Syrian threat: SAMs gallore

I find a link it and there is said that:
"In 1993, Iran procured an unidentified number of S-300PMU-1 missiles from Russia''
www.missilethreat.com...
Any comments???

I'm wondering: what conclusions would people here draw from Israeli warplanes overflying the Syrian president's palace?

Originally posted by Simon666
I'm wondering: what conclusions would people here draw from Israeli warplanes overflying the Syrian president's palace?

Try to get them to activate the SAM radars to find the sites?


I'll shut up now.

Originally posted by Simon666
I'm wondering: what conclusions would people here draw from Israeli warplanes overflying the Syrian president's palace?

israel is coming to get you, if israels soldiers are not released.

Originally posted by swesais
I find a link it and there is said that:
"In 1993, Iran procured an unidentified number of S-300PMU-1 missiles from Russia''
www.missilethreat.com...
Any comments???

That's unconfirmed and in my opinion unlikely to be the case. Although I believe that Iran was/is negotiating for some S-300 type systems with russia and/or China - it's high up their wish list. If Iran already has S-300 we'd have seen it being paraded for the local press just like they do every other of their "secret" and "super" weapons.

S-300 is a deterrant weapon. It is less useful if it is kept secret.

[edit on 14-7-2006 by planeman]

Originally posted by Xeven
In a war these would be the first targets along with the communications infrastructure.

Yeah and against well trained Serb forces the American( so called NATO) effort was very much in vain as they could not confirm the destruction of even 10% of Serb SA-3/6 systems.

Ground based SAMs are pretty much sitting targets.

Even the very ancient Serb systems managed to survive well enough so that is obviously not the case even when you outnumber the enemy the way NATO did.

Manpads are useless agaisnt high altitude and very fast nap of the earth bombing.

Manpads prevent low level intrusions while Sa-3/6 prevents mid altitude cruising and planes flying any higher are apparently very ineffective in a ground interdiction role as was evident after the NATO campaign against the Serbs.

The rest would be the highest priortity targets for an attack so they would not last more than a few days.

The Serbs managed to keep their defenses largely intact for 80 days.

Current EW systems are more than capable of protecting aircraft from getting shot down.

Not really and the only air force with substantial EW/ECM systems ( USAF) is rapidly losing that capacity.

The best a SAM can hope to do is disrupt some bomb runs. SAMS have very low life expectancy in a war.

Ask the Israeli's what happens when you do not respect air defense networks when you do not massively outnumber the enemy and can not afford losses.

Stellar

Originally posted by Willard856
The minimum range of the SA-5 is correct as posted by Planeman.

Not so in my opinion. It's primary purpose was the interception of incoming ballistic warheads and 60 km minimum interception range would have made that far harder to do.

My understanding is that the semi-active guidance doesn't kick in until after the boost phase.

Why would it need the semi active guidance for a intercept?

There actually aren't a lot of systems that can hack an Rmin of 300m, due warhead arming time, and guidance issues. Unless you do a ballistic launch only, hoping that the proximity fuse, if armed in time, goes off.

And Sam's can very easily be used in that way if conditions demand. I must admit i have not yet found the source i remember stating the minimum range as 300 meters but this one gives it at 7 km which makes good sense.

www.astronautix.com...

Another thing to remember is that SA-5 was designed to counter large bomber formations, not agile fighter type aircraft. Hence manoeuvrability wasn't a big requirement for the system, and neither was minimum range because at the speed the bombers would fly at, and their RCS, there was plenty of time to get the big missile airborne, and on the way to the target.

Just CIA lies really as is openly admitted in unclassified material. The Sa-5 was always primarily a ABM system that could double as a Sam system and the massive

SA-2 and SA-3 also suffer from limited manoeuvrability, though to a lesser extent than SA-5. SA-10 on the other hand is a whole different kettle of fish, and if Syria have it, then it complicates things.

It's because they are really outdated systems ( and the Sa-2 was also actually a ABM design) that should not really be used to fight modern air armada's.... Sa-10 is ,as you say, a whole different thing imo. I have done a LOT of reading on this topic and you should feel free to search for some of my ABM related posts.

All in all, an exceptional post mate. A WATS vote is on its way. I look forward to reading more of your work.

Forget to give him one earlier so I'll follow your example now...

