5B version is unknown), though the aging SA-5 has increasingly been replaced by the SA-10 Grumble. However, the SA-5 has received numerous upgrades and modifications, including terminal maneuvering capabilities.

www.cdi.org...&f/database/rusnukes.html

27

Note: SA-5 is actually a reused NATO reporting name: it originally referred to the Russian V-1000 Anti Ballistic Missile system, introduced in 1963 and retired the following year for unknown reasons. The SA-5 (as described here) is apparently considered to be a "highly modified version of it".

everything2.com...

28

In addition to the interceptor missiles currently deployed, the missile defence system also comprises reconnaissance means (Dunay 3U and Don 2N radars) for target detection, tracking and guidance; command posts, missile silos and an all-encompassing data grid. The press service said that the Russian missile defence system can perform automatically and by signals from the early warning missile strike system. It automatically distinguishes between warheads and other (false) targets, jamming and interference.


As for the March 4, 1961 test, the V-1000 is said to have been launched from the 10th State Research Training Field and intercepted an R-12 (SS-4 Sandal) missile carrying a mock-up payload of 500 kg, which itself had been lanched from Kapustin Yar. The V-1000 interceptor is said to have comprised:16,000 carbide-wolfram core balls, a TNT load and a steel jacket. The disk-shaped damage area was perpendicular to the axis of the countermissile. The V-1000 created by Petr Grushin, Fakel Design Bureau, had a speed of 1,000 mps. In 1961 the nuclear version was tested (without the fissionable material). The test results laid the basis for the A-35 Galosh missile deployed in dozens around Moscow
While the 1961 test was with a conventional explosive, the Griffon and successive Russian missile interceptors were all armed with small nuclear warheads. The explosive capacity of such weapons gave an additional level of certainty to the destruction of any incoming missiles, and eliminating the need for somewhat more difficult “hit-to- kill” technology.

Update: The March 4 edition of Itar Tass quotes Lieutenant -General Vladimir Popovkin, the chief of staff of the Russian space troops, outlining the current capabilities of Russian missile defenses. The system, he said is capable of detecting ballistic targets and intercepting and destroying warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles….The ABM system for the country’s central district can spot warheads of missiles against the background of light and heavy false targets and active and passive interferences, as well as during the use by the enemy of other means to overcome the air defences. Russia’s ABM system consists of intelligence means, command posts, silos for launching interception missiles and the very missiles, and the system for relaying information linking all the ground facilities of the anti- missile defences into one cycle.

full article

www.missilethreat.com...

29

In March 4, 1961, in the area of the A testing ground the V-1000 ABM with a fragmentation-high-explosive warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the R-12 BM launched from the State Central Testing Ground with a dummy warhead weighing 500 kilograms. The Dunai-2 radar of the A system detected the BM at a distance of 1,500 kilometers when it appeared over the radio horizon, then the M-40 central computer found parameters of the R-12 trajectory, and prepared target designation for precision homing radars and the launchers. The ABM was launched and its warhead was actuated by the signal from the command post. The warhead of the ABM consisted of 16,000 balls with a carbide-tungsten core, TNT filling, and a steel hull. The warhead had a fragments field shaped as a disk perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the ABM. The warhead was actuated by the signal from the ground with a deflection necessary for formation of the fragments field. The warheads of this type were designed under the supervision of Chief Designer A. Voronov. The M-40 central computer was designed by the Precise Mechanics and Computer Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences under the supervision of Academician S. Lebedev. The computer could make 40,000 operations per second.

The V-1000 had two stages. The first stage was a solid- propellant booster, and the second stage was a sustainer stage with a warhead which was equipped with a liquid- propellant engine developed by the Design Bureau of Chief Designer A. Isaev. In addition to the fragmentation warhead a nuclear warhead was also designed for the missile. The flight tests of the missile, which could intercept targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers, started in 1958. The parallel approach to the target at a strictly counter course was chosen as the method of the ABM's homing. The V -1000 was delivered to the trajectory calculated according to the homing method along the regular curve, parameters of which were defined by the predicted target trajectory. P. Kirillov was the Chief Designer of the missile's automatic pilot. On March 26, 1961, the ABM destroyed the warhead of the R-5 BM with 500 kilograms of TNT. Overall, during the trial of the A system 11 launches of ABMs were performed which destroyed warheads of BMs, and experimental ABMs with heat seeking self-homing warhead, radio-controlled fuses, and optical fuses were also launched. The S2TA version of the V-1000 ABM with a heat seeking self-homing warhead was tested at the A testing ground between 1961 and 1963. The flight tests of the V-1000 with the nuclear warhead (without the fissible material) designed in Chelyabinsk-70 were conducted in 1961. For this warhead two types of proximity fuses were designed and tested: the optical fuse (designed by the GOI under the supervision of Chief Designer Emdin) a and radio-electronic fuse (Chief Designer Bondarenko) for the R2TA and G2TA versions of the missile.

Systems for surmounting of air defenses intended for domestic BM were also tested during the trial of the A system. The launched target ballistic missiles were equipped with inflatable false targets Verba, unfolding false targets Kaktus, and Krot active jammers. Overall, the field tests of the A system showed a principle possibility of BM warheads interception. Experiments under the coded name Operation K were conducted (K1, K2, K3, K4, and K5) to check a possibility of the A system functioning under the influence of nuclear explosions at altitudes of 80 to 300 kilometers between 1961 and 1962 at the Sary-Shagan testing ground. The A system showed its capability to function even when a conventional enemy used nuclear weapons.

www.fas.org... rus.htm

30

However, in 1967 CIA decided that the SA-5 was purely an anti- aircraft system, and that the large phased array radars then under construction were for early warning of U.S. ballistic missile attack (and space track), but not for battle management, i.e. did not provide detailed target trajectory tracking data relative to an earth coordinate system to the SA-5 complexes.(1) Despite sporadic dissents by other members of the intelligence community and a major DIA challenge in 1982, CIA repeated its errors for the systems that appeared in the next two decades. CIA's erroneous assessments are the current dogma of U.S. policy makers.