Stellar

Originally posted by StellarX
Not so in my opinion. It's primary purpose was the interception of incoming ballistic warheads and 60 km minimum interception range would have made that far harder to do.

Why not the Sprint ABM system range wasn't all that high either.
www.astronautix.com...

It had a 60km range because of this. Against slow lumbering targets it had a 250 km range.

The missile's minimum range of 60 km is due to the booster burn time and jettison requirements, limiting the system to engagements against relatively large unmaneuverable targets at ranges up to 250 km. Guidance beyond the 60 km booster jettison point is by course correction command signals from the SQUARE PAIR radar with the S-200's own active radar terminal homing seeker head activated near the projected intercept point for final guidance.

www.globalsecurity.org...

Why would it need the semi active guidance for a intercept?

because it used it.

In the 1960's Grushin developed the 5V21 missile for the S-200 Angara surface-to-air missile system. This had a range of over 150 km and incorporated several new principles. It was equipped with the first semi-active radar homing head. The aerodynamic surfaces automatically adjusted according to the velocity and altitude of the rocket. In the Mideast, this missile successfully intercepted Israeli reconnaissance aircraft at a range of 190 km in the 1980's. This performance was unmatched in the world. The missile was used as the booster for the experimental Kholod hypersonic scramjet. Two launches of this were made on 28 November 1991 and 17 November 1992 as part of an experimental program run by TsIAM.

www.astronautix.com...

Just CIA lies really as is openly admitted in unclassified material. The Sa-5 was always primarily a ABM system that could double as a Sam system and the massive

nope common information www.globalsecurity.org... Why do you always ahve to equate it with the CIA, SA 5 issue.
It's also in the top of my post here.

It's because they are really outdated systems ( and the Sa-2 was also actually a ABM design) that should not really be used to fight modern air armada's.... Sa-10 is ,as you say, a whole different thing imo. I have done a LOT of reading on this topic and you should feel free to search for some of my ABM related posts.

no doubt it was an ABM system.



[edit on 30-7-2006 by urmomma158]

StellarX

A good reason for the survivanility of Serbian/Jugo SAM units was the fact that they operated in either forrested or mountaineous terrain and had the brains to keep their radars off 99% of the time.
Missile unit hiding in the woods is just as hard to destroy as a infatntry unit, that is pretty impossible...

Just to add to northwolf's comments, the Serb’s took the term "shoot and scoot" to a whole new level. Aided by the terrain they became masters at moving their SAM sites around in order to avoid detection. I can’t find the link right now but I recall reading that during the 78 days of the war Serbian SAM’s traveled hundreds of kilometers around the country. Combine this with the US’s time consuming kill chain and poor 24/7 surveillance capabilities (at that time) and you can see why we didn’t kill a higher percentage of Serbian SAM’s. The thing that really saved NATO aircraft was the use of EW systems. Despite flying 38,000 sorties with around 900 aircraft only two were shot down with around 700 missiles fired at friendly aircraft. Now, some countries have not paid attention to this, having SAM systems which are not very maneuverable in established sites in the middle of the desert is a poor decision. Especially in an age where UAV’s can provide almost constant surveillance, and where Net Centric capabilities have made possible to measure the time from detection to kill in mere minutes.

Westpoint is this the link you're looking for???

Unlike the Iraqis, however, the Serbs kept their SAMs defensively dispersed and operating in an emission-control mode, prompting concern that they meant to draw NATO aircraft down to lower altitudes for easier engagement. Before the initial strikes, there were reports of a large-scale dispersal of SA-3 and SA-6 batteries from nearly all of the known garrisons. The understandable reluctance of enemy SAM operators to emit and thus render themselves cooperative targets made them much harder to find and attack, forcing allied aircrews to remain constantly alert to the radar-guided SAM threat through- out the war.6 This situation also had the effect of denying some high-risk targets for a time, increasing force-package size, and increasing overall requirements for SEAD sorties.
The persistence of a credible SAM threat throughout the Kosovo air war meant that NATO had to dedicate a larger-than-usual number of strike sorties to the SEAD mission to ensure reasonable freedom to operate in enemy airspace.Thus, fewer sorties were available for NATO mission planners to allocate against enemy military and infrastructure targets- although the limited number of approved targets at any one time tended to minimize the practical effects of that consequence. Moreover, the Block 50 F-16CJ, which lacked the ability to carry the LANTIRN targeting pod, was never used for precision bombing at night because it could not self-designate targets.23

One of the biggest problems that confronted attacking NATO aircrews on defense-suppression missions was target location. Because of Kosovo’s mountainous terrain, the moving-target indicator and synthetic aperture radar aboard the E-8 joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft could not detect targets masked from view at oblique look angles, although sensors carried by the U-2 and the EC-135 Rivet Joint often compensated for this shortfall. The cover provided to enemy air defense assets by the interspersed mountains and valleys became a severe, complicating factor. Mitigating that constraint somewhat, the limited surveillance range of JSTARS caused by interposed ridgelines restricted E-8 operations primarily with regard to Kosovo, which harbored only a limited SAM threat (only one of the five SA-6 regiments and no SA-2s or SA-3s). Most of the enemy IADS targets lay outside Kosovo. Moreover, the U-2 and Rivet Joint typically performed well and did not suffer the same problems that sometimes plagued the E-8.24

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...

[edit on 31-7-2006 by urmomma158]

[edit on 31-7-2006 by urmomma158]

No it was another article, but that link discusses some key vulnerable areas which were discovered during the Kosovo Conflict. Some of those vulnerable areas have been addressed others are still lacking. However newer systems coming online will help bring some much needed capability against integrated and highly mobile air defense networks.

[edit on 31-7-2006 by WestPoint23]

Originally posted by urmomma158
Why not the Sprint ABM system range wasn't all that high either.
www.astronautix.com...

I am talking about minimum engagement range and not maximum effective altitude it can engage at.

It had a 60km range because of this. Against slow lumbering targets it had a 250 km range.

According to deceptively popular CIA mythology, yes.

Your quote comes from global security ( which just copies from the CIA apparently) which has apparently confused the system with the DAL system which got axed after failing to live up to expectations ( and no surprised considering the 60 km minimum range. The Sa-5 minimum range is 7km as your first source states. Do you have a specific reason to argue or are you just trusting the CIA?

because it used it.

Yes and i know that because i have read everything you did times 100. I said that it did not matter as the SARH was NOT REQUIRED to make such a intercept. Whether it employs SARH ( first missile so equipped ) or not is completely irrelevant to the original question.

nope common information www.globalsecurity.org... Why do you always have to equate it with the CIA, SA 5 issue.
It's also in the top of my post here.

Because your not very well informed in this field and your just quoting the first source which happens to disagree with me. I have in the past proven without any doubt that the CIA can simply not be trusted when it comes to Soviet weaponry.

no doubt it was an ABM system.

Which you would not accept just a few short months ago when i told you as much. I can see that you are learning from me and making progress but why do so in such a aggressive manner? You could just ask but instead....

Stellar

Originally posted by StellarX

I am talking about minimum engagement range and not maximum effective altitude it can engage at.

Which i gave you no need to tear the quote apart and i was also talking about range with the sprint. www.astronautix.com...

this source doesn't confuse it with the DAL

According to deceptively popular CIA mythology, yes.

Your quote comes from global security ( which just copies from the CIA apparently) which has apparently confused the system with the DAL system which got axed after failing to live up to expectations ( and no surprised considering the 60 km minimum range. The Sa-5 minimum range is 7km as your first source states. Do you have a specific reason to argue or are you just trusting the CIA?

You showed it was an ABM but never showed a different range.
Here's a source that doen't confuse it with the DAL www.astronautix.com...

Yes and i know that because i have read everything you did times 100. I said that it did not matter as the SARH was NOT REQUIRED to make such a intercept. Whether it employs SARH ( first missile so equipped ) or not is completely irrelevant to the original question.

it doesn't have to in an ABm role if you datlink it with an ABM radar

Because your not very well informed in this field and your just quoting the first source which happens to disagree with me. I have in the past proven without any doubt that the CIA can simply not be trusted when it comes to Soviet weaponry.

And the DIA has been known to make exaggerations in the past.
The CIA is not as much as the liars you put them out to be. here's some from your OWN sources which we're provided in earlier sources.

The U.S. intelligence community long has reported "gaps" in its knowledge of Soviet missile-defense plans that made it difficult to determine with certainty whether the Soviets were cheating on the ABM Treaty. But Lee and other former intelligence analysts interviewed by Insight contend that U.S. arms-control activists contributed to the deception by failing to recognize the evidence that was staring them in the face.