In fact, in the 1950s the Soviets adopted a two track approach: ABM systems dedicated to the def ense of Moscow, the apex of the Communist Party's nomenklatura; and dual purpose SAM/ABM systems-- first the SA-5 then the SA-10-- and large phased array battle management radars--first generation "Hen House" followed by second generation "LPAR"--for national ABM defense.(2) Moscow was defended by the best technology the Politburo had, the rest of the nation by the best it could afford.

When CIA concluded in 1967 that the SA-5 was just an anti- aircraft (SAM) system, and that the Hen House radars were just for early warning (and space tracking), a majority of the U.S. intelligence comunity joined the CIA choir. Subsequently ClAts analysis of the SA-5 and the Hen House radars was extended to the SA-10 and the LPARS. Once enshrined, CIAls erroneous analysis was not challenged even when "hard" evidence to the contrary appeared.(31)

By the time the Empire collapsed, more than 10, 000 dual purpose SAM/ABM interceptor missiles were deployed at SA- 5/10 complexes.

www.fas.org... m

31

On 29 November 1960 the first attempted intercept of an R-5 IRBM by the V-1000 was fully successful. The anti- ballistic missile passed within the kill radius of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the V-1000. But the warhead itself had not completed development and was not installed. The five following intercept attempts were unsuccessful - five R-5's and two V-1000's were expended (three times the system failed to launch the anti-ballistic missile in time):

1961 began with another string of failures (5 further launches were planned in the first test series). A variety of warheads were wasted in attempting to destroy the incoming missiles. Once, manually, and twice, automatically, the missile made a more-or-less successful intercept. But this was followed by three failures, indicating a great amount of time and effort were needed to develop the intercept method.

On 4 March 1961 the V-1000 achieved a world first - the destruction of the re-entry vehicle of an R-12 IRBM. This was followed by the destruction of an R-5 re-entry vehicle. In all, there were 11 launches with military warheads, plus launches of developmental warheads. The S2TA variant used an infrared-homing self-guiding high-explosive warhead and was designed by Storozhenko at the GOI State Optical Institute in Lengingrad. It was capable not only of determining the moment for warhead detonation, but also was capable of guiding the anti-ballistic missile independently using an on-board computer. The R2TA version used a radio- guided explosive warhead, with two types of proximity fuses used to determine the correct moment for warhead detonation. These were the G2TA, a radio ranging system, developed by Bondarenko and an optical system, developed by Emdin at GOI. Flight tests of the V-1000 with a nuclear warhead designed at Chelyabinsk-70 were also carried out.

www.astronautix.com...

32

Indeed, the upgraded S-300 PM is reported to be capable of hitting a warhead in space and already provides adequate protection to Russia's major cities. In seven to ten seconds a target can be located, fixed, and an interception missile launched. Around 10,000 troops are placed on permanent, around the clock, combat duty with apparently a great deal of work to suggest possible overstretches. "On average, the air defense troops detect and track over 250,000 aircraft, including more than 100,000 foreign aircraft and 1,000-1,500 foreign reconnaissance aircraft every year," commented Mikhailov.

www.jamestown.org... volume_id=407&issue_id=3300&article_id=2369596

33

Based on operational nuclear--capable delivery platforms, knowledge about the size and composition of the nonstrategic stockpile during the Cold War, and statements made by Russian officials about implementation of the 1991 -1992 presidential initiatives, we estimate that Russia maintains approximately 2,330 operational nonstrategic warheads and some 4,170 nonstrategic warheads in reserve. The operational warheads include: approximately 700 warheads for antiballistic missile and air defense systems (the A-135 system around Moscow and the SA-10 Grumble/S-300 system); some 975 air-to-surface missiles and bombs for delivery by land-based Tu-22M Backfire and Su-24 Fencer strike aircraft; and 655 warheads for cruise missiles, anti-air missiles, antisubmarine rockets, and torpedoes delivered by submarines, surface ships, and land-based naval aircraft. All naval warheads are stored on land.

www.thebulletin.org... art_ofn=ma06norris

You have seen much of this before and i am still waiting for reasonable objections ( based on something other than your ubsustansiated opinion) from months ago. This is 30 minutes worth of admin time i will never get back and sometimes i think that's your sole aim.

Stellar

You have voted StellarX for the Way Above Top Secret award. You have used all of your votes for this month.

Damn fine job StellarX. You got my vote.

Originally posted by iskander
Damn fine job StellarX. You got my vote.

I just wish that support from sane well informed people could change the fact that so many on this forum are not sane, informed or interested in changing their status! Just wish i could use the Wats to drag Rogue ( and his new found ally) closer to what i would consider a intelligent discussion of the subject matter.

Oh well

Stellar

omg, I keep trying to post and it wont work
stellar, arent the majority of the tanks and arty that russia has outdated? It doesnt have many t90s, does it?
alot of people that returned from the army told me that there is no order in russian army and that the training pretty much sucks. How much do you think this will play a role in a war with u.s(much better training)?