"It's like looking at an elephant," Lee says. "We could see three legs and a tail, but we couldn't tell for sure whether it had a trunk. The arms controllers kept saying that, because we couldn't see the trunk and the ears, we couldn't say with certainty that it was an elephant."

Given the gaps in information and our analytical uncertainties, there are understandably many differing conclusions and opinions about the technical characteristics of Soviet ABM systems and components and supporting radars, and about their capabilities to perform all the functions essential to ballistic-missile defense," concluded an Oct. 13, 1982, estimate titled, "Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense" (NIE 11-13-82). "However, the consequences of Soviet acquisition of a ballistic-missile defense, despite uncertainties about its effectiveness, are so serious that even a low probability of such an achievement is cause for concern."

www.findarticles.com...
www.findarticles.com...

Which you would not accept just a few short months ago when i told you as much. I can see that you are learning from me and making progress but why do so in such a aggressive manner? You could just ask but instead....

Well you provided a CIA link indicating that. i thought you said the CIA can't be trusted. Guess you'll take anything as long as it suits you.



[edit on 31-7-2006 by urmomma158]

Originally posted by urmomma158
Which i gave you no need to tear the quote apart and i was also talking about range with the sprint. www.astronautix.com...

this source doesn't confuse it with the DAL

No it does not but i never cared about the maximum range and it never entered the discussion untill you strangely brought it up.

You showed it was an ABM but never showed a different range.
Here's a source that doen't confuse it with the DAL www.astronautix.com...

I Know and i do not care about the MAXIMUM RANGE but about the MINIMUM engagement range . If it can only intercept something after 60 km it will make the weapon quite unwieldy in it's primary purpose of intercepting BM's.

it doesn't have to in an ABm role if you datlink it with an ABM radar

Right or against anything when you can fire it 'unguided'.

And the DIA has been known to make exaggerations in the past.

Which is a far more logical thing to do than making massive underestimations ( and quite on purpose as well) of your enemy. You can get away with overestimation but certainly not underestimations as history since 1977 has proven rather well.

The CIA is not as much as the liars you put them out to be. here's some from your OWN sources which we're provided in earlier sources.

I know my own source material rather intimately as i spent some months discovering and comparing it all.

Your next two quotes is rather selective as the authors book " The ABM treaty Charade' proves in much detail. If your going to quote someone at least make sure they agree with your basic premise ; not something MR lee does.

Well you provided a CIA link indicating that. i thought you said the CIA can't be trusted. Guess you'll take anything as long as it suits you.

No, i provide links from CIA pages ( unclassified ) proving that they knew the truth back then but CHOSE to lie about for their own reason which is another topic all in itself.

Stellar

Originally posted by StellarX

No it does not but i never cared about the maximum range and it never entered the discussion untill you strangely brought it up.

You wanted to know what it was and was curious.

I Know and i do not care about the MAXIMUM RANGE but about the MINIMUM engagement range . If it can only intercept something after 60 km it will make the weapon quite unwieldy in it's primary purpose of intercepting BM's.

Well no but look at the Sprint it had a range of 25 miles and a max height of 100,000 feet and wasstill a good ABM missile.

Right or against anything when you can fire it 'unguided'.

I didn't understand your statement i said it doesn't need the semi active guidance when it was in ABM mode because it would be datalinked with the ABM radar.

Which is a far more logical thing to do than making massive underestimations ( and quite on purpose as well) of your enemy. You can get away with overestimation but certainly not underestimations as history since 1977 has proven rather well.

That was because the overall picture of whetther they had an ABm or not was unclear i gave you material from YOUR own sources which is why the CIA didn't take any chances because they we're unsure.

I know my own source material rather intimately as i spent some months discovering and comparing it all.

Well just incase you din't recognize them.

Your next two quotes is rather selective as the authors book " The ABM treaty Charade' proves in much detail. If your going to quote someone at least make sure they agree with your basic premise ; not something MR lee does.

I agree there was a NMD but the CIA was unsure especially since all theintelligence communities disagreed and they weren't sure of it.But it was later confirmed by Russian officials.

No, i provide links from CIA pages ( unclassified ) proving that they knew the truth back then but CHOSE to lie about for their own reason which is another topic all in itself.

Well try to make your intent a little clearer next time.






[edit on 31-7-2006 by urmomma158]

Originally posted by StellarX
The system did not have to 'beat' the American air attack as that is not the point of air defenses. They did manage to protect Serb ground forces and that was in itself a massive achievement considering their limited means.

Not really, NATO wanted more oif a public show which is why they bombed Serbia proper.

It was apparently more than enough to ensure that the NATO bombing campaign was ineffective against Serb ground forces; blowing up fixed structures in large cities when you have the country completely surrounded and outgunned is the type of achievement only government propaganda agencies can make look good.

Hmm you obviously missed the point. They bombed Serbia to let the population know just what strife Milosevic had got them into. Just bombing Kosovo wouldn't have had nearly the same effect on the Serb people. Nothing beats a physical reminder.

Originally posted by StellarX
Ask the Israeli's what happens when you do not respect air defense networks when you do not massively outnumber the enemy and can not afford losses.

LOL, you mean like in the Bekaa Valley in 82 where the Israeli's destroyed 17 of 19 Syrian SAM battery without a single loss. Yep those, that's what happens when the Israelis's don't respect you. Then to top it off they have the biggest one sided aerial victory in the history of air warfare downing 82 Syrian planes for no losses.

Originally posted by rogue1
Not really, NATO wanted more oif a public show which is why they bombed Serbia proper.

Bombing civilian infrastructure was actually the intent, as you suggest here, so i will not argue with you on that score other than point out the criminal intent of the whole campaign.

Hmm you obviously missed the point.

I rarely do as your points are as perfectly obvious as they are spitefull.

They bombed Serbia to let the population know just what strife Milosevic had got them into.

Milosevic did not ask NATO to start bombing civilians and if it was not for the Western backed terrorist movements ( called liberation movements on Western TV) he never would have started doing the 'ethnic cleansing' ( in this case another name for actually shooting back at terrorist) he got involved in before the NATO campaign really started killing people.

Just bombing Kosovo wouldn't have had nearly the same effect on the Serb people. Nothing beats a physical reminder.

Which according to official US doctrine means the US is a terrorist state who ( by their own definition) uses terror to affect the political and policy changes they require. Not surprising the US is currently the only state that has ever been 'convicted' ( not the best term) by the UN as a terrorist state. The scale of US terrorism becomes quite apparent when one sees what the UN normally lets states get away with.

Originally posted by rogue1
LOL, you mean like in the Bekaa Valley in 82 where the Israeli's destroyed 17 of 19 Syrian SAM battery without a single loss. Yep those, that's what happens when the Israelis's don't respect you. Then to top it off they have the biggest one sided aerial victory in the history of air warfare downing 82 Syrian planes for no losses.

Syrian SAM operators also invited disaster upon themselves. Their Soviet equipment was generally regarded as quite good; Syrian handling of it was appalling. As noted by Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Syrians used mobile missiles in a

fixed configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills because they didn't want to dig latrines--seriously."56 The Syrian practice of stationing mobile missiles in one place for several months allowed Israeli reconnaissance to determine the exact location of the missiles and their radars, giving the IAF a definite tactical advantage on the eve of battle.57 Even so, the Syrians might have been able to avoid the complete destruction of their SAM complex had they effectively camouflaged their sites; instead, they used smoke to "hide" them, which actually made them easier to spot from the air.58 It is ironic that the Syrians, who have been criticized for their strict adherence to Soviet doctrine, chose to ignore the viable doctrine that emphasizes the utility of maneuver and camouflage. According to a 1981 article in Soviet Military Review, alternate firing positions, defensive ambushes, regular repositioning of mobile SAMs to confuse enemy intelligence, and the emplacement of dummy SAM sites are fundamental considerations for the effective deployment and survivability of ground-based air defenses.59

Three lessons of special relevance to the United States may be drawn from the Bekaa Valley battle. First is the overwhelming importance of winning the war in the fourth dimension (i.e., electronic warfare and C3). It is generally accepted today that to win the land and sea battle, a fighting force must first control the air. This concept--revolutionary in its genesis--was demonstrated numerous times in World War II and subsequent conflicts. Now, in order to win the air battle, one must first conquer the electromagnetic spectrum. What used to be "a minor side show to the real battles that raged on the land, on the sea, or in the air" is now a prerequisite for modern warfighting.60 The Bekaa Valley has shown that an effective electronic warfighting capability is no longer a luxury, but a necessity.

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...

I was actually referring to their earlier experiences which they apparently LEARNT from ( unlike the Syrians but) the same kinds of lesson the Serbs apparently took the heart.

It is, of course, essential to first summarize the events preceding and during the battle, as well as the factors contributing to the Israeli victory. The circumstances that determined the outcome of the Bekaa Valley battle can easily be traced back to 1967, when the Israelis launched a devastating surprise air attack on Egyptian airfields to begin the Six Day War. The Arab states, particularly Egypt, responded by establishing a system of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to deal with any future Israel incursions into their airspace. During the War of Attrition from 1967-70 the IAF admitted losing at least 22 aircraft to the new Arab missile defenses, though Egypt claimed 21 in July 1970 alone. Even so, it was not until the three-week-long October War in 1973 that SAM warfare came of age in the Middle East. Egyptian SAMs (SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s) along with 23-mm ZSU23-4 antiaircraft cannons destroyed some 40 Israeli aircraft in the first 48 hours of the war, or 14 percent of the frontline strength of the IAF.3 In contrast, only five Israeli aircraft were destroyed in air-to-air combat during the entire conflict.4 Coupled with the high number of aircraft lost to groundbased air defenses in Vietnam, the results of the October War prompted some analysts to ask whether tactical aircraft had outlived their usefulness on the modern battlefield.

In retrospect, it appears obvious that the Israelis were not prepared to counter the "missile umbrella" Egypt had erected before and during the 1973 war. Instead, their doctrine reflected the experiences of the Six Day War, in which SAMs were not a factor. But after sustaining heavy losses in the October War, the Israelis adjusted with a coherent SAM-suppression doctrine.6 Should hostilities resume, the IAF would now be prepared for SAM suppression and could adapt as necessary to meet new contingencies.

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...

Stellar

Originally posted by urmomma158
You wanted to know what it was and was curious.

I never asked that so please stop pretending that i did.

Well no but look at the Sprint it had a range of 25 miles and a max height of 100,000 feet and wasstill a good ABM missile.

Yes but the Sprint had MASSIVE acceleration to get to that distance and height which the Sa-5 did not thus making firing solutions harder for a slower missile intercepting at longer distance/lower altitudes. I never talked about the maximum range or maximum altitude for interception.

I didn't understand your statement i said it doesn't need the semi active guidance when it was in ABM mode because it would be datalinked with the ABM radar.

SARH is something you would use because of jamming and general guidance at long ranges which is not required for ABM point defense.

Which is a far more logical thing to do than making massive underestimations ( and quite on purpose as well) of your enemy. You can get away with overestimation but certainly not underestimations as history since 1977 has proven rather well.

That was because the overall picture of whetther they had an ABm or not was unclear i gave you material from YOUR own sources which is why the CIA didn't take any chances because they we're unsure.

It was in fact quite clear according to US sources and labs that the SA-2 could be used in the ABM role assuming basic competency and strategic will on the part of the USSR. The CIA admitted quite openly that the SA-5 had a 'marginal' ( however the CIA chose to define that ) ABM capability even while their own sources indicated a concerted effort on the part of the USSR. You have seen my sources ( your using them very selectively) and you should be aware by now that the CIA knew but managed to shout down the DIA who said the SA-5 was a full blown ABM system. Considering the strategic implications there was NO reason for the CIA to assume away active Soviet ABM missiles other than doing so on express orders from their wall street masters who would rather pocket the money in corporate hand outs than have the government spend it on defending mere 'workers'; those can after all easily be replaced on the cheap.

Well just incase you din't recognize them.

I have them them in doc format all grouped and ready to 'defend' my views as they currently stand.

I agree there was a NMD but the CIA was unsure especially since all theintelligence communities disagreed and they weren't sure of it.But it was later confirmed by Russian officials.

The CIA had no right to pull political strings to get it's 'views' ( i am being generous as they were closer to outright lies) accepted by politicians who's only aim was to save money ,to 'donate' to themselves, however many tens of millions of American lives might be lost.

Well try to make your intent a little clearer next time.

Doing my best already and i do not believe that the problem lies with me....

Stellar